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THE

Compleat Statesman:

OR, THE

Political Will

AND

Testament,

OF THAT

Great Minister of STATE, Cardinal Duke *de Richilieu.*

FROM

Whence *Lewis* the XIV. the present *French*-King has taken his Measures and Maxims of Government

In TWO PARTS.

Done out of *FRENCH.*

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

ADVERTISEMENT

TO THE

READER.

THE World would have reaſon to Wonder, that this *Political Teſtament* of Cardinal *de Richelieu*, could have been conceal'd ſo long, did not the Conſequence of it, and the uſe to which it was deſigned, convince us that he never intended the publiſhing thereof. But whereas it is the Fate of Myſterys to have a certain Date, and that it is impoſſible not to confide things of this Nature to ſome Indiſcreet Perſons, there is no reaſon to wonder at their falling at laſt into Liberal hands, who are glad to Impart them to the World.

It would be a Reflection on the Judgment of the Public, to Imagine that they could miſtake this Work; for tho Men can never be too Cautious to avoid being impoſed upon; It is impoſſible to read this without diſcovering all the Characters of that great Man's mind. The Elevation and Beauty of his Genius, joyn'd to the Nobleneſs of his Expreſſions, appears clearly in this; but moreover what variety of matter is not found in it? They are all handled with ſo much Solidity, that it is obvious that he knew them by a profound Meditation, ſeconded by a conſummated Experience,

and that none but himself was capable to Write them.

If it be very delightful to read the Reflections and Political Precepts which the best Authors make on the principal Events they Relate, that satisfaction, is considerably lessen'd, when we consider that most of them only reason after the Fact, and in their Study's, and that they would be at a great loss themselves to overcome the difficultys of the least Negotiation, or of the least dangerous Intrigue.

But this *Political Testament* is of a different Nature. It is a Favourite and a first Minister of State, who has Govern'd upwards of 25 years one of the most considerable Kingdoms of *Europe*, who has Guided it; and as it were held it by the hand in the first years of its Rise: Who prescribes no Counsels but what he has often practis'd himself; and Finally who by his Steadiness and Courage has overcome an infinite number of Obstacles, and Intrigues, which would have overwhelm'd any other Man.

Therefore there never was a Work of more use for those who are called to the administration of great Affairs, Kings, Princes, Favorites, Ministers, Councellors of State, Ecclesasticks, Nobles, Magistrates, Courtiers, and in fine, all sorts and degrees of Men, find instructions here, of an Inestimable Value.

Not that this Work is in the Condition in which it would undoubtedly have been had he had leisure to revise it; but tho some carelessness is discovered in it, and some Expressions less happy than others; nevertheless all the parts of it compose so fine Body, that those little faults can only

ly be look'd upon, like thoſe Strokes in fine Pictures, which tho' careleſs, diſcover the skill of the Artiſt.

It would be an Extraordinary Preſumption to endeavour by Words to Inhance the excellence of a Work, which ſuſtains it ſelf ſo well, and is infinitely above the Elogys that could be given to it. The reading of one Chapter of it will ſpeak more in its behalf, than whatever we could ſay.

The firſt Edition of this Book, and the two others which follow'd it cloſe, have been taken from a Manuſcript which ſeems to be of thirty years ſtanding, and to have been written with great precipitation, by two different hands, without any blots, but with many faults: The moſt Eſſential have been mended in this fourth Impreſſion, and we thought fit not to alter the reſt, for fear of miſtaking the ſence of the Author. As there is no reaſon to believe, that the Copy we have made uſe of, is the only remaining one, we intreat thoſe who have a better, and who ſhall obſerve any Capital faults, to Impart the ſame to us, in order to correct them in a fifth Edition.

The very Contents ſeem to be written by the Cardinal *de Richelieu* himſelf; as he was a very methodical Man, it is very likely that he begun his Work by the ſaid Contents, leſt the Matters ſhould anticipate upon each other.

The World will certainly be ſurpris'd at the Title of the firſt Chapter, which ſpeaks of the General Peace, of which he deſign'd to mention the Year which he has left in blank; ſince there was no General Peace at that time. But we have been

oblig'd to follow the Manuſcript, and it is apparent that he deſign'd it, and thereby to conclude the relation of the King his Maſter's great Actions.

As for the time when this Work was written, it is very likely that he did it at ſeveral times. In the firſt Chapter he proſecutes the relation of the King's Actions until the Year, 1638. Yet in ſome other Places he ſeems to write in 1635. ſince he gives the King but 25 years Reign. It may alſo be queſtion'd whether what he writes of the *Jeſuites*, is before, or after the Intrigues, which Father *Cauſin*, the King's Confeſſor, and Father *Monod*, Confeſſor to the Dutcheſs of *Savoy*, ſet on foot, to remove him from the Court, which had like to have ſucceeded. If he writ the ſaid Chapter after he had defeated the ſaid Intrigue, no body can ſufficiently admire his Moderation in ſpeaking ſo ſoberly of them; and if he writ it before, it is impoſſible to praiſe him enough, to have left his Work in its firſt State, without expreſſing more marks of his reſentment in the ſame.

That which ſeems moſt ſurpriſing, is, that he does no wiſe mention the Birth of the preſent King in his *Political Teſtament*; from whence we may infer, that it was written before; that Event being too conſiderable, to paſs it under ſilence.

Moreover, we muſt conſider, that he had given over Writing long before his Death; by reaſon of the miſchance of his Arm, being oblig'd to dictate all his Diſpatches; and whereas it is very likely, that he would not truſt his *Political Teſtament* to any other hand, he was no longer in a condition to do it himſelf, and that may be the reaſon of the ſaid Omiſſion.

All

All the Notes of the preſent Edition are in the Manuſcript, but the Hiſtorical Obſervations on the firſt Chapter, were lately communicated to me, and are peculiar to the fourth Edition: if ever any Work deſerv'd to be adorn'd with Remarks, it certainly is this. The Life and Memoirs of this Great Man, will furniſh abundance; but that is not ſufficient, it requires ſomething more particular yet, to heighten the Intrigues of that Court, which have not been divulg'd, which would be of great Uſe for the better Underſtanding of the Hiſtory. Several uſeful Remarks might alſo be made upon the then State of *France*, and that to which it is grown ſince: Wherein the Councels and Maxims of that great Miniſter have been follow'd, and in what they have deviated from them, and ſeveral other Remarks not only curious, but important. If any body will be ſo kind as to impart all thoſe things to Us, We will willingly communicate them to the Public.

TO

King *LEWIS* XIII.

SIR,

AS ſoon as Your Majeſty *was pleas'd to admit me into the Management of Your Affairs, I reſolv'd to uſe my utmoſt Endeavours to facilitate Your great Deſigns, as uſeful to this State, as glorious to your Perſon.*

God having bleſs'd my Intentions, inſomuch that the Virtue and Happineſs of Your Majeſty have aſtoniſh'd the preſent, and will be admir'd in future Ages, I thought my ſelf obliged to write the Hiſtory of your glorious Succeſſes, both to hinder many Circumſtances, worthy to live for ever in the Memory of Man, from being bury'd in Oblivion, thro' the Ignorance of thoſe who cannot know them like me; and to the end that the time paſt might ſerve as a Rule for the future. Therefore I forthwith apply'd my ſelf to it, being perſwaded that I could never begin that too ſoon, which was only to end with my Life.

I did not only carefully collect the matter of ſuch a Work, but moreover, I reduc'd part of it into Order, and put the Tranſactions of ſome Years in the Form I deſign'd to publiſh them.

I own, that tho' there is more Pleasure in furnishing the Matter of History, than in putting it into Form, yet I found a great deal of Satisfaction in relating what had been perform'd with great Labour.

While I began to relish the Delights of that Performance, the Illnesses and continual Inconveniences which attend the weakness of my Constitution, join'd to the Weight of Affairs, forc'd me to lay it aside, because it requir'd too much time.

Yet tho' I cannot possibly perform, upon this Subject, what I so passionately desir'd, for the Glory of your Person, and for the Welfare of your State, I think my self oblig'd in Conscience at least to leave your Majesty some Memoirs *of those things I think most necessary for the Government of this Kingdom.*

Two Reasons oblige me to undertake this Work. The first is, The Fear and Desire I have of ending my Days before the Expiration of yours.

The Second is, The Faithful Passion I have for your Majesty's Interest; which makes me not only desirous to see you attended with all sorts of Prosperities during my Life, but also makes me earnestly wish to see a Prospect of the Continuation of the same, when the Inevitable Tribute we are all oblig'd to pay Nature, shall hinder me from being a Witness of them.

This Piece will appear under the Title of my Political Testament; *because it is made to serve after my Death, for the Polity and Conduct of your Kingdom, if your Majesty thinks it worthy of it: Because it will contain my last Desires in relation*

relation thereunto; and that in leaving it to you, I bequeath to your Majesty the best Legacy I have to dispose of, whenever God will be pleas'd to call me out of this Life.

It shall be conceiv'd in the most concise and cleareſt Method I am capable of, as well to follow my own Genius, and my usual way of writing, as to comply with your Majesty's Humour, who ever lov'd, that Men should come to the Point in few Words, being as much pleas'd to hear the Substance of things, as apprehensive of the long Discourses most Men use to explain them.

If my Spirit, which will appear in these Memoirs, *can after my Death contribute any thing towards the Regulation of this great State, in the Management of which your Majesty has been pleas'd to give me a greater Share than I deserve, I will think my self infinitely happy.*

To that end, judging with Reason, that the Succeſs God has hitherto been pleas'd to grant the Resolutions your Majesty has taken with your most Faithful Creatures, is a powerful Motive to invite you to follow the Advices I will give you for the future: I will begin this Work with an Abstract of the great Actions you have perform'd with so much Glory, which may justly be stil'd, The Solid Foundation of the future Felicity of your Kingdom.

This Relation will be made with so much Sincerity, according to the Judgment of those who are faithful Witnesses of the History of your Time, that it will induce every body to believe, that the

Counſels I give your Majeſty, have no other Motives, but the Intereſt of your State, and the Advantage of your Perſon. I am, and will remain Eternally,

SIR,

Your Majeſty's moſt Humble, moſt Faithful, moſt Obedient, moſt Paſſionate, and moſt oblig'd Subject and Servant,

Armand Du Pleſſis.

THE Political Teſtament Of the Famous CARDINAL Duke *de* RICHELIEU.

PART I.

CHAP. I.

A Short Relation of the King's great Actions, until the Peace concluded in the Year———

WHEN *Your Majeſty* was firſt pleas'd to admit me into your Councils, and to repoſe a great Confidence in me for the Direction of your Affairs; I may affirm with Truth, that the *Huguenots* ſhar'd the State with you; that the Grandees behav'd themſelves as if they had not been your Subjects; and the moſt powerful Governours of Provinces, as if they had been Soveraigns in their Imployments.

I may ſay, that the ill Example of both was ſo prejudicial to this Kingdom, that the beſt regu-

lated Communities were tainted with their Behaviour, and in ſome caſes leſſen'd your Majeſty's lawful Authority, as much as in them lay, in order to extend their own beyond reaſon.

I may ſay, that every Man meaſur'd his Merit by his Preſumption; that inſtead of valuing the Favours they receiv'd from your Majeſty by their Intrinſick Worth, they only valued them according as they were ſuitable to the Unruline ſs of their Fancy; and that the moſt daring were eſteem'd the wiſeſt, and often prov'd the moſt happy.

I may alſo ſay, that Foreign Alliances were deſpis'd; Private Intereſt preferr'd to Publick Good; in a word, the Dignity of Royal Majeſty was ſo much debas'd, and ſo different from what it ought to be, by the Defect of thoſe who had then the principal Management of your Affairs, that it was almoſt impoſſible to diſtinguiſh it.

The Proceeding of thoſe to whom your Majeſty had intruſted the Helm of your State could no longer be tolerated, without ruining all; and on the other hand, it could not be alter'd all at once, without violating the Laws of Prudence, which do not allow the paſſing from one Extream to another, without a Medium.

The ill Poſture of your Affairs ſeem'd to conſtrain your Majeſty to take precipitated Reſolutions, without Election of Time or of Means; and yet Choice was neceſſary in both, to improve the Alteration which Neceſſity exacted from your Prudence.

The Wiſeſt were of Opinion, that it was impoſſible, without a Shipwrack, to ſteer through the Rocks

Rocks that appear'd on all ſides in times of ſuch Uncertainty: The Court was full of Men, who accus'd thoſe of Raſhneſs, who ſhould dare to attempt it; and all of them knowing that Princes are apt to impute the ill Succeſs of things that have been well adviſ'd, to thoſe that are about them; ſo few expected a good Event of the Alterations, it was ſaid, I deſign'd, that many concluded my Fall, even before your Majeſty had rais'd me.

Notwithſtanding all theſe Difficulties which I repreſented to your Majeſty, knowing what Kings can do, when they make a good uſe of their Power, I preſum'd to promiſe you without Temerity, in my Opinion, what is come to paſs in your State; and that in a ſhort time your Prudence, your Power, and the Bleſſing of God, would alter the Affairs of this Kingdom.

I promis'd your Majeſty that I would uſe my utmoſt Endeavours, and all the Authority you were pleas'd to give me, to ruine the *Huguenot* Party, to abate the Pride of the Grandees, to reduce all your Subjects to their Duty, and to raiſe your Name again in Foreign Nations, to the Degree it ought to be.

Moreover, I repreſented to your Majeſty, that in order to compaſs a happy end, it was abſolutely neceſſary you ſhould confide in me; and that notwithſtanding for the time paſt all thoſe who had ſerv'd you had thought no way ſo proper to obtain and to preſerve your Confidence, as to remove the Queen your Mother from it, I would take the contrary way, and that nothing ſhould be wanting on my ſide to

keep your Majesties in a strict Union, so necessary for your Reputation, and for the Welfare of the Kingdom.

As the Success which has attended the good Intentions which God has been pleas'd to inspire me with, for the Settlement of this State, will justifie to future Ages the steadiness wherewith I have constantly pursued that Design; so your Majesty will be a faithful Witness that I have us'd my best Endeavours, lest the Artifice of some Evil-minded Persons should be powerful enough to divide that, which, being united by Nature, ought also to be united by Grace. If after having, for many years, happily resisted their divers Efforts, their Malice has finally prevail'd; it is a very great Comfort to me, that your Majesty has often been pleas'd to express, That while I was most intent on the Grandeur of the Queen your Mother, she labour'd for my Ruine.

But I refer this matter to another place, to keep to my present Subject, and not to break the Order I am to keep in this Work.

The *Huguenots*, who have never slipt any occasion to increase their Party, having in 1624. surpriz'd certain Ships which the Duke of *Nevers* was preparing against the *Turk*, afterwards rais'd a potent Navy against your Majesty.

Notwithstanding the Care of the Sea had been so far neglected till then, that you had not one Ship, your Majesty behav'd your self with so much Address and Courage, that with those you could get among your Subjects, 20 from *Holland*, and 7 from *England*, you defeated the Army the *Rochelois* had put out to Sea. Which

prov'd

prov'd the more wonderful and happy, in that this advantageous Effect proceeded from a Succour which was only granted to ſerve you in appearance.

You took the Iſle of *Ré* by the ſame means which the *Rochelois* had unjuſtly made themſelves Maſters of long before: You routed 4 or 5000 Men they had put into it to defend it, and forc'd *Soubiſe*, who commanded them, to fly to *Oleron*; which your Friends not only drove him out of, but alſo forc'd him to fly the Kingdom.

This happy Succeſs reduc'd thoſe Rebellious Souls to make a Peace ſo glorious for your Majeſty, that the moſt difficult were pleas'd with it; and all agreed, that it was the moſt advantagious that had been made till then.

The Kings your Predeceſſors having for the time paſt rather received from, than given a Peace to their Subjects; though they were diverted by no Foreign Wars, they were Loſers in all the Treaties they made with them; and tho' your Majeſty had many other Occupations at that time, you then granted it to them, reſerving *Fort St. Lewis*, as a Citadel at *Rochel*; and the Iſles of *Re* and of *Oleron*, as two other Places which ſerv'd as a good Circumvallation about it.

At the ſame time your Majeſty ſecur'd the Duke of *Savoy* from the Oppreſſion of the *Spaniards*, who had attack'd him openly; and notwithſtanding they had one of the greateſt Armies that had been ſeen of a long while in *Italy*, which was Commanded by the Duke of *Feria*, a great Man; you hinder'd them from taking *Verua*, of which your Arms, jointly with the Duke of *Savoy's*

voy's, ſuſtain'd the Siege with ſo much Glory, that they were finally forc'd to raiſe the Siege ſhamefully.

The *Spaniards* ſoon afterwards making themſelves Maſters of all the Paſſes of the *Griſons*, and having fortify'd the beſt Poſts of all their Vallies, your Majeſty, not being able by a bare Negotiation to free your ancient Allies from that Invaſion, in which thoſe unjuſt Uſurpers had the more ſucceſs, by reaſon that the Pope favour'd them, upon the vain Hopes they gave him of procuring ſome Advantages for Religion, did that by force of Arms, which you had not been able to obtain by ſtrength of Reaſon.

Your Majeſty had by that means for ever freed that Nation from the Tyranny of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, had not *Fargis* your Ambaſſador in *Spain*, at the Sollicitation of Cardinal *de Berulle*, made (as he has confeſs'd it ſince) without your Knowledge, and contrary to your Majeſty's ſtrict Orders, a very diſadvantagious Treaty, to which you adher'd at laſt to oblige the Pope, who pretended to be concern'd in that Affair.

The late King your Father of Immortal Memory, deſigning to marry one of your Majeſty's Siſters in *England*, the *Spaniards* thought themſelves oblig'd to break that Project, by marrying one of their *Infanta's* there. The Treaty thereof being concluded, the Prince of *Wales* was ſo ill adviſ'd, as to expoſe himſelf to the Diſcretion of a Prince, who being Maſter of his Perſon, might impoſe whatever Law he thought fit upon him, and paſs'd through *France incognito*, in order to go into *Spain* to marry her.

As

As ſoon as the thing was known here, ſuch Negotiations were ſet on foot, that notwithſtanding the great Honours he receiv'd in that Court, where the King gave him the Right Hand all the while he tarry'd there, altho' he was no Crown'd Head at that time, the Marriage was broken off, and ſoon after it that of *France* was treated of, concluded and accompliſh'd, with Conditions three times more advantagious for Religion, than thoſe which were deſign'd to be propos'd in the late King's time.

Soon after that Powerful Cabals were form'd at Court, into which the Duke of *Orleans* your Brother was engag'd by thoſe who had the Care of his Conduct, before his Age made him capable of it.

Being conſtrain'd to ſay, with great Regret, that a Perſon of the greateſt Conſideration was inſenſibly drawn into it, with ſeveral others, who fomented and follow'd her Paſſions. I cannot omit the Merit you acquir'd before GOD, and before Men, in ſuppreſſing the Noiſe her imprudent Conduct would have made, had you not wiſely wink'd at what you might have repreſs'd, with as much ſafety as reaſon.

The *Engliſh* blindly engag'd in thoſe Cabals: Many of the Grandees of the Kingdom enter'd very far into them: The Duke *de Rohan* and the *Huguenot* Party were to wage War within, while the *Engliſh* with a Potent Navy were to attack the Iſles and Coaſts of this State.

The Plot ſeem'd to be ſo well laid, that moſt Men were of Opinion, that it was impoſſible to reſiſt the Force of the Conſpirators. Nevertheleſs,

leſs, the taking off Colonel *Dornano*, the Duke *de Vendome*, and the *Grand Prior*; the Chaſtiſement of *Chalais*, and the removal of ſome Princeſſes, broke that Cabal, inſomuch that all the Deſigns projected in your Majeſty's Court were diſſipated, and had no effect.

As it was not without a great deal of Goodneſs and Prudence together, your Majeſty conſented at *Nantes* to the Marriage of *Monſieur* your Brother; ſo the Sincerity of your true Servants in taking the boldneſs to repreſent to you beforehand the Inconveniences which might attend it, was a very great Proof of their Fidelity, and a certain Teſtimony they had no deſign to ſurprize you.

All theſe Diſturbances which ſeem'd to weaken your Power, did not hinder you from putting a ſtop to the courſe of Duels, by the Chaſtiſement of the *Sieurs de Bouteville* and *des Chapelles*. I own that my Mind was never more agitated than it was on that occaſion, in which I had much ado to forbear yielding to the univerſal Compaſſion, which the Misfortune and Valour of thoſe Young Gentlemen imprinted in the Hearts of all Men; to the Prayers of the greateſt Perſons of the Court; and to the Importunities of my neareſt Relations.

The Tears of their Wives mov'd me ſenſibly; but the Sluces of Blood of your Nobility, to which nothing could put a ſtop but the Effuſion of theirs, incourag'd me to reſiſt my own Inclinations, and to perſuade your Majeſty to cauſe that to be put in Execution, for the good of the Kingdom, which was almoſt againſt the Senſe of every

every body, and againſt my particular Sentiments.

As it was not poſſible to ſtop the Courſe of, and to hinder the great Preparations the *Engliſh* had made for a War, your Majeſty was oblig'd to oppoſe them by Force of Arms.

Thoſe ancient Enemies of the State landed in *Re*, and there beſieg'd the Fort *St. Martin*, while it was God Almighty's Pleaſure to afflict *France*, by the Illneſs wherewith he viſited your Majeſty at *Ville-Roy*.

This diſmal Accident, and the Ill Conduct which *Le Coigneux* and *Puy Laurens* endeavour'd a-new to inſpire into *Monſieur*, did not hinder your good Subjects from oppoſing the Efforts of that Warlike Nation, by the Influence of your bare Name. And your Majeſty no ſooner recover'd your Health, but you Reliev'd the Place they had Beſieg'd, Defeated their Land-Army by a ſignal Combat, and forc'd their Naval Forces to quit your Coaſts, and to make for their own Ports again.

After which you Beſieg'd *Rochel*, and took it after a Years Siege: And your Majeſty behav'd your ſelf with ſo much Prudence, that tho' you were ſenſible that the *Spaniards* neither deſir'd the taking of the ſaid Place in particular, nor the Proſperity of your Affairs in general; judging that the bare appearance of their Union would be of uſe in the opinion of the World; and that it would be no ſmall matter to hinder them by a Treaty from joining with the *Engliſh*, who were your Declar'd Enemies at that time; you made

made one with them, which produc'd the only Effect your Majesty expected from it.

The *Spaniards*, who only design'd to deceive you, in order the better to cross your Majesty's Designs, and the taking of the said City, did animate the *English* as much as in them lay to relieve it. And the Cardinal *de la Cueva* promis'd them positively, to that end, that his Master would send your Majesty no Succours, until you had no further need of it, and that he would recall it before it could annoy them: Which was so Religiously perform'd, that *Don Frederick* Admiral of *Spain*, who Sail'd from the *Coronna* with 14 Ships, after he was inform'd of the Defeat of the *English* in *Ré*, refus'd to tarry one day at *Rochel*, upon the Report that a new Fleet was coming to relieve the said City.

This Assurance incourag'd the *English* at two several times to attempt the Relieving of it, and afforded your Majesty the Glory of taking it with your own Forces, in sight of a Potent Naval Army, which, after two useless Engagements, had the Disgrace to see it self wholly frustrated of its end.

Thus at one and the same time the Infidelity and Cunning of the *Spaniards* prov'd ineffectual, and the English were over-reach'd.

During this Siege the *Spaniards* attack'd the Duke of *Mantua* in *Italy*: They took that time on purpose, thinking your Majesty would not be able to Succour him.

Cardinal *de Berule*, and *Marillac* the Lord Keeper, advis'd your Majesty to abandon that poor Prince to the Injustice and insatiable Avidity

of

of that Nation, which is an Enemy to the Repose of Christendom, lest they should trouble you; the rest of your Council prov'd of a different Opinion; both because *Spain* durst not have taken such a Resolution immediately after your having made a Treaty of Union with the *English*; and that tho' they should have follow'd so ill an Advice, they could not have been able to stop the Progress of your Designs.

They represented to your Majesty, that it would be sufficient not to Declare for the Duke of *Mantua* while you were engag'd in that great Siege; and that you could do no more, without committing a Baseness unworthy of a great Prince, who must never consent to it, whatever Advantages might accrue to him by it.

I should commit a Crime, if I did not observe in this place, that your Majesty, according to the Sentiments of your Heart and your usual Practice, took the best and most honourable Party on that occasion; which was attended with so much Success, that soon after it *Rochel* was taken, and your Arms in a Condition to assist that Prince so unjustly Attack'd.

Although at that very time *Monsieur* your Brother, who was become a Widower a Year after his Marriage, had a mind to marry the Princess *Mary*; he was so ill advis'd, that instead of favouring the Duke of *Mantua* her Father, he cross'd him more than his Enemies, by withdrawing from your Majesty, and retiring into *Lorraine*, at a time when it was his Interest to be strictly united with you, in order to make your Power the more considerable.

This

This ill Conduct did not hinder your Majeſty from continuing the Journey you had undertaken, for a Deſign ſo glorious; and God bleſs'd you ſo viſibly, that as ſoon as you came to the *Alps*, you forc'd all the Paſſages of it in the midſt of Winter, beat the Duke of *Savoy*, aſſiſted by the *Spaniards*; rais'd the Siege of *Cazal*, and conſtrain'd all your Enemies to agree with you.

This glorious Action, which reſtor'd Peace in *Italy*, was no ſooner atchiev'd, but your Majeſty, whoſe Mind and Heart never found any reſt but in Labour, paſs'd directly into *Languedoc*, where after having taken *Privas* and *Alez* by force, you reduc'd the reſt of the *Huguenot* Party throughout your Kingdom to Obedience, and by your Clemency granted a Peace to thoſe who had preſum'd to wage a War againſt you; not by granting them Advantages prejudicial to the State, as had been done till then; but by baniſhing him out of the Kingdom, who was the only Head of that miſerable Party, and who had all along fomented it.

That which is moſt conſiderable in ſo glorious an Action, is, that you ruin'd that Party abſolutely, at a time when the King of *Spain* endeavour'd to raiſe it again, and to ſettle it more than ever.

He had newly made a Treaty with the Duke of *Rohan*, to form in this State a Body of Rebellious States to God and to your Majeſty at once, in conſideration of a Million of Livres which he was to pay him yearly, for which he made the *Indies* Tributaries to Hell. But their

Projects

Projects prov'd ineffectual: And whilſt he had the Mortification to hear, that the Perſon he had employ'd to be the Bearer of ſo glorious an Eſtabliſhment, was executed upon a Scaffold by a Decree of the Parliament of *Thoulouſe*, before whom he was Try'd, your Majeſty had the Satisfaction and Advantage to pardon thoſe who could no longer defend themſelves, to annihilate their Faction, and to uſe their Perſons well, when they expected nothing but the Chaſtiſement of the Crimes they had commited.

I am ſenſible that *Spain* thinks to excuſe ſo ill an Action, by the Succours you granted the *Hollanders*; but that Excuſe is as ill as their Cauſe.

Common Senſe will convince every body, that there is much difference between the continuation of a Succours eſtabliſhed upon a Lawful Subject, if Natural Defence is ſo, and a new Eſtabliſhment manifeſtly contrary to Religion, and to the Lawful Authority Kings have received from Heaven over their Subjects.

The late King your Father never enter'd into a Treaty with the *Hollanders*, until the King of *Spain* had form'd a League in this Kingdom to uſurp the Crown.

This Truth is too evident to be queſtion'd; and there is no Theology in the World, but will grant, without going againſt the Principles of Natural Reaſon, that as Neceſſity obliges thoſe whoſe Life is attempted, to make uſe of all Helps to preſerve it; ſo a Prince has the ſame Right to avoid the loſs of his State.

That which is free in the beginning, ſometimes becomes neceſſary in the ſequel: There-

fore no body can find fault with the Union your Majeſty maintains with thoſe People, not only in conſequence of the Treaties of the late King; but moreover, becauſe *Spain* cannot be reputed otherwiſe than as an Enemy to this State, whilſt they retain part of its ancient Demeans: It is evident that the Cauſe which has given a Riſe to thoſe Treaties not being remov'd, the continuation of the Effect is as lawful as neceſſary.

The *Spaniards* are ſo far from any Pretence of being in the ſame caſe, that on the contrary, their Deſigns are ſo much the more unjuſt; that inſtead of repairing the Injuries they have done this Kingdom, they increaſe them daily.

Moreover, the late King never join'd with the *Hollanders*, until they were entred into a Body of State; and was conſtrain'd to it by an Oppreſſion which he could not wholly avoid: He neither occaſion'd their Revolt, nor the Union of their Provinces.

And *Spain* has not only often favour'd the Revolted *Huguenots* againſt your Predeceſſors; they alſo endeavour'd to unite them in a Body of State in yours: A holy Zeal has induc'd them to be the Authors of ſo good an Eſtabliſhment; and that withont any Neceſſity, and conſequently without Reaſon; unleſs the Continuation of their ancient Uſurpations, and the new ones they deſign, rectifie their Actions ſo much, that what is forbidden to all the World beſides, is lawful in them, upon the account of their good Intentions.

Having treated this matter more at large in another Treatiſe, I will leave it to continue the Sequel of your Actions.

The

The ill Faith of the *Spaniards* having induc'd them to attack the Duke of *Mantua* again, to the Prejudice of the Treaties they had made with your Majeſty, you march'd the ſecond time into *Italy*, where, by the Bleſſing of God, after having glorioufly croſs'd a River, the Paſſage whereof was defended by the Duke of *Savoy* with an Army of 14000 Foot and 4000 Horſe, contrary to the Faith of the Treaty he had made with your Majeſty the Year before: You took *Pignerol* in ſight of the Emperour's and King of *Spain*'s Forces, and of the Perſon and all the Power of the Duke of *Savoy*; and that which renders that Action the more Glorious, in ſight of the Marqueſs *de Spinola*, one of the greateſt Captains of his Time.

By that means you took *Suſa*, and overcame at once the three moſt conſiderable Powers of *Europe*, the Plague, Famine, and the Impatiency of the *French*, of which there are not many Examples in Hiſtory.

After which you Conquer'd *Savoy*, driving an Army of 10000 Foot and 2000 Horſe before you, which had a better Advantage to defend it ſelf in that Mountainous Country, than 30000 to attack them.

Soon after which the Combats of *Veillane* and of *Coriane* ſignaliz'd your Arms in *Piemont*: and the taking of *Valence*, Fortify'd by the Duke of *Savoy*, in order to oppoſe your Deſigns, made the World ſenſible, that nothing could reſiſt the Juſt Arms of a King as Fortunate as Powerful.

Cazal was reliev'd, not only againſt the Opinion of moſt Men, but even againſt the very Thoughts of the Duke *de Montmorency*, who had been employ'd to that end; and againſt the Opinion of *Marillac*, who was ſubſtituted in his Place, who both publickly declar'd, that it was an impoſſible Enterprize.

The Relief of the ſaid Place was the more glorious, in that a ſtronger Army than your Majeſty's, retrench'd at the Head of the *Milaneze*, which furniſhed them with all ſorts of Conveniencies, and ſhelter'd under the Walls of *Cazal*, which had been conſign'd in their Hands, was conſtrain'd to quit it, and five other Places at the ſame time, which the *Spaniards* held thereabouts in the extent of *Mont-Ferrat*.

Thoſe who know, that in the very height of that Deſign your Majeſty was reduc'd to the utmoſt Extremity by a Fit of Sickneſs; and that tho' your Perſon was dangerouſly Ill, your Heart was yet in a worſe Condition.

If they conſider, that the Queen your Mother, at the Inſtigation of ſome malicious Perſons, form'd a potent Party, which, weakning you, conſiderably ſtrengthen'd your Enemies: If they alſo conſider that they daily receiv'd Advice, that your Majeſty's moſt faithful Servants, whom they both did hate and dread, would not much longer be in a Condition to do them any harm; they muſt needs acknowledge, that the Goodneſs of *God* has contributed more towards your good Succeſſes, than the Prudence and Force of Men.

It was at that very time the Queen your Mother us'd her utmoſt Endeavours to change your

Majeſty's

Majesty's Council, and to establish one to her own mind.

It was at that very time also the Evil Spirits which possess'd *Monsieur*'s Mind, were labouring in his Name, as much as in them lay, to ruine me.

The Mother and the Son had made an Agreement, which was more contrary to the State, than hurtful to those whose Ruine they openly prosecuted, since in the present state of Affairs it was impossible to alter without ruining them.

The Son had promis'd not to marry the Princess *Mary*, which the Mother dreaded to that degree, that in order to prevent it, she had put him into the Castle of *Vincenne* in your Absence, where he tarry'd until that Agreement procur'd his Liberty; in exchange of which, the Mother had promis'd to put me out of your Majesty's favour, and to remove me from Court.

In order to render these Promises the more inviolable, they were put in Writing; and the Duke *de Bellegarde* carry'd them long between his Shirt and his Skin, to shew that they touch'd his Heart; and to make those that had made them sensible, that he would never lose them without his Life.

There never was a stronger Faction in any State; it would be easier to name those who were not concerned in it, than those that were.

And that which encreas'd the wonder of your Conduct on that occasion, is, that being sollicitous my self to withdraw from your Majesty, to oblige the Queen, who desir'd it passionately; your Majesty being destitute of all other Counsel

at that time, had no body to conſult with, and to help you to reſiſt the Authority of a Mother, the Artifices of all her Adherents, and my earneſt Sollicitations againſt my ſelf.

I ſay this, becauſe the Marſhal of *Schomberg*, who was faithful to you, was abſent at that time; and that the Lord Keeper *Marillac* was one of thoſe, who, ſeconding the Queen in her Deſigns, ſerv'd her againſt her ſelf.

Your Prudence was ſuch, that in removing the Lord Keeper of your own accord, you deliver'd your ſelf of a Man, who had ſo great an Opinion of himſelf, that he thought nothing well done, unleſs done by his Order; and who thought many ill ways lawful, to compaſs the Ends which were ſuggeſted to him, out of a Zeal which may be ſtyl'd Indiſcreet.

In fine, your Proceeding had ſo much Wiſdom in it, that you granted nothing to the Queen to the prejudice of your State; and yet refus'd her nothing that could be granted without wounding your Conſcience, and without acting as much againſt her as againſt your ſelf.

I might forbear ſpeaking of the Peace which was concluded at *Ratisbonne* between your Majeſty and the Houſe of *Auſtria*, by reaſon that as it was agreed on by your Ambaſſador on Conditions, which the Emperour himſelf was ſenſible he had no Power to grant; for that reaſon it cannot be plac'd in the number of your Actions. But if the World conſiders, that tho' the Fault of your Ambaſſador could not be imputed to you; as it requir'd a great deal of Goodneſs to ſuffer it, it requir'd no leſs Addreſs to repair it in ſome meaſure,

meaſure, and not to loſe the Fruit of a Peace which was ſo neceſſary to this State, at a time in which your Majeſty had ſo many Croſſes.

This Action will be look'd upon as one of the greateſt you ever did, and conſequently ſuch as cannot be omitted in this place.

Reaſon and Conduct of State did require an Exemplary Puniſhment of him, who had exceeded your Orders in ſo nice a Point, and in ſo important an occaſion: But your Goodneſs ty'd up the Hands of your Juſtice, by reaſon that tho' there was no Ambaſſadour but himſelf, he had not acted alone in that Affair, but with an Aſſociate of ſuch a Quality, as made you rather conſider the Motive of the Fault, than the Fault it ſelf.

They were both ſurpriz'd to that degree with the extream Illneſs you fell into at *Lions*, that they acted rather according to the Condition into which the Kingdom would have been by your Loſs, than that in which it was, and according to the Orders they had receiv'd.

Notwithſtanding the ill Conditions of their Treaties, the Imperialiſts were ſoon after forc'd to reſtore *Mantua*; the Dread of your Arms oblig'd them to reſtore what they had uſurp'd over the *Venetians* and *Griſons*; and after your Majeſty had ſuffer'd the Duke of *Savoy*'s Forces to enter into *Pignerol*, and into the Fort and Valley of *Perouſe*, according to the Treaty of *Queraſque*: You agreed ſo well with him, that by vertue of a new Treaty thoſe two Places did remain in your Majeſty's Hands, to the general Satisfaction as well as Advantage of all *Italy*, which for the future will be leſs in dread of an

unjuſt Oppreſſion, ſince it ſets a Door open to its Relief.

At that very time the Diſcontents the Duke of *Bavaria* had receiv'd from the Emperour and from the *Spaniards*, and the Dread which all the other Electors both Catholicks and Proteſtants were in of being diveſted of their States, like many other Princes at their Sollicitations, having induc'd them ſecretly to deſire your Aſſiſtance, your Majeſty treated ſo dexterouſly with them, and with ſo much Succeſs, that they hinder'd, even in the Emperour's Preſence, the Election of the King of the *Romans*, notwithſtanding the Dyet of *Ratisbone* had only been Conven'd to that end.

After which, to pleaſure the ſaid Duke of *Bavaria*, and to ſatisfie the Electors, as well as to confirm them in their Reſolution, of rendring the Catholick League not only Independent of the Empire, but of *Spain* alſo, which uſurp'd the Direction of it; your Ambaſſadors kept ſo good a Correſpondence with thoſe Princes, that they facilitated the means to them of depriving *Walſtein* of the Command of the Armies of the Empire, which prov'd very prejudicial to his Majeſty's Affairs.

Your Majeſty's Credit prov'd as great towards the *North*, ſince the Baron *de Charnau*, without the Title of Ambaſſador, procur'd almoſt at the ſame time a Peace between the Kings of *Poland* and of *Sweden*; a Peace which had been attempted in vain by many other Potentates.

The ſaid Peace gave way to the Enterprize the King of *Sweden* made ſoon after, to prevent the Oppreſſion of the Princes of the Empire, in *Germany*; which Deſign was no ſooner known to

your

your Majeſty, but to prevent the Prejudice the Catholick Religion might receive by it, you made a Treaty with him, which oblig'd him not to interrupt the Exerciſe thereof in all the places of his Conqueſt.

I am ſenſible that your Enemies, who endeavour to juſtifie their own Actions, by crying down yours, have us'd their beſt Endeavours to render that Agreement odious; but their Deſign had no other Effect, than to diſcover their Malice.

Your Majeſty's Innocence is the more apparent, in that your Ambaſſador never enter'd into any Treaty with that Conquerour, until Six Months after his entring into *Germany*; which evidently juſtifies, that the Conditions that were made with the ſaid Prince were the Remedy of the Evil, of which they could not be eſteem'd the Cauſe.

The Treaties that were made not only with that Great King, but alſo with many other Princes of *Germany*, are the more juſt, in that they were abſolutely neceſſary for the ſafety of the Duke of *Mantua* unjuſtly attack'd, and for that of all *Italy*, over which *Spain* had no leſs Right, than over the Dominion of that poor Prince, ſince they thought their Convenience a ſufficient Right.

The Danger this Kingdom had been reduc'd to by the Diviſion the *Spaniards* had openly fomented in your Royal Houſe, oblig'd your Majeſty to ſeek out proper Expedients to reſettle it.

Monſieur having left the Court of *France* for the third time, by divers Artifices, which the

Spaniards

Spaniards certainly were the principal Authors of; and the Cardinal Infant having receiv'd the Queen your Mother in *Flanders*, as he did at that time; it is natural to conclude, that unleſs thoſe good Neighbours had been employ'd at home, they would have proceeded farther, and would have employ'd themſelves at your Majeſty's Coſt in this Kingdom.

It was abſolutely neceſſary to remove the Storm, and moreover to prepare to ſuſtain the Effort of it, in caſe it could not be avoided.

For that reaſon, after your Majeſty was aſſur'd of a potent Diverſion, you did like thoſe, who, in order to prevent the Plague, which the Corruption of the Air threatens them with, carefully purge themſelves; being perſwaded that the beſt and ſafeſt way to ſecure themſelves from external Injuries, is to cleanſe the Inſide.

God's Providence prov'd ſo favourable to you on that occaſion, that thoſe who, animating the Queen and *Monſieur* againſt *France*, thought thereby to put them in a way to do it a great deal of Harm, only rendred them incapable of doing any; and your Conduct appear'd ſo much the more wonderful on that occaſion, that in recalling the one, and deſiring the return of the other, your Goodneſs towards them was evident to all the World, while the Effects of your Juſtice fell upon thoſe who had adviſ'd them to take ſuch ill Meaſures.

The Duke *de Bellegarde* was depriv'd of the Government of *Burgundy*, and conſequently of the Keyes of the Gates he had open'd to *Monſieur*, to let him out of the Kingdom.

The

The Duke *d' Elboeuf* was likewiſe turn'd out of that of *Picardy*, which your Majeſty had lately given him.

The Duke of *Guiſe* being conſcious of his Faults, retiring into *Italy*, when you call'd him to Court, there to give an Account of his Actions; that Criminal Retreat made him loſe the Government the late King your Father had honour'd him with.

Thus your Majeſty was deliver'd of ungrateful faithleſs Governours, and *Burgundy*, *Picardy* and *Provence*, Provinces of great Conſideration, remain'd in your Hands, free from thoſe dangerous Spirits.

You gave the firſt to the firſt Prince of your Blood, who was paſſionately deſirous of it; and thereby you prudently intereſs'd him in the Affairs of the Time, and fill'd *Monſieur* with anxious Thoughts, who, with reaſon, dreaded nothing ſo much in the World, as the Eſtabliſhment of a Perſon who came up ſo cloſe to him.

You beſtow'd the Second on the Duke of *Chevreuſe* a Prince of *Lorrain*, to ſhew, that Faults are perſonal; and that your Indignation extended only on thoſe of that Family, who had made themſelves guilty by their ill Conduct.

You gratify'd the Marſhal *de Vitri* with the Third, as well upon the account of his Loyalty, as becauſe that being upheld by your Authority, he was naturally capable to oppoſe him who had loſt it.

In the mean time the Declarations you caus'd to be Regiſter'd in the Parliament, were highly approv'd of by every body; ſeeing that in condemning

demning the Authors and Adherents of the Queen and of *Monſieur*'s Flight, you excus'd thoſe two Perſons, who are as dear as nearly related to your Majeſty, altho' the contrary had been done formerly on the ſame occaſions.

Your Majeſty eluded with a great deal of Vigilancy divers Deſigns, and many Enterprizes meditated and attempted in the Queen and *Monſieur*'s Names; and you ſhew'd ſo much Patience on thoſe unhappy Occurrences, that I may almoſt affirm, that you made nothing known of their Ill Conduct, but what you could not diſſemble.

Nevertheleſs, in order to ſtop the Courſe, and remove the Licenſe wherewith all things ſeem'd lawful to be undertaken under their Shadow, you caus'd the Marſhal *de Marillac*'s Head to be cut off, with ſo much the more reaſon, that being condemned with Juſtice, the preſent Conſtitution of the State requir'd a great Example.

Thoſe great and vexatious Affairs did not hinder you from repreſſing, with as much Authority as Reaſon, certain Enterprizes of the Parliament of *Paris*, which had been tolerated in many other occaſions; which is more remarkable, in that it was done during the Heat of the Diſcontents of the Queen and of *Monſieur*, and of all their Adherents, than for the thing it ſelf.

Afterwards *Monſieur* enter'd *France* with Sword in Hand, at the Inſtigation of the *Spaniards*, and of the Duke of *Lorrain*, with Forces, of which thoſe good Neighbours had furniſh'd the greateſt part.

One ſhould have thought, that the News your Majeſty receiv'd at that time of his being expected in *Languedoc* by the D. *de Montmorency*, who had a great Authority in that Province, which he was Governour of, ſhould have put a ſtop to the Deſign which had led you in *Lorrain* to diſingage that Duke out of the ill Party he had eſpous'd; but finiſhing what you had begun to ſo good an end, you caus'd *Monſieur* your Brother to be purſu'd ſo cloſe by the Marſhal *de Schomberg*, and you follow'd him ſo ſoon your ſelf, after having receiv'd three Places from the Duke of *Lorrain* as Pledges of his Faith, that all the Efforts of thoſe who were Leagu'd againſt you prov'd ineffectual.

The Victory which your Majeſty's Forces, commanded by that Marſhal, obtain'd at *Caſtelnaudari*, was as certain an Argument of the Bleſſing of God on your Majeſty, as the Favours you afterwards granted to *Monſieur*, and to his Followers, when the ill ſtate of his Affairs might have induc'd you to uſe them otherwiſe, was an evident Teſtimony of your Goodneſs.

The Sincerity wherewith you obſerv'd all the Promiſes, which were made to them in your Name at *Beziers*; tho' you were ſenſible that *Puy-Laurens*'s only Deſign was to avoid the Danger he was in, under the pretence of Repentance, which he could avoid no other way, was alſo as Authentick a Proof of your Majeſty's great Courage, as of your inviolable Faith.

The Chaſtiſement of the Duke *de Montmorency*, who never could contain himſelf from making an Inlet to all manner of dangerous Rebellions at all times; and particularly, when an

Heir

Heir apparent of the Crown made himſelf, by ill Counſel, Head of thoſe who ſwerv'd from their Duty, ſhew'd all the World that your Steadineſs equal'd your Prudence.

That Puniſhment alſo ſhew'd, that your Servants preferr'd Publick Good before Private Intereſt; ſince on that occaſion they reſiſted the Sollicitations of ſeveral Perſons, whom it behov'd them to have a great deal of Conſideration for, as well as the Threatnings of *Monſieur*, which *Puy-Laurens* carry'd to that degree, as to declare, That in caſe *Montmorency* were put to Death, *Monſieur* would find a time to make them ſuffer the ſame Fate.

The Patience wherewith you have born the new Conſpiracies which *Puy-Laurens* form'd in *Flanders*, in *Monſieur*'s Name, who retir'd thither for the third time, is altogether like that which induces a Father to excuſe the Bahaviour which one of his Children is inſpir'd with, after having laid aſide his Obedience.

That which has induc'd you to bear as long as the Good of the State and your own Conſcience would permit you, the Malice and Levity which have often induc'd the Duke of *Lorrain* to Arm againſt you, is a Virtue which has but few Examples in Hiſtory.

The Goodneſs which has prevail'd with you to be contented, for the Reparation of his ſecond Faults, with the Depoſition of ſome Places, capable to keep him within the Bounds of his Duty, had not his Folly equall'd his Breach of Faith, will be found perhaps the more ſingular, in that there are few Princes who loſe the opportunity of making

making themſelves Maſters of a Neighbouring State, when they have a lawful Subject and Power at once ſo to do.

After ſo many Relapſes committed by the Duke your Vaſſal, after he had ſnatch'd away from you, contrary to his Faith, againſt Divine and Humane Right, a Pledge almoſt as precious as your State; the Prudence wherewith you diveſted him, when his Malice and Inconſtancy could receive no other Remedies but the utmoſt Extremities; is the more to be commended, becauſe, that had you done it ſooner, your Juſtice might have been call'd in queſtion. Neither could you tarry longer, without ſhewing your ſelf inſenſible, and without committing by Omiſſion a Fault, equal unto that which a Prince ſhould commit in diveſting another without a Cauſe.

What ought we not to ſay of the good Nature, which has enclin'd you to procure *Monſieur*'s Return into *France* for the third time; when there ſeemed no longer to be any reaſon to truſt his Faith, after the divers Relapſes and extraordinary Infidelities of his Followers? Many thought with Reaſon, that he could never come back again, without expoſing your moſt Faithful Servants; and yet they were the only Perſons who did ſollicit your Majeſty to draw him out of the Peril into which he had expos'd himſelf.

That Action will meet but few Examples in Antiquity, if we conſider the Circumſtances of it; and perhaps but little Imitation of it for the future.

As no body could, without a great deal of Boldneſs, adviſe your Majeſty to grant *Monſieur*, contrary

trary to your own Sentiments, a notable Augmentation of Power, the Government of a Province, and a ſtrong Place, in order to recall him out of *Lorrain*, the firſt time he went out of the Kingdom; ſo it requir'd a great deal of Firmneſs to reſiſt the Inſtances he made for a whole Year together, to have one given him upon the Frontier, where he deſign'd to retire in quitting *Flanders*.

It was no ſmall Happineſs that thoſe two Counſels ſucceeded ſo well, that the Conceſſion of the firſt place occaſion'd his firſt Return; and yet prov'd ſo innocent a Cauſe, that being uſeful on that occaſion, they could not make an ill uſe of it ſince, when his Adherents endeavour'd it.

And that the Refuſal of the Second was ſo far from hindring him to return to his Duty, and into his Native Country, the only place of his Safety; that on the contrary, it induc'd him to return back again with as good an Intention, as he and his have confeſs'd ſince, it was bad, when under Pretence of the Safety of his Perſon, he deſir'd a Retreat to diſturb the growing Peace of *France* anew.

The extraordinary Favours your Majeſty granted to *Puy-Laurens*, to induce him to inſpire a good Conduct to his Maſter, are ſo worthy of remembrance, that they muſt not be forgotten in this place.

The Puniſhment he receiv'd, when you diſcover'd that he continu'd to abuſe your Favours, was too juſt and too neceſſary not to inſert it afterwards.

I am

I am perſuaded that Poſterity will obſerve three things, which are very conſiderable on that Subject: An entire Reſignation of all Intereſts, but ſuch as related to the Publick Good, in your Creatures; who having receiv'd him by your expreſs Command into their Alliance, nevertheleſs adviſ'd you to ſecure him, becauſe the Good of the State requir'd it: A great Prudence in performing that Action in the Preſence of *Monſieur*, who could not near hand diſapprove a Council which he would have dreaded for himſelf at a diſtance; had not Experience made him ſenſible, that he was not aim'd at. A great Boldneſs, in allowing him as much Liberty as he enjoy'd before; grounded barely upon this, That as ill Counſels only had ſeduc'd him, the Effect would ceaſe with the Cauſe; and that he would be no ſooner deſtitute of them, but he would follow by his own Sentiments a Method quite different from that he had been put upon.

This Action, and many others tranſacted during your Majeſty's Reign, will, I am ſure, make this paſs for a certain Maxim, That it is neceſſary on certain occaſions, in which the Welfare of the State is concern'd, to aſſume a Male Virtue ſometimes, to exceed the Bounds of Common Prudence; and that it is ſometimes impoſſible to avoid certain Evils, unleſs ſomething be given to Fortune, or rather, to Divine Providence, which ſeldom refuſes its Aſſiſtance, when our exhauſted Wiſdom can no longer furniſh us with any.

Moreover, your Conduct will be acknowledged the more juſt, in that thoſe who will read the Hiſtory of your Life, will find, that your Majeſty

never punishes any body, without having first endeavour'd by some extraordinary Favours to retain him within the Bounds of his Duty.

The Marshal *d'Ornano* was made Marshal to that end.

The Grand Prior was certain of the Command of the Sea, when he perverted his Brother's Mind; and both gave you Cause to deprive them of their Liberty.

The Marshal *de Bassompierre* only subsisted by your Favours, when his way of speaking and of behaving himself at Court oblig'd you to confine him to the *Bastille*.

The Lord Keeper *Marillac* was the more oblig'd to perform his Duty, because the height to which his good Fortune had elevated him, left him no room to desire any thing, tho' never so ambitious.

The Marshal his Brother settled in *Verdun*, and elevated to an Office of the Crown, had all the reason imaginable to avoid the Fate he deserved by his Ingratitude, and by his evil Behaviour.

The several Commands the Duke *de Montmorency* had had in your Armies, tho' he was as yet very young to deserve them, the Office of Marshal of *France*, the free Access your Majesty gave him to your Person, and the Familiarity he had with your Creatures, were Favours and Privileges sufficient to hinder him from flying to his Ruine.

Chateauneuf had been so lately honour'd with the Seals, when his ill Proceedings were first discover'd, that there is Reason to suspect, that at the beginning of his Magistracy he had the same Intentions, as when he ended it.

Ne-

Nevertheleſs, that firſt place of Juſtice to which your Majeſty rais'd him, contrary to his Expectation, an Hundred Thouſand Crowns he receiv'd from your Liberality in one Year, the Government of one of your Provinces, which are extraordinary Favours for a Man of his Profeſſion, were not ſufficient Conſiderations to hinder him from being the Promoter of his own Ruine.

The ſeveral and great Favours *Puy-Laurens* receiv'd in a ſhort time from your Majeſty's Goodneſs are ſo extraordinary, that thoſe who will know them, will perhaps be more ſurpriz'd at them, than at his ill Proceeding, which is uſual enough in Perſons whom Fortune raiſes in an inſtant without Deſert.

The Indemnity of his Crimes, which your Majeſty granted him at his return from *Flanders*, will not be thought inconſiderable by Poſterity.

The Immenſe Sums he receiv'd from your Liberality, the Government of *Bourbonnois*, the Quality of Duke and Peer, and my Alliance, were ſufficient Engagements to keep any other Man within the Bounds of his Duty; but he was not capable of preſcribing any to himſelf.

When Count *de Cramail* was put into the *Baſtille*, he had lately receiv'd, by his being recall'd to Court, an Inſtance of the Remiſſion of his firſt Faults. But that favourable Treatment did not hinder him from reſuming his former Courſe, in acting againſt the preſent ſtate of Affairs, and in endeavouring to make your Majeſty alter your ancient Conduct, of which the Events juſtify'd the Happineſs, and the Bleſſing of God the Juſtice.

The Choice that was made of the Marſhal *de Vitry* for *Provence*, oblig'd him to live very warily in ſo great an Employment, which his Courage and Fidelity had procur'd him. But his Greedineſs and haughty inſolent Behaviour did not contribute little to deprive him of it, to place him in a Government of leſs Extent.

If I muſt ſpeak of thoſe that were barely remov'd from Court, what Obligations had not the Duke *de Bellegarde* receiv'd from your Majeſty, and from your Servants?

The Goodneſs of the one, and the Addreſs of the other, had freed him out of ſome Troubles into which his exceeding Vanity, and the Unrulineſs of his Paſſions had engag'd him. He was a Duke by your Favour, and the more oblig'd to behave himſelf well with *Monſieur*, when he aſſiſted him to get out of the Kingdom, becauſe you had ſetled him in the firſt Places of his Houſhold, which he ſtood in great need of.

From being a poor ordinary Gentleman, *Thoiras* was ſeen to riſe in an inſtant to the degree of a Marſhal of *France*, ſo loaden with Favours, that he receiv'd not only the beſt Employments, and the greateſt Governments of the Kingdom, but over and above upwards of Six Hundred Thouſand Crowns in Gratifications.

La Fargis had all the reaſon imaginable to behave her ſelf well; ſince your Majeſty, by placing her with the Queen your Conſort, had put her above the Diſcourſes that were made of her.

The Dukes *de Guiſe* and *d' Elboeuf* have receiv'd, to the knowledge of all the World, incredible Favours from your Majeſty.

While

While the Princeſs of *Conty* was moſt zealous in forming of Cabals, ſhe drew a great deal of Money out of your Exchequer for the Sale of *Chateaurenault*; but that was not ſufficient to keep her within the Bounds of her Duty.

The Duke *de la Valette*'s Removal, tho' voluntary, and not forc'd, giving me an occaſion to put him in this Claſſis; I cannot forbear obſerving, that a little before his ſolliciting *Monſieur* your Brother, and the Count of *Soiſſons*, to employ your Army, which they commanded at that time, againſt your Perſon, your Majeſty had honour'd him with the Quality of Duke and Peer: Neither can I forbear adding, that in order to engage him the more in your Service, you were pleas'd to allow his Alliance with thoſe who were altogether inſeparable from it; and that in conſideration of my ſaid Alliance, you had granted him the Survivorſhip of the Government of *Guyenne*, and added 30000 Livres to the Revenue of his Place of Colonel of the Infantry. To which I may add, that the Pardon your Majeſty was pleas'd to grant him, out of an extraordinary Goodneſs for ſo foul and ſo ſhameful a Crime, aver'd by the Mouth of two Princes, whoſe Teſtimony was undeniable, could not hinder his Weakneſs and Jealouſie againſt the Prince of *Conde* and the Archbiſhop of *Bourdeaux*, or his Deſign of croſſing your Affairs, from doing a very ſhameful thing, in loſing the occaſion of taking *Fontarabia*, when the Enemies could no longer defend it.

If it be an effect of ſingular Prudence to have withſtood all the Forces of the Enemies of your State, with thoſe of your Allies, by putting your

Hand into your Purſe, and not to your Arms. To have made an open War, when your Allies were no longer able to ſubſiſt alone, is another of Wiſdom and Courage together, which juſtifies ſufficiently, that managing the Repoſe of your Kingdom, you have done like thoſe Oeconomiſts, who having been careful to lay up Money, know how to ſpend it prudently, to prevent a greater Loſs.

To have at one and the ſame time made divers Attacks in divers places, which was never done by the *Romans* or *Ottomans*, will undoubtedly be look'd upon by many as a great piece of Imprudence and Raſhneſs. And yet as it is a Proof of your Power, it is a greater yet of your Judgment; ſince it was neceſſary to cut out ſo much Work on all parts to your Enemies, that they might be invincible in none.

The War of *Germany* was ſomewhat forc'd, ſince that part of *Europe* was the Stage on which it was begun long ago.

Altho' that of *Flanders* had not the Succeſs which might have been expected, yet it was impoſſible not to look upon it as advantagious in the Project.

That of the *Griſons* was neceſſary to engage the Princes of *Italy* to take Arms, by removing their Dread of the *Germans*: and to encourage thoſe that had taken them in *Germany*, by ſhewing them, that *Italy* was not in a Condition to ſuccour the Enemies they had in their Country.

That of *Italy* was no leſs material; both becauſe it was the ready way to engage the Duke of *Savoy*, and by reaſon that the *Milaneze* being as it were

were the Heart of the Territories that are poſſeſs'd by the *Spaniards*; it was neceſſary to attack that Part.

Moreover, conſidering that your Majeſty had Allies on all parts, who were to join their Forces to yours; it muſt be concluded, that it was evident by that Union, that the *Spaniards* being attack'd in divers places, ſhould be forc'd to ſubmit to the Effort of your Power.

And yet during the courſe of that War, which laſted Five Years, no ill Accident ever befell you, but what ſeem'd only to be permitted for your Glory.

In 1635. the Army your Majeſty ſent into the *Low Countries*, as ſoon as they came there, won a famous Battel, before their being join'd with that of the States General: And if the Prince of *Orange*, commanding both, had no Succeſs ſuitable to thoſe great Forces, and to what was expected from a Captain of his Reputation, the fault of it cannot be imputed to you.

Having ſubmitted your Arms to the Command of that Prince, it was his part to purſue the Point of an Army he receiv'd Victorious. But the Slowneſs of a heavy Nation could not improve the Eagerneſs of yours, which requires Execution rather than Counſel; and which by dallying, loſes the Advantage which their Fiery Nature gives them over others.

That very Year the Forces of the Empire having paſs'd the *Rhine* at *Briſac*, came ſo near your Frontiers, that tho' you could not free them from Fear, yet you freed them from the Loſſes your Enemies ſuſtain'd.

One of the fineſt Armies the Emperour had put on foot for a long while periſh'd in *Lorrain*; and their Loſs prov'd the more conſiderable, in that the bare Patience of thoſe who commanded your Forces in thoſe parts occaſion'd it.

At the ſame time the Duke of *Roban*, favour'd by the principal Heads of the *Griſons*, who deſir'd their Liberty, enter'd happily into their Country with open force, ſeiz'd the moſt conſiderable Paſſes and Poſts, and fortify'd them, notwithſtanding the Oppoſition which the Neighbourhood of the *Milanese* enabled the *Spaniards* to make conveniently.

The Dukes of *Savoy* and of *Crequi*, who did command your Armies in *Italy*, took a Fort in the *Milaneze*, and built another upon the *Po*, which prov'd a dangerous Thorn to your Enemies.

In 1636. the Cowardiſe of three Governours of your Frontier Towns having given the *Spaniards* a Footing into this Kingdom, and cheaply enabled them to acquire conſiderable Advantages: Without being diſcourag'd, when all ſeem'd to be loſt, in Six Weeks time you rais'd ſo powerful an Army, that it might have been able totally to deſtroy your Enemies, had thoſe to whom you entruſted the Command of it, employ'd it as they ſhould have done. Their Failures oblig'd you to put your ſelf at the Head of it; and God aſſiſted you to that degree, that that very Year, in the ſight of thoſe who had only taken thoſe Places becauſe you were diſtant from them, you retook the only one which was of Importance to your State.

You overcame many Difficulties in that Expedition, which were created by your own Men; who

who being prejudic'd by Ignorance or Malice, highly diſapprov'd ſo great a Deſign.

If you did not ſucceed in the Siege of *Dole*, the reaſon which obliges every one to run to that which is moſt preſſing, was the only Cauſe of it. Your Majeſty remov'd your Forces from thence with great Prudence, ſince it concern'd you more to retake *Corbie* than to take *Dole*.

At that time *Galas* entring this Kingdom with the main Forces of the Empire, to which the Duke of *Lorrain* join'd himſelf with his. They were both driven out of *Burgundy* with the ſhame of Raiſing the Siege of *St. John de Laune*, a weak Place, and the loſs of part of their Cannon, and of ſo great a number of Men, that out of 30000 wherewith they entred this Kingdom, they did not march out Ten.

The River *Toſino* was Witneſs that very Year of an Action no leſs fortunate in *Italy*, where your Forces gain'd a famous and bloody Combat. And you had Advantages in *Valtelina*, which were the more conſiderable, by reaſon that your Enemies, having often taken the Reſolution to engage your Forces, in order to drive them out of it by Force, they never attempted to put their Deſign in Execution, but fighting and being beaten, prov'd one and the ſame thing to them.

In 1637. you took two Places from your Enemies in *Flanders*, and retook one of thoſe which had been deliver'd up to them the Year before by the Cowardiſe of the Governours.

A Third being beſieg'd in the Country of *Luxemburg*, was taken ſoon after; and your Enemy ſuffer'd as much Damage by the entrance of your Armies

Armies in their Country, as they design'd to make you ſuffer the ſame way.

If the Panick Fear of him who commanded your Forces in *Valtelina*, and the Infidelity of ſome of thoſe, for whoſe Liberty you had ſent them thither, made you loſe, through Cowardiſe and Treachery together, the Advantages you had acquir'd there by Force and Reaſon: That Year was happily Crown'd by the retaking of the Iſles of *St. Margaret* and of *St. Honorat*; and by the Relief of *Lucare*, beſieg'd by the *Spaniards*.

By the firſt of thoſe two Actions, Two Thouſand Five Hundred *French* landed at Noon-day in an Iſland, kept by as many *Spaniards* and *Italians*; an Iſland fortify'd by Five Regular Forts, joyn'd to one another by Lines of Communication, which enclos'd it almoſt entirely by a good Parapet. Your Men fought at their Landing, and beat your Enemies which oppos'd them; and after having forc'd the major part of them to retire into their Ramparts, they forc'd them out of them in Six Weeks time, Foot after Foot, by as many Sieges as there were Forts; tho' one of them was compos'd of Five Baſtions Royal, ſo well provided with Cannon, and with Men, and all other Neceſſaries, that it ſeem'd a Raſhneſs to attack it.

By the Second, a potent Army, ſo well retrench'd, that there was but one Head of a Thouſand Fathom by which it could be attack'd; a Head ſo well fortify'd, that at every Diſtance of Two Hundred Paces there were Forts and Redoubts, garniſh'd with Cannon, and lin'd with Infantry, was attack'd in the Night, and forc'd by an Army, which, tho' inferiour in number, did

did nevertheleſs defeat it wholly, after ſeveral Combats.

Thoſe two Actions are ſo extraordinary, that one cannot ſay they are ſignal Effects of the Courage of Men, without adding, that they were ſeconded by the Providence and Hand of God, who viſibly fights for us.

In 1638. tho' the beginning of the Year prov'd unfortunate to you in *Italy*, at St. *Omer*, and at *Fontarabia*, by the ill Fate of Arms, and by the Imprudence, Cowardiſe, or Malice of ſome of thoſe who commanded yours, the End Crown'd the Work by the taking of *Briſac*, after a long Siege, two Battels, and divers Combats attempted to relieve it.

Moreover, as ſoon as you had notice of the ill Event of the Siege of St. *Omers*, your Majeſty repair'd in Perſon to the Place, where there was reaſon to expect ſome dangerous Events: You put a ſtop to the courſe of the Misfortunes of your Arms, by taking and demoliſhing *Renty*, which greatly incommoded the Frontier.

After which *le Caſtelet*, the only Place of yours then remaining in your Enemies Hands, was taken by Force in ſight of them, without their daring to oppoſe the Effects of your Arms.

The Naval Engagement, in which 14 Gallies and 4 Ships of *Dunkirk*, all retir'd into the Bay of *Gattary*, under Five Land-Batteries, not daring to keep the Sea before 19 of yours, were all burnt or ſunk, with the loſs of Five or Six Thouſand Men, of 500 Guns, and a conſiderable Store of Ammunitions of War for the Relief of *Fontarabia*, are great amends, not for the Loſſes you ſuſtain'd at

St. *Omer*

St. *Omer* and *Fontarabia*, which were not conſiderable, but for the Gains you miſſed in not taking the ſaid Places.

If to this Advantage we join that which you had before, when your Arms made your Enemies loſe, in the Port of *Paſſage*, 14 great Ships, a great number of Guns, Colours, and all ſorts of Ammunitions, it will be found, that if the *Spaniards* mark this Year as being favourable to them, they eſteem themſelves happy when their Misfortunes are leſs than their Fears.

Finally, the Combat of the Gallies, perhaps the moſt famous that ever was fought at Sea, where 15 of yours attack'd as many of *Spain*, and fought them with ſo much advantage, that your Enemies loſt between Four and Five Thouſand Men, and Six Gallies; among which the Admiral and two *Patrones* did not a little ſignalize that Action.

This Combat, I ſay, ſhews, that the Prudence of your Conduct has not only been accompany'd with good Fortune, but alſo, that the Boldneſs of your Commanders has been ſeconded.

Several things are obſervable in this War.

The firſt thing is, that your Majeſty only engag'd into it, becauſe you could not avoid it; and that you only laid down your Arms when it was proper ſo to do.

This Remark is the more glorious for your Majeſty, in that you were often ſollicited by your Allies to take Arms, and ſtill refus'd to do it; and that during the War your Enemies often propos'd a particular Peace to you, which you would never hearken to, becauſe you could not forſake the Intereſt of your Allies.

Thoſe

Thoſe who ſhall know, that your Majeſty has been forſaken by ſeveral Princes, who were engag'd with you, without abandoning any of them; and that notwithſtanding ſome of thoſe who did remain ſteady in your Party, fail'd you in many important things, they have ſtill receiv'd Effects from your Majeſty ſuitable to your Promiſes; thoſe, I ſay, will acknowledge, that if your Majeſty's good Fortune has appear'd in the Succeſs of your Affairs, your Virtue equals your good Fortune.

I am ſenſible, that had you broken your Word, it would have leſſen'd your Reputation conſiderably, and that the leaſt loſs of that kind in a great Prince is irreparable. But it is no ſmall matter to have perform'd ones Duty in ſundry occaſions, in which Vengeance, and the Quiet which is naturally deſir'd after a War, induce one to do the contrary.

It requir'd no leſs Prudence than Force, nor leſs Effort of Mind than of Arms, to perſiſt almoſt alone in the ſame Deſign, which was to have been proſecuted by the Union of many.

Nevertheleſs it is moſt true, that the Defection of ſeveral Princes * of *Germany*; that the Duke of *Parma*'s being oblig'd to abandon your Party through the neceſſity of his Affairs; that the Duke of *Mantua*'s Death, and the Levity of his Dowager-Mother to the Young Duke, who was no ſooner Miſtreſs, but forgetting all her Obligations to *France*, ſhe turn'd publickly againſt it; that the Deceaſe of the Duke of *Savoy*, and the Impru-

* Saxony *firſt abandon'd the King of* Sweden, Brandenburg, *the Landgrave of* Heſſe, *ſeveral Hans Towns*, Wittemberg, Parma, *and* Mantua.

Imprudence of his Widow, who loſt her ſelf, becauſe ſhe would not receive the Aſſiſtance that was offer'd her; I ſay, it is moſt true, that all theſe Accidents never ſhook your Majeſty's Reſolution; and tho' they alter'd the ſtate of your Affairs, they did not hinder you from perſiſting in your Deſigns.

The Second Remark worthy of great Conſideration on this Subject is, That your Majeſty never would condeſcend to free your ſelf from the Perils of War, by expoſing Chriſtendom to that of the *Ottoman* Arms, which were often offer'd to you.

Your Majeſty was not ignorant, that you might have accepted ſuch a Succours with Juſtice; and yet that Knowledge could not prevail with you to take a Reſolution dangerous for Religion, but advantagious to obtain a Peace.

The Example of ſome of your Predeceſſors, and of divers Princes of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, who do particularly affect to appear as Religious before God, as they are in reality to their own Intereſts, prov'd too weak to induce you to do that, which Hiſtory informs us has often been practis'd by others.

The Third Circumſtance, which has caus'd a great deal of Wonder in this War, is, the vaſt number of Armies, and of Sums, which were requir'd to ſuſtain the ſame.

The greateſt Princes on Earth having ever made a Difficulty of undertaking two Wars at once, Poſterity will have much a-do to believe, that this Kingdom was capable to keep up ſeparately, and at their own Charge, Three Land, and Two Naval Armies, beſides thoſe of their Allies, towards the

the Subſiſtence of which they contributed conſiderably.

Yet it is moſt certain, that beſides a potent Army of 20000 Foot, and between 6 and 7000 Horſe, which you kept all along in *Picardy*, to attack your Enemies, you had another in the ſame Province, compos'd of 10000 Foot and 4000 Horſe, to defend the Entrance of that Frontier.

It is moreover true, that you kept one all along in *Champagne* of the ſame Number with this laſt.

One in *Burgundy* of the ſame Strength.

One no leſs powerful in *Germany*.

Another as conſiderable in *Italy*, and another in *Valtelina* at certain times. And what is moſt to be admir'd, the major part of them were deſign'd more to attack than to ſtand upon the Defenſive.

Although your Predeceſſors deſpis'd the Sea to that degree, that the late King your Father had not one Ship, your Majeſty nevertheleſs during the whole Courſe of this War, kept 20 Gallies and 20 Ships in the *Mediterranean*, and about 60 well Mann'd in the Ocean. Which has not only prevented your Enemies Deſigns upon your Coaſts, but has done them as much Harm as they deſign'd to do us.

Moreover, you have yearly aſſiſted the *Hollanders* with 1200000 Livres, and ſometimes more; and the Duke of *Savoy* with upwards of a Million.

The Crown of *Sweden* with the like Sum.

The Landgrave of *Heſſe* with 200000 Rix-dollars; and divers other Princes with divers other Sums, according as occaſions did require it.

By reaſon of which exceſſive Charges, the Expences of every one of the Five Years, during which

which *France* has ſupported that War, has amounted to upwards of 60 Millions; which is the more to be admir'd, in that it has been done without taking the Sallary of Officers, without touching the Revenue of private Perſons, and even without demanding any Alienation of the Fund of the Clergy, all extraordinary means, which your Predeceſſors have often been oblig'd to have recourſe to, in leſs conſiderable Wars.

Thus 60 Millions of Expence every one of thoſe Five Years; an Hundred and Fifty Thouſand Foot both in your Armies and Garriſons, and upwards of Thirty Thouſand Horſe, will be an Immortal Argument to Poſterity of the Power of this Crown.

If I add, that theſe different Occupations did not hinder you at the ſame time from fortifying your Frontiers to that degree, that whereas they were open on all parts before to your Enemies, they cannot look on them now without amazement, I ſhall touch a new Point no leſs conſiderable to Poſterity, ſince that as this Kingdom is thereby ſecur'd for ever, it will receive as much Benefit by it for the future, as your Majeſty has endur'd Labour and Pain iu the Performance.

Thoſe whom Hiſtory will acquaint with the Croſſes your Majeſty has met with in all your great Deſigns, through the Envy your Proſperities, and the Fear of your Power, have created in divers Foreign Princes, by the want of Faith of ſome of your Allies, by the Treachery of ſome of your Subjects, by a Brother ill counſell'd at ſome times, by a Mother always poſſeſs'd by ill-diſpos'd Minds, after her having depriv'd her ſelf of your

Majeſty's

Majeſty's Councils, and ſeparated her Intereſts from thoſe of your State; being ſenſible, that ſuch Obſtacles are no ſmall heightnings to your Glory; being ſenſible alſo, that great Hearts having form'd great Deſigns, cannot be with-held by the Difficulties they meet in the ſame: If they conſider beſides the natural Levity of this Nation, the Impatience of the Souldiers, little us'd to the inevitable Fatigues attending the courſe of Wars; and finally, the Weakneſs of the Inſtruments you were forc'd to make uſe of on thoſe occaſions, among which I take the firſt place, they will be forc'd to own, that nothing could ſupply the Defect of the Tools, but the Excellence of your Majeſty, who was the Workman.

Moreover, if they conſider, that overcoming all thoſe Obſtacles, you have attain'd the Concluſion of a Peace, in which the Defect of ſome of your Allies, and the Affection you have had for them, have oblig'd you to relinquiſh part of what you had Conquer'd by your own Forces, they will needs be oblig'd to acknowledge, that your Goodneſs is equal to your Power, and that in your Conduct, Prudence, and the Bleſſing of God, have kept an even Pace.

Theſe, *Sir*, have been your Majeſty's Actions hitherto, which I will eſteem happily ended, if they be attended with a Repoſe, which may allow you to bleſs your Kingdom with all manner of Advantages.

In order whereunto, it is neceſſary to conſider the ſeveral Orders of your Kingdom, the State they compoſe, your Perſon, which is charg'd with the Conduct thereof, and the Means you muſt

follow to perform it worthily ; which requires nothing in general, but to have a good and faithful Council, to esteem their Advice, and to follow Reason in the Principles it prescribes for the Government of your Kingdom : 'Tis to that I will reduce the Remainder of this Work, treating those matters distinctly in divers Chapters, subdivided into divers Sections, in order to explain them the more methodically.

REFOR-

REFORMATION
OF THE
Divers Orders
OF THE
STATE.

ONE might make whole Volumes upon the Subject of the ſeveral Orders of this Kingdom; but the Scope of my Deſign not being the ſame with many others, who aim at nothing but to diſcourſe well upon all the parts of a State, without conſidering whether the Publick will receive any Benefit by their Diſcourſing, or not. I will only endeavour to repreſent to your Majeſty in few Words, what is neceſſary to procure the Welfare of all your Subjects in their ſeveral Conditions.

CHAP. II.

Of the Reformation of the Eccleſiaſtical Order.

SECTION I.

Which repreſents the ill State of the Church at the beginning of the King's Reign; the Preſent State thereof; and what is neceſſary to be done to put it in that in which it ought to be.

WHEN I remember to have ſeen Gentlemen and other Lay Perſons, in my Youth, who held not only the major part of Priories and Abbies, but alſo of Cures and Biſhoprick *in Commendam*; and when I conſider that in my firſt Years there was ſuch a Licentiouſneſs in Monaſteries of both Sexes, that nothing but Scandals and ill Examples were met with in places where Edification was to be look'd for, I own that it is no ſmall Satisfaction to me, to ſee thoſe Diſorders abſolutely baniſh'd under your Majeſty's Reign; and that the ſaid Tenures and the Diſorders of Monaſteries are ſcarcer than lawful Poſſeſſions and Orderly Communities were at that time.

The beſt Method, in my Opinion, for your Majeſty to continue and to increaſe that Bleſſing, is to take a particular Care to place Perſons of Merit and of exemplary Lives, in Biſhopricks; to beſtow Abbies and other ſimple Benefices of your Nomination on Perſons of Probity; to deprive thoſe who lead Licentious Lives in ſo holy a Station, as that is which unites men particularly to God; of your Sight and Favours, and to make an exemplary puniſhment of the Scandalous.

I might

I might propoſe many other Expedients for the Reformation of the Clergy; but provided your Majeſty will be pleas'd to obſerve theſe Four Conditions, and to uſe virtuous Men of that Profeſſion favourably, you will diſcharge your Duty, and will render the Eccleſiaſticks of your State either ſuch as they ought to be, or at leaſt ſo prudent, as to endeavour to become ſo.

To that end it is my Duty to repreſent to your Majeſty, that it is very neceſſary to take Care not to be miſtaken in your Judgment of the Capacity of Biſhops.

A Man may be Learned, may be Capable, and yet not fit for that Function; which beſides Science, requires Zeal, Courage, Vigilancy, Piety, Charity and Activity together.

It is not ſufficient to be an honeſt Man, to make a good Biſhop; for he muſt be good for others as well as for himſelf.

I have often had a Dread that Men of Quality would hardly contain themſelves within the bounds of their Duty, and that they are leſs regular in their Lives than others: Many others being mov'd with that Fear, are of Opinion, that Doctors of a good Life, and low Birth, are fitter for thoſe Employments, than thoſe who are of higher Extraction: But there are many things to be conſider'd on that Subject.

A Biſhop ought to be Learned, full of Piety, Zeal, well Born; by reaſon that the Authority requir'd in ſuch Places is only to be found in Perſons of Quality. But as it is difficult to meet all thoſe Qualifications in one and the ſame Perſon, I will be bold to ſay, that good Manners, which

muſt be conſider'd above all things, being ſuppos'd, Quality and Authority, which are commonly Companions, are to be preferr'd before great Science; having often ſeen very Learned Men who made very ill Biſhops, either for not being able to Govern, upon the account of their low Extraction, or for living too near, according to their Birth, which borders upon Avarice; whereas Nobility, which is attended by Virtue, commonly has a particular Deſire of Honour and of Glory, which produces the ſame Effects as Zeal, occaſion'd by the pure Love of God; that they generally live with a Splendour and Liberality conformable to that Dignity; and better underſtand the manner of behaving themſelves in, and converſing with the World.

Above all things, a Biſhop muſt be humble and Charitable, have Learning and Piety, a ſteady Courage, and a great Zeal for the Church, and for the Salvation of Souls.

Thoſe who aim at Biſhopricks out of Ambition and Intereſt, are commonly thoſe who make their Court beſt to obtain that by Importunity, which they cannot pretend to by Merit; and therefore ſuch muſt not be choſen, but thoſe whom God calls to that Vocation; which is eaſily known by their different way of living; theſe applying themſelves to the Eccleſiaſtical Functions, that are practis'd in Seminaries. And it would be very proper for your Majeſty to declare, That you will chuſe none but ſuch as have ſpent a conſiderable time after their Studies, in applying themſelves to the ſaid Functions in Seminaries, which are places appointed in order thereunto; ſince it is not reaſonable

ſonable, that the moſt difficult and moſt important Profeſſion in the World ſhould be undertaken without having firſt ſtudied it; ſince no Man is allow'd to exert the meaneſt and the moſt vile, without a Prentiſhip of many Years.

After all, the beſt Rule in that Choice is, to have no general one; but to chuſe ſometimes Learned Men, ſometimes Men that have not ſo much Learnig, and are better Born; young Men on ſome occaſions, old ones on others; according as Men of divers Conditions may be thought moſt fit to Govern.

I have always had this Conſideration; but yet whatever Care I have taken to make a good uſe of it, I own I have been ſometimes miſtaken; and indeed it is very difficult not to be miſtaken in Judgments, which are the leſs eaſie, in that it is almoſt impoſſible to penetrate into the Hearts of Men, or to fix their Inconſtancy.

They change their Humour with their Condition; or rather, they diſcover what they diſſembled till then, to obtain their ends.

While ſuch Men live in Miſery, they make it their buſineſs to be thought much better than they are; and when they have obtain'd their ends, they no longer conſtrain themſelves to conceal the ill Qualifications they have had all along.

Nevertheleſs, in uſing the Precautions I propoſe in the ſaid Choice, you will diſcharge your Conſcience before God: And I maintain boldly, That your Majeſty will have nothing to fear, provided, that obliging thoſe who ſhall be choſen with the ſaid Caution, to reſide in their Dioceſes, to eſtabliſh Seminaries there for the Inſtruction of their Eccleſia-

sticks, to visit their Flock, as they are oblig'd to do by the Canons, you put them in a way to perform that Duty effectually.

I say this, *Sir*, because it is absolutely impossible for them to do it at present, by reason of the daily Encroachments your Majesty's Officers make upon their Jurisdiction.

Six things are likewise to be wish'd, that the Souls which are committed to their Care may receive all the Assistance they can expect from them.

Three of them depend on your own Authority; one on *Rome* only; and the other two on *Rome* and your Authority together.

The three first are, the Regulations of Appeals, that of Privileg'd Cases, and the Suppression of the *Regalia*, pretended by the holy Chappel of *Paris*, over the major part of the Bishopricks of this Kingdom, until those who are nominated for the same by your Majesty have taken the Oath of Allegiance.

The fourth is, a Regulation of the Plurality of the Sentences requir'd by the Canons, for the Punishment of a Crime committed by an Ecclesiastick; to the end, that the Guilty may not be able to avoid the Punishment they deserve, by the Delays of the Formalities that are practis'd.

And the other two, which relate to the Authority of the Church and yours together, are the Exemptions of the Chapters, and the Right of Presenting to Cures, which belongs to divers Abbots and Seculars.

We must distinctly examine these Cases one after another.

SECT.

SECT. II.

Of Appeals, and the Means to regulate the ſame.

I Do not deſign in this place to explain the Original of Appeals, as a thing, the Knowledge whereof is abſolutely neceſſary; provided it be known how to apply a proper Remedy to the ſaid Evil, it matters but little to know when it firſt began.

I am ſenſible, that it is ſo difficult to diſcover the true Source of that Practice, that the Advocate General *Servien* us'd to ſay, That had he known the Author of ſo good a Regulation, he would have erected his Statue.

Neverthelefs, there is great Reaſon to believe, that the firſt Foundation of it aroſe from the Confidence which the Eccleſiaſticks repos'd in the King's Regal Authority, when being impos'd upon by the Anti-Popes, *Clement* the 7th, *Benedict* the 13th, and *John* the 23d, who fled to *Avignon* for a Refuge, they had Recourſe to King *Charles* the 6th then Reigning, to be diſcharg'd of the firſt Fruits, Penſions and extraordinary Subſidies they often impos'd upon them.

The Complaints of the Clergy of *France* having induc'd that King to make an Ordinance, prohibiting the Execution of the Reſcripts, Mandates and Bulls which the Popes might give for the future, to the Prejudice of the Franchiſes and Liberties the Gallick Church injoyn'd.

This Order gave way to the firſt Enterpriſes of the King's Officers over the Eccleſiaſtical Juriſdiction.

Never-

Nevertheleſs, it was no ſooner made, but the fear they had of being prejudiced by it, inſtead of receiving the Advantage they deſir'd, prevail'd with the King to defer the Execution of the ſame for ſome Years. Afterwards, the continuation of the Vexations Benefices were afflicted with, made it to be put in execution for ſome Years; after which, it was finally ſuppreſs'd by King *Charles* VII. at the beginning of his Reign, by reaſon of the divers Abuſes that were committed in the practice thereof.

The Experience of the Abuſe of ſuch an Order, oblig'd the Clergy for a while patiently to bear the ill Treatments they receiv'd from the Officers of the Court of *Rome*.

But finally, the redoubling of the Exactions that were laid upon them, oblig'd them to aſſemble at *Bourges*, in 1438. to conſult about the means to free themſelves of the ſame. That Aſſembly, which was famous for the Number and Merit of the Prelates which compos'd it, carefully examin'd the many Grievances the Church was afflicted with; and concluded, That the beſt Remedy they could apply to them, was to receive the Decrees of the Council of *Bale*; which reducing moſt things to the Conſtitution of the Common and Canonical Right, diſabled the Officers of the Court of *Rome* from attempting any thing againſt the Clergy.

After which, they form'd a *Pragmatical Sanction* of the Decrees of that Council, which they reſolv'd to put in practice by the King's Leave, whom they Petition'd to be Protector of the ſame.

The

The King adhering to the Supplications of his Clergy, enjoyn'd his * Judges Royal, to cauſe the ſaid *Pragmatical Sanction* to be Religiouſly obſerv'd; and 'tis from thence the Grievances the Church labours under at this time in this Kingdom, by the interpoſition of the King's Officers; receiv'd a new Force, after the beginning they had had under the Reign of *Charles* VI. And it is alſo from thence the Parliaments have taken an occaſion to aſſume the Cogniſance of the greateſt part of what only belongs to the Tribunal of the Church of God.

* *The Judges Royal had already begun a little to aſſume the Cogniſance of what only belongs to the Church, under pretence of the Poſſeſſion of Benefices, of which the Bull of Pope Martin, given in the Year 1439. attributed the Cogniſance to them.*

It was very eaſie for them to attribute to themſelves, to the Excluſion of ſubaltern or inferiour Judges, what had been at firſt only committed to them, and to extend their Power under that pretence beyond its lawful Bounds, ſince they had none but Inferiours to encounter with.

In the Eſtabliſhment of the firſt Order, made to remedy the Infractions of the *Pragmatical Sanction*, * Appeals were not allowed of: They only chaſtiſed ſuch as did obtain Reſcripts, or Mandates, from the Court of *Rome*, againſt the Common Right, upon the bare Complaint that was made and averr'd of the ſame, and that without taking cogniſance of the Merits of the Cauſe.

* *That firſt Regulation never had the Name, End, or Effect of Appeals.*

After which, Time, which changes all things, being join'd to Power, which, like Fire, attracts all to it ſelf, made them proceed from that Order, eſtabliſh'd for the Preſervation of the Common Right,

Right, and the Franchiſes of the *Gallick* Church, againſt the Attempts of *Rome*, to the Appeals; the abuſe of which, utterly annihilates the Juriſdiction of the *French* Prelates, as well as of the Holy See.

I am ſenſible, that the moſt ſubtile Adherents of the Parliaments, to authorize their Practice, may ſay, That the Prelates aſſembled at *Bourges*, having petition'd his Majeſty to hinder the Holy See, by his Officers, from infringing the *Pragmatital Sanction*, have tacitly given him a Right to oppoſe the Contraventions that might be made to the ſame by themſelves, which authorizes them to take cogniſance of the Sentences which are daily given in their Tribunal.

But the Proverb may be alledg'd in this place, which is moſt true, That a Bargain is nothing but what it is made; and that it is as certain as evident, That the *Gallick* Church aſſembled at *Bourges*, never thought on what theſe Gentlemen pretend; and moreover, that they had no reaſon to do it.

They had recourſe to the King, againſt the Enterprizes of *Rome*, by reaſon that the Holy See having no Superiour Tribunal on Earth, Temporal Princes alone, as Protectors of the Church, can put a ſtop to the courſe of the Exorbitances of the Officers of *Rome*, whereas the Attempts of the Biſhops may be repreſs'd by their Superiours, to whom one may and ought to appeal.

Finally, he that gives his Friend Arms to defend him, can never be ſuppos'd to give them for his own Deſtruction. The Parliaments cannot pretend, that the Protection which the Prelates aſſembled

bled at *Bourges*, desir'd of the King, gives his Officers a Right to oppress their Jurisdiction.

Nevertheless, as Evils are greater in their Progress, and in their Periods, than in their Beginning, the Design of the Parliaments, cover'd with divers Pretences for a time, began to appear without a Mask in the last Age *, under King *Francis* I. who was the first that ever made use of the Name † of *Appeal* in his Ordinances.

* *Ordinances of* 1539.

† *The Word has its Original from the Practice of Attornies and Advocates; who according to the Order of applying themselves before the Parliament by way of Appeal, gave the same Name to the recourse Ecclesiasticks had there.*

Many knowing the Illegality of that Practice, which the Church complains of at present, will think perhaps, that since it may be abolish'd with Justice, it would be proper to do it: But I'm of Opinion, that such an Alteration would do more harm, than the Evil they would avoid; and that nothing but the Abuse of such an Order is prejudicial.

Whatever Ground the said Practice may have, it is certain, that when it was first publickly establish'd, it was only with a pretence to put a stop to the Encroachments the Ecclesiastical Judges might attempt upon the King's Royal Jurisdiction.

In process of time, they have not only made use of it against the Transgressors of the Ordinances of the Kingdom, which include many matters besides Jurisdiction, but they have also extended it to the Infractions of the Holy Canons, and of the Decrees of the Church, and of the Holy See; and

and finally, by excess of abuse to all sorts of Matters, in which the Laicks pretend a *Lezion* of Polity, which they maintain only belongs to the King's Officers.

One might reasonably desire to have the Effect of this Remedy reduc'd to its first Foundation, which had no extent beyond Attempts upon the Royal Jurisdiction, which is sufficiently regulated by the First Article of the Ordinance of 1539. But to remove all pretence of *Lezion* from the Officers of the Prince, and to hinder them from pretending with any appearance, that it is impossible for them to get the Ordinances observ'd, by reason of the Enterprizes of the Church; I am of Opinion, that they may consent to the said Appeals, when the Judges shall pronounce directly against the Ordinances; which is the only Case in which *Charles* IX. and *Henry* III. by the 59th Article of the Ordinance of *Blois* required them to be admitted. Provided they be not extended under that pretence to the Transgression of the Canons and Decrees, because many Ordinances, particularly the * *Capitularies* of *Charlemagne*, often contain the same substance with those of the Church.

* *Regulation of Church-Affairs.*

I am sensible, that it will be difficult to make so exact an Indiction of the Ordinances to this end, but that sometimes there will be abuses in whatever Regulation may be made. But it is certain, that there is no difficulty in the Will of the King's Officers, who shall be employ'd to put his in execution: The Order which he will be pleas'd to give them, will serve them as a Rule without any trouble.

The

The Pretence which the Parliaments uſe, that when Eccleſiaſtical Judges judge againſt the Canons and Decrees, of which Kings are the Executors and Protectors, they have the Power to correct the Abuſe of their Sentences, is a Pretence ſo void of all appearance of Juſtice, that it is altogether inſupportable.

Should the whole Church judge againſt the Canons and Decrees, one might ſay, that the King, who is the Protector of the ſame, might and ought to maintain them in an extraordinary manner by his own Authority: But ſince, when a Judge gives a Sentence againſt their Tenor, the ſaid Sentence may be revers'd, and he corrected by his Superiour, the Officers of the Prince cannot, without invading the Prieſtly Office, and without a manifeſt Abuſe, do that which only belongs to thoſe that are particularly conſecrated to GOD: And when they do ſo, before the laſt Sentence of the Church is given, their attempt is not only void of Juſtice, but even of all appearance of Juſtice.

The Endeavours of the Parliaments alſo to tranſlate all the Spiritual and Eccleſiaſtical Juriſdiction, to the Tribunal of Princes, under pretence of Temporal Juſtice, is no leſs void of Ground and of Appearance: And yet there is no Preſidial or Judge Royal, but will ordain the time of Proceſſions, the Hour of High Maſſes, and many other Ceremonies, under colour of publick Convenience; thus the Acceſſary becomes the Principal: And whereas the Service of God ſhould preceed all things, and be the Rule of Civil Actions, it will no longer be in force, than while the Temporal Officers of Princes will be pleas'd to allow it.

I am

I am very ſenſible, that ſometimes the Male-Adminiſtration of Juſtice of thoſe who exert the Eccleſiaſtical Juriſdiction, and the Tediouſneſs of the Formalities preſcrib'd by the Canons, give a ſpecious Pretence to the Incroachments of the King's Officers; but it cannot be with Reaſon, ſince one Inconvenience does not eſtabliſh another, but obliges to correct both; which is what I deſign to ſhew hereafter.

I would willingly paſs under ſilence the Pretenſion which the Parliaments have to render every thing abuſive which is Judg'd againſt their Decrees, to which, by that means, they would give the force of Ordinances, if I were not oblig'd to ſhew, that this Abuſe is the leſs ſupportable, in that they endeavour by that Encroachment to equal their Authority to that of their Maſter and of their King.

The Detriment the Church receives by ſuch Encroachments, is the more inſupportable, in that it hinders the Prelates abſolutely from performing their Office. When a Biſhop deſigns to puniſh an Eccleſiaſtick, he ſtrait removes from under his Juriſdiction by an Appeal; if in making his Viſitation he makes any Ordinance, the effect of it is immediately ſtopt, by reaſon, that tho' in matters of Diſcipline Appeals are only by way of Devolution, yet the Parliaments make them ſuſpenſive againſt all manner of Reaſon.

In fine, we may affirm with Truth, that the Church is fetter'd; and that, if her Miniſters are not blind, yet their Hands are tied; inſomuch that tho' they know the Evil, it is not in their Power to redreſs it.

That

That which comforts me in this Extremity, is, that what is impoſſible to the Church on this Subject, will be very eaſie to your Majeſty, on whoſe bare Will the remedy ſuch Diſorders depends.

The firſt thing that is to be done in order thereunto, is, to prohibit thoſe Appeals for the future; unleſs in the Caſe of a viſible attempt upon the Royal Juriſdiction, and of an evident Tranſgreſſion of the Ordinances, which only relate to the Temporal Authority of Kings, and not to the Spiritual Authority of the Church.

This Ordinance being ſuppos'd, if in order to have it regularly obſerv'd, your Majeſty will be pleas'd to make a Regulation containing Six Heads. You will at once put a ſtop to the Incroachments of the Church, and of the Parliaments.

The Firſt Head of that Regulation muſt order all Appeals of this kind to be ſeal'd with the Great Seal, for the Parliament of *Paris*; and that in all others, which the Diſtance of your Court obliges to make uſe of the Privy Seal, they may not be ſeal'd before three ancient Advocates have affirm'd under their Hands, that there is cauſe of Abuſe, ſubmitting to a Fine, in caſe it be found otherwiſe.

The Second muſt declare, that all Appeals made in point of Diſcipline, ſhall be only by way of * Devolution, and not of Suſpenſion.

* *The like Remedy was practis'd 15 Years after the Pragmatical Sanction, to ſtop the courſe of the Secular Judges Uſurpations over the Eccleſiaſtical Juriſdiction; it was ordain'd, That thoſe who had a mind to get Letters out of the Chancery, to oppoſe the Reſcripts and Letters of the Pope, ſhould be oblig'd to quote evidently the means by which they did pretend to juſtifie, that the Pragmatical Sanction was infring'd.*

The Third must order the Abuse complain'd of to be specify'd both in the Appeal, and in the Sentence that shall be given upon the same; which is the more necessary, in that it often comes to pass, that tho' there is only an Errour in point of Formality, or in some particular Head of the Sentence, which contains many, when the Parliament declares that there is an Error or Abuse, the Sentence is held void in all things; tho' it ought only to be so in one of its Circumstances, which commonly is not very material.

The Fourth must oblige the Parliaments to enter the Causes of the said Appeals upon the Rolls before any others, and to call and judge them preferrably to all others, without referring the same, to avoid the Delays; which are often desir'd by those, who only aiming to elude the Punishment of their Crimes, endeavour to tire out their ordinary Judges, from whom they Appeal; and because it is not reasonable to deprive the Publick of the Administration of Ecclesiastical Justice, by making those who are the principal Officers of it bare Sollicitors before a Tribunal which is inferiour to theirs.

The Fifth must impose a Necessity on the Parliaments, to Fine and to Condemn those to pay the Costs, who shall appeal without a Legal Cause, without the Power of remitting the same, on any account, or upon any pretence whatever; and to send them back again before the same Judges, from whom they have appeal'd without a Cause; which is the more necessary, because that without this Remedy all Criminals would be at liberty to free them-

themſelves of the common Juriſdiction, by Appealing without a Cauſe

The beſt Ordinances and the juſteſt Regulations being often deſpis'd by thoſe who ought to obſerve them moſt Religiouſly; and the Licentiouſneſs of Soveraign Courts often proceeding to that degree, as to violate or reform your Orders, according to their pleaſure; the beſt way to render your Will effectual, and to make your ſelf to be obey'd in a point of ſuch Conſequence, is to add a Sixth Head to the Five foregoing, which will be as effectual a Remedy to oblige your Officers to perform their Duty on that ſubject, as that of Appeals is excellent to hinder the Eccleſiaſtical Judges from being wanting in theirs in the Exerciſe of their Juriſdiction.

This Remedy requires nothing but to grant the humble Petition of your Clergy, that your Majeſty would be pleas'd to allow them to Appeal from you to your ſelf; by applying themſelves to your Council, whenever your Parliaments ſhall be wanting in the Obſervation of your Orders and Regulations.

This is the more reaſonable, in that whereas, in order to ſuppreſs the Incroachments of the Church, by appealing to your Judges, Application is made to a Tribunal of an Order different and inferiour by its Nature; and that in having recourſe to your Council, to put a ſtop to thoſe of your Parliaments, Application is made to an Order of the ſame kind. And undoubtedly, even thoſe who envy the Franchiſes of the Church, can find no fault with it, ſince that inſtead of making it independent of Temporal Juriſdiction, it adds a Degree to its ſubjection.

Finally, it will be the more advantagious to your Majeſty in that, as it will keep the Power of the Church within its own Bounds; it will alſo reſtrain that of the Parliaments within the juſt Extent, which is preſcrib'd to them by Reaſon and by your Laws.

And if beſides your Majeſty's Commands to your Council, to exert the Power they have by your Authority to hinder the Encroachments of all your Subjects, and particularly thoſe of your Officers, who adminiſter your Juſtice in this Kingdom, you take Care to fill it, not with Men, whoſe Pretenſion and Importunity are the beſt Titles they can produce to obtain their Ends, but with Perſons choſen for their Merit, from among all your Subjects; you will have the Satisfaction to ſee, that thoſe who will not contain themſelves within the bounds of their Duty by Reaſon, will be conſtrain'd to it by force of Juſtice; which will not be continu'd long, but you will find clearly, that what was forc'd in the beginning will become voluntary.

SECT. III.

Of Priviledg'd Caſes, and the means to Regulate the ſame.

THoſe who Conſecrate themſelves to God, by devoting their Lives to his Church, are ſo abſolutely exempted of the Temporal Juriſdiction of Princes, that they can only be try'd by their Eccleſiaſtical Superiours.

Divine Right, and the Law of Nations, eſtabliſh the ſaid Immunity clearly. The Law of Nations,

Nations, in that it has been acknowledg'd by all Nations. Divine Right, by the Confeſſion of all Authors who have treated of it, before the Modern Juriſprudence of the laſt Age.

The Church has enjoy'd it until the Male-Adminiſtration of Eccleſiaſtical Juſtice has open'd a way to the Ambition of the Officers of Temporal Princes to take Cognizance of the ſame.

The Church alſo being ſenſible, that the Misfortunes of the Times hindred them from being able to redreſs by their own Power, many Diſorders, which thoſe who were under her Juriſdiction were fallen into, reſolv'd in order to remove all Cauſe of Complaint, upon the account of the Impunity of the Crimes, which were committed under the Protection of her Authority, to give Secular Judges the Power to take Cognizance of thm in certain priviledg'd Caſes; † becauſe they could not do it otherwiſe, than by virtue of the Priviledge that was particularly granted them to that effect.

† *Fifty Years ago this diſtinction of Privileg'd Caſes and of Common Treſpaſſes was unknown to the Church: Common Treſpaſſes are all the Faults, the Cognizance whereof belongs to the Eccleſiaſtical Tribunal.*

It muſt be noted, that there is a difference between the Caſes that are ſtyl'd *Priviledg'd* in all States, and thoſe that are particularly pretended ſuch in *France*.

The Firſt may be reduc'd to Two, which are Voluntary Homicide with Premeditation, and manifeſt Apoſtacy, as to perſwade Clerks to deſpiſe, and to forſake an Eccleſiaſtical Life, to quit the Habit of it, and to live with Scandal in the World, either in bearing Arms, or in doing

any other Action directly contrary to their Profeſſion.

The number of the Second were inconſiderable at firſt. When the *Pragmatical Sanction* was eſtabliſh'd, there were but two; the bearing of Arms, and the Infraction of the King's Safeguard; but by degrees they have been extended farther.

All Treſpaſſes againſt the *Pragmatical Sanction* have been deem'd Criminal Caſes.

That of the * *Concordats* has been put in the ſame Rank.

* *Agreement made between King Francis the 1. and Pope Leo the 10. about Benefices.*

The Verification of Cedules before the Judge Royal is alſo deem'd of the ſame kind.

Raviſhments, Robberies upon the High Ways, Falſe Witneſſes, Coining, High Treaſon, and all enormous Crimes are deem'd to be of the ſame nature by the Parliaments.

In fine, if we believe them all the Faults of Eccleſiaſticks, even common Injuries are priviledg'd Caſes, there are no longer common Treſpaſſes.

Such Crimes as are granted to be priviledg'd Caſes, in all States, are own'd as ſuch by the unanimous Opinion of the whole Church; and many of thoſe that are deem'd ſuch in this Kingdom, are ſo by Abuſe, and by the Incroachments of the Officers Royal.

They have been the bolder in aſſuming the Cognizance of all the Deportments of Clerks, by reaſon that, according to the Order of the Canons, which requires three conformable Sentences for the Condemnation of their Faults, it is very difficult to puniſh even the moſt notable, and impoſſible to do it in a ſhort time.

Altho'

Altho' this Pretence is plauſible, and that it requires a Reformation of the Formalities obſerv'd in the adminiſtration of the Juſtice of the Church; nevertheleſs, the ancient Lawyers could not forbear blaming the ſaid Incroachment publickly. And it is no Argument to urge, that thoſe Crimes which render Eccleſiaſticks unworthy of their Character, deprive them at the ſame time of their Immunities; ſince by ſuch Arguments many Concluſions would be inferr'd as falſe as prejudicial, even to thoſe who draw ſuch Conſequences.

The only Conſequence that can be inferr'd of the Delays and Irregularities obſerv'd in the Adminiſtration of the Juſtice of the Church, is, that it is neceſſary to remedy the ſame; and that as the Eccleſiaſticks are oblig'd ſo to do, ſo Kings are oblig'd to maintain them in the Immunities which God has been pleas'd to confer on his Church.

In order to diſcharge theſe Obligations, the Church is oblig'd to remedy, by the means we ſhall propoſe hereafter, the intolerable Delays of theſe Sentences, requir'd by the ancient Canons; and in the next place, to become ſo exact in the puniſhment of the Crimes committed by thoſe that are under her Juriſdiction, that as ſoon as a Scandal is diſcover'd, the exemplary Puniſhment of the ſame may be known as ſoon as the Offence.

And the King making a Declaration to expreſs all the priviledg'd Caſes, which may be reduc'd to thoſe which may be committed by ſuch, and in all States, and in all Orders; and beſides, in the bearing of Arms, the Infraction of the King's Safeguard, the Verification of Cedules, ma-

nifeſt Apoſtacy, as it is above explain'd, Robberies on the High Way, Coining, and all Crimes of Leze-Majeſty, muſt abſolutely forbid his Officers to take Cognizance of any other Caſes, until the Accus'd be ſent to them by the Judges of the Church; and that in caſe they infringe the ſaid Order, their Puniſhment may be known almoſt as ſoon as their Treſpaſs.

Now ſince Juſtice requires an exact knowledge of a Fault before it can be puniſh'd; and that Kings cannot adminiſter Juſtice themſelves to all their Subjects: His Majeſty will diſcharge his Obligation, in ordering his Privy Council to receive the Complaints of the Infractions made by his Officers of what Quality ſoever, to ſuch a Regulation, and to puniſh their Incroachments ſeverely: In which caſe the Church being ſatisfy'd with ſuch an Order, will be the more careful to adminiſter Juſtice, when they do receive it from their Prince.

SECT. IV.

Which ſhews the Conſequence of the Regalia *pretended by the Holy Chappel of* Paris *over the Biſhops of* France, *and opens a way to ſuppreſs the ſame.*

ALtho' the Canons of the Holy Chappel * of *Paris* maintain, that the *Regalia* was given them by St. *Lewis*

their

* *By Letters Patent of* 1453. *Charles the 7th granted that favour to the Holy Chappel, inſtead of the Gift Charles the 5th had made to them of the remainder of all the Accounts deliver'd in the Chamber, which he deſir'd to be employ'd for the Reparation both of the Palace and of the Holy Chappel.*

their Founder: Yet it is moſt certain, that the firſt Grant we find of it is of *Charles* the 7th, which allows them for three years only the right of enjoying the Temporal Revenue of the vacant Biſhopricks, over which the *Regalia* ſhould be found to have a Right. The time of the ſaid Grant being expir'd, he continu'd the ſame for three years longer, and for the four following; the whole on condition, that one half of the Money ariſing thereby ſhould be imploy'd for the maintenance of the Chanters who were to perform the Service; and the other, for the Reparation of the Glaſs Windows and Ornaments, and for the maintenance of the Choiriſters, according as it ſhould be ordain'd by the Chamber of Accounts of *Paris*.

Charles the 7th being dead, his Son *Lewis* the 11th continu'd the ſame Favour to the Holy Chappel, during his Life, which was look'd upon to be ſo extraordinary, that the Chamber of Accounts would only verifie the Letters Patents thereof for Nine Years.

After the Reign of *Lewis* the 11th, his Succeſſors *Charles* the 8th, *Francis* the 1ſt, and *Henry* the 2d continu'd the ſame Favour during their Lives.

Charles the 9th went farther, * and granted to Perpetuity to the Holy Chappel, what his Predeceſſors had only granted them for a time.

* *By the Edict of* Febr. 1569.

The Intention thoſe Princes had is praiſe-worthy, ſince they gave a Right which did belong to them to a good end. But the Uſe thoſe of the Holy Chappel have made of it can never be ſufficiently blam'd, ſince that inſtead of being ſatisfy'd with

with what was given them, they have endeavour'd under that pretence, to make all the Bishopricks of *France* subject to the *Regalia*.

The Parliament of *Paris*, which pretend to be the only Judges of the *Regalia*, have been blinded to that degree by Self-interest, as to make no Scruple to declare even all those Bishopricks, † which in our days have been united to the Crown, liable to that Servitude; and to order the Advocates in proper terms no longer to question, but that the extent of the *Regalia* was as large as that of the Kingdom.

† *The Bishop* du Bellay.

This Incroachment being too visible to produce any Effect, induc'd the Churches which were not liable to that Right no longer to acknowledge that Tribunal for Judges, and the Kings to refer all such Causes to their Council.

The extent of that Right over all the Bishopricks of the Kingdom, is a Pretension so ill grounded, that in order to discover the Injustice thereof, it will be sufficient to read a Deed *, the Original of which is in the Chamber of Accounts, which the President *Le Maitre* caus'd to be printed, which gave an Account of the Bishopricks that are subject to the *Regalia*, and of those that are free from it.

* *The Deed begins with these words,* Dominus Rex.

Formerly the common Opinion was, that there was no *Regalia* beyond the River *Loire* †, the Kings *Lewis le Gross* and *Lewis the Young* exempted the Archbishoprick of *Bourdeaux*, and the Suffragans thereof, of the same. *Raymond*

† *The Ordinance,* Dum Episcopus alicujus Episcopatus, ubi Rex habet Regalium.

Philip the 4th in his Philippines of the Year 1308. *uses these words,* In aliquibus Ecclesiis Regni.

mond Count of *Tholouſe* granted the ſame Favour to the Biſhops of *Provence* and of *Languedoc*, which was afterwards confirmed to them by *Philip le Bell*; and St. *Lewis* yielded the *Regalia* of all *Brittany* to the Dukes of the Country, by the Treaty he made with *Peter Mau-clerc*; which ſhews, that he did not give it to the Holy Chappel when he founded it.

Philip the 6th in his Ordinance of the Year 1334. ſpeaks thus, In the Biſhopricks in which we have a *Regalia*.

Lewis the 12th in his Ordinance of 1499. *cited by the firſt Preſident* Le Maitre, We have and do forbid all our Officers in the Archbiſhopricks, Biſhopricks, Abbies, and other Benefices, in which we have no Right of *Regalia*, or of Guard, to eſtabliſh any there, on pain of being puniſh'd as guilty of Sacrilege.

Paſquier in the 3d Book of Enquiries, chap. 13.

The late King Henry *the 4th, by his Edict of the Year 1606. Art.* 17. We only deſign to enjoy the Rights of the *Regalia*, as our Predeceſſors and our ſelves have done heretofore, without extending the ſame to the Prejudice of the Churches, that are exempted from it. *And that good Prince believing that the Parliament of* Paris *would judge to the contrary, ſuſpended all the Cauſes about the* Regalia *for a year by his Letters Patent of the 6th of* October. 1609.

The King now Reigning *having inherited his Piety as well as his Kingdom, declares by the Ordinance of* 1629. *Art.* 16. That he only deſigns to enjoy the *Regalia* as it has been done for the time paſt. *And the Clergy having complain'd, that thoſe Terms were not expreſs enough*, H.M. *order'd his Commiſſioners to make this Anſwer*, That the Ordinance being refer'd to that, of 1606. thoſe Terms were ſufficient to ſatisfie the World, that he did not deſire to enjoy the *Regalia* in thoſe places where it has not been enjoy'd for the time paſt.

The Ordinance, Dominus Rex, *makes uſe of theſe Words*, Conſuevit capare Regaliam.

Philip *the 4th, in his Ordinance of* 1302. *ſays*, Regalias, quas Nos & Prædeceſſores noſtri conſuevimus precipere.

And the Philippine *of the Year* 1334. Our Predeceſſors Kings upon the Account of the *Regalia*, and the Nobility of the Crown of *France* have us'd and have been accuſtom'd to be in Poſſeſſion and Seiſin. *And ſince all the Kings in their Ordinances have only ſpoken of the Cuſtom and of their Poſſeſſions.*

Several other Biſhopricks, as *Lyons*, *Autun*, *Auxerre*, and divers others, are ſo undoubtedly free from that Subjection, that no body calls it into queſtion.

The

The Ordinances made at divers times ſhew clearly, that the Kings of *France* never did pretend to have a *Regalia* over all the Biſhopricks; and that Truth is ſo evident, that *Paſquier* the King's Advocate in the Chamber of Accounts, is forc'd to confeſs, that he who maintains that Doctrine, is rather *a Court Flatterer than a French Lawyer*. Theſe are his very Words.

The Ignorance, or rather the want of Spirit, and Intereſt of ſome Biſhops, has contributed very much towards the Vexation the Prelates of this Kingdom ſuffer at this time, who, to free themſelves of the Perſecution they did receive in their own particular, have made no ſcruple to receive Acquittances from the Holy Chappel for Sums they never paid.

The Opinion they had, that in diſputing their Right before Judges who were their Parties, they would be condemn'd, has perſwaded them that they might innocently commit ſuch a Fault, the Conſequence of which would be very dangerous, if your Majeſty's Goodneſs did not repair the harm done by their Weakneſs.

Common Right requiring the Diſpoſition of the Fruits of a vacant Benefice, to be reſerv'd for the future Succeſſor; the contrary cannot be done without an Authentick Title to impower one ſo to do.

Yet we find none of that kind to juſtifie the Pretenſions of Kings, to diſpoſe of them according to their Pleaſure; for want of which they are forc'd to have recourſe to Cuſtom.

This Truth is ſo certain, that all the Ordinances made upon that Subject only maintain their ancient Poſſeſſion.

As

As it is very eaſie for Soveraign Princes, by divers Pretences, to attribute that to themſelves which does not belong to them; and that thereby an unjuſt Uſurpation in the beginning, may in proceſs of time be deem'd Lawful, by virtue of Poſſeſſion: There may be a great deal of Reaſon to queſtion, Whether Cuſtom can have the force of an authentick Title in the caſe of Soveraigns.

But not deſigning to diſpute your Majeſty's Rights, but only to perſuade you to regulate them, inſomuch that they may not endanger the Salvation of Souls; without endeavouring any farther to examine the Source and the Foundation of the Regalia's, which I ſuppoſe valid; I only deſign to examine what the Holy Chappel can pretend by virtue of thoſe Conceſſions of your Predeceſſors, and to propoſe the Remedy of the Abuſe which is committed in the enjoyment of ſuch a Grant.

It often happens, that a Biſhop who is Rich in all the Qualifications requir'd by the Canons, and which the Piety of Good Men can deſire in him, but Poor by his Birth, remains two or three Years incapable of performing the Duty of his Office, both by the Payment of the Bulls, to which he is oblig'd by the *Concordates*, which often ſweep away a whole Year's Revenue, and upon the account of this new Right, which takes away another. So that adding to theſe two Expences the Charge he muſt be at to buy the Ornaments he ſtands in need of, and to furniſh his Houſe according to his Dignity; it will often be found, that three Years are paſs'd, before he can receive any thing for his Maintenance: For which reaſon, many of them do not go to their Biſhopricks, excuſing

cuſing themſelves upon neceſſity; or laying aſide Houſe-keeping, deprive themſelves of the Reputation they ought to have to feed their Flock, as well by Acts of Charity, as by Words.

It alſo often comes to paſs, that to avoid theſe Inconveniencies, they engage themſelves ſo far, that ſome are prevail'd with to practiſie illegal means to acquit their Debts: And thoſe who do not fall into that Extremity, live in perpetual Miſery, and finally fruſtrate their Creditors of what they owe them, for want of Power to pay them.

The Remedy to that Evil, is as eaſie as neceſſary, ſince it only requires the annexing to the Holy Chappel, an Abbey of equal Revenue with that which they can receive by that Settlement.

Some perhaps will ſay, That it will not be eaſie to clear this Point as it ſhould be, by reaſon of the difficulty the ſaid Society will make of diſcloſing that which they deſign to conceal: But if your Majeſty orders them to juſtifie in two Months time, by the Acts of their Regiſters, what they did enjoy before the perpetual Conceſſion made to them by *Charles* IX. and that on pain of forfeiting the ſaid Right; this lawful Proceeding will ſoon diſcover what is neceſſary to be done, to recompence the Grant they have receiv'd from your Predeceſſors.

I am ſenſible, that the ſaid Chapter will pretend, that the Revenue they receive by the *Regalia*, ought to be conſider'd, according to what they enjoy by it at preſent; but whereas it is certain, thot they were no ſooner certain of the perpetuity of that Grant, but they extended it on divers Biſhopricks that were not liable to it, it is evident, that

that the Fine I propoſe is that on which you may juſtly take your Meaſures.

If your Majeſty will be pleas'd to do this, you will eaſily procure an incredible advantage to your Church, by which means the Souls will more eaſily receive the Food that is ſo neceſſary for them, and which they ought to expect from their Paſtors.

If, in the next place, you continue the Reſolution you have taken and which you have practis'd for a conſiderable time, Not to grant any Penſion on Biſhopricks, which is abſolutely neceſſary, you will admit nothing in your Power, to put Biſhops out of danger of not being able to perform their Duty for Want.

SECT. V.

Of the Neceſſity of Protracting the Delays that are us'd in the Courſe of Eccleſiaſtical Juſtice; from whence it happens, that three Crimes remain unpuniſh'd.

EVery body knows, that the Orders which are meerly Political in the Church, may and ought often to be chang'd, according to the Alteration of Times. In the Purity of the firſt Ages of Chriſtianity, ſome Eſtabliſhments of that kind were good, which at preſent would be very prejudicial.

Time, which is the Father of all *Corruption*, having render'd the Manners of Eccleſiaſticks different from what they were in the Fervor of their firſt Zeal; it is certain, that whereas during the courſe of ſeveral innocent Years, the Church, in which the

Zeal

Zeal of the Prelates made them as ſevere in the Puniſhment of Crimes, as they are ſlack aud negligent in that Performance at preſent. It is certain, I ſay, that whereas in thoſe Days the Delays of the Formalities, obſerv'd in the Eccleſiaſtical Juriſdiction, were of no ill Conſequence, they are very prejudicial at preſent; and Reaſou does not permit the continuanco of the ſame.

This Conſideration makes it very neceſſary to aboliſh the ancient Order preſcribed by the Canons, which requires three conformable Sentences for the Conviction of Clerks.

The ill uſe that has been made, for a long while, of the ſaid Order, Author of all Impiety, and conſequently of the Diſorders of the Church, obliges it to do it ſelf Juſtice in that point, to remove all Pretence from Temporal Judges, to follow the Opinion of certain Theologians, who have made no ſcruple to ſay, That it were better the Order ſhould be revers'd by an Incompetent Judge, than to ſee Diſorder reign.

It is impoſſible to take away the Right of Juriſdiction of the Archbiſhopricks, of the Primates of the Holy See; but whereas it often comes to paſs, that Six or Seven Sentences are given, before Three of them happen to be conformable to one another, the ſaid Inconvenience may be remov'd, by ordering the Sentence of the Judges Delegated by the Pope, upon the Appeal of the Primate, or Archbiſhop, to be definitive and abſolute; and to the end this laſt Judgment may be obtained ſpeedily, and that the Zeal of the Church may appear in the good Adminiſtration of their Juſtice, it will be fit his Majeſty would be pleas'd

to

to joyn with his Clergy, to obtain from the Holy See, that inſtead of having recourſe to *Rome*, in all the particular Caſes that are to be Tried, his Holineſs would be pleas'd to Delegate, in all the Provinces of the Kingdom, Perſons of Capacity and Probity, with a Power to Judge Soveraignly of all Appeals made in his Tribunal, without any new Reſcripts.

This Propoſition cannot be odious at *Rome*, ſince the *Concordate* obliges the *Pope* to Delegate *in partibus*, for the Deciſion of the Cauſes that are depending there; this difference will only be found, That whereas at preſent there is a neceſſity of having recourſe to *Rome* in every Cauſe, for the Delegation of thoſe Judges, they will then be all ready Nominated for the Deciſion of all the Cauſes of the Kingdom; which facilitating the Puniſhment of the Crimes of the Eccleſiaſticks, will remove all pretences of the Parliament's Incroaching, as they do, upon the Juſtice of the Church, and all Subjects of Complaints from the Eccleſiaſticks againſt them.

And thereby the Mouths of thoſe that are open Enemies of the Church, or envious of her Immunities, will be ſhut; and her beſt Children who have been ſilent hitherto upon that Subject, will maintain her Cauſe, and ſpeak boldly and freely to defend her Liberty, againſt thoſe who would oppreſs it without Reaſon.

I am ſenſible, that the Holy See will fear, leſt thoſe Delegates ſhould become perpetual Dictators in time; but the changing of them from time to time, which I think to be fit and neceſſary, will remove the fear of that Inconvenience; and con-

tinuing to ſue out the Appeals at *Rome* in every Cauſe which may be ſuffered, the Rights of the Holy See will remain entire, without any diminution.

It may be urg'd, That it will require no more time to obtain a new Delegation of Judges from *Rome*, for every Crime that ſhall be committed, than to ſue out an Appeal to remove the Cauſe, before thoſe that are already Delegated; but the thing is very different, ſince it is certain, that one of the principal Abuſes which hinders the Puniſhment of the Crimes of the Clerks, conſiſts in that the Appellant commonly obtains at *Rome* his Removal, before ſuch a Judge as he thinks fit in *France*, by Colluſion with the Benchers, who for Money ſerve their Clients as they pleaſe.

SECT. VI.

Which repreſents the Prejudice the Church receives by the Four Exemptions ſeveral Churches enjoy, to the Prejudice of the Common Right; and propoſes Means to remedy the ſame.

EXemption, is a Diſpenſation, or Relaxation of the Obligation we lay under to Obey our Superiours: They are of different kinds; ſome are of Right, others of Fact.

The Exemptions of Right, are thoſe we enjoy by the Conceſſion of a lawful Superiour, who grants them upon mature Deliberation, and for certain Reaſons.

The

The Exemptions of Fact, are those we are in poſſeſſion of without a Title, * but only by the uſe thereof Time out of Mind.

* *Quòd enim, quæ ſine Privilegio poteſt acquiri. Conſuetudine immemoriali,* ſay the Canons.

The Exemptions of Right are approv'd of by all Caſuiſts, as granted by a Lawful Authority.

Thoſe of Fact, though not lawful in themſelves, are not always condemn'd by them; becauſe thoſe that have enjoy'd a Priviledge Time out of Mind, had formerly Bulls for the ſame, though they cannot produce them.

There are Three different Exemptions of Places; The Firſt is that of Mendicant Monaſteries, which the Biſhop does not viſit, though he is receiv'd ſolemnly there, whenever he goes thither, may hold his Orders there, and perform all the Epiſcopal Functions, whenever he thinks fit.

The Second is of many other Places, in which they are not receiv'd, and can perform no Epiſcopal Function, unleſs they make a Declaration, That it is without prejudice to the Rights and Privileges of the ſaid Places. The Abbeys of *Marmoutier*, and of *Vendoſme*, and many others, are of this kind.

The Third is of certain Territories, in the extent of which, the Biſhop exerts no Juriſdiction, not even over the Laity; over which, thoſe who enjoy ſuch Exemptions, have the ſole Juriſdiction, and the Power commonly call'd, *Lex Diocæſana*: The Abbeys of S. *Germans des Prez*, or of the Fields, of *Corbie*, of S. *Florent le Vieil*, of *Feſcamp*, and many others are of this kind within the whole extent of their Territories, the Monks themſelves exert all the Epiſcopal Juriſdiction.

They give Diſpenſations of Banes; they appoint Monitories; they publiſh Jubilees, aſſign the Stations after the Orders are come from *Rome*; the *Viſa's* are expedited in their Names. Moreover, they pretend a Right to chuſe whatever Biſhops they think fit to give Orders, without Leave from their Dioceſan Biſhop.

Finally, they give Demiſſories to receive Orders from any Biſhop.

The Chapter of *Chartres* enjoys this Exemption; by virtue of which, the Biſhop cannot make his Entry into the Church, without giving an Act, by which he promiſes to preſerve the Priviledges of the Church, nor make any Viſitation, either of the Holy Sacrament, or of the Holy Oyls.

Thoſe Perſons are ſo far exempted from the Juriſdiction of the Biſhops, that when a Canon becomes a Delinquent, the Chapter nominates the Judges that are to Try him; and if there be an Appeal of Judgment, they apply themſelves to *Rome*, to have Judges *in Partibus*, becauſe that Church *ad Sanitam Romanam Eccleſiam, admiſſo nullo medio, pertinet.*

They publiſh Indulgences; they have a hundred and odd Pariſhes; they exert all the Dioceſan Juriſdiction, and the Appeal of all their Sentences is carried to *Rome*: They ordain all General Proceſſions.

St. *Martin* of *Tours* enjoys the ſame Priviledges.

Four ſorts of Perſons are particularly exempted in the Church; the Archbiſhops of the Primates; the Biſhops of the Archbiſhops; the Monks, and the Religious of the Biſhops; and the Canons of the Biſhops and Archbiſhops.

Thoſe

Thoſe Exemptions differ in many Circumſtances; ſome only exempt Perſons, and others alſo exempt the Place of their Abode, and that differently.

Anciently the Archbiſhops were ſubject to the Primates *, to whom the Pope ſent the *Pallium* to exert Power and Authority over the Metropolitans. But ſince thoſe of *France*, excepting thoſe of *Tours*, of *Sens*, and of *Paris*, have obtain'd, either by Bulls, or by Preſcription, leave to have no Dependance on the Primates.

* *'Tis but 60 Years ago, ſince the Archbiſhop of* Rouen *has been freed of the Yoke of the Primate of* Lyons, *and has made himſelf Primate of* Normandy.

Some Biſhops † have alſo obtain'd the Exemption of their Subjection to their Archbiſhops from the Pope.

† *The Biſhop* du Poy *is exempted from the Juriſdiction of the Archbiſhoprick of* Bourges, *and ſo are many others in* Italy; *yet they are oblig'd to appear in the Provincial Councils that are held by the Archbiſhops.*

St. Gregory *of* Tours *exempted an Hoſpital, a Church, and a Monaſtery from the Juriſdiction of the Biſhops of* Autun, *at the Requeſt of Queen* Brunchalt, *and of her Grandſon King* Thierry.

Crotbert *Archbiſhop of* Tours *exempted the Monaſtery of St.* Martin *from his Juriſdiction.*

The Monks are almoſt all exempted from the Common Juriſdiction, and their Right is grounded on the free Conceſſion of their Biſhops, or of the Popes; their moſt ancient Exemptions, are thoſe that were granted them 7 or 800 Years ago, by the Biſhops and Archbiſhops; but thoſe they have obtain'd ſince, have been granted by the Popes, to one of theſe ends, either leaſt the Preſence and Court of the Biſhops ſhould diſturb their Solitude, or to free them from the Rigour of ſome, by which they were, or pretended to be ſeverely us'd.

The last that have been exempted from the Jurisdiction of their Superiours, are the Canons. In their first Institution they were so strictly bound and united to their Bishops, that they could do nothing without their leave; and to endeavour to free themselves of their Obedience to them, would have been look'd upon as the greatest Crime they commit in those days

Many have been of Opinion, that they have obtain'd all their Exemptions from the Anti-Popes, or that they are evidently surreptitious, or barely grounded on the Possession of a Time out of Mind; but it is most certain, that some of them are more ancient than the Schisms, and more authoriz'd than those which draw their Force and Virtue from the Anti Popes.

* *A Letter of* Alexander *the 3d to the Chapter of* Paris, *shews, that the Popes have granted Exemptions.*

The most lawful have granted some; * either in Confirmation of the Concessions of the Bishops, or of the Agreements made with them; or of their own accord, under pretence to secure the Canons against the ill Usages they did receive from them.

In order to penetrate into the bottom of this matter, and clearly to distinguish the good Exemptions from the bad, we must consider the Bulls by which they are Authoriz'd differently.

Those that were granted by the Popes before the Misfortune of the Schisms are different from those which were granted since the Extinction of the same.

The first sort must be look'd upon as good and valid; but yet such Bulls being an Exemption from

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the common Right, which is always odious, muſt be carefully examin'd, for fear of being miſtaken in the Tenor of them; ſince it is certain, that many are produc'd as Bulls of Exemption, which are only Bulls of Protection, which were obtain'd anciently; and Bulls, which grant ſome particular Priviledges, but not an Exemption from the uſual Juriſdiction; or Bulls, which only authorize Chapters to erect a Juriſdiction inferiour to that of the Biſhops; like unto thoſe of the Arch-Deacons, who in ſome Churches have a right to Exeommunicate, to Interdict, and to injoin publick Penances, tho' they are ſtill ſubordinate to the Biſhop's Juriſdiction.

As for the ſecond ſort, as they are void in themſelves, for want of a Lawful Authority in thoſe who did grant them, particularly by the Conſtitution of Pope *Martin* the 5th, * which annihilates all Bulls obtain'd during the Schiſms, no body can pretend, without Malice or Ignorance, to make uſe of them to the Prejudice of the Common Right.

* *The Exemptions of* Sens, Paris, Bourges, Bourdeaux, Limoges, Meaux, Auxerre, *and the Country of* Mans, *have been obtain'd by the Anti-Popes.*

The third ſort have been granted, either to ſerve for new Exemptions, or to confirm preceding ones.

The firſt muſt be reputed void, either becauſe they are directly oppoſite to the Decree mention'd by *Martin* the 5th; or becauſe they have been ſurreptitiouſly obtain'd, as the Parliament of *Paris* and *Tholouſe* have adjudg'd it, againſt the Chapters of *Angers* and *Cahors*.

The ſecond being only granted to confirm an ancient Right, which is never found to be lawfully eſtabliſh'd, muſt, in the Judgment of all Impartial Perſons, be look'd upon as of no Effect.

* *The Exemption of Auxerre, Noyon, Orleans, Beauvais, Chalons, Angers Poitiers and Lyons are grounded on the Conceſſions of the Biſhops, and the Agreement made among them.*

It now remains to ſee whether the Exemptions* grounded on the bare Conceſſions made by the Biſhops, or on the Agreements and Arbitral Sentences interpos'd upon that Subject againſt them and their Chapters, are good and valid.

If it be never lawful for Biſhops to alienate their Temporal without an evident Advantage and Profit, much leſs can they renounce their Spiritual Authority, to the great prejudice of the Church, which thereby ſees her Members divided from the Head, and the Rule whereby it ſubſiſts chang'd into a Confuſion, which deſtroys it.

The Nullity of Agreements, mutual Promiſes, or Arbitral Sentences is very viſible by that Principle: No Man can compromiſe or transfer a thing, the Diſpoſition whereof is not in his Power; and if there be any Authors who are of Opinion, that Spiritual things may be transferr'd, all in general except ſome, among which the Subjection of this nature is the firſt: And indeed thoſe ſort of Titles are ſo invalid in the Caſe in queſtion, that tho' they were confirm'd by the Popes, they would not be ſufficient to deprive of their Right the Succeſſors of the Biſhops, who have parted with their Superiority in one of the three ways above ſpecify'd.

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As Reaſon ſhews that none of theſe ways can be of force againſt common Right; it alſo ſhews, that Bulls barely confirming the ſaid Conceſſions, Agreements, or Arbitral Sentences, give no Right to thoſe who would make uſe of them, becauſe they can have no more Force than the Foundation they ſuppoſe.

One Point only remains liable to Examination, *viz.* Whether the Cuſtom and ancient Poſſeſſion which Chapters claim againſt the Authority of their Biſhops, is a Title ſufficiently valid to make the Church undergo the Prejudice it ſuffers by Exemptions.

* Cuſtom is a very deceitful Rule; the ill ones, tho' nenever ſo ancient, are univerſally condemn'd; and all thoſe that are againſt common right, and deſtroy an Order eſtabliſh'd by Eccleſiaſtical Conſtitutions, muſt be reputed ſo, and can be no juſt ground of Preſcription, much leſs in what relates to Eccleſiaſtical than to Civil Laws, ſince the Settlements of the Church are grounded on a more certain Principle; and the Difficulty propos'd muſt be decided every where, by ſaying, That Cuſtom may ſerve as a Title in thoſe things which may be poſſeſs'd by common Right, but never in thoſe in which Poſſeſſion violates it; in which Caſe it is abſolutely void, unleſs it be accompany'd with a Title ſo Authentick, that it may be liable to no manner of Suſpicion: Whence it reſults, That Common Right ſubmitting all Canons to their Biſhops, there is no Cuſtom

* Cypr'anus. *Fruſtra quidam qui ratione vincuntur conſuetudinem nobis opponunt, quaſi conſuetudo major ſit veritate, aut non ſæcrit in ſpiritualibus ſequendum; ſi melius fuerit à ſpiritu ſancto revelatum.*

Cuſtom ſufficiently powerful to exempt them from that Subjection.

It is impoſſible to imagine the many Evils Exemptions are the Source of. They overthrow the Order the Church has eſtabliſh'd conſonant to Reaſon, which requires Inferiours to be ſubject to their Superiours. They ruine the Concord which ought to be between the Head and the Members; they authorize all ſorts of Violences, and leave many Crimes unpuniſh'd, as well in the Perſon of the Priviledg'd; as in that of many Libertines, who take the Advantage of them to ſecure themſelves.

There are two ways to redreſs that Evil, either by annihilating the Exemptions abſolutely, or by regulating them.

I am very ſenſible that the firſt Expedient, as the moſt abſolute, is the moſt difficult: But ſince it is not impoſſible, I will nevertheleſs propoſe it to your Majeſty, who has ever delighted in doing that which your Predeceſſors durſt not attempt.

However, I do not think it proper in relation to the Exemptions which Monks and their Monaſteries enjoy. As they are diſpers'd in divers Dioceſes, the Uniformity of Mind, which ought to reign among them, requires, that inſtead of their being govern'd by divers Biſhops, whoſe Minds are different, they ſhould be under the Government of one Regular Chief; upon which Foundation I affirm boldly, That it is as neceſſary to allow them the Poſſeſſion of the lawful Exemptions they enjoy, as it is juſt to know the Validity of them, by the Examination of their Bulls, which

which they extend ſometimes farther than Reaſon requires.

But I ſay moreover, that the other Exemptions may be aboliſh'd with ſo much Advantage for the Church, that that Univerſal Motive is ſufficient to make one deſpiſe particular Intereſts on that occaſion.

When a thing is juſt, it is a ſufficient Inducement for us to undertake it; and we are abſolutely oblig'd to do it when it is altogether neceſſary.

The Church having ſubſiſted hitherto without the Alteration I propoſe, I do not ſuppoſe it has this laſt Quality; but I ſay, that it would be very uſeful, in that it would leave no ſubject of Excuſe to the Biſhops, in caſe they were wanting in their Duty.

To make uſe of this firſt Expedient would only require a Revocation made by his Holineſs of the Exemptions and Priviledges in queſtion, and a Power given to the Biſhops to exert their Juriſdiction over their Chapters, and all other priviledg'd Perſons, except thoſe above mention'd.

Such a Bull, accompany'd by a Declaration from your Majeſty, verify'd in your Parliaments and in your Council, would break the Fetters which tie the Hands of the Prelates of your Kingdom, and would make them anſwerable for the Diſorders of their Dioceſes, which it is almoſt impoſſible for them to do at preſent.

The obtaining of the Pope's Bull would prove the eaſier in my Opinion, in that it is conſonant to the overtures of the Council of *Trent*, which declares

clares particularly *, That the Chapters and Canons cannot by virtue of any Exemption, Custom, Possession, Sentence, Oath and *Concordat* whatever, be excus'd of being visited, corrected, and chastis'd by their Bishops, or other Persons deputed by them: And tho' this Expedient were not relish'd at *Rome*, where Novelties, tho' useful, are commonly odious, and where the least Opposition generally obstructs great Advantages; your Majesty causing the Decree of the Council to be observ'd on this Subject, will have no need of any new Expedition.

I am sensible that this Remedy will be dislik'd by the Parliaments, with whom Use and Practice is far more prevailing, than whatever Reasons can be urg'd; but after having foreseen that good, and consider'd all the Obstacles which may be met in it, I declare boldy, that it would be much better to pass over all of them, than to stop at any opposition whatever: And your Majesty may undertake the said Alteration the better, and with more Reason, because that in restoring things upon the foot of common Right, you will restore them in their own Nature; and that it sometimes becomes Sovereigns to be bold on certain occasions, which are not only just, but of which the Importance cannot be question'd *.

* Sess. 14. Cha. of Ref. 1. *Capitula & Cathedralium & aliarum majorum Ecclesiarum illorum Persona Exemptionibus, Consuetudinibus, Sententiis, Juramentis, Concordatis, fieri si possint, quo minus à suis Episcopis, & aliis majoribus Prelatis per se ipsos solos, vel illis quibus sine videtur adjunctis, juxta Canonicas sanctiones, toties quoties opus fuerit visitari, corrigi, & emendari, etiam authoritate Apostolica possint & valeant.*

* Isidorus. *Sæpe per Regnum Terrenum, Cœleste Regnum profecit, ut qui infra Ecclesiam positi contra Fidem & Disciplinam Ecclesiæ agunt, vigore Principium conterantur.*

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The Canons keep their Titles ſo conceal'd, that it is impoſſible to come to the knowledge of them, unleſs by the King's Authority: Moreover, they often ſuppoſe them, when they have none; which *Peter de Blois* and *Peter le Venerable* openly complain of.

Tho' the Advantage of theſe two Expedients, which indeed are but one and the ſame, ought to prevail with the World to approve them; yet the Fear I am in, that the Difficulties which would be met with, to put them in Execution, would make them ineffectual, makes me paſs to the ſecond, which conſiſts in the Nomination of Commiſſioners, Biſhops, Canons and Monks, which being joyn'd to Deputies of the Council and of the Parliaments, ſhall take an Account of all the Exemptions and Priviledges of the Church; to the end, that being repreſented to your Majeſty, thoſe that will be found good and valid may be regulated; and thoſe that have no lawful Foundation, retrench'd and aboliſh'd: And the ſaid Expedient is the more practicable, in that the Ordinances of *Orleans* *, made under *Francis* the 2d, have a particular Article for the Regulations of Exemptions.

* Ordinance of *Orleans*, Art. 11. *All Canons and Chapters, whether Seculars or Regulars, and of Cathedral or Collegiate Churches, ſhall be equally ſubject to the Archbiſhop, or Dioceſan Biſhop, without being allow'd to plead any Priviledge or Exemption, in relation to the Viſitation and Puniſhment of Crimes, all Oppoſition or Appeals whatever notwithſtanding, without Prejudice to the ſame, of which we have transferr'd the Cognizance and retain'd the ſame to our Privy-Council.*

If, in the next place, the Pope would be pleas'd to impower in every Metropolis the Delegated Judges we have above propos'd, to regulate by the Authority

Authority of the Holy See, what the Biſhops will not be able to do of themſelves, by reaſon of the Exemptions, which will remain in their Force and Vigour, and your Majeſty to command your Council to take Cognizance of the Differences which will ariſe upon ſuch a Subject, you will abſolutely remedy all the Evils the ſaid Priviledges occaſion.

SECT. VII.

Which repreſents the Inconveniences that ariſe from the Biſhops not having an Abſolute Power to diſpoſe of the Benefices that are under them.

IT now remains to ſpeak of the Evil which proceeds from, that the Biſhops do not diſpoſe of the major part of their Cures of their Dioceſes, to which the Eccleſiaſtical or Lay-Patrons have a Right of Preſentation.

The Eccleſiaſticks began to enjoy the right of Patronage * in the Council of *Orange*, where it was ordain'd, That the Biſhops, who ſhould build Churches in another Dioceſe, ſhould have a Right to put ſuch Prieſts there as they ſhould think fit, provided their Capacity was approv'd of by the Dioceſan Biſhop.

* *The Year* 441.

* The ſame Right was alſo given by *Juſtinian* to the Laymen, who ſhould be Founders of Chappels, which they obtain'd afterwards even in reſpect of Monaſteries, which they ſhould be Founders of. * The

* Nouvell. 123. *Ch.* 18. *the Year* 541.

* The Ninth Council of *Toledo* moreover extended the Right of Laick Patronage to Parochial Churches, allowing the Founders to nominate Curates, leſt the Negligence wherewith Biſhops would ſerve their Foundations ſhould diſcourage them from making any new ones.

* *St. Gregory's Epiſtle to Secundinus, in the Year 598. juſtifies that Point.*

In the beginning this Right was of no longer continuance than the Founders Life, *Gregory* and *Pellagius* extended it to their Children; and finally, under *Charlemayne* it paſs'd to the Heirs, whoever they were, which has continu'd ever ſince.

This Right, which is approv'd of by ſeveral Fathers of the Church, being confirm'd by divers Councils, particularly that of *Trent*, muſt be look'd upon as holy and inviolable, by reaſon of its Ancientneſs, for its Authority founded on the Canons of the Fathers and of the Councils, and for the Advantage which accrues to the Church by the ſame, in favour of which many Foundations are made, thereby to acquire the Power to nominate thoſe that are to enjoy them.

But when I conſider, that Neceſſity has no Law, and that the Uſe of a Priviledge, which was good during the fervour of the Founders, is at preſent ſo prejudicial by the Corruption of thoſe who are Heirs of their Eſtate, but not of their Zeal and of their Virtue, nor even ſometimes of their Religion, that it is impoſſible to continue it, without expoſing many Souls to their Ruine: I dare affirm boldly, that a Diſorder of that Conſequence can no longer be conniv'd at, without being anſwerable for the ſame before God.

Many

Many are of Opinion, That the beſt Remedy for this Evil, is wholly to aboliſh the Cauſe of it; but when I conſider, that a Legacy of this nature cannot be poſſeſs'd with Juſtice, without performing the Conditions on which it has been given; and that the Fathers of the Council of *Trent*, who were ſenſible of the Abuſes of the ſame, durſt not alter them, I am at a ſtand; and I do not think that a private Man can, without Temerity, propoſe ſuch a Remedy: It will be better to have recourſe to a milder way, in ſome meaſure propos'd by the Council of *Trent* *, though not directly.

* *Seſſ.* 2. *Ch.* 18. of *Reff.*

† *Idem Seſſ.* 24. of the ſame Chapter.

That way is, † That the Synod ſhould Elect Examiners, by which all the Pretenders to Benefices, which have the Cure of Souls, ſhall be carefully examin'd, to the end that their Capacity and Probity being known, they may afterwards propoſe two or three of the moſt Capable, to the Patrons of the Cures which ſhall be vacant, for them to chuſe, and preſent to the Biſhop the Perſon which ſhall be moſt agreeable to them.

I am ſenſible that this Expedient takes off ſomething of the Liberty Patrons enjoy in *France* at preſent; but ſince in reſtraining it, it nevertheleſs leaves it them, and hinders incapable Perſons from being put into Cures, it ought to be receiv'd; and that the more willingly, in my Opinion, ſince that in redreſſing the Evil which ariſes from the Preſentations to Cures, if the Order of the Council be obſerv'd, it will alſo redreſs thoſe that are caus'd by the facility wherewith the Archbiſhops often receives the Prieſts, whom their Suffragans have refus'd:

refus'd; in that as the Council's Orders, that the Examiners, propos'd by it, to be the Judges of the Capacity of thoſe that are to be nam'd for Cures, ſhall be oblig'd to give an account of their Proceedings to the Provincial Councils; ſo it will not allow the Archbiſhops to paſs by their Judgment, without ſo juſt a Cauſe, that no body may diſapprove it.

SECT. VIII.

Of the Reformation of Monaſteries.

AFter ſuch juſt Regulations, as are above mentioned, it will ſuit with your Majeſty's Piety to Authorize the Reformation of Monaſteries as much as is poſſible.

I am very ſenſible, that many Conſiderations may give cauſe to fear, that thoſe which have been made in our Days, are not ſo auſtere in their Progreſs, as in their Beginning; but yet it is very neceſſary to mind, and to favour them; ſince Good does not change its Nature in not being laſting, but ſtill remains good; and that he who does what he can with Prudence for a good End, performs his Duty, and anſwers what God expects from his Care.

It is true, that I ever was of Opinion, and am ſo ſtill, That it were better to eſtabliſh moderate Reformations, in the Obſervation of which, both Bodies and Minds may ſubſiſt with ſome eaſe, than to undertake ſuch auſtere ones, that the ſtrongeſt Bodies will hardly be able to bear the Rigour of them. Temperate things are commonly con-

ſtant and laſting; but it requires an extraordinary Grace to make that ſubſiſt, which ſeems to force Nature.

It is alſo obſervable, That the Reformations of Religious Houſes in this Kingdom, muſt be different from thoſe of other States, which being free of Hereſies, require rather a profound Humility, and an exemplary Simplicity in the Members thereof, than Doctrine, which is altogether neceſſary in this Kingdom, in which the Ignorance of the moſt Vertuous Monks in the World may prove as prejudicial to ſome Souls who ſtand in need of their Learning, as their Zeal and Vertue are uſeful to others, and to themſelves.

I muſt needs ſay by the bye on this Subject, That as to what relates particularly to the Reformation of the Monaſteries of Women, to reſtore the Elections, and particularly the Triennial, inſtead of the King's Nomination, is not always an infallible Expedient.

The Brigues and Eactions which reign ſometimes amidſt the Weakneſs of that Sex, often riſe to that degree, that they are not ſupportable, and I have ſeen your Majeſty oblig'd twice to alter it, in places where you had ſetled it, to reſtore Things to their former ſtate.

As it behoves your Majeſty's Piety to labour about the Regulation of ancient Monaſteries, ſo it behoves your Prudence to put a ſtop to the progreſs of the over-great number of new Monaſteries which are daily eſtabliſh'd.

In order whereunto, it is neceſſary to deſpiſe the Opinion of certain Perſons, as Weak as Devout, and more Zealous than Prudent; who often fanſie,

fanſie, that the Salvation of Souls, and the Safety of the State, depends on that which is prejudicial to both.

As none but ſuch as are wicked or blind, can be inſenſible or diſown, that Religious Houſes are not only very uſeful, but alſo neceſſary; ſo none but thoſe who have an indiſcreet Zeal can be ignorant, that the exceſs of them is inconvenient, and that it might come to ſuch a point as would be ruinous.

That which is done for the State being done for God, who is the Baſis and Foundation of it; to Reform the Houſes that are already eſtabliſh'd, and to put a ſtop to the exceſs of new Eſtabliſhments, are two Works very agreeable to GOD, who loves Rule in all things.

SECT. IX.

Of the Obedience which is due to the POPE.

THE Order which God requires in all things, gives me an occaſion to repreſent to your Majeſty, in this place, That as Princes are oblig'd to acknowledge the Authority of the Church, to ſubmit to their Holy Decrees, and to pay an entire Obedience to the ſame, in what relates to the Spiritual Power which God hath placed in her hands for the Salvation of Mankind; and that as it is their Duty to maintain the Honour of the *Popes*, as Succeſſors of St. *Peter*, and Vicars of *Jeſus Chriſt*; ſo they ought not to yield to their Attempts, when they endeavour to extend their Power beyond its Bounds.

As Kings are oblig'd to reſpect the *Thiara* of the Soveraign Pontifs, the ſame Obligation lies upon them to preſerve the Power of their Crown.

This Truth is acknowledged by all Theologians; but it is very difficult to diſtinguiſh the Extent and Subordination of theſe two Powers aright.

In ſuch a matter, Princes are neither to credit the Gentlemen of the Long Robe, who commonly meaſure the King's by the Form of his Crown, which being round, has no end; nor thoſe who by the exceſs of an indiſcreet Zeal, declare themſelves openly in favour of *Rome*.

Reaſon adviſes us to hear both the one and the other, in order afterwards to reſolve the Difficulty by Perſons of ſo much Learning, that they may not be liable to miſtake through Ignorance; and ſo ſincere, that neither the Intereſts of the State, nor thoſe of *Rome*, may prevail with them againſt Reaſon.

I may declare with Truth, That I have ever found the Doctors of the Univerſity of *Paris*, and the moſt Learned Monks of all Orders, ſo reaſonable on this Subject, that I have never obſerv'd the leaſt Weakneſs in them, that could hinder them from defending the juſt Rights of this Kingdom; neither have I ever obſerv'd any exceſs of Affection in them for their Native Country, which could induce them, contrary to the true Sentiments of Religion, to diminiſh thoſe of the Church to augment the others.

In ſuch Caſes, the Opinion of our Fathers muſt be of great Weight; the moſt famous and moſt impartial Hiſtorians and Authors, who have written

ten in all Ages, muſt be carefully conſulted on thoſe Occaſions, in which nothing can be more dangerous than Weakneſs or Ignorance.

SECT. X.

Which ſets forth the Advantage of Learning; and ſhews how it ought to be Taught in this Kingdom.

HAving repreſented, that Ignorance is ſometimes prejudicial to the State; I am now to ſpeak of the Neceſſity of Learning, one of the greateſt Ornaments of States, this being the moſt proper place for it, ſince the Empire of it is juſtly due to the Church, by reaſon that all ſorts of Truths have a natural Relation to the firſt, the Sacred Myſteries of which, Eternal Wiſdom has been pleas'd to make the Eccleſiaſtical Order Depoſitories of.

As the Knowledge of Letters is abſolutely neceſſary in a Commonwealth, it is certain, that they ought not to be taught without diſtinction to every body.

As a Body having Eyes in all its Parts, would be monſtrous; a State would be the ſame, if all the Inhabitants thereof were Learned; we ſhould find as little Obedience in it, as Pride and Preſumption would be common.

The Commerce of Letters would abſolutely baniſh that of Trade, which enriches Nations; would ruine Husbandry, the true Mother of the People; and would ſoon deſtroy the Nurſery of Souldiers, which encreaſes more in the Rudeneſs of Ignorance, than in the Politeneſs of Sciences: Finally, it would

fill *France* with Litigious Persons, more proper to ruine private Families, and to disturb publick Peace, than to do the State any good.

If Learning were prophan'd to all sorts of Minds, we should see more Persons capable to form Doubts, than to resolve them; and many would be fitter to oppose Truths, than to defend them.

'Tis this Consideration which induces Politicians to say, that a well regulated State requires more Masters of Mechanick Arts, than Masters of Liberal Arts to teach Letters.

I have often heard Cardinal *du Perron*, for the same Reason, earnestly wish the Suppression of part of the Colledges of this Kingdom; he was desirous to have four or five famous ones establish'd in *Paris*, and two in every Metropolitan City of the Provinces.

He added to all the Considerations I have urg'd, that it was impossible to find a sufficient number of Learned Men in every Age to supply a great number of Colledges; whereas being contented with a moderate number, they might be fill'd with worthy Persons, who would preserve the Fire of the Temple in its Purity, and would transmit by an uninterrupted Succession the Sciences in their Perfection.

I cannot forbear thinking, when I consider the great number of Men who profess the Teaching of Letters, and the multitude of Children that are instructed, that I see an infinite number of Sick People, who only aiming to drink pure and clear Water for their Cure, are press'd with such a disorderly Drought, that receiving without distinction all those that are presented to them, the major part

part drink such as are impure, and often out of poyson'd Cups; which encreases their Drought and their Distemper, instead of easing either.

In fine, this great number of Colledges, indifferently establish'd in all places, produces two Evils; the one, by the mean Capacity of those that are oblig'd to Teach, there not being a sufficient number of eminent Persons to fill the Pulpits; the other, by the want of natural Disposition in those whose Fathers oblige them to study, by reason of the Conveniences of it, without examining their Capacity; which is the reason, that most of those that study have only a mean Tincture of Learning; some for want of more Capacity, others for not being well instructed.

Tho' this Evil is of great consequence, the Remedy is easie, since it only requires to reduce all the Colledges of such places as are no Metropolitans to two or three Classis, sufficient to free the Youth from gross Ignorance, prejudicial even to those who design to follow Arms, or to spend their Lives in Trading.

By that means, before Children are determin'd to any Condition, two or three Years will discover the Capacity of their Minds; after which, those that have a good Genius, being sent to great Cities, will succeed the better in their Learning, both upon that account, and by their being instructed by abler Masters.

Having thus provided against this Evil, which is much greater than it seems to be, we must also provide against another into which *France* would infallibly fall, if all the Colledges that are establish'd were in one Hand.

The Univerſities pretend, that a great deal of wrong is done them, in not leaving them excluſively from all others the faculty of Teaching Youth.

The Jeſuits on the other hand would not be diſpleas'd, perhaps, of being the only Perſons imploy'd in that Function.

Reaſon, which ought to decide all ſorts of Differences, does not permit the fruſtrating of an ancient Poſſeſſor, of what he poſſeſſes with a juſt Title: And Publick Intereſt cannot ſuffer a Society, not only recommendable by their Piety, but famous for their Learning, as the Jeſuits are, to be depriv'd of a Function, which they are able to perform with great Advantage for the Publick.

If the Univerſities ſhould teach alone, there would be cauſe to fear they would in time reſume their former Pride, which might prove as prejudicial for the future as it has been heretofore.

If on the other hand the Jeſuits had no Companions in the inſtructing of Youth, beſides that the like Inconvenience might be fear'd, there would be moreover a juſt ſubject to fear many others.

A Society which is govern'd, more than any ever was, by the Laws of Prudence; and which, devoting it ſelf to God, without depriving themſelves of the knowledge of the things of this World, lives in ſo perfect a Correſpondence, that the ſame Spirit ſeems to animate the whole Body: A Society, which by a blind Vow of Obedience is ſubmitted to a perpetual Chief, cannot, according to the Laws of Sound Policy, be much Authoriz'd in a State, in which a powerful Community muſt be formidable.

If

If it be true, as it is moſt certain, that Men have a natural Inclination to advance thoſe they have receiv'd their firſt Inſtructions from; and that Parents have always a particular Affection for thoſe who have educated their Children. It is alſo true, that the abſolute Education of Youth cannot be committed to the Jeſuits, without being expos'd to give them a Power, which would be the more obnoxius to States, in that all the Places and Honours which give the management thereof, would be fill'd by their Diſciples; and that thoſe who take an Aſcendant early over the Mind ſometimes retain it during their whole Life.

If we add, that the Adminiſtration of the Sacrament of Penance gives that Society a ſecond Authority over all ſorts of Perſons, which is of no leſs weight than the firſt: If we conſider, that by thoſe two ways they penetrate into the moſt ſecret Motions of Hearts and Families, it will be impoſſible not to conclude, that it is not fit to leave them the ſaid Miniſtry alone, without Competitors.

Thoſe Reaſons have been ſo powerful in all States, that we have no Example of any hitherto, who have been willing to yield the Empire of Letters, and the abſolute Education of their Youth to that Society alone.

If that Society, good and harmleſs in it ſelf, created ſo much Jealouſie in the Arch-Duke *Albert*, one of the moſt pious Princes of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, who only acted according to the Motions of the Council of *Spain*, that he thought fit to exclude them out of certain Univerſities, in which they were actually ſettled, and to oppoſe the new Settlements they deſign'd in *Flanders*.

If

If they have behav'd themſelves ſo, as to induce ſome Republicks to remove them abſolutely out of their Dominions, tho' with too much Rigour, it is the leaſt that can be done in this Kingdom, to give them ſome Check, ſeeing not only that they are ſubmitted to a Foreign and Perpetual Chief, but moreover, ſubject and at the Devotion of Princes, who ſeem to deſire nothing more, than to humble and ruine this Crown.

As in point of Faith all the Catholick States of the World have but one Doctrine; in that which does not relate to it, there are many who differ, from whence the Source of their Fundamental Maxims is often deriv'd; for which reaſon, ſtanding in need of ſome Theologians, who may on certain occaſions couragiouſly defend the Opinions, which have been always receiv'd there; and preſerv'd by an uninterrupted Tranſmiſſion, they require ſome free from any Ingagement with any ſuſpected Powers, having no dependance to deprive them of Liberty in things, in which Faith allows it to all the World.

Hiſtory informs us, that the Order of St. *Benedict* was formerly ſo abſolutely Maſter of the Schools, that no body was taught in any other places, and that it decay'd ſo abſolutely in point of Science and of Piety together in the Tenth Century of the Church, that it was call'd Unhappy upon that account. It alſo informs us, that the *Dominicans* have afterwards enjoy'd the ſame Advantages which thoſe good Fathers were firſt poſſeſs'd of; and that Time has depriv'd them of it like the others, to the great prejudice of the Church, which happen'd to be infected at that time with many

many Hereſies: It alſo informs us by the ſame means, that Letters are like paſſing Birds, which do not always remain in the ſame Country. And therefore Policy requires the preventing of the ſaid Inconvenience, which being come to paſs twice, is with Reaſon to be fear'd a third time; and which probably will not happen, if that Society has Companions in the Poſſeſſion of Letters.

All Parties are dangerous in point of Doctrine; and nothing can be more eaſie, than to form one under pretence of Piety, when a Society thinks it ſelf oblig'd to it by the Intereſt of their Subſiſtance.

The Hiſtory of Pope *Benedict* the 11th, againſt whom the *Cordeliers*, nettled upon the account of the Perfection of Poverty, *viz.* of the Revenue of St. *Francis*, were animated to that degree, that they did not only declare open War againſt him by their Books, but moreover by the Emperour's Arms; by favour of which an Anti-pope aroſe, to the great prejudice of the Church, is too great an Example to require any thing more to be ſaid upon that ſubject.

The more Societies adhere to their Chief or Superiour, the more they are to be fear'd, particularly by thoſe to whom they are not favourable.

Since then Prudence obliges not only to oppoſe whatever may be prejudicial to the State, but alſo to prevent whatever might contribute thereunto; ſince the Power of ſo doing often creates a Deſire ſo to do.

Since alſo the Weakneſs of Humane Nature requires a Counterpoiſe in all things, and that it is the Foundation of Juſtice; it is more reaſonable, that

that the Univerſities and the Jeſuits ſhould Teach in Emulation of one another, to the end that the ſaid Emulation may whet their Vertue, and that Sciences may the better flouriſh, and be certain in the State, in that being depoſited into the Hands of Two Guardians, if the one ſhould chance to loſe this ſacred Pledge, it may be found among the others.

SECT. XI.

Means to Regulate the Abuſes which are committed by Graduates in the obtaining of Benefices.

WHereas it would be prejudicial to a State, if Men of all Capacities ſhould apply themſelves to the Sudy of Letters, it is to be wiſh'd that Men of Senſe may be encourag'd in it. Your Majeſty cannot do a more uſeful thing to that end, than to put a ſtop to the Abuſes which are committed in the Diſtribution of Benefices, which ought to be reſerv'd for thoſe to whom they are due, as a Reward of their Labours.

None but ſuch as are Enemies to Learning and Vertue can queſtion that Right. The Council of *Baſle* *, and the *Concordate* which paſs'd afterwards at the Council of *Lateran*, between *Leo* X. and *Francis* I. have ſetled it too clearly, for any one to have ſuch a Thought: But yet, at the ſame time, Men muſt be void of Juſtice and Reaſon, not to be deſirous to

* Seſſ. 31. *The Council of* Baſle *ordained, that one third Part of the Benefices ſhould be conferr'd on Maſters of Arts, Batchelors, Licenciates, and Doctors of Phyſick, Law, and Theology, which have ſtudied a certain time in a Priviledg'd Univerſity.*

By the Concordate, *which was made ſince at*

to correct the Abuſes of the ſame; which are ſo great by fraudulent *Permutations*, by ſuppos'd Reſignations, by the Artifice of Patrons, and by the Authority of the *Indultaries*, who are more powerful than the Graduates, and by the Induſtry of thoſe who are only indebted to their Purſe for their Degrees; that the ſaid Priviledge is ſo far from being the Reward of Vertue at preſent, that it is only the Recompence of the Craft and Villany of thoſe, who being ignorant of Letters, are only learned in Litigiouſneſs.

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The true Remedy to that Evil, is to prefer, conformably to the Holy Canons, Doctors and Batchelors in Divinity, to all thoſe who have the ſame Degrees in other Faculties.

That among Theologians equal in Degrees, thoſe who have preach'd the Word of God, or Theology longeſt, be provided before the others.

That Doctors and Batchelors at Law may have the ſame Advantage over ſuch as are only Maſters of Arts; and that among the laſt, thoſe who have been longeſt Regents, be preferr'd firſt.

That none be allow'd to take out his Letters for the Maſterſhip of Arts, nor his Degrees in Civil or Canon Law, but in the Univerſities where he has ſtudied.

That none of the ſaid Letters be granted to any, but ſuch as have actually made an entire Courſe of Philoſophy; nor any Degrees in Civil or Canon Law, but to ſuch as have ſtudied for the ſpace of Three whole Years in Law-Schools, and

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have

have made their Exercises publickly, with the Intervals requir'd.

In case this Order be carefully observ'd, the Merit of Letters will certainly be rewarded; and Ignorance will no longer be protected by it, and receive what is only due to Learning.

If, in the next place, your Majesty will be pleas'd to free those, who shall make themselves famous for Learning, from the Persecution of the *Indultaries*, it will encourage many to redouble their Labour, in order to receive the deserv'd Reward of the same.

SECT. XII.

Of the Right of *INDULT.

*A Grant from the Pope to Confer Benefices.)

THE Right of *Indult* being deriv'd from a Bull of Pope *Eugene* †, which is not to be found; if it should be examin'd with rigour, we would find that the Foundation of it is not solid; since, according to Reason, such things as cannot be prov'd, ought to be put in the same Classis with those that are not.

† *Bull of Pope* Eugene, *granted to King Charles* 8th.

I am sensible, that *Paul* III. being willing to oblige the Presidents and Counsellors of the Parliament of *Paris* †, who did oppose the *Concordates*, gave them a Power of Nomination to Regular and Secular Benefices. I am also sensible, that the Chancellor of *France*, as President of the said Parliament, receiv'd the same Privilege by

† *The Bull was sent to King* Francis I. *in* 1538.

by the ſame Bull: But if we conſider that the ſaid Bull is grounded on that of his Predeceſſor, which is not to be found; that Conſideration will have no force, ſince Lawyers inform us clearly, That a Reference can have no force, unleſs the thing referr'd unto, is clear and evident*.

* *Non creditur referenti, niſi conſtet de relato.*

The leſs the Foundation of that Privilege is certain, the more the Abuſes which are committed in it, are inſupportable.

Notwithſtanding the ſaid Right is Perſonal; that is, Though it was only granted to the Perſon of the Officers, ſpecified by the Bull of Pope *Paul* III. it paſſes now to the Widow, and to the Heirs, as a Temporal Heritage: And tho' the ſaid Favour was only granted them, in order lawfully to gratifie either their Children, or ſome of their Relations or Friends, capable of the Benefices to which they ſhould be Nominated; they often, contrary to Divine and Human Laws, conſtrain thoſe who obtain Benefices by virtue of their *Indults*, to reſign them to whomſoever they think fit; abuſing the ſaid Priviledge to that degree, that often thoſe who will not hold them *in Commendam*, can only avoid that Crime, by committing another, which makes them guilty of Simony before God.

The Weakneſs of the Foundation of the ſaid Grant, and the Number * of Abuſes committed by virtue thereof, might lawfully induce your Majeſty to aboliſh it; which would be the eaſier, in that it would be ſufficient in order thereunto, to refuſe the *Indultaries* their Letters of Nomination, without which, they

* Aug. *Ipſa mutatio conſuetudinis etiam quæ adjuvant utilitate nonnulla perturbat.*

can

can pretend to no Benefices: But Experience teaching us, That an accuſtom'd Evil is often more ſupportable than a Good, the novelty of which is vexatious; it will be ſufficient for your Majeſty to make ſo good a Regulation, that thoſe who are to enjoy the Benefit of the ſaid Grants, may not be able to make an ill Uſe of the ſame, as they have done heretofore.

If you hinder the ſame Officer from having his Nomination upon ſeveral Benefices: If you order thoſe that ſhall be preſented by him to be Nominated, not to be admitted before a good Examination, according to the Ordinances, without Favour.

If you make an Order, that the Letters of their Nomination ſhall expreſs poſitively, That the Benefices to which they are Nominated, ſhall be really for them: That it ſhall not be allow'd for them to be conſtrain'd to reſign them to any body; and that if it be diſcover'd that if they lend their Names to any to poſſeſs the ſaid Benefices *in Commendam*, they ſhall not only be made incapable of ever poſſeſſing any Benefices for ſuch a Crime, but moreover be liable to Puniſhment.

If, in the next place, you are pleas'd to order the ſaid Right, which is only Perſonal, from being tranſmitted to Heirs; the Obſervation of ſuch a Regulation, will produce this effect, That your Officers not being depriv'd of the Favour your Predeceſſors have obtain'd for them, Learned Men will receive a great Advantage under your Reign, and will be deliver'd of the great Vexation they receive from them.

You

You might alſo refuſe to allow your Officers, after having Nominated a Man to an *Indult*, to ſubſtitute another in his room, in caſe he ſhould die before it be fill'd.

CHAP. III.

Of the NOBIITY.

SECT. I.

Divers Means to Advantage the Nobility, *and to make them Subſiſt Honourably.*

AFter having repreſented what I eſteem abſolutely neceſſary for the Re eſtabliſhment of the Firſt Order of your Kingdom; I proceed to the Second; and ſay, That the Nobility muſt be Reſpected, as one of the principal Sinews of the State, capable to contribute much towards its Preſervation and Settlement. They have been ſo much depreſs'd of late Years, by the vaſt Number of Officers, which the Misfortune of the Age has elevated to their prejudice, that it is very neceſſary to protect them againſt the Attempts of ſuch Men. The Wealth and Pride of the one, triumphs over the Neceſſity of the others, who are only rich in Courage, which induces them to employ their Lives freely for the State; of which your Officers reap the Advantage.

As it is neceſſary to protect them againſt thoſe who oppreſs them; ſo a particular Care muſt be taken to hinder them from uſing thoſe that are under them, as they are us'd by the others.

It is a common Fault in thoſe that are born in that Order, to exert Violence againſt the People, to whom God ſeems rather to have given Arms to get their Livelihood, than to defend themſelves.

It is abſolutely neceſſary to ſtop the courſe of ſuch Diſorders, by a continu'd Severity, to the end that the weakeſt of your Subjects, though unarm'd, may be as ſafe under the protection of your Laws, as thoſe who are arm'd.

The Nobility having ſhewn in this War, happily ended by a Peace, that they have Inherited the Vertue of their Anceſtors, which induc'd *Cæſar* to prefer them before all others; it will be fit to Diſcipline them, to the end that they may acquire a new, and preſerve their former Reputation, and that the State may be uſefully ſerv'd.

It is moſt certain, That the Nobility which does not ſerve you in the War, is not only uſeleſs, but a Burthen to the State; which in that Caſe may be compar'd to the Body which ſupports an Arm which is troubled with the Palſie, as a Load which burthens it, inſtead of affording it any eaſe.

As the Gentry deſerves to be well us'd when they do well, it is neceſſary to be ſevere againſt them, when they are wanting in what their Birth exacts from them: And I make no ſcruple of ſaying, That thoſe who degenerating from the Vertue of their Forefathers, do not ſerve the Crown with their Swords and Lives, with all the Conſtancy

ſtancy and Courage which the Laws of the State require, deſerve to be depriv'd of the Advantages of their Birth, and to be reduc'd to bear part of the Burthen of the People.

As Honour ought to be dearer to them than Life, it were better to chaſtiſe them, by depriving them of the firſt, than of the laſt.

To take away the Life of Men who expoſe it daily upon a meer Notion of Honour, is much leſs than to take away their Honour, and to ſave their Life; which in that Condition, is a perpetual Torment to them.

As all means muſt be us'd to maintain the Nobility in the true Vertue of their Fathers; ſo none muſt be omitted to preſerve them in the poſſeſſion of the Eſtates they have left them, and to help them to acquire new ones.

As it is impoſſible to find out a Remedy againſt all Evils; ſo it is very difficult to find out a general Expedient to the Ends I propoſe.

The many Marriages which are contracted in every Family in this Kingdom, (whereas in other States, ſeldom any but the Eldeſt Marries) are one of the true Cauſes which ruine the beſt Families in a ſhort time. But if that Cuſtom impoveriſhes private Families, it enriches the State, the main force of which conſiſts in the Multitude of Men; inſomuch that inſtead of complaining of it, it muſt be encourag'd; and inſtead of oppoſing it, means muſt be found out for the ſubſiſtance of thoſe it brings into the World, according to the Purity of Heart they derive from their Birth.

In order thereunto, it is neceſſary to diſtinguiſh the Nobility which is at Court, from thoſe who live in the Country.

That which is at Court will be conſiderably eas'd, by retrenching the State and inſupportable Expences which have been introduc'd there by degrees; ſince it is moſt certain, that ſuch a Regulation will do them more good than all the Penſions they receive.

As to thoſe who live in the Country, though ſuch an Order will not eaſe them ſo much, by reaſon of their Miſery, which will not allow them to make ſuperfluous Expences, they will nevertheleſs find the Benefit of the ſaid Remedy; ſo neceſſary for the whole State, that, without it, it can never avoid its ruine.

If your Majeſty be pleas'd to add to the Regulation of that Diſorder, the Eſtabliſhment of Fifty Troops of *Gens d'Armes*, and the like number of *Chevaux Legers*, to be paid in the Provinces, on the Conditions hereafter ſpecified, it will be a great help for the Subſiſtence of the moſt indigent Nobility.

If, in the next place, you ſuppreſs the Sale of the Governments of the Kingdom, and of all Military Imployments, which the ſaid Order pays ſufficiently for, at the Rate of their Blood.

If you obſerve the ſame Method in what relates to the Places of your Houſhold: If whereas at preſent all manner of Men are admitted into the ſame, by the diſhonourable Traffick of their Purſe, you prohibit the receiving of any Perſon into them, but ſuch as have the Happineſs of being of a Noble Blood: If, moreover, the Entrance there-

of

of be no longer allow'd, even to thoſe who have that Advantage, unleſs by your Majeſty's choice of them, in conſideration of their Merit, the ſaid good Regulation will prove both Advantagious and Honourable to all the Nobility.

Whereas at preſent Gentlemen can only purchaſe Places and Dignities at the Rate of their Ruine, their Fidelity will be the more certain for the future, by reaſon that the more they will be gratified, the leſs they will think themſelves indebted, for the Honours they will receive, to their Purſes, and to their Creditors, who never put them in mind of what they owe them; but at the ſame time they are troubled for being rais'd that way.

If, moreover, you will be pleas'd to extend your Favour ſo far, as to be careful to gratifie their Children (who ſhall be found to have as much Learning and Piety as is requir'd) with part of the Benefices that are in your Gift; that Order will be the more oblig'd to you, in that diſcharging them of part of the Burthen which overwhelms them, you will put them in a way to keep up their Families, ſince the Support and Preſervation of the beſt, depends often on thoſe who eſpouſing an Eccleſiaſtical Life, commonly look on their Nephews as their own Children, and place their chief Delight in bringing up ſome of them to Learning and Vertue, in order to their being promoted to ſome of thoſe they are in poſſeſſion of, if they prove capable of them.

I might mention many other things to eaſe the Nobility; but I ſuppreſs the Thoughts of it, upon Conſideration, That as it would be very eaſie to

write them, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to put them in practice.

SECT. II.

Which Treats of the Means to prevent Duels.

SO many Edicts have been made hitherto to no purpose, to put a stop to Duels, that it is very difficult to find out a certain Way to stop the course of that Rage.

The *French* despise their Lives so much, that Experience has taught us, that the most rigorous Proceedings have not always prov'd the best to stop their Frenzie.

They have often fancy'd, that it was very glorious to violate the Edicts; and to shew by such an Extravagance, that they valued their Honour more than their Life: But the dread of losing the Conveniency, without which, they cannot live happy in this World, having a greater influence over them than the fear of Dying without the Grace of God, without which they will be unhappy in the next; the fear of losing their Places, their Estates, and their Liberty, has prov'd more prevailing than the fear of losing their Life.

I have us'd my utmost Endeavour to find out some proper Remedy for the Cure of this dangerous Distemper. I have often consulted to know, whether as it is lawful for Kings to make two private Men Fight, to prevent a Battel, and thereby to decide the difference which has oblig'd them to take Arms, they might not also grant some Combats, to avoid the multitude of Duels that are daily

daily Fought. I urg'd, That it was very likely that this proceeding might free *France* of this Frenſie, which is ſo prejudicial to it, ſince that in putting thoſe in hopes of obtaining leave to Fight, who ſhould have a juſt Reaſon to claim the Combat, every Man would freely ſubmit to the Judges deputed to examine the Nature of the Offence; which probably might prevent the Misfortune of Duels, ſince moſt Quarrels would be determin'd by a good Accommodation.

The better to favour this Thought, I added, That formerly many Duels had been allow'd of in this Kingdom, which had alſo been practis'd in divers States.

I thought it might be a means to aboliſh the Barbarity of the Cuſtom, which wills, That every Man that is offended, ſhould do himſelf Juſtice, and find his Satisfaction in his Enemy's Blood: But after having perus'd, over and over, what the moſt Authentick Authors ſay upon thoſe Matters, and often mus'd on this important Subject, I have found by the Advice of the leaſt ſcrupulous and moſt reſolute Theologians of the Time, That Kings being Eſtabliſh'd to preſerve their Subjects, and not to ruine them, they cannot expoſe their Life without ſome publick Uſe, or particular Neceſſity: That they cannot permit private Combats, without expoſing the Innocent to receive the Puniſhment of the Guilty, ſeeing that God not having oblig'd Himſelf always to render Reaſon victorious, the Fate of Arms is uncertain: And that notwithſtanding ſuch Permiſſions have been Authoriz'd ſometimes, at leaſt in divers States, and even with the Approbation of ſome particular

Churches, they have ever prov'd abuſive; which appears evidently, ſince finally the Univerſal Church has prohibited and condemned them, under very great Penalties. I have diſcover'd, that there was a great deal of difference between making two particular Perſons fight, to prevent a Battel, and to put a period to a War, and making them fight to prevent a Duel.

The Firſt is lawful; becauſe Nature teaches us, That Part ought to be expos'd for the Whole; and that Reaſon requires, That Particular Perſons ought to be hazarded for the General Good; by reaſon that beſides that the ſaid Expedient has been practis'd at all times, we find Examples of it in Holy Writ; and that the Effect of it is wholeſom and certain, in that whatever Event a Duel allow'd of in this Caſe may have, it ſaves the Lives of abundance of Men, who may ſerve the Publick in other Occaſions.

But it is not ſo with the Second, which is unlawful in its Nature, ſince that inſtead of certainly ſaving the Generality, by the hazard of ſome private Perſons, and thus to prevent a great loſs by a ſmall, it expoſes private Men directly to their Ruine, upon the bare Imagination of a publick Good, which has no certain Foundation: This Method is the leſs allowable, ſince that inſtead of preventing Duels, it is capable to increaſe the Licentiouſneſs of them; becauſe the Blindneſs of the Nobility is ſuch, that many being of Opinion, That to demand a Combat thus, would be to ſeek out a way to avoid it, would think themſelves oblig'd in Honour to find out a ſhorter way to right themſelves, and to ſhew their Courage.

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The late King attempted this Way, in 1609. with all the Circumſtances that could make it uſeful: He depriv'd all thoſe of Eſtates, Places, and Life, who ſhould Fight without leave; but all in vain: And that oblig'd your Majeſty, after having made the ſame Trial at the Beginning of your Reign, to have recourſe by your Edict of *March* 1626. to another Remedy, which has prov'd more effectual, by reaſon that though the Penalties of it are more moderate, yet they are more ſmarting to thoſe who value their Lives leſs than their Eſtates and Liberty.

Now whereas the beſt Laws in the World are uſeleſs, unleſs they are inviolably obſerv'd; and that thoſe who commit thoſe kind of Faults, uſe ſo much Art to invalidate the Proofs of it, that it is almoſt always impoſſible to convince them.

I preſume to tell your Majeſty, That it is not enough to puniſh averr'd Duels and Challenges, by the Rigour of your Edicts; but when there is a Notoriouſneſs without Proof, it will be abſolutely neceſſary to impriſon the Delinquents at their own Charge, for more or leſs time, according to the divers Circumſtances of their Faults: Otherwiſe, the common Negligence of your Attorneys-General to inform againſt them, the Indulgence of your Parliaments, and the Corruption of the Age, which is ſuch, that every Man eſteems it as Honourable to aſſiſt thoſe who have Fought to diſguiſe their Crime, as an honeſt Gentleman would think it ſhameful to conceal the Theft of a Robber, will make the Edicts and your Cares ineffectual.

'Tis in ſuch a Caſe, that nothing but the way of Fact can oblige Men to obſerve your Laws and Ordinances; 'tis on thoſe Occaſions your Authority muſt paſs over Forms to maintain Rule and Diſcipline, without which a State cannot ſubſiſt; and it will enable your Officers to puniſh Crimes according to Forms, ſince it is more probable that the Cauſe and Proof of a Fault will be ſooner found when the Guilty are ſeiz'd, than when at liberty to uſe their utmoſt Endeavours to ſtifle the Diſcovery of the ſame.

If, in the next place, your Majeſty will be pleas'd to order Rancounters to paſs for Duels, and to be puniſh'd as ſuch, until thoſe who have been guilty of them, ſurrender themſelves Priſoners, and are abſolv'd of the ſame by Law; you will do whatever is probable to ſtop the courſe of that Frenſie; and your Care to preſerve the Lives of your Nobility, will make you Maſter of their Hearts, and will engage them to ſo ſtrict an Allegiance, that they will pay with Uſury, whatever your Majeſty can expect from them, in all the Imployments they are gratified with.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Third ORDER of the Kingdom.

TO Treat of the Third *Order* of the Kingdom with Method, and to ſee clearly what is proper to be done to make it ſubſiſt in the State in which it ought to be, I will divide it into Three Parts.

The First ſhall contain the Body of the Officers of Juſtice.

The Second, of thoſe who have the Management of the *Finances*. And

The Third, the People, which commonly bears the Burthen of the State.

SECT. I.

Which relates in general to the Diſorders of the Courts of Juſtice; and examines in particular, whether the Suppreſſion of the Sale of Offices, and of Hereditary Offices, would be a proper Remedy for ſuch Evils.

IT is much eaſier to diſcover the Defects of the Courts of Juſtice, than to preſcribe Remedies for the ſame: Every body is ſenſible, that thoſe who are appointed to hold the Scale even in all things, have inclin'd it ſo much themſelves on one ſide to their own Advantage, that there is no longer any Counterpoiſe.

The

The Diſorders of the Courts of Juſtice are come to that paſs, that they can go no farther: I would enter into the Particulars of the ſaid Diſorders, and of the Remedies which may be applied to the ſame, if the Knowledge I have both of the Perſon of him who has the Firſt Office of Juſtice at preſent, and of his Deſign to render it as pure, as the Corruption of the World will allow it, did not oblige me barely to propoſe certain general Remedies to your Majeſty, to ſtop the progreſs of the principal Diſorders.

In the Opinion of the Generality of the World, the Chief conſiſts in ſuppreſſing the Sale of Offices, in extinguiſhing the Inheritance of the ſame; and in giving them *gratis* to Perſons of ſuch known Capacity and Integrity, that even Envy it ſelf may not be able to conteſt their Merit.

But whereas it is a thing which cannot be done at this time; and that it will be difficult to practice this Expedient at any other, it would be uſeleſs at preſent to propoſe Means to that End.

Whenever the ſaid Deſign is undertaken, ſome will certainly be found, which cannot be foreſeen at preſent; and thoſe one might preſcribe, would be no longer in ſeaſon, when the thing might be attempted.

In the mean time, though it is commonly dangerous to be ſingular in Adviſing, I cannot forbear ſaying boldly, That conſidering the preſent State of Affairs, and that which may be foreſeen for the future, it is better, in my Opinion, to continue the ſaid Sale and Inheritance of Offices, than abſolutely to alter the Settlement thereof.

So

So many Inconveniences are to be fear'd in ſuch an Alteration, that as though the Elections for Benefices are more ancient, and more Canonical than the Nomination of Kings; nevertheleſs the great Abuſes which have been committed in the ſame, and which it would be impoſſible to prevent, render the Nominations more ſupportable, as leſs ſubject to ill Conſequences.

So, notwithſtanding the ſuppreſſion of the Sale, and Inheritance of Offices, is conſonant to Reaſon, and to all the Conſtitutions of Right; yet the inevitable Abuſes which would be committed in the diſtribution of Offices, depending ſo much on the bare Will of Kings, and conſequently on the Favour and Craft of thoſe who ſhould have moſt Power with them; would render the preſent proceeding in the ſame, more tolerable than that which has been us'd heretofore, by reaſon of the great Inconveniences which alway attended it.

All reaſonable Men muſt needs ſee the difference between theſe two Parties, and heartily deſire the ſuppreſſion of the Sale and Inheritance of Offices, ſuppoſing that in this caſe Places would be diſtributed by the pure Conſideration of Vertue.

Neither can they be ignorant, that in ſuch a Caſe, the Artifices of the Court would prevail before Reaſon, and Favour before Merit.

Nothing contributed more to make the Duke of *Guiſe* ſo Powerful, in the League againſt his King and Country, as the great Number of Officers his Credit had introduc'd in the greateſt Employments of the Kingdom. And I have been told by the Duke of *Sully*, That the ſaid Conſideration was the

moſt

most powerful Motive which induc'd the late King to the Eſtabliſhment of * the Annual Duty: That that great Prince had not ſo much regard to the Revenue which accru'd to him by it, as to the Means to ſecure himſelf for the future againſt ſuch Inconveniences: And that notwithſtanding Treaſure had a great Influence over him, Reaſons of State were more prevailing on that occaſion.

* *Duty yearly paid by the Judges and other Officers, &c.*

In the new Eſtabliſhment of a Commonwealth, it were a Crime not to baniſh the Sale of Offices, becauſe in ſuch Caſes, Reaſon obliges to eſtabliſh the moſt perfect Laws Human Society can permit: But Prudence does not allow it in ancient Monarchies; the Imperfections of which are turn'd to uſe, and the Diſorder of which (not without Advantage) compoſes part of the Orders of the State.

In ſuch Caſes, Men muſt ſubmit to Weakneſs, and prefer a moderate Regulation, to a more auſtere Settlement, which perhaps would be leſs proper, the Rigour of it being capable to ſhake the Fabrick which one would ſtrengthen.

I am ſenſible that it is a common Saying, That he who buys Juſtice by the Lump, may ſell it by Retail; but yet it is certain, that an Officer who lays out the beſt part of his Eſtate upon a Place, will be kept from doing ill in a great meaſure, for fear of loſing all that he is worth; and that in ſuch a caſe, the Price of Offices is not an ill Pledge of the Fidelity of the Officers.

The Complaints which are made againſt the Sale of Offices, have been the ſame in all the Ages

of

of the Monarchy; but though they have ever been look'd upon as reasonable in themselves; yet the Disorders, upon which they are grounded, have been tolerated, supposing that we are not capable of the austere Perfection which is the scope of them.

Those who are not ignorant of History, must needs know, that some Writers, not even sparing the King St. *Lewis*, have upbraided his Reign, because, Places were not bestow'd *gratis* in his Time: That they condemn others after him, because the Traffick of Offices was already so publick, that the Money arising by the same was Farm'd; and that they cast an Odium upon the Memory of the great King *Francis*, because he was the first, who upon the account of the necessity of the Age he liv'd in, made a Regulated Commerce of them, which has lasted ever since.

I own that it is a Misfortune for that great Prince, to have been the first Author of that evil Establishment; but perhaps he would not be blamable, if the Reasons which constrain'd him to do it were known. The Knowledge he had that his Favours were sold by private Persons without his Leave, and the Importance of the Affairs which overwhelm'd him, persuaded him that there was no better nor more ready way to get the Estates of his Subjects voluntarily, than to give them Honour for Money.

The late King, assisted by a very good Council, in a profound Peace, and in a Reign free from Necessity, added the Establishment of the Annual Duty, to the Sale of Offices, introduc'd by that great Prince:

It

It is not to be presum'd that he did it unadvisedly, and without having foreseen, as much as Humane Prudence could permit, the Consequences of the same; and it is most certain, that those things which have been done by Princes, whose Conduct has been Judicious, cannot be chang'd without a Reason; unless Experience discovers the Prejudice of them, and that it is evident that one might do better.

The Disorders which have been Establish'd by Publick Necessities, and strengthned by Reasons of State, cannot be reform'd without Time: It must be done by degrees, without passing from one Extream into another.

An Architect, who by the Excellence of his Art corrects the Defects of an ancient Building, and who without pulling of it down, reduces it to some supportable symetry, deserves more Praise, than he who ruines it absolutely, to erect a new Edifice perfect and accomplish'd.

It would be very difficult to change the Order establish'd for the disposition of Offices, without altering the Hearts of those that are in possession of them; in which case, there would be reason to fear, That whereas in Times past they have been serviceable to keep the People within the Bounds of their Duty, they would contribute more towards their Debauches for the future, than any others. Prudence obliges sometimes to weaken Remedies, to make them the more effectual; and those Orders which are most consonant to Reason, are not always the best, because they are not always proportion'd to the Capacity of those that are to put them in practice.

Where-

Whereas the ſuppreſſion of the Sale and Inheritance of Offices, ought to make way for Vertue, it would only make way for Brigues and Factions, and would fill Places with Officers of low Extraction, often more loaden with Latin than Eſtates; which would produce many Inconveniencies. If Men could obtain Places without Money, Merchandiſe would be forſaken by many, who being dazled with the Splendor of Offices, would ſooner embrace Offices and their Ruin together, than addict themſelves to Merchandiſe, which inriches Families.

Moreover, it is very well known, that the Weakneſs of this Age is ſuch, that Men yield more to Importunities, than they are guided by Reaſon; and that inſtead of being rul'd by Juſtice, Favour oftentimes ſways us.

The Experience of what is paſt, ſhould make us fear the future; both becauſe it has ever ſhewn us, That the moſt powerful in Credit often gain their Cauſe, to the prejudice of Vertue; and that as the Prince and his Confidents can only know the Merit of Men, by the Judgment of others, they are often liable to take the Shadow for the Body.

A low Birth ſeldom produces the Parts which are neceſſary in a Magiſtrate; and it is certain, that the Vertue of a Man that is well-born, has ſomething more noble in it, than that which is found in Men of meaner Extraction. The Minds of ſuch Men are difficult to manage; and many of them have ſuch a nice Authority, that it is not only troubleſome, but alſo prejudicial.

It is with the firſt, in reſpect to the ſecond, as with Trees, which being planted in a good Ground, produce better Fruit, and finer, than thoſe which

are in an ill one: And therefore the Sale of Offices ought not to be condemn'd, becauſe it excludes many Perſons of low Extraction from Places and Offices; ſince, on the contrary, 'tis one of the Reaſons which rather makes it tolerable.

A good Eſtate is a great Ornament to Dignities; which are ſo much heightned by exteriour Luſtre, that one may boldly affirm, That of two Perſons of equal Merit, he whoſe Circumſtances are the moſt eaſie, is preferrable to the other; ſince it is moſt certain, That a poor Magiſtrate muſt have a world of Vertue to withſtand the Temptations of Intereſt. Experience alſo informs us, That the Rich are leſs liable to Extortion and Bribes, than the others; and that Poverty conſtrains an Officer to be very careful of the Revenue of the Bag.

It may perhaps be urg'd, That though theſe Inconveniences may induce to ſuffer the Sale of Offices; yet it is moſt certain, that the Annual Duty ought to be ſuppreſs'd, becauſe it puts Offices out of Price, and hinders vertuous Men from obtaining them even for Money.

The late King foreſeeing that Evil, had inſerted, in the Edict he made upon that Subject, Precautions capable to prevent it; excepting not only from the Annual Right the Offices of firſt Preſidents, Attorneys, and Advocates General, but moreover reſerving to himſelf the diſpoſal of the Offices that are compris'd in the ſame, when they were vacant, paying in lieu thereof, to the Heirs of thoſe who were in poſſeſſion of them, the Price they ſhould be valued at.

Thoſe Precautions were as equitable as neceſſary; and to ſay the truth, the Evils which the Annual Duty

Duty, cauſes at preſent in the State, do not proceed ſo much from the Defect of its Nature, as from the Imprudence of thoſe who have remov'd the Clauſes which that great Prince had included in it. Had the Edict been kept in its firſt Purity, Offices had never come to the exceſs of Price they are at preſent. The Alterations that have been made in it, have made the uſe of it as prejudicial, as it would have been innocent, had it been left in the firſt from in which it was made; and therefore it is fitter to correct the Abuſes of it, than to reverſe it.

The Revocation of the Annual Duty, would oblige the old Officers to quit their Offices, when the Experience and Maturity of their Age would render them moſt capable to ſerve the Publick. Yet it is neceſſary to have both old and young ones, by reaſon, that as the Prudence of the firſt may be of great uſe to direct the others, the Vigour of the younger ſort is neceſſary to revive and animate the old ones.

If I had a mind, by this Work, to acquire the Inclination of the People, rather than to deſerve their Good-will, by making my ſelf uſeful to the State, I would maintain, That it is neceſſary to ſuppreſs the Sale of Offices and the Annual Duty at once; all Men are ſo prepoſſeſs'd that they are the two Sources of the Diſorders of the Kingdom, that the Publick Voice would decree Crowns for me, without examining whether I deſerve them or no.

But being ſenſible, that thoſe who endeavour to gain Reputation, by the Overture of a Reformation, more conformable to the Rigour of the Laws, than proportion'd to the Strength of the State,

only ſeek their own Intereſt, and can never excuſe a Vanity, which is not only blamable, but criminal alſo; and that in ſuch a caſe, their Cares, though ſpecious, are as prejudicial to the Publick, as the Negligence and Malice of others.

I will take ſpecial care not to commit ſuch a Fault; the ſuppreſſion of thoſe two Edicts is attended with too many Inconveniences, to conclude it neceſſary to be done.

If they did really contribute towards Negligence and Vice, as it is commonly ſuppos'd, I would give my Vote immediately for the revocation of them: But when I conſider, that if any Perſons are admitted into Offices, not being qualified for the ſame, it is only the fault of the Attornies General, who are to enquire into their Lives and Converſation, and of the Courts; which being Judges of their Capacity and Vertue, ought to refuſe them when they want the Qualifications requir'd. I cannot forbear ſaying, That the Remedy of the Evil conſiſts more in the obſervation of the Ordinances, than in the ſuppreſſion of the Sale of Offices and Annual Duty, which are not the Cauſes thereof.

Perhaps it may be urg'd, That if Places of Judicature were not ſold, Juſtice might be adminiſtred *gratis*; but provided the Charges of it be regulated, they cannot be conſider'd as a great Grievance.

I am ſenſible, that examining the thing with rigour, that very Price which is due for the Adminiſtration of Juſtice, is paid for the loſs of the Liberty of thoſe who have voluntarily ſubmitted themſelves to the Obſervation of Laws; and therefore, that to oblige thoſe who go to Law, to give

Money,

Money, is obliging them to buy that a ſecond time, which they have already dearly purchas'd by their Subjection. Nevertheleſs, the ſaid Cuſtom has prevail'd ſo far, that though the Spice is ſharp by its Nature, yet no body dares complain of that which is paid in the * Palace; and ſhould any body propoſe to aboliſh the uſe of it, they would expoſe themſelves to the Laughter of all the World.

* *The place where the Courts of Judicature are held.*

There are Abuſes which muſt be tolerated, for fear of falling into Inconveniences of worſe Conſequence: Time and Occaſion will open the Eyes of thoſe who will ſucceed in other Ages, to perform that uſefully, which we dare not undertake in this, without expoſing the State imprudently to a great deal of danger.

All the Reaſons aboveſaid, and many others being maturely conſider'd, though the Sale and Inheritance of Offices are not Canonical; though it were to be wiſh'd that Merit were the only Price of Offices, and Vertue the only Title to tranſmit the ſucceſſion of them to the Heirs of the Officers, inſtead of concluding for the alteration of thoſe two Settlements, the preſent Conſtitution of the State obliges me to ſay three things determinately.

The Firſt is, That by the Reverſion of the Act for the Sale of Offices, the Diſorders which would proceed from the Brigues, and the Sollicitations which would be made for the obtaining of Offices, would be greater than that which ariſes by the liberty of Selling, or Buying of them.

The Second, That if the Inheritance of the ſame were only aboliſh'd, beſides that the abatement it would daily occaſion in the Price of the

Offices which would become vacant, would render the Revenue, which accrues to the King by the Sale of the ſame, wholly inſignificant; and that thereby a baſe Commerce would be introduced, which would enable many Men of little Merit, ſecretly to ſhare the Favours, which Kings only deſign for their Officers, we would relapſe into the Evil the late King endeavour'd to free the State from, when by the Eſtabliſhment of the * *Paulette*, he depriv'd the Grandees of the Kingdom of the means to make many Creatures at his Coſt, to ſerve them on all Occaſions, to the prejudice of the Publick Good.

* *A yearly Revenue which the King receives from all Officers of Judicature, &c.*

The Third is, That ſince the Virtue of Men is not always ſtrong enough to induce them to preſer Merit before Favour; it is better to leave the Sale of Offices and the Annual Duty, than to aboliſh thoſe two Settlements, which are very difficult to alter all of a ſudden, without endangering the State.

But, I add, That it is abſolutely neceſſary to moderate the Price of Offices; which is riſen to that degree, that the exceſs of it is intolerable.

If the Excellence of a Council conſiſts in its being uſeful and eaſie to put into practice, this ought to be receiv'd, ſince the Benefit of it is evident, and the Practice eaſie; ſince the execution of it only requires to reſtore the Edict of the Annual Duty to the firſt terms of its Settlement.

In ſo doing, Offices being reduc'd to a reaſonable Price, which will not exceed one half of that, to which the Extravagance of the Age has brought it at preſent; and the King having the liberty to pay it to the Heirs, to diſpoſe of the ſaid Places

Places according to his Pleaſure, the State would be ſo far from receiving any prejudice by it, that, on the contrary, I dare repeat, that a conſiderable Advantage would accrue by it.

Moreover, things may be reduc'd to that point, without affording the leaſt cauſe of Complaint to the Parties concern'd; ſince it is eaſie to make them amends for the Prejudice they have done themſelves by divers means I do not ſpecifie at preſent, by reaſon that if they were diſcover'd, they would loſe their Force, before they could be put in practice.

SECT. II.

Which propoſes the general Means which may be us'd to put a ſtop to the Diſorders of the Courts of Juſtice.

AFter what is aboveſaid, I have nothing to add before I conclude this Chapter, but what I have repreſented to your Majeſty, upon the Subject of the Firſt Order of your Kingdom.

If you encourage thoſe Officers of Juſtice, who are Men of an unſpotted Reputation; if you diſcourage thoſe, who, being deſtitute of all Merit, have nothing but Money to obtain the Magiſtracy; if you deprive all thoſe of your Favour, and cauſe them to be puniſh'd who do not perform their Duty, and do ſell Juſtice to the prejudice of your Subjects, you will abſolutely do whatever can be uſefully done for the Reformation of that Body, which, as well as that of the Eccleſiaſtical Order, depends more on thoſe who have the Adminiſtration of them, than on Laws and Regulations, which remain uſeleſs, unleſs thoſe who are employ'd to ſee them obſerv'd, are willing to perform it.

Although the Laws were defective, if the Officers are Men of Honour, their Integrity will be capable to ſupply that Defect and let them be never ſo good, they prove ineffectual, when the Magiſtrates neglect the putting them in execution; much more when they are ſo wicked as to pervert the uſe of them, according to their Paſſions: Since it is difficult to be a Judge, and young at the ſame time, I cannot forbear obſerving, after what I have ſaid, That it is a thing of no ſmall Conſequence, in order to reform the Courts of Juſtice, to put the Ordinances in execution, in what relates to the Age of Officers.

In my Opinion, it is impoſſible to be too exact in it, nor conſequently too ſevere towards the Attornies General who ſhall be wanting in their Duty, in taking care that the Parties concern'd may not be able to ſurpriſe the Judges on that Subject, nor to elude the good Intentions of the Prince, by Suppoſitions or Concealments.

Thereby the Evil of Youth, which is conſiderable, will be avoided, as well as that of Ignorance, which is the Source of many others.

Officers not being able to precipitate themſelves, as they do at preſent, in their Reception, will ſtudy more; ſince otherwiſe they would remain idle, which ſeldom happens to thoſe who have ſtudy'd until they have obtain'd the End they propoſe.

I muſt not omit ſaying on this Subject, That it would be fit abſolutely to retrench the Practice of certain Doctors, who, prompting the Young ones like Parrots, often teach them to ſay things they do not underſtand, and only make them Learned in cheating the Publick, and themſelves alſo.

Such Men may be compar'd to Fencing-Maſters,

who

who are only good to inſtruct Men to their own ruin, and to hinder them from Learning the true Exerciſes of Soldiers, which are only learn'd in Armies, with a great deal of time and fatigue.

The baniſhment of ſuch, would be of great uſe; which in the Practice would be found as difficult, as it is eaſie in the Propoſition. Therefore I rather chuſe to condemn the Fathers in this place, who ſuffer their Children to be inſtructed thus, and to adviſe them no longer to commit any ſuch Faults againſt their own Blood, than to intreat your Majeſty to preſcribe new Laws upon that Subject; which would be no ſooner made, but a thouſand ways would be found out to elude the Effect of the ſame, and to avoid the putting of them in practice.

The Experience which Twenty Years of continual Occupation I have had, in the Adminiſtration of Publick Affairs, has given me, obliges me to obſerve, That though it were to be wiſh'd, that the Sedentary Courts, which are abſolutely eſtabliſh'd to adminiſter Juſtice to every one, and to prevent and regulate all the Diſorders of the Kingdom, ſhould acquit themſelves ſo well of their Duty, that there might be no neceſſity to have recourſe to extraordinary Commiſſions to maintain them in the ſame. It is nevertheleſs ſo difficult to hope for that, which is to be wiſh'd on that Subject, that I dare be bold to ſay, That in order to maintain this great State in the Policy and Diſcipline, without which it can never flouriſh, nothing can be of greater uſe, than to ſend from time to time in the Provinces Chambers of Juſtice, compos'd of Counſellors of State, and Maſters of Requeſts, well ſelected, to avoid the Thorns of Parliaments, which foment Difficulties upon every thing; to the end that the

ſaid

ſaid Court receiving the Complaints which may be made againſt all ſorts of Perſons, without any exception of Quality, may remedy the ſame immediately.

I am ſenſible, that the Soveraign Courts will be loth to ſuffer any ſuch Eſtabliſhments to be made: But as they muſt needs know, that a Soveraign is not oblig'd to ſuffer their Negligence, and that Reaſon obliges him to remedy thoſe Defects; I am not afraid of ſaying, That it is ſafer on that occaſion to acquire their Eſteem in performing one's Duty, than to preſerve their Good-will, in being wanting in what is due to Publick Good. But whereas it is impoſſible to ſend ſuch Commiſſions at one and the ſame time in all the Provinces, and that it will ſuffice, for one of that Nature, compos'd of the ſame Officers, or different, to make the Circuit of *France* in ſix Years time; I am of Opinion, that it will be neceſſary to ſend often Counſellors of State into the Provinces, or Maſters of Requeſts well ſelected, not only to perform the Function of Intendants of Juſtice in Capital Cities, which may ſerve more toward their Vanity, than be of any uſe to the Publick; but to go into all the Parts of Provinces, to enquire into the Behaviour of the Officers of Juſtice, and of the *Finances*; to ſee whether the Impoſitions are rais'd according to the Ordinances; whether the Collectors commit no Injuſtices in vexing of the People; to diſcover how they perform their Offices; to know how the Nobility behaves it ſelf; and to put a ſtop to all Diſorders, eſpecially to the Violences of thoſe who, being Powerful and Rich, oppreſs the Weak, and the King's poor Subjects.

SECT.

SECT. III.

Which repreſents the neceſſity of hindring the Officers of Juſtice, from incroaching upon the King's Authority.

AFter having repreſented what ought to be practis'd, and may be done with eaſe, to render the Officers of Juſtice ſuch as they ought to be, in relation to private Perſons, I cannot, without a Crime, abſtain from propoſing what is neceſſary to hinder ſo Potent a Body, as that which they compoſe, from being prejudicial in the whole to the State.

One would think there were a great deal to be ſaid upon that Subject; and yet I will ſay as much as is neceſſary in three Words, if I ſet forth that it only requires to reſtrain the Officers of Juſtice from medling with any thing but the adminiſtring of the ſame to the King's Subjects; which is the only End of their Eſtabliſhment.

The Wiſeſt of your Predeceſſors have made it their Buſineſs, and have found the Benefit of it; your Majeſty has follow'd their Example as long as I have had the Honour to ſerve you. And indeed it is a thing of ſuch moment, that unleſs a ſtrict hand be kept over thoſe Powerful Societies, it would be impoſſible afterwards to keep them within the Bounds of their Duty.

It would be impoſſible to hinder the ruin of Royal Authority, in following the Sentiments of thoſe, who being as Ignorant in the Practice of the Government of States, as they preſume to be Learned in the Theory of their Adminiſtration, are neither capable to Judge ſolidly of their Conduct, nor

proper

proper to make Decrees upon the Course of Publick Affairs, which exceed their Capacity.

As nothing must be suffer'd from those great Companies, to wound Soveraign Authority, it is Prudence to tolerate some of their Defects of another kind.

It is necessary to wink at the Imperfections of a Body, which having several Heads, cannot have the same Mind; and which being influenc'd by as many different Motions, as it is compos'd of different Subjects, cannot sometimes be inclin'd to discover, or to suffer its own Good.

Every body must needs blame their Proceeding, when they act contrary to Justice and Equity; but in condemning it with Reason, it is difficult to find a Remedy for it; by reason that in great Companies the number of the Wicked always exceeds the Good; and that though they were all Wise, yet it would not follow, that the best Sentiments would be found in the Majority; Judgments being so various, even in those who only designing Good, do neither differ in their Intentions, nor in their Ends.

It is a thing so common in such Bodies, to pry into, and to find fault with the Government of States, that no body can wonder at it.

All Subordinate Authority looks upon that which is Superiour to it with an envious Eye; and not daring to dispute the Power of it, they take the liberty to exclaim against the Conduct thereof.

The mildest Government is in some measure odious, even to the most reasonable: And upon that Consideration, one of the Ancients said, with a great deal of Reason, That among Men who are Equals by Nature, there are few who do not repine at the difference which Fortune puts between them;

and

and who being oblig'd to ſubmit, do not blame thoſe who have a Command over them; to ſhew, that though they are inferiour to them in Power, they exceed them in Merit.

SECT. IV.

Of the Officers of the Finances.

THe Officers of the *Finances* and the * *Partiſans*, are a ſeparate *Claſſis*, prejudicial to the State, but nevertheleſs neceſſary.

* *Thoſe who Farm the King's Revenue.*

Theſe ſort of Officers are an unavoidable Evil; but they muſt be reduc'd to ſupportable Terms.

Their Exceſſes, and the Diſorders which have been introduc'd among them, are come to that heighth, that it is impoſſible to ſuffer them any longer. They cannot raiſe their Fortunes higher, without ruining the State; and without undoing themſelves, by giving the Prince a juſt Pretence of ſeizing their Eſtates, upon the bare knowledge of the exceſſive Riches they have heap'd up in a ſhort time, upon the difference which will be verified between what they had when they were firſt employ'd, and what they are found to be in poſſeſſion of.

I am ſenſible, that ſuch a Proceeding may be liable to great Miſtakes, and that it may ſerve as a Pretence for very unjuſt Violences: Neither do I mention this, by the bye, to adviſe the putting it in practice, which would occaſion great Abuſes; but I maintain, that no body could juſtly complain of it, if it were manag'd with ſo much caution, that in puniſhing thoſe who do inrich themſelves of a ſudden, by the ſole Induſtry of their Fingers, no

preju-

prejudice were done under that Pretence, to the Estates of those who are grown Rich and Powerful, either by their Patrimony, one of the most lawful means to rise; or by the Gratifications receiv'd from the Favour of their Master, which exempts them from Crime; or by the Rewards which have been given to their Services; which is also one of the most lawful, since that in being useful to private Persons, it is also advantageous to the State; which will be the better serv'd, when those who serve it usefully are well rewarded.

It is absolutely necessary to remedy the Incroachments of the *Financiers*, otherwise they will finally occasion the ruine of the Kingdom; which is so much impair'd by their Robberies, that unless a stop be put to the same, it will be quite undone in a short time.

The Gold and Silver they abound in, affords them the Alliance of the best Families in the Kingdom; which are so much Bastardiz'd by that means, that their Issue proves as different from the Generosity of their Ancestors, as they often differ in the Resemblance of their Faces. I may affirm, as having been an Eye-witness of it, in many occasions, that their Negligence, or Malice, has been very prejudicial to Publick Affairs.

After a serious Consideration, on all the Remedies of the Evils they occasion, I dare say, that the best is to reduce them to as small a Number as is possible; and to employ, by way of Commission on important Occasions, Men of Probity and Capacity, instead of Persons whose Places being for Life, or Hereditary, think it a sufficient Title to Rob, without the least fear of Punishment.

It will be very easie, in time of Peace, to suppress many

many Officers of this kind, and thereby to free the State of thoſe who, without doing it any Service, ſuck up all its Subſtance in a very ſhort time.

I am ſenſible that it may be urg'd, That they are commonly us'd like Leeches, who with a Grain of Salt, are often made to diſgorge all the Blood they have ſuck'd up, and, like Spunges, which are eaſily ſqueez'd dry again, though never ſo full before. But, in my Opinion, it is an ill Expedient; and I look upon the Agreements and Compoſitions which are ſometimes made with the Officers, as a Remedy which is worſe than the Diſeaſe; ſince, properly ſpeaking, it gives them a Title to Rob anew, in hopes of a freſh Pardon; and that if any thing be got out of their Purſe that way, they do not only recover the Principal they have given, but alſo the Intereſt at a much higher rate than is allow'd of by the Law. Wherefore I conclude, That beſides certain neceſſary Officers, as a Treaſurer of the Exchequer, a Receiver General, Two or Three Treaſurers of *France* in every Generality, and ſuch others as are abſolutely neceſſary, it will be no ſmall piece of Service to the State, if in ſatisfying thoſe who have, *bona fide*, given their Money in hopes to advance themſelves by ſuch Employments, according to the courſe of the times, all the reſt are ſuppreſs'd. Without this Remedy, whatever Regulation may be made, it will be impoſſible to preſerve the King's Money, ſince all Puniſhments, tho' never ſo great, are not capable to hinder many Officers of that kind from converting part of the Money, which will paſs through their hands, to their own uſe.

SECT.

SECT. V.
Of the PEOPLE.

ALl Politicians agree, That when the People are too eaſie, it is impoſſible to keep them within the Bounds of their Duty. Their Reaſon is, That being more Ignorant than the other Orders of the State, which are much more cultivated, or better inſtructed, unleſs they are kept under by ſome Neceſſity, they will hardly keep within the Bounds preſcrib'd to them by Reaſon, and by the Laws.

Neither does Reaſon allow their being exempted from all Charges, ſince that in loſing thereby the Badge of their Subjection, they would alſo loſe the Remembrance of their Condition; and that if they were diſcharg'd of Tribute, they would alſo think themſelves diſcharg'd of Obedience.

They muſt be compar'd to Mules, which being us'd to Burthens, are ſpoil'd more by Reſt than by Labour; but as the Labour muſt be moderate, and that the Burthens of thoſe Animals muſt be proportion'd to their Strength; ſo unleſs the Subſidies which are impos'd on the People are moderate, even when they are uſeful to the Publick, they are unjuſt.

I am ſenſible, that when Kings undertake Publick Works, 'tis ſaid with truth, That what the People gets by it, returns to them again by the Payment of the *Taille*: But then one may alſo maintain, That what Kings get out of the People, returns to them again; and that they only advance itto get it again by the Enjoyment of Reſt, and of their Eſtates, which cannot be ſecur'd, unleſs they contribute towards the Maintenance of the State.

I know moreover, that many Princes have ruin'd their States, and their Subjects, by not keeping ſufficient Force on foot for their Preſervation, for fear of over-burthening them; and that ſome Subjects have been expos'd to the Servitude of their Enemies, by deſiring too much Liberty under their Natural Soveraign. But there is a certain Point which cannot be exceeded without Injuſtice, common Senſe teaching every Man, that there muſt be a proportion between the Burthen and the Strength of thoſe who beat it.

That Proportion muſt be ſo Religiouſly obſerv'd, that as a Prince cannot be eſteem'd Good, if he exacts more from his Subjects than is neceſſary, thoſe are not always the beſt, who never raiſe but what is abſolutely neceſſary.

Moreover, as when a Man is wounded, the Heart, which grows faint by the loſs of the Blood which flows from it, does not draw that of the lower Parts to its aſſiſtance, until the greateſt part of that which lies in the uppermoſt is exhauſted; ſo in the urgent Neceſſities of States, Soveraigns muſt, as much as in them lies, make uſe of the abundance of the Rich, before they bleed the Poor extraordinarily.

'Tis the beſt Counſel your Majeſty can take; which you may eaſily put into practice, ſince for the future you may draw the principal Subſiſtence of your State, out of your General Farms, in which the Rich are more concern'd than the Poor, by reaſon that as they ſpend leſs, they do not contribute ſo much to the Product thereof.

CHAP. V.

Which conſiders the State in it ſelf.

SECT. I.

Which repreſents how neceſſary it is, that the ſeveral Parts of the State ſhould remain every one within the extent of their Bounds.

AFter having ſpoken ſeparately of the divers Orders the State is compos'd of, I have but little to ſay in the main; but that as the Whole only ſubſiſts by the Union of its Parts in their Order and natural Situation; ſo this great Kingdom can never flouriſh, unleſs your Majeſty takes care to keep the Bodies which compoſe it, in their Order; the Church having the Firſt Rank, the Nobility the Second, and the Officers, which are at the head of the People, the Third.

I ſpeak this boldly, becauſe it is as neceſſary as juſt, to put a ſtop to the Incroachments of ſome Officers, who being puff'd up with Pride, either upon the account of the great Eſtates they are poſſeſs'd of, or by the Authority they derive from their Places, are ſo preſumptuous as to challenge the Firſt Rank, whereas they can only pretend to the Third. Which is ſo contrary to Reaſon, and to the Good of your Service, that it is abſolutely neceſſary to put a ſtop to the Progreſs of ſuch Enterpriſes; ſince otherwiſe *France* would no longer be what it has been, and what it ought to be, but a monſtrous Body, which as ſuch, could never ſubſiſt or be laſting.

As it is moſt certain, that the Elements which

are

are capable of weight, have none when they are in their Place; ſo it is certain, that none of the Orders of your State will prove burthenſome to the other, while each do remain in the Place which their Birth has aſſign'd them.

And as neither Fire, Air, nor Water, can ſuſtain a Terreſtrial Body, becauſe it is heavy out of its place; ſo it is certain, that neither the Church, nor the Nobility, can ſupport the Burthen of the Officers, when they endeavour to move out of their Sphere.

As I am very ſenſible that your Majeſty knows how to keep all Orders within their Bounds, without enlarging any farther upon this Subject, I will proceed to two Queſtions, which I incert in this Chapter, becauſe they have an equal Relation to the Three different Orders of the State.

SECT. II.

Which examines, Whether it is better to make the Governments Triennial in this Kingdom, than to leave them Perpetual, according to the Uſe which has been practis'd hitherto?

EVery body will fancy at firſt, that it will be better to make them Triennial; but after having compar'd the Advantages which may thereby accrue, to the Inconveniences that are to be fear'd; perhaps it will be thought, as I have already obſerv'd it, that though the Nomination to Benefices is not ſo Canonical as the Elections, the Uſe of it is nevertheleſs more advantagious at this time, for ſeveral Reaſons; as alſo that notwithſtanding the ſuppreſſion of the Sale of Offices is to be deſired for ſeveral Reaſons, yet the not tolerating the Uſe of it

would occaſion many Inconveniences expreſs'd in their proper places.

So it is impoſſible to render the Governments of Provinces and of Towns Triennial, without being expos'd to far greater Inconveniences, than thoſe which may be fear'd by the perpetual Settlement of Governours.

I am ſenſible, that ſome may urge, That a Man having a Government only for Three Years, will, in all probability, endeavour to quit it with Reputation, and to behave himſelf with ſo much Prudence, that his Adminiſtration may be preferr'd before his Predeceſſor's; whereas having it for Life, the certainty of it gives him more Licence.

But it is much more likely, that he who knows he is not long to continue in his Office, will endeavour to draw as much Profit out of it, as he might expect during his Life, if he were to enjoy it to his Death. Moreover, conſidering the Inconſtancy of our Nation, there might be ſome reaſon to fear the employing of ſome, who foreſeeing the End of an agreeable Adminiſtration, might reſolve to perpetuate it, by receiving thoſe as Maſters, whom they ought to look upon as Enemies.

If the Practice of *Spain* be urg'd, which often changes Governours, after having anſwer'd, that Example ſhews us, that nothing can be more dangerous than that Government; I will add, That as there are Fruits, the Uſe of which is excellent in one Country, and a Poiſon in another; ſo there are Settlements, the Practice whereof is good in one State, but yet would prove pernicious in another.

Some may ſay, to prevent the Objections which may be made againſt the Practice of the Order of

Spain

Spain in this Kingdom, That thoſe who will lay down an Office, after the expiration of the term of their Adminiſtration, will have no reaſon to be diſſatisfied, ſince they will be employ'd in others which will prove better; but ſuch great difficulties will be met with in the Practice of ſuch an Order, that it will be impoſſible to overcome them.

A Man may be fit to Govern in *Piccardy*, by reaſon of his being born there, who will not be fit to be employ'd in *Brittany*, where he has no Acquaintance, and where the Place which will be given him, will hardly be able to maintain him.

The Governments of *France* are, for the moſt part of ſo little Profit, that unleſs they are given to Perſons who are more deſirous of them upon the account of Honour, and for the Convenience of their Neighbourhood, than out of any other Conſideration; there are few who are able to bear the Expence of them: Beſides, there are not Men enough in the Provinces, for the Alterations which muſt needs be made, if Employments are made Triennial.

Thoſe Mutations are not only practicable, but abſolutely neceſſary in the great Employments of *Spain*; as thoſe of the Viceroys of *Naples*, of *Sicily*, of *Sardinia*, the Government of *Milan*, and other Employments of the like Conſequence: And all of them are ſo profitable to thoſe that poſſeſs them, that in quitting the Abundance of the one, they enter into the Wealth of the other.

Places which are diſtant from the abode of Princes, require a Change of Governours in Places of the Conſequence of thoſe I have mention'd, by reaſon that a longer Reſidence than that of Three Years, might enable them to form Projects

to ſettle themſelves there for ever ; ſeeing particularly that the Ambition of Men is ſo prevailing, that they are eaſily inclin'd to change the Condition of Subject into that of Maſter.

But the caſe is different in *France*, where the Governments are not ſo diſtant from the abode of the Kings, as to fear ſuch Inconveniences ; nor the ſaid Employments ſo great, as to give the Poſſeſſors a ſufficient Authority to make themſelves Maſters of the ſame.

Therefore provided your Majeſty, and your Succeſſors, keep the Power of Changing the Governments as you ſhall think fit, upon real Cauſe given ſo to do, which you may always do with Juſtice, provided they are given *gratis*, and not ſold ; I dare be bold to ſay, That it is better in that point to follow the ancient Cuſtom of *France*, than to imitate that of *Spain* ; which is nevertheleſs ſo politick and ſo reaſonable, conſidering the extent of its Dominion, that though it cannot be uſefully practic'd in this Kingdom ; yet it will be proper, in my Opinion, to make uſe of it in thoſe Places, of which *France* will preſerve the Poſſeſſion in *Lorrain* and in *Italy*.

SECT. III.

Which condemns Survivorſhips.

THe Survivorſhips in queſtion in this Place, are granted either againſt the Will of the Poſſeſſors of Places, or by their Conſent.

All Men are ſenſible, that it is very unjuſt to nominate the Succeſſors of a Man, while he is alive, againſt his Will ; ſince it expoſes his Life to the Artifices of the Perſon that is to profit by his Death, and

and that the Dread which may juſtly ſeize his Mind, is a kind of Death to him.

That Practice which was formerly very much in vogue in this Kingdom, is at preſent baniſh'd from thence. It is ſo dangerous, that the Councils, and the beſt Conſtitutions of Temporal Princes, do condemn it, as well as Reaſon.

Neither can the Conſent of the Poſſeſſors any ways juſtifie that Proceeding, ſince that whatever Confidence they may repoſe in thoſe who are appointed to ſucceed them, they are often miſtaken: Though it is impoſſible to ſatisfie every body in a State by Grants, yet it is neceſſary at leaſt to afford hopes to thoſe to whom nothing better can be given: Which can never be done, if Places, Offices, and Benefices are given to Children, who in the height of their Merit, and of their Age, would perhaps hardly dare to expect thoſe Honours and Dignities which are granted them in the Cradle.

Such Favours, in which the State is greatly concern'd, hardly oblige any body. A Man does not think that that is given him, which his Father, or another Relation is in poſſeſſion of, he looks upon the Survivorſhip of it as a Right of Inheritance, rather than as an effect of the Prince's Goodneſs.

Notwithſtanding that the Good of the State requires, that in the Promotion of Offices, Merit ſhould be preferr'd to all other things; in what relates to Survivorſhip, a greater regard is had to the Service of him who demands a Succeſſor, than to the perſons that is to ſucceed him can do. The Favour of the one on ſuch occaſions, often ſerves in lieu of Merit in the others, who have nothing but their Importunity to recommend them.

Therefore I conclude, that the leſs Favours of that kind are granted, is certainly the beſt; and that it would be better yet never to grant any; ſeeing that whatever particular Conſiderations can be alledg'd, the Conſequence of them is dangerous in States, where Examples have often more Force than Reaſon.

If any one obſerves that I condemn a thing in this Article, the practice whereof I have ſuffer'd even in reſpect to my own Relations *, I am ſure that he will remain very well ſatisfied, if he conſiders, that while a Diſorder is in vogue, without any poſſibility of a Remedy, Reaſon requires that Order ſhould be extracted out of it: Which was my Intention in preſerving Places, which had been eſtabliſh'd by my Cares, to Perſons whom I could more ſtrictly oblige to follow my Intentions and my Steps. If it had been poſſible, during the Troubles of a Reign agitated by divers Storms, to ſettle the Regulation I propoſe, I would have been a very Religious Obſerver of it.

* *When the Command of the Sea was given to the Cardinal, Trade was almoſt totally ruin'd, and the King had not one Ship.*

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Which repreſents to the King, what Men think he ought to conſider, in relation to his Perſon.

GOD being the Principle of all Things, the Soveraign Maſter of Kings, and He who makes them Reign proſperouſly; if your Majeſty's Devotion were not known by all the World, I would begin this Chapter, which relates to your Perſon, in repreſenting to you, That unleſs you follow the Will of your Creator, and ſubmit to his Laws, you muſt not expect to have yours obſerv'd, and to find your Subjects obedient to your Orders.

But it would be ſuperfluous to exhort your Majeſty to Devotion; you are ſo naturally inclin'd to it, and ſo much confirm'd in it, by the Habit of your Vertue, that there is no reaſon to fear that you will ever deviate from it.

Therefore inſtead of repreſenting to you what Advantages Religious Princes have above others, I will content my ſelf with ſaying, That the Devotion which is neceſſary in Kings, muſt be free from Scruples: I ſay it, Sir, becauſe the Niceneſs of your Majeſty's Conſcience often makes you dread to offend GOD, in doing things, which certainly you cannot abſtain from without Sin.

I am ſenſible, that the Faults of Princes, which are of this nature, are much leſs dangerous for the State, than thoſe which incline to Preſumption, and to the Contempt of thoſe things they ought to reve-

reverence. But ſince they bear the name of Faults, it is neceſſary to correct them, particularly if it be true, as it is moſt certain, that many Inconveniences may ariſe from thence, very prejudicial to the State.

In conſideration of which, I make it my humble Petition to your Majeſty, That you would be pleas'd more and more to fortifie your ſelf againſt Scruples; calling to mind, that you can never be guilty before GOD, if you follow (on Occaſions which will prevent themſelves of difficult Diſcuſſion, in what relates to your Conſcience) the Advice of your Council, confirm'd by that of ſome good Theologians, unſuſpected, in the caſe in queſtion.

This firſt Foundation being laid, as nothing can be more material towards the Welfare of your Affairs, than the Preſervation of your Majeſty's Health, I cannot forbear reſuming ſo important a Subject.

The careful and diligent Obſervations I have made on all that relates to you, makes me ſay boldly, That nothing is requir'd to ſo important an End, but your own Will, which nevertheleſs is the greateſt Enemy you have to encounter with on this Subject; ſince it is often very difficult to prevail with Princes to will that, which is not only very uſeful, but abſolutely neceſſary for them.

Your Majeſty's Mind has ſo abſolute a Sway over your Body, that the leaſt of your Paſſions ſeize your Heart, and diſturb the whole Frame of your Perſon; many Experiences have convinc'd me of this Truth, with ſo much Certainty, that I have never ſeen you ſick by any other Principle.

GOD

GOD has been pleas'd to give your Majesty Force enough couragiously to bear those things, in which you are most concern'd, in Affairs of the greatest Consequence; but as a Counterpoise to this great Quality, He has permitted your being so sensible, to those things which concern you, in Subjects of far less Consequence, that even things which one should think at first could not displease you, trouble you to that degree, that it is impossible to ease you on such occasions, according to one's Desire: Time, which makes those Fumes that surprise the Sense to evaporate, has hitherto been the sole Remedy to such Distempers in your Majesty, who has no sooner been seiz'd by them, but the Consequence has prov'd a corporal Indisposition.

In that, you are like those, who despising the Points of Swords, through the greatness of their Courage, cannot, nevertheless, by a certain natural Antipathy, bear the pricking of a Launcet.

If it were impossible for all Men to prevent, by Reason, the Surprises they receive by their Passions; yet I would not think it so in your Majesty, who has many excellent Qualities which others have not.

And therefore I am of Opinion, That the first Heat of your eager Youth being past, the Flegm of a riper Age will assist you, to secure your self by Reason, against an Enemy, which is the more dangerous, in that it is internal and domestick; and which has done you so much harm, particularly twice or thrice, that it had like to have cost you your Life.

As it is a thing very important for your Health, it is no less considerable for your Reputation and Glory,

Glory, which cannot ſuffer that any thing, which is nothing in Reaſon, ſhould have an Influence over your Sentiments, which ought to be regulated by it in all things.

Neither can I forbear, on this Subject, to reiterate a Petition I have often made to your Majeſty, conjuring you to apply your Mind to great things important to your State, and to deſpiſe little ones, which are unworthy of your Cares and Thoughts.

It will be advantagious and glorious to you, often to meditate on the moſt conſiderable Deſigns which the courſe of Affairs will put in agitation; whereas you will be ſo far from deriving the leaſt Advantage, by applying your Mind too much on thoſe which are not of that nature, that, on the contrary, you will receive great prejudice by it; not only in that ſuch Occupations will divert you from others of more Conſequence, but alſo by reaſon that as ſmall Thorns are more capable of pricking than great ones, which are eaſily perceiv'd, it would be impoſſible for you to avoid many Vexations, of no uſe to the Affairs of the State, and very prejudicial to your Health.

The great Diſquiets wherewith I have ſeen your Mind agitated on divers occaſions, oblige me to repreſent to you, in this place, as I have done on ſeveral other occaſions, That as certain Cares are neceſſary for the Welfare of Human Affairs, there are ſome which can produce no other Effects, than to alter the Good Diſpoſition of Him who applies himſelf too eagerly to them; and ſuch a Surpriſe to thoſe who ſerve, that the Trouble of their Mind renders them the leſs capable to perform what is expected from them.

The

The Experience which a Reign and Government of Twenty five Years affords your Majesty, does not permit you to be ignorant, that in great Affairs, the Effects never answer the Orders that have been given exactly. It also informs you, that you should rather pity those to whom you commit the execution of your Will, when their Labour does not succeed, than to impute to them the ill Events which they are not guilty of.

GOD alone can render his Resolutions infallible; and yet his Goodness is such, that, letting Men act according to their Weakness, he suffers the difference there is between their Events, and his Dispositions; which teaches Kings to suffer that patiently by Reason, which their Creator only indures out of his Goodness.

Your Majesty being naturally of a tender Constitution, not very healthy, of a restless impatient Humour, particularly when you are in an Army, of which you take the Conduct upon your self, I should think my self guilty of a Crime, if I did not make it my humble Request to you, to avoid War for the future as much as it is possible; which I do upon this Foundation, That the Levity and Inconstancy of the *French*, can only be vanquish'd by the Presence of their Master, and that your Majesty cannot, without expoling your self to Ruin, fix upon so lasting a Design, nor consequently expect a good Success from it.

You have sufficiently shewn your Valour, and the Power of your Arms, to think on nothing for the future, but to enjoy that Peace and Tranquility which you have acquir'd to the Kingdom by your Labour, keeping your self in a posture to defend

ſend it againſt all thoſe, who, contrary to Publick Faith, would offend you anew.

As it is very uſual to many Men to have no action, unleſs they are animated by ſome Paſſion, in which they may be compar'd to Incenſe, which never ſmells ſweet but when it is put into Fire, I cannot forbear telling your Majeſty, that this Conſtitution, which is dangerous in all ſorts of Men, is particularly ſo in Kings, who ought to be guided by Reaſon above all others.

And indeed whenever Paſſion inclines to Good, it is by chance, ſeeing that by its Nature it makes us ſwerve ſo much from it, that it blinds thoſe in whom it reigns; and that though a blind Man may chance to hit upon the right Way, yet it is a wonder if he does not loſe himſelf; and he muſt needs ſtumble often, unleſs he has an extraordinary Fortune.

So many Misfortunes have befallen Princes and their States, when they have follow'd their own Sentiments to the prejudice of Reaſon; and that inſtead of conſulting Publick Intereſt, they have been guided by their Paſſions, that it is impoſſible not to intreat your Majeſty to reflect often upon it, in order to confirm your ſelf more and more in what you have all along practis'd to the contrary.

I alſo humbly crave you would be pleas'd often to call to mind what I have repreſented ſeveral times to you, That no Prince can be in a worſe Condition, than he who not being always able to do thoſe things himſelf which he is oblig'd to do, is loth to permit others to do them for him; and that to be capable to ſuffer himſelf to be ſerv'd, is not one of the leaſt Qualities a great King can have; ſeeing that otherwiſe occaſions are often ſooner fled, than Men can

diſpoſe

diſpoſe themſelves to take hold of them, whereby favourable Conjunctures for the advancement of the State are loſt, for Subjects of no conſideration.

The late King your Father being reduc'd to a great Neceſſity, paid his Servants with good Words; and made them do things by Careſſes, which his Neceſſity did not allow him to incline them to any other way.

Your Majeſty not being of that Conſtitution, has a natural drineſs, which you take from the Queen your Mother, as herſelf has often told you in my preſence, which hinders you from imitating the late King on this Subject. I cannot forbear repreſenting to you, that it is your Intereſt to do good to thoſe who ſerve you; and that at leaſt it is reaſonable to take particular care not to ſay any thing to diſoblige them.

As I ſhall have an occaſion in the ſequel to treat of the Liberality which is neceſſary in Princes, I will ſay no more of it in this place; but I will enlarge upon the Evils which attend thoſe who ſpeak too freely of their Subjects.

The Wounds which are receiv'd by Swords, are eaſily cur'd; but it is not ſo by thoſe of the Tongue, particularly by the Tongues of Kings, the Authority of which makes them incurable, unleſs the Cure comes from themſelves.

The higher a Stone is thrown from, the more impreſſion it makes where it lights; many would freely expoſe themſelves to be run through by the Swords of their Maſter's Enemies, who cannot bear a Scratch from his hand.

As a Fly is not Meat for an Eagle; as the Lion deſpiſes thoſe Animals which are not of his Force; as a Man attacking a Child would be blam'd by all the

the World; ſo I preſume to ſay, That great Kings ought never to wound private Perſons with Words, becauſe they bear no proportion to their Grandeur.

Hiſtory is full of the ill Events which have been occaſion'd by the liberty great Men have formerly allow'd their Tongues, to the prejudice of Perſons they deem'd to be of no Conſideration.

GOD has been pleas'd to favour your Majeſty ſo much, that you are not naturally inclin'd to do harm; and therefore it is reaſonable you ſhould regulate your Words ſo much, that they may not do the leaſt prejudice.

I am certain, that you will not willingly fall into that Inconvenience: But as it is difficult for you to ſtop your firſt Motions, and your ſudden Agitations of Mind, which do ſometimes tranſport you, I ſhould not be your Servant, unleſs I acquainted you, that your Reputation and Intereſt requires your taking a particular care to ſuppreſs them, ſeeing that though ſuch liberty of Speech ſhould not wound your Conſcience, yet it would very much prejudice your Affairs.

As to ſpeak well of one's Enemies, is an Heroick Vertue. A Prince cannot ſpeak licentiouſly of thoſe who would venture a thouſand Lives for his Service, without committing a notable Fault againſt the Laws of Chriſtians, as well as againſt ſound Policy.

A King whoſe Hands are undefiled, whoſe Heart is pure, and whoſe Tongue is innocent, has not a common Vertue; and thoſe who poſſeſs thoſe two firſt Qualities eminently, as your Majeſty does, may eaſily acquire the third.

As

As it ſuits with the Grandeur of Kings to be reſerv'd in their Words, that nothing may come out of their Mouths capable to offend private Perſons; ſo in Prudence it behoves them not only to take care never to ſay any thing to the diſadvantage of the Principal Communities of their State, but moreover, to ſpeak in ſuch a manner of them, that they may have reaſon to believe they have an Affection for them: The moſt important Affairs of the State oblige them ſo often to croſs them, for Publick Good, that Prudence requires they ſhould be ſatisfied in things which are not of that nature.

It is not ſufficient for great Princes, never to open their Mouths to ſpeak ill of any body; but Reaſon requires they ſhould ſhut their Ears againſt Slanders and falſe Reports, and that they ſhould turn out, and baniſh the Authors of them, as dangerous Plagues, which infect the Courts and Hearts of Princes, and the Minds of all thoſe who come near them. If thoſe who have a free acceſs to the Ears of Kings, without deſerving it, are dangerous, thoſe who poſſeſs their Hearts out of pure Favour, are much more ſo; ſeeing that in order to preſerve ſuch a Treaſure, they muſt needs make uſe of Art and Malice, to ſupply the want of Vertue which is not in them.

I cannot forbear adding upon this Subject, That I have always dreaded for your Majeſty the Power of ſuch Men, more than the Power of the greateſt Kings of the World; and that it behoves you more to beware of the Artifice of a Menial Servant, than of all the Factions the Grandees could form in your State, though they ſhould all tend to the ſame End.

When I was firſt introduc'd into the Management of Affairs, thoſe who had had the Honour to ſerve you before, were prepoſſeſs'd that your Majeſty believ'd whatever was reported to their prejudice; and upon that Foundation, their principal Care was ever to keep ſome of their Confidents about you, to ſecure themſelves againſt the Evil they were afraid of.

Though the Experience I have of your Majeſty's ſteadineſs in relation to me, obliges me to acknowledge, either that their Opinion was ill grounded, or that the Reflections which Time has allow'd you to make upon me, have remov'd that Eaſineſs of Youth; yet I muſt needs conjure you to ſettle your ſelf ſo firmly in the Conduct you have been pleas'd to uſe towards me, that no body may have reaſon to dread a contrary Fate.

In the next place, I muſt alſo tell you, That as Prince's Ears muſt be ſhut againſt Calumnies, ſo they muſt be open to hearken to the Truths which are uſeful to the State; and that as the Tongue muſt have no motion to ſay any thing to the prejudice of any body's Reputation; ſo it muſt be free and bold to ſpeak, when Publick Intereſt is concern'd.

I mention theſe two Points, becauſe I have often obſerv'd, that it was no ſmall trouble to your Majeſty to have the Patience to hearken even to that which was moſt important to you; and that when the Welfare of your Affairs oblig'd you to expreſs your Will, not only to Perſons of great Quality, but alſo to thoſe of mean Condition, you had much ado to reſolve to do it, when you ſuſpected that it would be diſagreeable to them.

I confeſs, that the ſaid Dread is a ſign of Goodneſs; but to be no Flatterer, I muſt alſo tell you, that it is a ſign of Weakneſs, which though tolerable in a private Man, cannot be ſo in a great King, conſidering what Inconveniences it may be attended with.

I lay no ſtreſs upon that ſuch a Proceeding would lay all the Odium and Hatred of Reſolutions upon your Majeſty's Council, becauſe that is inconſiderable, if it could prove beneficial to the Affairs of the State; but that which is worth conſidering, is, that there are often occaſions, in which whatſoever Authority a Miniſter can have, it cannot be ſufficient to produce certain Effects, which require the Voice of a Soveraign, and an abſolute Power.

Moreover, if the Grandees were once perſuaded, that an unſeaſonable Shame would hinder a King from performing the Office of a King, in Commanding abſolutely, they would always pretend to obtain by Importunity, the contrary of what has been order'd by Reaſon; and finally, their Audaciouſneſs might proceed ſo far, that finding their Prince apprehenſive of acting like a Maſter, they would grow weary of acting as Subjects.

Princes muſt have a Maſculine Vertue, and do every thing by Reaſon, without being guided by Inclination, which often leads them into dangerous Precipices, if thoſe which blind them, and induce them to do whatever they pleaſe, are capable to produce Miſchief, when they follow them with too much Inadvertency, the natural Averſion they receive ſometimes without a Cauſe, may cauſe greater yet, unleſs they are temper'd by Reaſon as they ought to be.

In ſome occaſions your Majeſty has ſtood in need of your Prudence to check the Tendency of thoſe two Paſſions; but more in the laſt than in the firſt, ſince it is eaſier to do Miſchief, following the Dictates of Averſion, which requires nothing but a Command in a King, than to do good according to one's Inclination; which cannot be done, without depriving one's ſelf of one's own, which many Perſons can hardly reſolve to do.

Thoſe two Motions are contrary to the Genius of Kings, principally if reflecting little upon them, they oftener follow their Inſtinct than their Reaſon.

They often induce them to engage in the Diviſions, which are frequent in Courts, among private Perſons, which has occaſion'd great Inconveniences in my time. Their Dignity obliges them to reſerve themſelves for Reaſon, which is the only Party they ought to eſpouſe on all occaſions; they cannot do otherwiſe, without diveſting themſelves of the Quality of Judges and of Sovereigns, to take that of Parties, and ſubmitting, in ſome meaſure, to the Condition of private Men.

They thereby expoſe their State to many Cabals and Factions, which are form'd afterwards. Thoſe who are to defend themſelves againſt the Power of a King, are too ſenſible that they can never do it by Force, to attempt it otherwiſe than by Intrigues, Artifices, and Cabals, which often occaſion great trouble in States.

The Sincerity which is neceſſary in a Man who makes a Teſtament, does not permit my Pen to end this Section, without making a Confeſſion as true as it is advantagious for your Majeſty's Glory, ſince

ſince itwill teſtifie to all the World, That the Law of GOD has always been a Bound capable to ſtop the Violence of any Inclination or Averſion, which could have ſurpris'd your Mind; which being liable to the leaſt Defect of Human Nature, has always Thanks be to GOD, been free of the moſt notable Imperfections of Princes.

CHAP. VII.

Which repreſents the preſent State of the King's Houſhold; and ſets forth what ſeems to be neceſſary, in order to put it into that in which it ought to be.

THE Order of Arts, and of all good Diſcipline, requires that a Man ſhould begin his Work by that Part which is moſt eaſie. Upon this Foundation, the firſt thing an Architect does, who undertakes a great Building, is to make a Model of it; in which the Proportions muſt be ſo well obſerv'd, that it may ſerve him as a Meaſure and Foot for his great Deſign: And when he cannot compaſs the ſaid Project, he lays aſide his Enterprize; common Senſe making the dulleſt ſenſible, that he who cannot perform the leaſt, is altogether incapable of the moſt.

In that Conſideration, as the meaneſt Capacities are ſenſible, That as the Structure of Man is an Abſtract of that of the Great Word, ſo private Families are the true Models of States, and of Republicks; and every body being perſuaded, that he who either cannot, or will not regulate his Family, ~~is not capable to Order a State Reaſon~~ did require, that in order to compaſs the Reformation of this Kingdom, I ſhould begin by that of your Majeſty's Houſhold.

Never-

Nevertheleſs, I confeſs, that I never durſt undertake it, by reaſon that your Majeſty having ever had an Averſion for the Orders you reckon'd to be of ſmall conſequence, when any private Perſons were concern'd in them, no body could propoſe ſuch a Deſign, without openly ſhocking your Inclination, and the Intereſt of many Men, who being continually about you in great Familiarity, might have prejudic'd you againſt thoſe Orders which were moſt neceſſary for your State, to put a ſtop to thoſe of your Houſhold, the Irregularity of which were uſeful to them.

But as a Teſtament ſets forth many Intentions, which the Teſtator durſt not divulge during his Life, this will petition your Majeſty towards the Reformation of your Houſhold, which has been omitted, both by reaſon that though it did ſeem more eaſie than that of the State, yet it was in effect much more difficult; and alſo becauſe Prudence obliges to ſuffer in ſome meaſure ſmall Loſſes, to gain conſiderably in others.

As it is obvious to all the World, that no King ever carried the Dignity of his State to a higher degree than your Majeſty; ſo no body can deny, that none ever ſuffer'd the Luſtre of his Houſhold to be more trampled upon.

The Strangers who have travell'd in *France* in my time, have often wonder'd to ſee a State ſo exalted, and a Houſhold ſo debas'd.

And indeed it is inſenſibly decay'd to that degree, that ſome are in poſſeſſion of the firſt Places of it, who under the Reigns of your Predeceſſors, durſt not have preſum'd to aſpire to the leaſt: All things have been in confuſion there, from the Kitchen to the Cabinet.

Whereas in the King your Father's time, the Princes, the Officers of the Crown, and all the Grandees of the Kingdom, did commonly eat at your Tables; in your time they ſeem only eſtabliſh'd for Servants, common *Chevaux Legers*, and *Gens d'Armes*. Moreover, they have been ſo ill ſerv'd, that ſome of them have been ſo nice as to deſpiſe them, inſtead of being fond of them.

Strangers have often found fault, even with your own, being ſerv'd by common naſty Scullions, whereas thoſe of other Kings are only ſerv'd by Gentlemen.

I am ſenſible that this Cuſtom has not been introduc'd in your time; but it is never the more tolerable for being ancient, ſince it is abſolutely derogating from the Dignity and Grandeur of ſo great a Prince.

I am alſo ſenſible, that the ſaid Practice has been ſuffer'd hitherto, under pretence of the Safety of Kings, ſaying, That it is impoſſible for Officers to anſwer for what they have done, unleſs they carry, or ſee it carried themſelves to your Majeſty.

But this Reaſon ſeems inconſiderable to me, ſince there is no reaſon to believe, that a Scullion will be more faithful to his Maſter, than a Gentleman, who in divers other occaſions might betray him, if he were ſo minded.

Fourſcore young Gentlemen, whom your Majeſty maintains Pages of your Chamber, or of your Stables, would be much better employ'd in that Service, than in barely ſerving your Firſt Gentlemen, or Queries who Command them; and without

out doubt as they would do it with more Dignity, they would not perform it with leſs Fidelity.

The Neatneſs, which is becoming in all places, is conſequently more requir'd yet in the Palaces of Kings: The Magnificence of Furniture is the more neceſſary there, by reaſon that Foreigners only judge of the Grandeur of Princes by what appears externally; and yet though your Majeſty is vaſtly ſtor'd with the ſame, both fine and rich, which are deſtroy'd in the Places where they ſhould be preſerv'd: Your Majeſty often uſes ſuch in your Chamber, that thoſe to whoſe ſhare they fall when you lay them aſide, do not think fit to uſe them after you.

The Entrance into your Cabinet has been allow'd to all Men, not only to the Prejudice of your Dignity, but alſo in Contempt of the Safety of your Perſon.

Ambaſſadors have been crowded more by Footmen, by Pages, and other inferiour Officers, than by the Grandees of your State, in their Audiences; and nevertheleſs, your Dignity, and the ancient Cuſtom of this Kingdom, require on ſuch Occaſions your being attended by the Princes, Dukes, and Peers, the Officers of the Crown, and other Grandees of your State.

I am ſenſible, that moſt Kingdoms have different Cuſtoms: That in *Spain*, the Greateſt ſee their King oftner than in *England*: There are ſuch good Orders there upon that Subject, that though all the Doors are open, none are ſeen in the Chambers or Cabinets, but ſuch as have a free entrance there, by their Dignities and Employments.

I know moreover, that it is a Privilege of thoſe who bear your Crown, to be crowded by their Subjects; but it ſhould be with this diſtinction, that uſually it ought to be by your Nobility, and on the occaſion of receiving Foreigners by qualify'd Perſons, of which there is a ſufficient Number in your State, to make them obſerve the Grandeur and Singularity of it, by that Prerogative.

In a Word, Diſorder reigns ſo univerſally in all your Majeſty's Houſhold, that there is no particular place free from it.

Though all great Princes are careful to have an Equipage of great Horſes, ſuitable to their Grandeur, your Majeſty never had one in your great Stable, which you could uſe on occaſion; though you are at a greater Charge about it, than ever any of your Predeceſſors were.

I might eaſily ſpecifie many other Defects, no leſs remarkable than this; but I will not enter into the Particulars of ſo great a Diſorder, both becauſe it would be a very difficult Task, without deſcending too low for the Dignity of this Work; and that it is ſufficient to know a Diſtemper without publiſhing it, to preſcribe Remedies for the ſame. I will perform my Duty, in propoſing to your Majeſty the true means to afford as much Luſtre to your Houſhold, as there is Meanneſs and Diſorder in it at preſent.

The firſt thing which is neceſſary to that end, is, That your Majeſty ſhould be ſtrongly bent to the ſaid Reformation; ſince it is certain, that in Affairs of this nature, the Will of Kings is like the Will of GOD, in relation to the moſt difficult things, in which to will and to do, is one and the ſame thing.

The

The ſecond is, That you would be pleas'd, for the future, to employ none but Perſons of Quality in the Firſt Places of your Houſhold, having all the Qualifications which are requir'd to diſcharge their Truſt worthily.

Let an Officer be never ſo great, he will apply himſelf to the leaſt Dependencies of his Office, if he be capable of it; becauſe he will judge them to be of Conſequence, as indeed they are.

Unleſs the Stewards, for inſtance, take a particular Care, to cauſe thoſe Places to be cleans'd, Morning and Evening, where People eat, as ſoon as the Tables are remov'd, they will be wanting in one of the moſt material Points of their Charge.

I may ſay the ſame of all the Principal Officers, and particularly of the Firſt Gentlemen of your Chamber, who muſt be careful to keep all your Majeſty's Apartment ſo neat and ſo clean, that it will not be too much to ſweep and perfume them three or four times a day, by reaſon of the vaſt Concourſe of People which cannot be avoided there, though it be never ſo well regulated.

Provided every Man be qualify'd for his Office, every thing will be done according to your Majeſty's Deſire; and the Regulation of all the reſt, depends on this point: For whatever Rule be eſtabliſh'd, it will prove uſeleſs, unleſs there are Men capable to ſee it perform'd; and if they are, they will have Wit enough to cauſe that to be done, which Reaſon will ſhew them to be neceſſary for the Dignity of their Place, and for the Service of their Maſter.

The third conſiſts in That your Majeſty ſhould employ none but Gentlemen in all the Places of your

your Houſhold, unleſs in the Loweſt; which contributing much towards your Dignity, will create the more Affection into your Nobility, in that they will have more means to advance themſelves near your Perſon.

By this means, your Majeſty may make the four Troops of your *Gens d'Arms* of the Body, the Four beſt Troops of *Gens d'Arms* in your Kingdom; it being moſt certain, that there are many Gentlemen who would be over-joy'd to have a means to live in that Quality, provided thoſe Places be given them *gratis*, which are now ſold at who gives moſt.

In that caſe, many will be glad to have that Employment, who would by no means accept of it at preſent, becauſe it is uſurp'd by Perſons who do not deſerve it.

And all Gentlemen will willingly accept of it, upon the account of the acceſs it will give them at Court, where a Chance and ſome Acquaintance may advance their Fortune in an inſtant.

Your Majeſty will alſo receive another Benefit by the ſaid Eſtabliſhment, in that as it will leſſen the Number of the * *Roturiers*, who are freed of the *Tailles* by the Places they enjoy in your Houſhold, it will encreaſe the Number of thoſe who are to help the People to bear the Burthen they are over-whelmed with at preſent.

* *Yeomen, or all thoſe who are not of the Order of the Nobility or Gentry.*

The fourth is, That your Majeſty ſhould give all the Places of your Houſhold *gratis*, without allowing them to be ſold upon any Conſideration whatever.

It may be urg'd, perhaps, That it is not reaſonable, that thoſe who have bought Places very dear, ſhould not be allow'd to ſell them again; but as it is impoſſible to make any Settlements of great uſe for the Publick, without their being attended with ſome Inconveniencies for private Perſons, the ſaid Inconvenience is not conſiderable, ſeeing that as they did not buy their Places with an aſſurance of leave to ſell them again, like thoſe Officers who pay an Annual Duty to the King, they may be depriv'd of the Hopes they had fram'd to themſelves, without any Injuſtice.

And though ſome private Perſons may find themſelves griev'd by ſuch an Alteration, all the Nobility and the Greateſt will find a notable Advantage by it, in that whereas they were formerly oblig'd to ſell a conſiderable part of their Eſtates to get Places, which has often ruin'd the beſt Famies of the Kingdom, there will be no means left to expect them, but Merit; which will hinder them from ruining their Eſtate, and will oblige them to acquire Vertue, which is deſpis'd in this Age, becauſe the Price of all things only conſiſts in Money.

Moreover, there will be ſo many means to ſatisfie thoſe who upon the account of any particular Conſideration will deſerve to be exempted from the general Rule, That the Publick will receive the Benefit of the Advantage your Majeſty will be pleas'd to procure them, and yet ſuch private Perſons as might have cauſe to complain with Juſtice, will receive no prejudice by it.

As it is impoſſible to queſtion the Uſefulneſs of theſe Propoſitions, the Facility to put them in Execution is evident, ſince, as aboveſaid, it only requires a firm and conſtant Reſolution in your Majeſty, to reap the Benefit of the ſame, and to reſtore your Houſhold to its former Greatneſs.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the PRINCE's Council.

SECT. I.

Which ſhews that the beſt Prince ſtands in need of a good Council.

IT is no ſmall queſtion among Politicians, to know, Whether a Prince who Governs a State by his own Head, is more deſirable than he who not confiding ſo much in his own Abilities, relies much on his Council, and does nothing without their Advice?

Whole Volumes might be compil'd of the Reaſons which might be alledg'd for and againſt it: But referring this Queſtion to the particular Fact which obliges me to introduce it in this place; after having preferr'd the Prince who acts more by his Council, than by his own Opinion, to him who prefers his own Head to all thoſe of his Counſellors; I cannot forbear ſaying, That as the worſe Government is that, which has no other Spring than the Head of a Prince, who being incapable, is ſo preſumptuous as to ſlight all Counſel; the beſt of all is that of which the main Spring is in the Senſe of the Soveraign, who, though capable to Act by Himſelf, has ſo much Modeſty and Judgment, that he does nothing without Advice, upon this principle, That one Eye does not ſee ſo well as many.

Beſides

Beſides that Reaſon diſcovers the Solidity of this Deciſion, Truth obliges me to ſay, That Experience has convinc'd me ſo much of it, that I cannot forbear affirming it, without doing my ſelf a Violence.

A Capable Prince is a great Treaſure in a State; a Skilful Council, and ſuch as it ought to be, is no leſs conſiderable: But the Concert of Both together, is of an ineſtimable Value, ſince thereon depends the Felicity of States.

It is certain, that the moſt happy States are thoſe, in which Princes and Counſellors are the Wiſeſt.

It is alſo certain, That there are few Princes capable to Govern States alone; and, moreover, though there were many, they ought not to do it.

The Almighty Power of GOD, his infinite Wiſdom, and his Providence, do not hinder Him from making uſe, in things which he might do by his bare Will, of the Miniſtry of Second Cauſes; and conſequently Kings, whoſe Perfections are limitted, inſtead of being infinite, would commit a notable Fault, in not following his Example.

But whereas it is not in their power, as in GOD's, to ſupply the Defects of thoſe they employ, they muſt be very careful to chuſe them as perfect and as accompliſh'd as poſſible can be.

Many Qualifications are requir'd to make a perfect Counſellor; nevertheleſs they may be reduc'd to Four, *viz.* Capacity, Fidelity, Courage, and Application, which includes many others.

SECT.

SECT. II.

Which repreſents what Capacity is requir'd in a good Counſellor.

THe Capacity of Counſellors does not require a pedantick Knowledge: None can be more dangerous in a State, than thoſe who will Govern Kingdoms by the Maxims they find in Books: They often ruin them thereby, becauſe the Time paſt has no relation to the preſent, and that the Conſtitution of Times, Places, and Perſons, is different.

It only requires Goodneſs, Steadineſs of Mind, Solidity of Judgment, true Source of Prudence, a reaſonable Tincture of Letters, a general Knowledge of Hiſtory, and of the preſent Conſtitution of all the States of the World, and particularly of that in which they are.

Whereupon two things ought particularly to be conſider'd:

The Firſt, That the greateſt Wits are more dangerous than uſeful in the Management of Affairs; unleſs they have a great deal more Lead than Quickſilver, they are no ways fit for the State.

Some are fertile in Inventions, and abounding in Thoughts; but ſo variable in their Deſigns, that thoſe of the Morning and of the Evening, are never alike; and have ſo little connexity and choice in their Reſolutions, that they alter the good, as well as the ill ones, and never remain conſtant in any.

I may ſay with truth, as knowing it by Experience, that the Levity of ſuch Men is no leſs dangerous, in the Adminiſtration of Publick Affairs, than the Malice of many others.

Much is to be dreaded from Minds whoſe Vivacity is accompanied with little Judgment; and tho' thoſe who excell in the Judicious part ſhould not have a great reach, yet they might be uſeful to States.

The Second Remark to be made on this Subject is, That nothing can be more dangerous in a State, than to give a great Authority to certain Men, who have not Senſe enough to Govern themſelves, and yet think they have too much to ſtand in need of any body's.

They are neither capable to take a good Counſel from their own Head, nor to follow the Advice of thoſe who are capable to direct them; and thus they commit groſs Faults.

Preſumption is one of the greateſt Vices a Man can be guilty of, in publick Employments; and if Humility is not requir'd in thoſe who are deſign'd for the Conduct of States, yet Modeſty is abſolutely neceſſary; ſince it is moſt certain, that thoſe who have the greateſt Parts, are ſometimes the leaſt capable to admit Society and Counſel; Qualifications without which, even thoſe to whom Nature has given moſt Knowledge, are not fit for Government.

Without Modeſty, Men of great Parts are ſo wedded to their own Opinions, that they condemn all others, though better; and the Pride of their natural Conſtitution being join'd to their Authority, renders them altogether inſupportable.

The

The wiſeſt Man in the World ought to hearken to the Advice of thoſe whom he thinks leſs capable than himſelf.

As in Prudence a Miniſter of State ought to ſpeak but little, ſo it behoves him to hearken much. A Man may profit by all ſorts of Advices; the Good are uſeful in themſelves, and the Ill ones confirm the Good.

In a word, The Capacity of a Miniſter of State, requires Modeſty; and if with that Quality he has a good *Genius*, and Solidity of Judgment, he will have whatever is neceſſary.

SECT. III.

Which repreſents the Integrity that is requir'd in a good Counſellor.

IT is a different thing to be an honeſt Man in what relates to GOD, and in relation to Men.

He who takes a particular care to obſerve the Law of his Creator, performs his Duty in the firſt; but to do it in the ſecond, he muſt obſerve that which is preſcrib'd by the Honour of Men.

Thoſe different Integrities are neceſſary in a Counſellor of State; but it is uncertain yet, whether he who poſſeſſes all the Qualifications which are requir'd in order thereunto, as to thoſe of the World, alſo commonly has thoſe which make him an honeſt Man before GOD. A Man might be very careful to regulate his Conſcience according to the Will of his Creator, who being

depriv'd of ſome of the Conditions of that Integrity, will be leſs fit to be employ'd in the Miniſtry of publick Affairs, than he who having them all, may be ſubject to ſome particular Defects, in relation to the firſt.

However, as the Diſorder of Conſcience is the true Source of all the Imperfections of Man; I declare boldly, That the Two Integrities I am ſpeaking of, are equally neceſſary for the Perfection of a Counſellor of State, and that he cannot have the ſecond, if he be deſtitute of the firſt.

In a word, A States-man muſt be Faithful to GOD, to the State, to all Men, and to himſelf; which he will be, if, beſides the Qualities abovemention'd, he has an Affection for the Publick, and has no private Ends in his Counſels.

The Integrity of a publick Miniſter, does not ſuppoſe a fearful ſcrupulous Conſcience; on the contrary, nothing can be more dangerous in the Government of a State; ſince that as the want of Conſcience may occaſion many Injuſtices and Cruelties, Scruples may introduce many Emotions and Indulgences, very prejudicial to the Publick: For it is moſt certain, that thoſe who tremble in the moſt certain things, out of fear to ruin themſelves, often ruin States, when they might ſave themſelves with them.

As the Integrity of a Counſellor of State can never agree with a certain Rigour, which is accompanied with Injuſtice, it is not contrary to the Severity which muſt be us'd of neceſſity in many occaſions; on the contrary, it adviſes and preſcribes it ſometimes, and often obliges to be Pitileſs.

It does not hinder a Man from minding his own Buſineſs, in ſerving the State; but it only forbids him to think on it, to the prejudice of publick Intereſt, which ought to be dearer to him than his own Life.

That Integrity does not allow a certain Goodneſs, in thoſe who are employ'd in publick Affairs, to hinder them from boldly refuſing thoſe who have unjuſt Pretenſions; on the contrary, it requires, that in granting that which is reaſonable, they ſhould be ſteady in denying what is not ſo.

I cannot proceed on this Subject, without ſaying what *Ferdinand* Great Duke of *Florence*, who liv'd in our time, was us'd to ſay on the ſaid Subject, That he would prefer a corrupted Man, before one whoſe Facility was extraordinary; becauſe, added he, a corrupted Perſon cannot always be wrought upon by his Intereſt, which does not always come in play; whereas he who is of an eaſie Temper, is eaſily ſway'd by all thoſe who preſs him; which happens the oftner, by reaſon that it is known, that he is not capable to reſiſt thoſe who preſs him.

The ſaid Integrity requires that all thoſe who are employ'd in the Government of a State, ſhould walk an even pace; and that as they act to the ſame End, they ſhould hold the ſame Language; otherwiſe, if any one be found, who, though he behaves himſelf well in effect, ſpeaks leſs reſolutely than the reſt to decline Envy; beſides, that he will be wanting in the Integrity requir'd in a Miniſter of State, he will load thoſe with Hatred whoſe freeneſs of Speech is conſonant to the Steadineſs of their Actions.

There are Men, whoſe Vertue conſiſts more in Bewailing Diſorders, than in applying a Remedy to the ſame, by the eſtabliſhment of a good Diſcipline.

Thoſe are not the Men we ſeek for; their Vertue is only in appearance; and as it has no Action which can be of uſe, it differs but little from Vice, which has none but what may be hurtful.

The Integrity of a Counſellor of State muſt be active; it diſdains Complaints, and fixes on ſolid Effects, which may be uſeful to the Publick.

There are others, who having nothing but the good of the State in their Mouth, have ſo extravagant an Ambition in their Heart, that no End can ſtop their Deſires, and nothing can ſatisfie or content them.

Others proceeding farther, not contented with never being to, convert, under ſpecious Pretences, Publick Intereſts to their own; and inſtead of guiding Particular Intereſt by that which is Publick, they do the contrary, with as much Injuſtice as Boldneſs.

Such Men are not only deſtitute of the Integrity which is neceſſary in the Employment of Publick Affairs, but they are moreover true Plagues to a State; they are the wild Boars of the Scripture, in the Vineyard, in a full Vintage, who do not only fill their Bellies with it, but ſpoil and deſtroy all the reſt.

Thoſe who are of a wilful Temper, and follow their Paſſions more than Reaſon, and who, inſtead of chuſing Men barely upon the account of their Capacity, in thoſe things in which they are to be employ'd,

employ'd, chuſe them only becauſe they are ſenſible that they have an Affection for them, and that they are link'd to their Intereſt, cannot neither be reckon'd Men of the Integrity which is requir'd in the Adminiſtration of States.

If a Man be Revengeful, to put him in Authority, is to put a Sword in the hand of a Fury: if he follows his Appetite, and not Reaſon in his Elections, it is expoſing the State to be ſerv'd by Men of Favour, rather than of Merit; which will occaſion many Inconveniences.

A Man of true Integrity muſt never revenge his own Injuries, unleſs when he rights thoſe of the State: Moreover, he muſt not be induc'd to publick Vengeance, upon the account of his particular Intereſt; and when he does it, as thoſe who have a ſcrupulous Integrity, often injure themſelves by a good Principle, it may be ſaid with truth, that he does good by an ill one.

As the Integrity of a Counſellor of State requires his being proof againſt all ſorts of Intereſts and of Paſſions, it alſo requires his being ſo againſt Calumnies; and that all the Croſſes he may meet with, may never diſcourage him from doing well.

He muſt know, that the Labour Men undergo for the Publick, is ſeldom acknowledg'd by private Perſons; and that no other Reward is to be expected for it on Earth, than that of Fame, which is the true Reward of great Souls.

He muſt alſo know, That the great Men who are employ'd in the Government of States, are like thoſe who are condemn'd to ſuffer; with this difference only, That thoſe receive the

Reward of their Faults, and the others of their Merit.

Moreover, he muſt know, That none but great Souls are capable to ſerve Kings faithfully, and to ſupport the Calumnies which the Wicked and Ignorant impute to Men of Honour, without diſquiet, and without ſlackning in the Service they are oblig'd to do them.

He muſt likewiſe know, That the Condition of thoſe who are call'd to the Adminiſtration of publick Affairs, is much to be pity'd; by reaſon that if they do well, the Malice of the World leſſens the Glory of it, pretending that one might do better, though it were abſolutely impoſſible.

Finally, he muſt know, That thoſe who are employ'd in the Miniſtry of the State, are oblig'd to imitate the Stars, which notwithſtanding the Barking of Dogs, lighten them, and follow their Courſe; which ought to oblige him ſo far to contemn ſuch Injuries, that his Integrity may not be ſhaken by it in the leaſt, nor he hinder'd from proſecuting thoſe Ends ſteadily, which he has propos'd to himſelf for the Advantage of the State.

SECT.

SECT. IV.

Which repreſents what Courage and Force is requir'd in a Counſellor of State.

THe Courage which is neceſſary in this caſe, does not require ſo much Boldneſs in a Man, as to diſpiſe all ſorts of Perils; nothing can be more likely to ruin States: And a Counſellor of State ought to be ſo far from behaving himſelf ſo, that, on the contrapy, it behoves him to be very wary on all occaſions, and to undertake nothing without great Conſideration, and in proper Time.

Neither does the Courage requir'd in a perfect Counſellor of State, oblige him to think on nothing but Great Things, which happens often to the moſt elevated Souls, when they have more Courage than Judgment; on the contrary, it is abſolutely neceſſary, that he ſhould ſtoop to the meaneſt, though they may ſeem below him at firſt; becauſe great Diſorders often ariſe from ſmall Beginnings; and that the moſt conſiderable Eſtabliſhments, have ſometimes Principles which ſeem to be of no Conſideration.

But the Courage in queſtion requires a Man to be free from Weakneſs and Fear, which render thoſe who are tainted with thoſe two Defects, not only incapable of taking good Reſolutions for the Publick Good, but alſo from putting thoſe in execution which they have taken.

It requires a certain Fire, which makes Men desire and prosecute great things with as much Eagerness, as the Judgment embraces them with Wisdom.

It requires moreover a certain Steadiness, which makes Men undergo Adversities bravely, and hinders them from appearing, and from being alter'd in the greatest Alterations of Fortune.

It ought to give the Minister of State an honest Emulation of Glory; without which, the most capable and the most worthy seldom signalize themselves by an advantagious Action to the Publick.

It must give him the force to resist, without being daunted, Envy, Hatred, Calumny, and all the Crosses which are commonly met with in the Administration of Publick Affairs.

Finally, It must justifie the Saying of *Aristotle* in his Person, who affirms, That whereas those that are Weak make use of Cunning and of Craft, those who are strong despise both equally, by the just Confidence they have in themselves.

To this end, we must observe, That to be Valiant, and to have Courage, is not the same thing.

Valour supposes a Disposition to expose one's self willingly on all occasions to the Perils which present themselves, which Courage does not require, but only a sufficient Resolution to despise Peril, when we are engag'd in it, and to support Adversity patiently when we are involv'd therein.

We may even proceed farther, and say, That besides the Disposition above specify'd, Valour requires

requires another, which is Corporal, and which enables Men to ſhew their Valour by their Arm.

I am ſenſible, That thoſe who have ſpoken of the principal Vertues of Man heretofore, did not underſtand thoſe Diſtinctions; but if you conſider them maturely, you will find the firſt abſolutely neceſſary, and the ſecond not ſuperfluous; becauſe moſt Men only judge of a Man's Valour, by the Performances of his Arm, which ſhew his Worth.

Whatever ſence you take Valour in, it is not neceſſary in a Counſellor of State; there is no need of his having a Diſpoſition to expoſe himſelf to Perils, nor even a corporeal Aptneſs to ſhew his Worth by the virtue of his Arm; it is ſufficient for him to have ſo much Courage, that an ill-grounded Fear, and the Croſſes he may chance to meet with, may not be able to divert him from his good and generous Deſign; and as the Mind governs, and not the Hand, it is ſufficient that his Heart ſhould ſuſtain his Head, though it cannot influence his Arm.

SECT.

SECT. V.

Which repreſents what Application is requir'd in Counſellors of State.

Application does not require that a Man ſhould Labour inceſſantly in Publick Affairs; on the contrary, nothing is more capable to make him uſeleſs, than ſuch a proceeding: The nature of State-Affairs requires reſpite, by reaſon that the weight of it is greater, and more burthenſom than all others; and that the Forces of the Mind and Body of Men being limitted, a continual Labour would exhauſt them in a ſhort ſpace of time.

It allows all manner of honeſt Divertiſements, which do not divert thoſe who take them, from thoſe things to which they ought to be particularly apply'd.

But it requires, that he who is engag'd in Publick Affairs, ſhould make them his particular Care, and ſhould fix his Mind, his Thought and Affection on them; it requires that the greateſt of his Pleaſures ſhould be the good ſucceſs of his Affairs.

It requires that he ſhould often ſurround the World, to foreſee what may happen, and to find means to prevent the Evils which are to be fear'd, and to execute thoſe Enterpriſes which Reaſon and Publick Intereſt adviſe.

As it obliges not to loſe one moment in certain Affairs, which may be ruin'd by the leaſt delay; it

it alſo requires, that we ſhould not precipitate our ſelves in others, in which time is neceſſary to take ſuch Reſolutions as one may have no reaſon to repent of.

One of the greateſt Grievances of this Kingdom is, that moſt Men apply themſelves more to thoſe things to which they cannot apply themſelves without a Fault, than to thoſe they cannot omit without a Crime.

A Soldier ſpeaks of what his Captain ought to do; the Captain, of the Defects he imagines in his Colonel; the Colonel finds fault with his General; the General diſapproves and blames the Conduct of the Court; and none of them move in their own Sphere, or think of performing thoſe things which their Station particularly obliges them to.

There are Perſons of ſo little Action, and of ſuch weak Conſtitutions, that they never apply themſelves to any thing of their own accord, but barely receive occaſions, which influence theſe more than they do them.

Such Men are fitter to live in a Cloiſter, than to be employ'd in the Adminiſtration of States, which require Application and Activity together; ſo that when they are in them, they do as much harm by their languiſhing Conduct, as another may do good by an active Application.

We muſt not expect great Effects from ſuch Minds; no body is oblig'd to them for the Good they do; neither can they be blam'd much for the harm they do, ſince properly ſpeaking, Chance acts more in them than themſelves.

Nothing

Nothing can be more contrary to the Application which is neceſſary in Publick Affairs, than the Inclination which thoſe who have the Adminiſtration of them have for Women.

I am ſenſible, that there are Minds ſo abſolutely Superiour and Maſters of themſelves, that though they are diverted from what they owe to GOD by ſome unruly Affection, yet it does not divert them from what they owe to the State. There are ſome, who not giving thoſe an Influence over their Will, who ſway their Pleaſures, only apply themſelves wholly to their Buſineſs.

But there are but few of this nature; and it muſt be granted, That as a Woman loſt the World, nothing is ſo capable to ruine States as that Sex; when influencing thoſe who Govern them, they often make them move as they pleaſe. and conſequently ill. The beſt of Women's Thoughts being commonly ill, in thoſe who are govern'd by their Paſſions, which generally uſurp the Empire of Reaſon in their Mind, whereas Reaſon is the only and true Motive which muſt animate and influence thoſe who are employ'd in publick Affairs.

Whatever Force a Counſellor of State may have, it is impoſſible for him to apply himſelf as he ſhould do to his Truſt, unleſs he be free from all ſuch Engagements. He may chance to perform his Duty with them; but heing free of them, he will do much better.

Whatever Station he is in, in order to do well, he muſt divide his Time ſo, as to have Hours to work alone about the Expeditions which are requir'd by his Place, and others to give Audience

to every body; Reaſon obliges him to treat every one courteouſly, and with as much Civility as his Staition, and the diſtinct Quality of Men who have Buſineſs with him requires.

This Article will give Poſterity a Teſtimony of my Integrity, ſince it preſcribes what I have not been able to perform in every point.

I have always liv'd civilly with thoſe who had Buſineſs to treat with me; the Nature of Affairs, which obliges to refuſe many Perſons, does neither allow ill Looks, nor ill Words, when we cannot ſatisfie them by Effects: But the illneſs of my Health has not allow'd me to give acceſs to every body, as I could have wiſh'd; which has often troubled me to that degree, that that Conſideration has ſometimes made me deſirous to retire.

Nevertheleſs, I may affirm with truth, That I have husbanded the Weakneſs of my Forces ſo well, that if I have not been able to anſwer the Deſires of every body, they have never been able to hinder me from performing my Duty in relation to the State.

Finally, Application, Courage, Integrity, and Capacity, form the Perfection of a Counſellor of State; and the Concurrence of all thoſe Qualities muſt meet in his Perſon.

A Man may be very honeſt, who having no Talent for Affairs of State, would be altogether uſeleſs in them; and would keep Places he were not able to diſcharge.

Another might be capable, and have the Integrity which is requir'd, who not having Courage enough

enough to ſuſtain the divers Caſualties which it is impoſſible to avoid in the Government of States, would be prejudicial inſtead of being uſeful.

Another might mean well, be capable, and have Courage together, whoſe Lazineſs would prove deſtructive to the Publick, he not applying himſelf to the Functions of his Office.

Another may have a good Conſcience, be capable, have Courage and Application to his Employment, who being more ſenſible to the Object which touches him, than to what Concerns the Intereſt of the Publick, though he ſerves often uſefully, is nevertheleſs much to be fear'd.

Capacity and Probity produce ſuch a perfect Agreement between the Underſtanding and the Will, that as the Underſtanding knows how to chuſe the beſt Objects, and the propereſt means to acquire the Poſſeſſion of them; the Will alſo knows how to embrace them with ſo much eagerneſs, that it omits nothing within its power to compaſs the Ends propos'd by the Underſtanding.

Integrity and Courage produce an honeſt Boldneſs, to tell Kings what is uſeful for them, though it be not altogether pleaſing to them.

I ſay, an honeſt Boldneſs; becauſe unleſs it be well regulated, and always reſpectful, inſtead of being reckon'd among the Perfections of a Counſellor of State, it would be one of his Vices.

Kings muſt be ſpoken to with ſilken Words. As a faithful Counſellor is oblig'd to mind them in private of their Faults with Caution, he can never repreſent them to them in publick, without committing a great Fault.

To

To ſpeak that aloud which ought to be whiſper'd, is a Reproach which may become criminal in the Mouth of him who utters it, if he Publiſhes the Imperfections of his Prince, to advantage himſelf by it; being more deſirous, out of a vain Oſtentation, to ſhew that he diſapproves them, than that he has a ſincere Deſire to correct them.

Courage and Speculation produce ſo much Steadineſs in the Deſigns choſen by the Underſtanding, and embrac'd by the Will, that they are proſecuted with Conſtancy, without being liable to the Changes which the Levity of the *French* often produces.

I have not ſpoken of the Force and Health of Body neceſſary in a Miniſter of State, by reaſon that though it is a great advantage, when it meets with all the Qualifications of Mind above-mention'd, it is not, nevertheleſs, ſo neceſſary, but that Counſellors may perform their Functions without it.

There are many Employments in the State, in which they are abſolutely neceſſary, becauſe the Body is to act as well as the Mind, in repairing to divers Places, which often muſt be done with ſpeed; but he who holds the Helm of the State, and whoſe ſole Care is the Direction of Affairs, ſtands in no need of that Qualification.

As the Motion of Heaven only ſtands in need of the Intelligence which moves it; ſo the Force of the Mind alone is ſufficient to conduct a State; and that of the Arms and Legs is not neceſſary to move all the World.

As he who Governs a Ship has no other Action than that of the Eye to ſee the Compaſs; after which, he orders the Turning of the Helm, according as he thinks fit; ſo in the Conduct of a State, nothing is requir'd but the Operation of the Mind, which ſees and orders at once what it thinks fit to be done.

If it be true, that the Sun which heats all things is not hot in it ſelf; it is evident, that in order to make the World act corporeally, the Action of the Body is not requir'd.

I own nevertheleſs, that I have often wiſh'd my ſelf rid of the Government of the State, upon the account of my want of Health; the Line of which has been ſo ſhort, that it has almoſt been impoſſible for me not to exceed the meaſure of it often.

Finally, After having ſerv'd your Majeſty many Years in the moſt difficult Affairs that can be met with in a State, I may confirm by Experience, what Reaſon teaches all the World, That it is the Head, and not the Arm, which conducts States.

SECT

SECT. VI.

Which repreſents the Number of Counſellors of State that is requiſite, and that one among them ought to have the Superiour Authority.

AFter having examin'd and diſcover'd the Qualifications that are neceſſary in thoſe who are to be employ'd in the Miniſtry of State, I muſt alſo obſerve, That as the Plurality of Phyſicians ſometimes cauſes the Death of the Patient, inſtead of contributing towards his Cure; ſo the State will receive more prejudice than advantage, if the Counſellors are in great Number: I add, That no benefit can be deriv'd by them, if their Number exceeds Four; and moreover, That one of them muſt have the Superiour Authority, to be as it were the *Primum Mobile*, which moves all the other Heavens, without being mov'd by any thing but its Intelligence.

I am loth to ſet down this Propoſition, becauſe it will look as if I deſign'd to maintain my own Cauſe; but conſidering that it would be eaſie for me to prove it by ſeveral Authorities of Scripture, of the Fathers, and of Politicians; and that the Confidence your Majeſty has always honour'd me with, while you have been pleas'd to give me a ſhare in the Adminiſtration of Publick Affairs, wants no other Principle for the defence of it, but that which was neceſſary for its Eſtabliſhment; I mean, your Will; which will be look'd upon by Poſterity as a juſt Reaſon of the

Authority I have had all along in your Councils; I find that I may ſpeak upon this Subject without being ſuſpected; and that it is my Duty to do it, to prove that by Reaſon, which the Honour I have always receiv'd from your Goodneſs will authoriſe by Example.

The natural Envy which is commonly met with among equal Powers, is too well known to every body to want a long Diſcourſe, to ſhew the Truth of this Propoſition.

Divers Experiences have made me ſo knowing in this matter, that I ſhould think my ſelf anſwerable before GOD, if this preſent Teſtament did not declare in proper terms, That nothing can be more dangerous in a State, than divers equal Authorities in the Adminiſtration of Affairs.

What the one undertakes, is croſs'd by the other; and if the worthieſt Men is not the moſt capable, though his Propoſitions ſhould prove the beſt, they would always be eluded by the moſt powerful in Senſe.

Each will have their Sectators, which will form divers Parties in the State, and will divide the Forces of it, inſtead of uniting them together.

As the Diſtempers and Death of Men only proceed from the Diſcord of the Elements they are compos'd of; ſo it is certain, that the Contrariety andthe want of Union, which conſtantly reigns among equal Powers, will ever diſturb the Peace of the States they have the Management of, and will produce divers Accidents, which finally may ruin them.

If it be true, That Monarchical Government is more conſonant to G O D's than any other; if all Politicians, both Sacred and Prophane, teach us, that that Form ſurpaſſes all thoſe that were ever put in practice; we may boldly affirm, That if the Soveraign cannot, or will not have a continual eye himſelf upon his Map, and upon his Compaſs, Reaſon requires that he ſhould give the peculiar Charge thereof to one above all the reſt.

As divers Pilots never put their Hands at once to the Helm; ſo there muſt be but one at the Helm of the State.

He may receive the Advice of others; moreover, he ought ſometimes to deſire it; but he is to examine the Goodneſs of it, and to turn his Hand to the Right or Left, as he thinks it beſt, to avoid the Storm, and to ſteer his Courſe.

The main point conſiſts in making a good Choice on that occaſion, and never to be deceiv'd in it.

Nothing can be more eaſie than to find a *Primum Mobile* to move all, without being mov'd by any Superiour Authority but that of his Maſter; but nothing is more difficult than to find one to move well, without being able to be mov'd by any Conſideration which might diſorder its Motion.

All Men will think themſelves, by their own Sence, capable of that Function; but as no Man can be a Judge in his own Cauſe, the Judgment of a thing of this importance, muſt be referr'd to thoſe who have no intereſt to blind them.

Such a Man will not be capable of being wrought upon by the Practiſes and Preſents of the Enemies of the State, who may be mov'd by their Artifices.

Another may be capable of being wrought upon by Intereſts; which though not criminal, might nevertheleſs prove very prejudicial to the State.

There are many, who would rather die than act againſt their Conſcience, who nevertheleſs would not be uſeful to the Publick, becauſe they are too apt to yield to the Importunities, and to the Tenderneſs they have for thoſe they love.

Some may be incapable of being mov'd by any Intereſt whatever, who may be mov'd by Fear, by Aſtoniſhment, and by a panick Terrour.

I am ſenſible, that the Capacity, Integrity, Courage, and, in a word, all the Qualities which we have attributed to Counſellors of State, may remedy ſuch Inconveniences; but, to ſpeak the truth, as the Miniſter we are ſpeaking of muſt be above all the reſt, ſo he muſt have all thoſe Qualities in an eminent degree, and conſequently he muſt be carefully examin'd before he is choſen.

The Prince muſt have a perſonal Knowledge of the Perſon he intruſts with ſo great an Employment; and though the ſaid Perſon muſt be elected by himſelf, yet the Choice he makes of him, muſt if poſſible, be accompanied with Publick Approbation; for if he has the liking of every body, he will be the more capable to do good.

As thoſe who are the beſt skill'd in Aſtronomical Supputations, can never be deceiv'd of one Minute, but the Judgments they make afterwards

muſt

muſt be liable to all manner of Falſities; ſo it is certain, that if the Qualifications of the Perſon who is to govern others, are only good in appearance, his Conduct will prove very bad; and that if they are but mean, his Government will not prove excellent.

It is is eaſie to repreſent the Qualifications that firſt Miniſters ought to have; but it is difficult to meet them all in one Subject.

Nevertheleſs, it is certain, that the Happineſs, or Unhappineſs of States, depends on that Election; which lays a ſtrict Obligation on Soveraigns, either to take that Care themſelves, which the Weight of their Crown Charges them with, or to make ſo good a choice of him on whom they will disburthen themſelves of it, that their Opinion may be approv'd by Heaven and Earth.

SECT. VII.

Which repreſents what the King's Behaviour is to be towards his Counſellors; and ſhews, that in order to be well ſerv'd, the beſt Expedient he can take is to uſe them well.

YOur Majeſty having thus choſen your Counſellors, it is your Buſineſs to put them in ſuch a ſtate, that they may be able to labour towards the Grandeur and Felicity of your Kingdom.

Four things are particularly neceſſary to that end:

The Firſt, that your Majeſty muſt confide in them, and that they ſhould know it, which is abſolutely ne-

ceſſary, becauſe that otherwiſe the beſt Counſellors might be ſuſpected by Princes; and that the Miniſters not being certain that their Sincerity is known, would reſtrain themſelves in many occaſions, in which their ſilence might prove very prejudicial.

'Tis a common Saying, That a Phyſician who is lik'd by his Patient, and is belov'd by him, will be able to do him more good than another: And 'tis alſo certain, that there is none who could apply himſelf boldly to the Cure of his Patient, if he were perſuaded that he was diffident of him.

The Second is, To command them to ſpeak freely to him, and to aſſure them that they may do it without Peril.

That Condition is abſolutely neceſſary, not only for ſome weak and timorous Minds, who want to be encourag'd, but alſo for thoſe who not being naturally timerous, employ their Zeal the more uſefully for the Advantage of the Publick, in being certain that their Boldneſs cannot be prejudicial to them.

The Soldier who fires behind a Breaſt-work, is more confident than he who knows that in ſhooting he may be ſhot; and indeed, few Men would expoſe themſelves to Ruin to ſerve the Publick.

It is true, that an honeſt Man muſt never conſider his own Intereſt, when the Publick is concern'd; and that the higheſt Point of Fidelity that can be deſir'd in a Servant, is, to ſpeak that ingenuouſly which he knows to be for his Maſter's Intereſt, without the leaſt fear of incurring

curring the Hatred of those who have most interest with him, nor even of displeasing him: But there are but few who have so much Zeal as to run such a Risque.

The Third, To be liberal towards them, and to give them reason to think, that their Services will not be unrewarded.

Which is the more necessary, because there are but few Men who love Vertue naked; and that the only way to hinder a Servant from thinking too much on his own Interest, is to practice the Advice of that Emperour, who recommends to his Son, to have a great care of the Affairs of those who are very mindful of his.

No honest Man ever endeavours to enrich himself at the cost of the Publick, in serving it; but as it would be a Crime to have such a Thought, nothing can be more shameful in a Prince, than to see those who are grown old in his Service, loaden with Years, with Merit, and with Poverty together.

The Fourth is, To authorise and maintain them so openly, that they may be certain, that they need neither fear the Artifices, nor the Power of those who would ruin them.

The Interest of the Prince obliges him to behave himself thus, since no Man can serve the Publick effectually, without incurring the Hatred and Envy of every body; and that few would be found so vertuous as to do well, if they thought it would prove prejudicial to them.

There is no Town in the World, though never ſo ſtrong in it ſelf, but will be taken in proceſs of time, unleſs a particular Care be taken to defend her Out-works.

It is the Caſe of the Greateſt Kings, who can never preſerve their Authority entire, unleſs they take a ſingular care to maintain it in the leaſt of their Officers, near or diſtant from their Perſons, which are Outworks that are attack'd firſt; the taking of which, imboldens Men to make Efforts againſt thoſe within, though they ſeem to be impregnable, as ſacred and fix'd to the very Perſon of Kings.

Few Men will be ſo preſumptuous as to attack thoſe by open force, whom the Prince will make choice of to ſerve him; becauſe all are ſenſible that their Power cannot cope with their Sovereign, who is too much concern'd to protect his Servants, to neglect it to his prejudice; but there are always ſome who endeavour to ruin them by Artifices and indirect Means, difficult to be diſcover'd.

Men behave themſelves commonly with ſo much Cunning in thoſe occaſions, that when the leaſt proſpect is obſerv'd in ſuch Deſigns, they muſt be look'd upon as certain; not to harm thoſe who are ſuppos'd guilty before they are convicted, but to prevent them with Prudence.

The Artifice of Men makes them diſguiſe themſelves a hundred different ways to compaſs their Ends: Some ſpeak openly, under pretence that their Silence would be criminal; but there are few of that kind: Others feign to be Friends to thoſe they deſign to ruin: Others employ a Third

Perſon

Perſon to ſpeak, and reſerve themſelves to ſecond the ill Offices they have begun. Finally, there are ſo many ways to do harm in that kind, that a Prince can never be too much upon his Guard, to ſecure himſelf againſt ſurpriſes, in a thing of that importance.

Whenever any body ſpeaks to him in private againſt the Government of the State, under any pretence whatever, he may aſſure himſelf that it is to ruin and to undo him.

We may compare thoſe who behave themſelves ſo, to thoſe who have Fevers, which are the more malignant, in that the external Fire ſeems little, when they are almoſt parch'd up within.

Such Diſtempers muſt be prevented in time, without ſtaying for a perfect Knowledge of them, becauſe it often happens that we can only have it by the Event, and the Effect of the ill Deſign which is projected.

Thoſe who make ſuch Enterpriſes, are too ſenſible of the Danger to which they expoſe themſelves to begin them, without a Reſolution to go thro' with them. On ſuch occaſions, Men begin ſlowly and fairly; but afterwards, the nature of ſuch Affairs obliges them to double their pace, and to run for fear of being ſurpris'd by the way.

In that, they imitate the Stone which is flung from the top of a Mountain; its firſt motion is ſlow, and the more it deſcends, the more weight it receives, and redoubles the ſwiftneſs of its fall: And as it requires more force to ſtop it in the midſt of its fall, than in the beginnig; ſo it is very difficult to ſtop a Conſpiracy, which not being ſtifled in its Birth, has already made a great Progreſs.

The

The more considerable a Place is, the more the Enemy endeavours to seduce the Governour of it; the more a Woman is beautiful, the more Men endeavour to engage her Affections: So likewise the more a Minister is useful to his Master, powerful in his Mind and Favour, the more Men envy him, and are desirous of his Place, and endeavour to supplant him to come in his room.

Among faithful Governours, those are most esteem'd, who do not only resist the Propositions which are made to them against their Duty, but also refuse to hear them, and who immediately stop the mouths of those who will tempt them by such means.

Among chast Women, those who have no Ears to hearken to the ill Discourses which Men would make to them to seduce their Purity, are, by the Judgment of the Wisest, preferr'd to those who open them, even when they shut their Hearts.

So among Masters who have Servants, whose Fidelity has been tried on so many occasions, that they cannot question it with Reason, those are the Wisest who stop the Mouths of those would speak ill of them.

Whatever Virtue there may be in resisting Temptation; Princes and Husbands are esteem'd too Indulgent, when they allow their Governors and their Wives, to give Ear to those things which they would not have them adhere to, and to which they cannot consent without a Crime; and Masters must condemn themselves, when they give Ear to what Men would tell them against those, whose Fidelity is unreproachable. The Primitive Reason of this decision consists in that, as to expose

once

ones ſelf boldly to danger in a juſt and uſeful occaſion, is an Act of Valour; ſo to do the ſame without Cauſe or Reaſon, is an Act of Temerity; and it is in that Sence, it has been ſaid with great Reaſon, that whoever gives Ear to Calumnies deſerves to be deceiv'd.

Perhaps ſome will ſay, that there is a great deal of difference, between the Duty of the Governor, of the Woman, and of the Prince, in the caſe which is repreſented: That it is true, that the Governor and the Woman, do a great deal better not to hearken, becauſe they can in no wiſe conſent to what is to be propos'd to them; but that the caſe is different in relation to the Prince, who muſt keep his Ears open, ſince he may be told Truths of that conſequence, that he will be oblig'd to provide againſt them.

To that I anſwer in the firſt place, That in ſpeaking only of ſuch Servants whoſe Fidelity is unreproachable, and whoſe Conduct has been try'd on many occaſions of that importance, that it is impoſſible to meet with greater; the difference will be ſo inconſiderable in the Compariſon aforeſaid, that in Reaſon it muſt be look'd upon as none; the Rule of Moral Things, obliges to look upon thoſe things as nothing, which are of ſlight conſequence.

I add in the ſecond place, That the ſome inconvenience might attend the cloſing of ones Ears againſt what any body would ſay againſt a Servant of approv'd Fidelity; It is ſo inconſiderable in reſpect to thoſe which are inevitable, in opening them to the prejudice of Perſons thus qualifi'd, that I may ſay abſolutely, that the Governor, the

Woman,

Woman, and the Prince muſt equally ſhut them in the occaſions above-mention'd.

There is no ground to preſume, that he who has been faithful all his Life, would become unfaithful in a moment, without Cauſe or Reaſon, principally when the Intereſt of his Fortune is joyn'd to his Maſter's.

An Evil which can happen but ſeldom, muſt be preſum'd not to happen at all; particularly, when to avoid it, we muſt expoſe our ſelves to others which are inevitable, and of greater Conſequence, which is the Caſe in queſtion: It being certain, that it is almoſt impoſſible for a Prince to preſerve his moſt faithful and moſt aſſured Servants, if under pretence of not ſhutting his Ears againſt Truth, he opens them to the Malice of Men; beſides, that it is certain that he will loſe more, in loſing one thus Qualify'd; than if for want of giving Ear, he ſhould tolerate in any one, Faults which cannot be of great conſequence, if he finds him faithful in the moſt important Occaſions.

If he who gives a free entrance to the Murtherers who kill a Man, is guilty of his Death, he who receives all ſorts of Suſpicions, and of Calumnies, againſt the Fidelity of one of his Servants, without examining the Caſe to the bottom, is anſwerable before GOD for ſuch a proceeding.

The beſt of Actions are deem'd ill by two ſorts of Men; by the Malicious, who impute every thing to Ill by the exceſs of their Malice, and by thoſe who are naturally ſuſpicious, who explain every thing ill by their Weakneſs.

There is no Man on Earth, though never ſo vertuous, that can paſs for innocent in a Maſter's Mind,

Mind, who not examining things himſelf, gives ear to Calumny.

As there are but two ways to reſiſt Vice, either by Flight, or by Combat; ſo there are alſo but two to reſiſt the Impreſſions which are made by Calumnies; the one conſiſts in rejecting them abſolutely, without hearkning to them; the other in being ſo careful in the Examination of what is told, that the Truth or Falſhood thereof may be averr'd.

To avoid all Inconveniences, to ſecure one's ſelf againſt the Artifices and Snares that are laid by the Wicked, to ruin honeſt Men, and not to be depriv'd of the means to diſcover the ill Behaviour of thoſe who ſerve ill; the Prince muſt look upon all thoſe things as Calumnies which are only whiſper'd to him; and upon that account, refuſe to hear them: And if any Man will maintain what he has to ſay in the preſence of thoſe he accuſes, then he may give ear to them thus, on condition of a good Recompence, if he ſays any thing material to the Publick which proves to be true; and of a great Puniſhment, if his Accuſation prove falſe, or not conſiderable and important, though it ſhould prove true.

I have always begg'd of your Majeſty to follow this Method in relation to my ſelf, in order to give thoſe who would cenſure my Actions an opportunity to do it, and me means to defend my ſelf.

I may ſay with truth, That your Majeſty never had the leaſt Diſguſt againſt my Conduct, but when you have not practis'd this Council, which is the more to be receiv'd, in that it is altogether innocent.

The End of the Firſt Part.

THE Political Teſtament Of the Famous CARDINAL Duke *de RICHELIEU.*

The Second PART.

THE Rules I have ſet down in the firſt Part of this Book, being well eſtabliſh'd; it is the Duty of Counſellors to uſe their beſt Endeavours like Men of Honour according to certain general Principles, on which the good Adminiſtration of States depends.

It would be eaſie to propoſe many, which would ſeem very uſeful; but as the Excellency of Sciences conſiſts in a ſmall number of Principles by reaſon that they are the ſooner and better underſtood, I will reduce thoſe I look upon to be moſt advantagious for the Government of this Kingdom to Nine, which in my opinion are abſolutely neceſſary.

Tho ſome of them may have divers Branches, they will not increaſe their Number, as thoſe of Trees do not multiply the Stems.

CHAP. I.

The first Foundation of the Happiness of a State is the Establishment of the Reign of God.

THE Reign of God is the Principle of the Government of States; and indeed it is a thing so absolutely necessary, that without that Foundation it is impossible for any Prince to rule well, or for any State to be happy.

It would be easie to write whole Volumes upon so important a Subject, for which Scripture, the Fathers and all sorts of Histories furnish us an infinite number of Examples, of pretences and exhortations which all tend to the same end: But all Men are so sensible by their own Reason, that their Original does not proceed from themselves, but that a God is their Creator, and consequently their Director, that they all feel that Nature has imprinted that Truth in their hearts with undefaceable Characters.

So many Princes have undone themselves, and their States, by laying the foundation of their Conduct upon a Judgment contrary to their own knowledg; and so many have been loaden with Blessings in submitting their Authority to that from whom it was deriv'd, for having only sought their Grandeur, in that of their Creator; and for having taken more Care of his Reign than of their own, that I will enlarge no further on a Truth too evident, to stand in need of any Proof.

I will only ſay this, that as it is impoſſible that the Reign of a Prince, who ſuffers diſorder and vice to reign in his State, ſhould be happy; ſo God will not eaſily permit his to be unhappy, who takes a particular care to eſtabliſh his Empire within the Extent of his Dominion.

Nothing can be of greater uſe to ſuch an Eſtabliſhment than the Regularity of Princes Lives, which is a Law that ſpeaks and perſuades with more efficacy than all thoſe they could enact to induce People to follow the good they would procure.

If it be true, that whatever Crime a Soveraign may fall into, he ſins more by the ill Example he gives than by the nature of his fault: It is no leſs certain that whatever Laws he may make, if he practiſes what he preſcribes, his Example is no leſs uſeful towards the Obſervation of his Will than all the Penalties of his Ordinances, tho never ſo grave.

The purity of a chaſt Prince will baniſh more impurity out of his Kingdom than all the Ordinances he could publiſh to that end.

The Prudence and Diſcretion of thoſe who avoid Swearing will ſooner put a ſtop to the Oaths and Blaſphemies, which are too common in States, than all the Rigors they can exert againſt thoſe who addict themſelves to ſuch Execrations.

Not but it is abſolutely neceſſary at the ſame time to chaſtiſe Scandals, Swearing and Blaſphemies with the utmoſt Severity; It is a thing in which Princes can never be too exact; for let the Life of a Prince or of a Magiſtrate be never ſo godly and regular, they will never be reputed to have perform'd their Duty, unleſs while they invite People

to it by their Example, they also force them to it by the Rigor of their Laws.

All the Soveraigns of the World are oblig'd by that Principle to promote the Conversion of those, who living under their Reign, stray out of the Road to Heaven. But as Man is reasonable by his Nature, Princes perform their Duty, in practising all reasonable means to attain so good an end; and Prudence does not allow them to attempt any so hazardous, as to run the risque of pulling out the good Wheat in endeavouring to remove Dissention, which it would be difficult to purge a State of by any means but those of mildness, without exposing it to a tottering condition capable to ruin it, or at least to cause a notable prejudice to it.

As Princes are oblig'd to establish the true Worship of God, they must be very careful to banish the false Appearances of it, so prejudicial to States, that one may truly affirm, that Hypocrisy has often serv'd as a Veil to cover the deformity of the most pernicious attempts.

Many Persons, whose Weakness is equal to their Malice, sometimes use that kind of Varnish, which is the more common in Women in that their Sex is more inclin'd to Devotion, and that the little force it is attended with makes them the more capable of such disguises, which suppose less Solidity than Cunning.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Reaſon muſt be the Rule and Conduct of a State.

NAtural Knowledg convinces us, that Man being created reaſonable, Reaſon ought to be the Guide of all his Actions, ſince otherwiſe he would act againſt his Nature, and conſequently againſt him who is the Author of it.

It alſo teaches us that the greater a Man is, and the more he is elevated, the more he ought to reſpect that Privilege, and to avoid abuſing that reaſon which conſtitutes his Being; becauſe the advantages he has over other Men, oblige him to preſerve, whatever relates to the Nature, and to the End, which he whom he derives his Elevation from propos'd to himſelf.

It follows clearly from thoſe two Principles, that if Man is Soveraignly reaſonable, it is his Duty to give Reaſon an abſolute Empire; which does not only require his doing nothing without her, but obliges him moreover to uſe his beſt endeavours to oblige thoſe who are under his Authority to reverence and follow it religiouſly.

This Conſequence is the Source of another, which teaches us, that as we ought never to will any thing, but what is juſt and reaſonable, ſo we muſt never will any thing, without putting it in execution, and without exacting an intire Obedience to our commands; ſince otherwiſe Reaſon would not reign ſoveraignly.

The Practice of that Rule is the easier in that Love is the most powerful Motive to oblige Men to obey, and that it is impossible for Subjects not to love a Prince, when they are sensible that Reason is the Guide of all his Actions.

Authority constrains to obey, but reason persuades to it, and it is much safer to guide Men by Ways which insensibly ingage their Will than by such, which for the most part only prevail by force.

If it be true, that Reason ought to be the Light to guide Princes in their own Conduct, and in the management of their States, it is also true, that as nothing in Nature is more inconsistent with it than passion, which blinds Men to that degree, that it often makes them mistake the Shadow for the Body; a Prince must above all things avoid to act by such a Principle, which would render him the more odious, in that it is directly opposite to that which distinguishes Men from Animals.

Men often repent at leasure what Passion has induc'd them to do in haste, and we never run that risque when we act by reasonable Considerations.

We must be positive on what we resolve by such Motives, since it is the only way to be obey'd, and that as humility is the first Foundation of Christian Perfection, Obedience is the most solid ground of subjection, and so necessary towards the welfare of States, that they can never flourish while it is defective.

Many things are of this Nature, that there is no difference between the Will and the Performance, by reason of the facility we meet in the execution; but

but we muſt will them to the purpoſe, that is, with ſo much firmneſs as never to deſiſt from them, ſeverely chaſtiſing thoſe who ſhall refuſe to obey, after having commanded them to put them in execution.

Thoſe that appear moſt difficult and almoſt impoſſible are only ſo upon the account of the difference, wherewith we ſeem to will and to command them; and it is moſt certain that Subjects will always be religious in obeying, while Princes are ſteady and perſevering in their Commands; from whence it follows that it is moſt certain, that their Indifference and Weakneſs is the Cauſe of it.

In a word as to will a thing poſitively, and to do what one has a mind to, is one and the ſame thing in a lawful Prince; ſo to will weakly, and not to will, are things ſo different from 'em, that they tend to the ſame End.

The Government of a Kingdom requires a manly Vertue and an unmoveable ſteadineſs, contrary to the Irreſolution, which expoſes thoſe who are govern'd by it, to the Enterpriſes of their Enemies.

Men muſt behave themſelves in all things with Vigor, principally ſeing that tho Succeſs ſhould not anſwer our expectation, at leaſt we will have this advantage, that having omitted nothing in order to make it ſucceed, we will avoid the ſhame, when we cannot avoid the misfortune of an ill Event.

Tho Men ſhould abſolutely miſcarry in performing their Duty, the Diſgrace would be happy; and on the contrary what ever Succeſs a Man could have, in deviating from that which he is oblig'd to out of Honour and Conſcience, he ought to be

esteem'd unhappy, since he can gain nothing thereby to equal the disadvantages he receives by the means wherewith it has been procur'd.

Heretofore, most of the great designs of *France* have miscarry'd, because the first difficulty that oppos'd the putting of them in execution, put a stop to the Proceedings of those who in reason ought nevertheless to have prosecuted them; and if it has prov'd otherwise during your Majesties Reign, it is to be imputed to your Perseverance.

When a Time proves improper for the execution of a good design, we must expect another, and when we have once set our hands at work, if the difficulties we meet with oblige us to any suspension reason instructs us to resume our first designs, as soon as time and occasion prove more favourable.

In a word, nothing ought to divert us from a good Enterprise, unless some Accident happen, which renders it altogether impossible, and we must omit nothing to further the Execution of those we undertake with Reason.

That obliges me to mention Secresy and good Discipline in this Place, which are so essential towards the good Success of Affairs that nothing can be more.

Besides that Experience justifies it, the reason of it is evident, seing that whatever surprises, commonly astonishes so much that it often deprives Men of the means to oppose it, and that the prosecuting the Execution of a design slowly, and the divulging of it, is just like the Speaking of a thing not to do it.

This is the reason, that Women who are naturally lazy and have not the gift of Secresy, are so unfit

ſit for Government, and if we conſider moreover, that they are very ſubject to their Paſſions, and conſequently little capable of Reaſon and of Juſtice, that Principle will exclude them from all public Adminiſtrations.

Not but ſome might be found ſo free of thoſe defects that they might be admitted to it.

There are but few Rules without Exceptions; This very Age has produc'd ſome which can never be ſufficiently commended; but yet commonly their natural Weakneſs renders them Incapable of maſculine Vertue, ſo neceſſary for Adminiſtration, that it is almoſt Impoſſible for their Government to be free either of Lowneſs or of Diminution, which the Weakneſs of their Sex is the Cauſe of: or of Injuſtice, or Cruelty, which the unrulineſs of their Paſſions is the True Source of.

CHAP. III.

Which ſhows that Public Intereſt ſhould be the only End of thoſe who govern States, or at leaſt that it ought to be perferr'd to particular Advantages.

PUblic Intereſt ought to be the only Aim of the Prince, and of his Councelors, or at leaſt both ought to have ſo ſingular a reſpect for it, as to prefer it to all particular advantages.

It is Impoſſible to conceive the good a Prince, and thoſe he Imploys in his Affairs are Capable of

of doing in following this Principle Religiouſly, neither can any one Imagin the Miſeries a State is lyable to; when Private Intereſt is prefer'd to Public good: And that the laſt is regulated by the firſt.

True Philoſophy, the Chriſtian Law, and Policy give ſuch lively demonſtrations of this Truth, that the Councellors of a Prince can never ſufficiently make him ſenſible of the neceſſity of this Principle, nor the Prince be too ſevere in the Chaſtiſement of ſuch members of his Councel, as are ſo wretched as not to put it in Practice.

I muſt needs obſerve on this Subject, that the proſperity which has conſtantly accompany'd *Spain*, for ſome Ages laſt paſt; is wholy to be imputed to the Care of their Councel, to prefer the Intereſt of the State to all others, and that moſt of the Misfortunes which have befallen *France*, have been occaſion'd by the application which many of thoſe, who have been imploy'd in the Adminiſtration, have had to their private Intereſt to the prejudice of the Public.

The firſt have all along follow'd Public Intereſt which by the force of its Nature, has inclin'd them to do that which was moſt advantageous to the State.

The others ſuiting all things to their Private Intereſt or Capricio, have often diverted it from its own end, to apply it to that which was moſt agreable or moſt advantagious to them.

Neither Death nor the Alteration of Miniſters have ever occaſioned any Mutation in the Council of *Spain*. But it has been otherwiſe in this Kingdom, in which Affairs have not only been alter'd by the removal

removal of Councellors, but they have taken ſuch variety of Forms under the ſame Perſons, by the variety of their Councils, that ſuch a Proceeding had undoubtedly ruin'd this Monarchy, did not God out of his infinite Goodneſs extract out of the Imperfections of this Nation, the Remedy of the Evils it creates. Tho the diverſity of our Intereſts and our Natural Inconſtancy incline us often to dangerous Prejudices, the ſame Levity does not permit us to remain firm and conſtant even in thoſe things which are for our good, and turns our mind with ſo much ſwiftneſs that our Enemies not being capable to take juſt meaſures upon ſuch frequent Varieties, have not time enough to improve our faults to their advantage.

The Proceeding of your Council being alter'd of late, your Affairs have alſo taken a new face to the great advantage of your Kingdom; and if your Succeſſors take care to follow the Example of your Majeſty's Reign, our Neighbours will not have the advantages they have had for the time paſt: But this Kingdom ſharing Wiſdom with them, will undoubtedly ſhare their good Fortune, ſince that notwithſtanding Men may be wiſe without being happy, the beſt means we can uſe not to be unhappy is to tread the Path which Prudence and Reaſon direct us to, and not to follow the Irregularities to which the Minds of Men are ſubject, and particularly the *French*.

If thoſe to whom your Majeſty will confide the Care of your Affairs, have the capacity and probity above mention'd, you will have no further care in what relates to this Principle, which of it ſelf will not prove difficult, ſince the particular Intereſt

tereſt of a Princes reputation and thoſe of the Publick have the ſame End.

Princes eaſily conſent to the general Regulations of their States, by reaſon that in making them, they follow the dictates of Reaſon and of Juſtice, which Men eaſily embrace when they meet no Obſtacles to lead them out of the right way. But when occaſion offers it ſelf to practiſe the good Settlements they have made, they do not always ſhow the ſame ſteadineſs, becauſe that is the time when divers Intereſts, Piety, Compaſſion, Favour and Importunities ſolicite them and oppoſe their good Intentions, and that they have not always force enough to vanquiſh themſelves, and to deſpiſe particular Conſiderations whith ought to be of no weight in reſpect to thoſe of the Publick.

It is on thoſe occaſions it behoves them to muſter up all their Force againſt their Weakneſs, conſidering that thoſe whom God appoints to preſerve others, muſt have none but ſuch as may ſerve to diſcover what is advantagious for the Public, and proper for their Preſervation.

CHAP. IV.

How much Foreſight is neceſſary for the Government of a State.

NOthing can be more neceſſary for the Government of a State than Foreſight, ſince thereby we may eaſily prevent many things, which cannot be redreſs'd without great difficulties when they are come to paſs. Thus

Thus a Phyſitian who has the skill to prevent Diſtempers, is more eſteem'd than he who only labours to cure them. Therefore it is the Duty of Miniſters of State to repreſent to their Maſter, that it is more neceſſary to conſider the future than the preſent, and that Diſtempers are like the Enemies of a State againſt whom Prudence obliges us to march rather than tarry till they are come to drive them out again.

Thoſe who do not follow this Method will fall into great Confuſions, which it will be very difficult to remedy afterwards.

Yet it is a common thing among weak Men to drive off time, and to chuſe the preſerving of their Eaſe for a Month rather than to deprive themſelves of it for a while, to avoid the trouble of many Years which they do not conſider, becauſe they only ſee what is preſent, and do not anticipate time by a wiſe Providence.

Thoſe who never conſider to morrow live happily for themſelves, but others live unhappily under them.

Thoſe who foreſee at a diſtance, never do any thing raſhly, ſince they conſider betimes, and Men ſeldom miſcarry when they conſider before hand.

There are ſome occaſions on which we are not allow'd to deliberate long, becauſe the nature of Affairs does not permit it. But when they are not of that kind, the ſafeſt way is to ſlumber over them and to recompence by the prudence of the Execution, the delay we uſe the better to digeſt it.

There was a time in which no Orders were given in this Kingdom by way of prevention, and even after the evil was come to paſs, none but Pal-

liating

liating Remedies were apply'd to it, becauſe it was impoſſible to proceed abſolutely againſt it, without wounding the Intereſt of many particular perſons, which was then prefer'd to publick good. For which reaſon they only endeavour'd to eaſe the wound, inſtead of curing it, which has caus'd a great deal of harm in this Kingdom.

Of late years, thanks be to God, this way of proceeding has been alter'd with ſo much ſucceſs, that beſides Reaſons inviting us to continue the ſame, the great benefit we have receiv'd by it, obliges us ſtrickly ſo to do.

We muſt ſleep like the Lion, without cloſing our Eyes, which muſt be continually kept open, to foreſee the leaſt inconveniencies which may happen; and to remember that as Phtyſick does not move the Pulſe, tho' it is mortal: So it often happens in States, that thoſe evils which are imperceptible in their Original, and which we are leaſt ſenſible of, are the moſt dangerous, and thoſe which finally prove of moſt conſequence.

The extraordinary care which is requir'd not to be ſurpris'd on ſuch occaſions, is the reaſon that as all thoſe States have always been eſteem'd very happy which were Govern'd by Wiſe Men; ſo it has been thought, that among thoſe who did Govern them, the moſt unwiſe were the moſt happy.

The more capable a Man is, the more he is ſenſible of the weight of the Government that lies upon him.

Publick Adminiſtration takes up all the thoughts of the moſt Judicious, inſomuch, that the perpetual Meditations they are obliged to make to foreſee and prevent the Evils that may happen, deprives them

of

of all manner of Reſt, and Contentment, excepting that which they receive in ſeeing many ſleep quietly relying on their Watchings, and live happy by their miſery.

As it is very neceſſary to conſider before hand, as much as is poſſible, what ſucceſs may attend the deſigns we undertake in order not to be miſtaken in our reckoning. The Wiſdom and Sight of Men having bounds beyond which they can ſee nothing, God only being able to ſee the ultimate end of things; it often ſuffices to know that the Projects we form are Juſt and Poſſible, to undertake them with Reaſon.

God concurs to all the Actions of Men by a general Co-operation which ſeconds their deſigns, and it is their part to uſe their freedom in all things, according to the Prudence Divine Wiſdom has indu'd them with.

But when Men are ingag'd in great undertakings which concern the Conduct of Mankind after having diſcharg'd the obligation they are under to open their Eyes doubly, the better to take their meaſures; after having made uſe of all the conſiderations Human Minds are capable of, it is their Duty to rely upon the goodneſs of the Spirit of God, which ſometimes inſpiring thoſe thoughts into Men which are ſet down in his Eternal Decrees, leads them, as it were, by the Hand to their proper ends.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Puniſhment and Reward are two Points abſolutely neceſſary for the Conduct of States.

IT is a common but a very true ſaying, which has ever been in the Mouths and Minds of Men, that Puniſhments and Rewards are the two moſt conſiderable points for the Conduct of a Kingdom.

It is moſt certain, that tho' no other Principle be us'd in the Government of States, but that of being inflexible in Chaſtiſing thoſe who act againſt them, and Religious in rewarding thoſe who procure them any notable advantage. They cannot be Govern'd amiſs, ſince all Men may be kept within the bounds of their Duty, either by Fear or Hope.

I place Puniſhment before Reward, becauſe that if there were a neceſſity to be depriv'd of one of them, one might better diſpenſe with the laſt than the firſt.

As good is to be imbrac'd for its own ſake, there is no Reward due to thoſe who perform it, taking it in the ſtricteſt Sence. But as there is no crime which does not violate that, to which Men are oblig'd, there are none but what require the Puniſhment which is due to diſobedience, and that obligation is ſo ſtrict, that in many occaſions a fault cannot be left unpuniſhed, without committing a new one.

I ſpeak of faults which affect the State, and are committed with premeditation, and not of many others, which happen by chance and by misfortune, for

for which Princes may and ought to uſe Indulgence.

Tho' to Pardon in ſuch caſes is a laudable thing; not to Puniſh a conſiderable Fault, the impunity of which opens a door to Licenciouſneſs, is a criminal omiſion.

Theologians allow it as well as Politicians, and all agree that on certain occaſions in which the Prince would be to blame not to Pardon thoſe who are intruſted with the Government of the Publick, they would alſo be inexcuſable, if inſtead of a ſevere Puniſhment, they ſhould uſe Lenity.

Experience teaching thoſe who have had a long practice of the World, that Men eaſily loſe the remembrance of Favours, and that when they are loaden with them, the deſire of increaſing them often makes them Ambitious and Ingrateful together, ſhows us alſo that Puniſhment is a more certain way to keep Men within the bounds of their Duty; ſince they are not ſo ſoon forgotten, by reaſon that they make a ſtronger impreſſion on the ſences of moſt Men than Reaſon, which has but little power over many.

To be ſevere towards Private Men who make it their Pride to deſpiſe the Laws and Ordinances of a State, is to be kind to the Publick. And the greateſt crime one can be guilty of againſt the Intereſt of the Publick, is to be indulgent towards thoſe who violate them.

Among many Combinations, Factions and Seditions that have been made in my time in this Kingdom, I have never obſerv'd that Impunity ever inclin'd any one naturally to correct his evil Inclination. But on the contrary that they return'd to their old Vomit, and often with more ſucceſs the ſecond than the firſt time.

The Indulgency hitherto practis'd in this Kingdom has often reduc'd it to very great and very deplorable Exremities.

Faults not being Puniſh'd, every Man has made a Trade of his Place, and without regarding what he was oblig'd to do to diſcharge his Truſt worthily, he only conſider'd what he could do to get the more by it.

If the Ancients have been of opinion, that it was dangerous to live under a Prince, who will remit nothing of the Rigor of Right, they have alſo obſerv'd that it was more dangerous to live in a State in which Impunity opens a door to all ſorts of Licenciouſneſs.

Some Princes or Magiſtrates will be afraid of being faulty by too much Rigor, who would be accountable to God, and muſt needs be blam'd by all Wiſe Men, unleſs they exerted that, which is preſcrib'd by the Laws.

I have often repreſented it to your Majeſty, and it is my humble Petition ſtill that you would be pleas'd to remember it carefully, by reaſon that as there are Princes who want to be perſuaded from Severity, to avoid Cruelty, to which they are naturally inclin'd, your Majeſty wants to be diverted from a falſe Clemency, more dangerous than Cruelty it ſelf, ſince Impunity obliges to uſe a great deal in the end, which can only be prevented by Puniſhment.

The Rod which is the Emblem of Juſtice muſt never be uſeleſs; I own at the ſame time that it ought not be ſo much accompany'd with Rigor, as to be deſtitute of Goodneſs; but that laſt qualification does not conſiſt in the Indulgency which authorizes diſorders, which tho never ſo inconſiderable,

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are often so prejudicial to the State; that they may prove it's ruin.

If any are so ill advis'd in this Kingdom as to condemn the severity which is necessary in States, because it has not been practis'd hitherto, let them only open their Eyes, and they will find that Impunity has been too common in it hitherto, and the only cause, that Order and Rule have not been observ'd, and that the Continuation of Disorders obliges to have recourse to the utmost Extremities, to put a stop to them.

The only Source of all the Parties that have been form'd heretofore against Kings, has been their over much Indulgence. Finally, those who are acquainted with our History, cannot be ignorant of this Truth, of which I produce a Testimony which is the less to be suspected, in this case, because it is taken from the Mouth of our Enemies, which almost in all other occasions would make it suspicious.

Cardinal *Sapata* a Man of good Sence, meeting *Baraut* and *Bautru* in the King his Master's Antichamber, a quarter of an hour after their having receiv'd the News of the Duke *de Montmorency*'s Execution, put this question to them; Which was the chief cause of that Duke's death? *Bautru* answer'd immediately according to his fiery temper, in *Spanish*; *Sus falsas.* No, reply'd the Cardinal: *Pero la Clemensia de lors Royes antepassados:* which was as much as to say, that the Punishment of the said Duke was more to be imputed to the faults the King's Predecessors had committed, than to his own.

In Crimes of State, it is absolutely necessary to banish Pity, and to despise the Complaints of persons concern'd, and the discourse of an ignorant

Multitude, who sometimes blame what is most useful to them, and often absolutely necessary.

Christians ought to bury the remembrance of private Injuries; but Magistrates are oblig'd not to forget those which concern the Publick; and indeed to leave them unpunish'd, is rather to begin them anew, than to pardon and remit them.

There are many whose ignorance is so stupid as to imagin that a new Prohibition is a sufficient remedy to any Evil, but they are so much in the wrong, that I may affirm with Truth, that new Laws are not so much a remedy for the disorders of States, as Testimonies of their Illness, and certain proofs of the weakness of the Government; by reason that had th' antient Laws been put in execution; there would be no necessity to revive them, nor to make others to prevent new disorders, which would no sooner have appear'd, but it would have been easy to punish the evil committed.

Ordinances and Laws are altogether useless unless they are put in execution, which is so absolutely necessary, that notwithstanding in the course of Common Affairs, Justice requires an authentick proof, it is not so with those which concern the State; in such cases, that which appears by pressing conjectures must sometimes be held as a sufficient conviction, seeing that the Factions and Conspiracies that are form'd against publick safety, are commonly carry'd on with so much Art and Secresy, that we have seldom any evident proof of them, but by the event, which is past remedy.

In those cases it is sometimes necessary to begin by Execution, whereas in all others, proving the Fact evidently either by Witnesses or undeniable Authorities ought to precede every thing. Those

Thoſe Maxims ſeem to be dangerous, and indeed they are not altogether void of peril, but they will moſt certainly be found good, if not making uſe of the laſt, and extream remedies, in faults which will only be verify'd by conjectures, the courſe of them is barely prevented by innocent means, as the Baniſhment or Impriſonment of ſuſpected perſons.

The good Conſcience, and the penetrat of a judicious Mind, who being learn'd in the courſe of Affairs, is able to know the future almoſt with as much certainty as the preſent, as well as a meaner capacity, by the very ſight of things, will ſecure that Practice from ill conſequences; and at the worſt, the abuſe that can be committed in it being only dangerous for private Perſons, whoſe life will not be in danger this way, it ought not to be rejected, ſince their Intereſt is not to be compar'd to that of the Publick.

Yet it requires a great deal of Prudence not to make it an In-let to Tiranny, which will be avoided undoubtedly, if, as I have ſaid, in doubtful caſes, none but Innocent remedies are practis'd.

Puniſhment is ſo neceſſary in what relates to Publick Intereſt, that we are not ſo much as allow'd to commit faults of Indulgence in this kind, recompenſing a preſent evil, for a paſt good; that is to leave a crime unpuniſh'd, becauſe the perſon that has committed it, has done good ſervice on other occaſions.

Nevertheleſs this has hitherto been often practis'd in this Kingdom, in which not only light faults have been forgotten, in conſideration of important ſervices; but the greateſt Crimes aboliſh'd, by ſervices of no moment, which is altogether inſupportable.

Good and Evil are ſo different in their Nature, that they can never be put in Parallel one with another; they are Enemies, among which there is no Quarter to be given, nor Exchange to be made; if the one is worthy of Reward, the other deſerves Puniſhment, and both ought to be us'd according to their Merit.

Altho' Conſcience would allow the leaving of a ſignal Action unrewarded, and a notable Crime without Puniſhment, Reaſons of State could not allow it.

Puniſhment and Rewards relate to the future more than to the time paſt; a Prince muſt be ſevere of neceſſity, to prevent the miſchiefs that might be committed, in hopes of a Pardon, if he were known to be too Indulgent; and very kind to thoſe that are of uſe to the Publick, to encourage them to continue their Endeavours, and every body to imitate them and follow their example.

There would be a great deal of pleaſure in pardoning Crimes, if the Impunity of the ſame had no ill conſequence; and the neceſſities of the State would ſometimes lawfully excuſe a Prince from Rewarding a Service, if in depriving him, who has done it, of his Reward, he did not at the ſame time deprive himſelf of the hopes of receiving others for the future.

Noble Souls taking as much pleaſure in good, as they are loath to do harm, I quit the diſcourſe of Puniſhments and Executions, to conclude this Chapter agreeably, by Favours and Rewards; whereupon I muſt needs obſerve, that there is this difference between the Favours which are beſtow'd as a Reward of Service; and thoſe that have no other

foundation

foundation than the inclination of Kings, that these ought to be greatly moderated, whereas the others ought to have no other bounds than those of the Services they have done the Publick.

The Good of States does so absolutely require that their Princes should be Liberal, that when at any time it is come into my mind, that there are Men, who out of a natural propensity are not inclin'd to do good; I have always concluded, that this natural defect, blamable in all Men, is a far greater imperfection in Sovereigns, who being in a more peculiar manner the Image of their Creator, who by his Nature does good to all the World, cannot fail of imitating him in that point, without being answerable for the same before him.

The Reason of it is, That it is his pleasure they should follow his example, and bestow their Favours handsomly; for those who oblige without that condition, are like the Misers, who serve good Meat in their Treats, but so ill dress'd, that those who are invited to them, eat them without any pleasure, and without thinking themselves beholden to those that have been at the charge of it.

I would enlarge more upon this Subject, if I had not done it already in one of the preceding Chapters, representing the necessity of Princes being kind to those of their Council, who serve them faithfully.

CHAP. VI.

A Continual Negotiation contributes much towards the good Succeſs of Affairs.

STates receive ſuch advantages by continual Negotiations, when they are manag'd with Prudence, that it is almoſt incredible to any but thoſe who have had the Experience of it.

I own that I had been imploy'd five or ſix years in the management of Affairs before I diſcover'd this Truth: But I am ſo certain of it at preſent, that I dare affirm boldly, that to Nagotiate continually, openly, or ſecretly, in all Places, altho no preſent benefit be received by it, and but little Proſpect for the Future, is a thing abſolutely Neceſſary for the good of States.

I may ſay with Truth, that in my Time, I have ſeen the Affairs of *France* and of Chriſtendom quite alter'd, by having put that Principle into Practice, by the Kings Authority, which till then had been abſolutely neglected in this Kingdom.

Among the Seeds of them ſome produce Fruit ſooner than others; ſome are no ſooner in the Ground but they ſprout while others are a long while without producing the ſame Effect.

He who Negotiates finally finds out a proper moment to compaſs his Ends; and tho he ſhould not find it, at leaſt, it is certain, that he can loſe nothing, and that by the means of his Negotiation, he is inform'd with what paſſes in the World, which is a thing of no ſmall Conſequence for the good of States.

Negotiations

Negotiations are Innocent remedys, which never do any harm; it is neceſſary to Act every where, far and near, and particularly at *Rome*.

Among the good Councils, which *Anthony Perez* gave the late King, he adviſ'd him to make himſelf powerful in that Court, and not without reaſon, ſince the Ambaſſadors of all the Princes in Chriſtendom, who repair there, judg that thoſe who have moſt Credit and Authority in that Court, are in reality thoſe who have moſt Power in themſelves, and moſt Fortune; and indeed their Judgment is not ill grounded, ſince it is certain, that tho Popes ought to reſpect Reaſon above all other Men, yet there is no Place in the World in which Power is more conſider'd than in their Court, which is ſo evidently true, that the Reſpect which is paid to Ambaſſadors there, increaſes or diminiſhes daily according to the good or ill State of their Maſters affairs, from whence it often comes to paſs that thoſe Miniſters receive two different Faces in one day, if a Courier who comes at night brings different News from thoſe that came in the Morning.

It is with States as it is with Human Bodies, the freſh Colour which appears in our Faces, makes the Phyſitian conclude that all is well within, and as that good Complection proceeds from the good Diſpoſition of the Noble and Internal Parts, ſo it is certain that the beſt way a Prince can put in Practice, to be in favour at *Rome*, is to ſettle his Affairs well at home, and that it is almoſt impoſſible to have a great reputation in that City, which has been long the Head, and is the Centre of the World, without having the ſame throughout the Univerſe, to the great advantage of publick Intereſt.

Natural

Natural Reaſon teaches us, that we ought to have a great regard for our Neighbours, by reaſon that as their Neighbourhood gives them an opportunity to annoy, it alſo puts them in a condition to ſerve as the Out-works of a Place, which hinder the Immediate Approach of the Walls.

Perſons of mean capacity limit their thoughts within the extent of the States in which they are born, but thoſe to whom God has been pleas'd to give more knowledg, learning from Phyſitians, that in the greateſt Diſtempers Revolutions are made with moſt Violence in the moſt diſtant Parts, they uſe their beſt Endeavours to fortify themſelves at a diſtance.

It is neceſſary to act in all Places (which is to be obſerv'd) according to the humour and by ſuitable means to the capacity of thoſe with whom we negotiate.

Different Nations have different Wayes, ſome ſpeedily conclude what they deſign to do, and others are very ſlow.

Republics are of the laſt kind, they proceed ſlowly, and commonly they do not at firſt grant what is deſir'd of them, but one muſt be ſatisfy'd with little in order to obtain more.

As great Bodies do not move ſo eaſily as ſmall ones, thoſe kind of States being compos'd of ſeveral heads, they are much ſlower in their Reſolutions and in their Executions than others.

And for that reaſon, Prudence obliges thoſe who negotiate with them to give them time, and to preſs them no more than their natural Conſtitution permits.

It is obſervable, that as ſtrong and ſolid Reaſons are excellent for Men of vaſt Genius, weak ones are better for Men of meaner Capacitys, becauſe they are more ſuitable to their reach.

Men conceive Affairs according to their capacity, the greateſt ſeem eaſie and ſmall to Men of good Underſtanding and great Courage, and thoſe who want theſe qualifications commonly find every thing difficult.

Such Men are incapable of apprehending the Weight of what is propos'd to them, and ſometimes ſlight what is moſt conſiderable, and alſo often ſet a great ſtreſs on things which deſerve no conſideration.

It is neceſſary to act with every Man according to his Capacity: On ſome Occaſions to Act and to ſpeak couragiouſly, when we have right on our ſide, is ſo far from making a Breach, that on the contrary, it is rather the way to prevent and to ſtifle it in it's Birth.

In others, inſtead of reſenting unſeaſonably, certain imprudent Expreſſions ſpoken by thoſe we treat with, we muſt ſuffer them with Prudence and Addreſs together, and have only Ears for thoſe things which may conduce to our Ends.

There are Men who are ſo preſumptuous, as to think they ought to ſhew their Bravery on all occaſions, hoping thereby to obtain what they cannot get by reaſon, and what they cannot conſtrain People to do by force.

They think they have done harm by threatning it; but beſides, that this proceeding is contrary to reaſon, it never ſucceeds with Perſons of Honor.

As

As Fools are not fit to negotiate, there are Minds ſo very nice and refin'd, that they are as unfit for it as they, by reaſon that ſubtilizing upon every thing they are like thoſe who break the Points of Needles in whetting them.

The moſt proper Men are thoſe who keep a Medium between thoſe two extreams, and the moſt ſubtle making uſe of their Wit, to avoid being deceiv'd, muſt take care at the ſame time not to uſe it to deceive thoſe they treat with.

Men are always diffident of thoſe that act craftily, and give an ill Impreſſion of the frankneſs and fidelity they ought to behave themſelves with; That never advances their Affairs.

The ſame Words have often two Senſes, the one depends on the Sincerity and Ingenuity of Men, the other on Art and Subtlety by which it is very eaſie to turn the true Signification of a Word to voluntary Explications.

Great Negotiations muſt not have one Moments Intermiſſion, it is neceſſary to purſue what we undertake with a perpetual chain of deſigns, never ceaſing to act, unleſs with Reaſon, and not by a Relaxation of Mind, Indifference, wavering thoughts and contrary reſolution.

Neither muſt Men be diſguſted by an ill Event, ſince it often comes to paſs, that what is undertaken with moſt Reaſon, ſucceeds with leaſt happineſs.

It is difficult to combat often, and always to be Conqueror, and it is a Sign of an extraordinary Bleſſing when Succeſs is favourable in great Undertakings, and only contrary in thoſe that are of little Moment.

It is enough that Negotiations are ſo harmleſs, that one may receive conſiderable advantage by them, and never any harm.

If any body urges, that ſome of them prove prejudicial ſometimes, I give him leave to reject my Judgment, if he does not find, in caſe he will open his Eyes, that inſtead of having any reaſon to impute the ill ſucceſs he has obſerv'd in the Remedy I propoſe, they are only to be imputed to thoſe who did not know how to make a good uſe of it.

Tho it ſhould produce no other advantage than to gain Time on certain occaſions, which happens commonly, the practice of it would be very commendable and uſeful in States, ſince a moment often ſerves to avoid a Storm.

Notwithſtanding the Alliances, which are often contracted by Marriages between Crowns, do not always produce the Effect that might be deſir'd, yet they muſt not be neglected; and they often prove the moſt Important matters of Negotiations.

They always produce this advantage, that they retain States for ſome Time in ſome conſiderations of Reſpect one towards another; and to have a Value for them, it is ſufficient that they prove ſometimes advantageous.

As the way to get good Fruit is to Graft; the Princes of *France*, who derive their Birth from Parents of Equal and high Quality, muſt in Reaſon be more elevated, and without doubt, their Blood remains the more Illuſtrious, in being leſs mix'd with other.

Moreover Alliances ſerve ſometimes to extinguiſh Leagues and Engagements among Princes, and tho they do not always produce that good Effect, the

the advantages the houſe of *Auſtria* derives by them, ſhows that they are not to be neglected.

In matters of State, all things muſt be improv'd, and what may be uſeful, muſt never be diſpis'd.

Leagues are of that kind, the Benefit of them is often very uncertain, and yet they muſt be reſpected: However I would not adviſe a great Prince, to ingage himſelf voluntarily, upon the account of a League in a deſign of difficult Execution, unleſs he finds himſelf powerful enought to make it ſucceed altho his Colleagues ſhould fail him.

Two Reaſons oblige me to advance this Propoſition.

The firſt draws its Original and Force from the Weakneſs of Unions, which are never very certain among divers Soveraign Heads.

The ſecond conſiſts, in that Petty Princes are often as careful and diligent, to Ingage great Kings into great Enterpriſes, as they are ſlow in ſeconding them, notwithſtanding they are ſtrictly oblig'd ſo to do, and that there are ſome, who ſave their own ſtake, at the coſt of thoſe they have ingag'd againſt their Will.

Altho it is a common Saying, that whoever has Force, has commonly Reaſon, it is true nevertheleſs, that two unequal Powers being joyn'd by a Treaty, the greateſt is in danger of being forſaken by the other; the reaſon of it is Evident. Reputation is a thing of ſo much Importance to a great Prince, that no advantage can be propos'd to him, to recompenſe the loſs he would ſuffer by it, in caſe he ſhould forfeit the Engagements of his Word and Faith: And ſuch Terms may be offer'd to him, whoſe Power is Inconſiderable, tho his Quality is Sovereign,

that

that according to all Probability he will prefer his advantage to his Honor, which will make him fail in his Obligation towards him who, foreſeeing his Infidelity, cannot reſolve to prevent it; by reaſon that to be abandon'd by his Allys, is not of ſo much Conſequence to him, as the prejudice he would receive in violating his Faith.

Kings muſt take a great deal of Care what Treatys they make; but when they are made they muſt keep them Religiouſly.

I am ſenſible that many Polititians teach the Contrary; but without conſidering in this Place what the Chriſtian Faith affords us againſt thoſe Maxims; I maintain, that ſince the loſs of Honor is greater then the loſs of Life, a great Prince ſhould ſooner venture his Life, and even the Intereſt of his State, than to break his Word, which he can never violate without loſeing his Reputation, and conſequently the greateſt Force of Sovereigns.

The importance of this Place makes me obſerve, that it is abſolutely neceſſary to be exact in the Choice of Ambaſſadors, and other Negotiators; and that a Prince can never be too ſevere in puniſhing thoſe who exceed their Commiſſions; ſince by thoſe Faults, they expoſe the Reputation of Princes, and the Well-fare of the Commonwealth at once.

The eaſineſs, or corruption of ſome Perſons, is ſometimes ſo great, and the deſire of others, who are neither ſo weak nor ſo wicked, to do ſomething is often ſo extraordinary, that if they are not kept within the bounds which are preſcrib'd them, out of fear of abſolute Ruin, there will always be a greater Number of thoſe who will be drawn in to make ill Treatys, than to make none at all.

I have had ſo much Experience of this Truth; that it forces me to end this Chapter, ſaying, That whoever ſhall not be Rigorous in thoſe Occaſions, will be wanting in what is neceſſary to the ſubſiſtance of States.

CHAP. VII.

One of the greateſt Advantages, that can be procur'd to a State, is to give every one an Employment ſuitable to his Genius and Capacity.

SUCH Misfortunes befal States through the Incapacity of thoſe that are Imploy'd in the principal Places and moſt important Commiſſions, that the Prince, and thoſe who have a ſhare in the Adminiſtration of Affairs, can never be too careful to employ none but ſuch as are fit for the Places they are deſign'd for.

The moſt clear ſighted being ſometimes blind, and there being but few Men, who are willing to impoſe Bounds to themſelves, according to the Rules of Reaſon; Thoſe who are in credit about Princes always think themſelves worthy of all ſorts of Imployments, and upon that falſe Foundation, they uſe their utmoſt Endeavours to obtain them.

Nevertheleſs it is certain, that a Man who is capable to ſerve the Publick in certain Functions, may be capable to ruin it in another.

I have ſeen ſuch ſtrange Inconveniences proceeding from the ill choice that have been made in my time, that I cannot forbear exclaiming upon that Subject to avoid the like for the future. If

If Phyſicians will not ſuffer Experiments to be made on Perſons of any conſideration, it is eaſy to conceive how dangerous it muſt be to put unexperienc'd Perſons in Places of the greateſt Truſt, ſince thereby you give way to Learners to make Eſſays on occaſions, in which Maſters and Maſter pieces are ſo neceſſary.

Nothing can be more capable to ruin a State than ſuch a Proceeding, the true ſource of all ſorts of diſorder.

An Ambaſſador ill choſen to make a Treaty may cauſe a notable prejudice out of Ignorance.

A General of an Army incapable of ſuch an Imployment is capable of hazarding all his Maſter's Fortune, and the happineſs of the State unſeaſonably.

I dare ſay on the contrary, That if all thoſe who are imploy'd in Public Truſts were worthy of them, States would not only be exempted from many accidents, which often trouble their quiet, but they would enjoy unexpreſſible Felicities.

I am ſenſible that it is very difficult to meet Subjects, which have all the Qualifications requir'd for the Places they are deſign'd for; but at leaſt they muſt have the Chief, and when none that are accompliſh'd can be found, it is no ſmall ſatisfaction to chuſe the beſt that can be found in a barren Age.

If the maſk moſt Men put on, and if the Artifices they uſually practiſe to diſguiſe themſelves, and to conceal their Defects, deceive us, inſomuch that being once ſettl'd in great Places, they appear as malicious as they were eſteem'd full of Virtue when they were choſen; the ſaid miſtake muſt be rectifi'd immediately, and tho Indulgence may induce to

Tolerate ſome ſmall Incapacity, it muſt never excuſe malice which is ſo to prejudicial to States, to be Tolerated in conſideration of Private Intereſt.

It is on this Occaſion our Duty obliges us to repreſent freely to Princes, to what degree they are anſwerable before God, when they give Places of great Truſt out of pure favour, which can never be poſſeſſed by mean Capacitys, without prejudice to the State.

It is on the ſaid Occaſion, we are oblidg'd to ſhow, that tho we do not abſolutely Condemn particular Affections, which have no other foundation but that natural Inclination, which Men have rather for one Perſon than for another; we cannot excuſe Princes who ſuffer themſelves to be prevail'd upon ſo far, as to give thoſe, they Love thus, Places, in the adminiſtration of which they ſhow themſelves as prejudicial to the State, as uſeful to themſelves.

Thoſe who have the happineſs to Injoy the favour of Princes, by the force of their Inclination, muſt not be depriv'd of receiving Advantages from them, tho they have not all the Qualifications requir'd to make them worthy of the ſame, and the Public can not complain of it with Reaſon, unleſs they are Immoderate.

But it is a ſiniſter Omen for a Prince, when he, who is the moſt Conſiderable for his Intereſt, is not the moſt conſider'd by his Favour, and States are never in a worſe Condition, than when the Inclinations the Prince has for ſome particular Perſons, prevail before the ſervices of thoſe that are more uſeful to the Public.

In ſuch a Caſe, neither the Eſteem of the Soveraign, nor the Affection one has for him, nor the

the hope of reward do any longer excite Virtue. Men remain on the contrary in an Indifference of Good and Evil, and Envy, and jealouſie, or Spite, Induce all Men to neglect their Duty, becauſe that in performing it, they have no proſpect of reward.

A Prince, who deſires to be belov'd by his Subjects, muſt fill up all the Places of Truſt, and the firſt Dignitys of his State, with Perſons ſo much eſteem'd by every one, that the Cauſe of his Choice may be found in their merit.

Such Men muſt be carefully ſought after throughout the State, and not receiv'd by importunities, or choſen in the Croud of thoſe who preſs moſt about Kings, and about their Favourites.

If Favour has no hand in Elections, and Merit be the Sole foundation of them, beſides that the State will be well ſerv'd, Princes will avoid a great deal of Ingratitude, which is often met with in certain Men who are the leſs grateful for the favours they receive, in that they leaſt deſerve them: It being moſt certain, that the ſame Qualifications, which render Men worthy of favours, are the ſame which make them Capable and deſirous to acknowledg them.

Many have good ſentiments in the moment you Oblige them, but the Conſtitution of their Nature ſways them ſoon after, and they eaſily forget what they owe others, becauſe they only love themſelves; and as Fire converts all things into its own ſubſtance, they only conſider Public Intereſts, to convert them to their one advantage, and equaly deſpiſe thoſe who do them Good, and the States in which they receive it.

Favour may innocently be allow'd in ſome things; but a Kingdom is in a ſad Caſe, when the Throne of that falſe Goddeſs is raiſed above Reaſon.

Merit ſhould always turn the Scale, and when Juſtice is on our ſide, favour cannot prevail without Injuſtice.

Favourites are the more dangerous, in that thoſe who are raiſed by Fortune ſeldom conſult Reaſon; and whereas it ſeldom favours their deſigns, it proves commonly Ineffectual to ſtop the Courſe of thoſe they form to the prejudice of the State.

In my opinion nothing is more likely to Ruin the moſt flouriſhing Kingdom in the World, than the Apetite of ſuch Men, or the inordinate Paſſions of a Woman, when a Prince is poſſeſſed by them.

I am the bolder in advancing this Propoſition, becauſe there are no Remedies againſt thoſe Evils, but ſuch as depend altogether on Chance and Time; which often ſuffering the Sick to dye, without any aſſiſtance, muſt be look'd upon as the worſt Phyſician in the World.

As the greateſt Light in Nature cannot make the blind perceive one glimpſe of their way, ſo there is no Ray capable to unſeal the Eyes of a Prince, when they are ſeal'd by Favour and Paſſion.

Thoſe whoſe Eyes are blinded, can never make good Choices unleſs by Chance, and therefore ſince the welfare of the State requires them ever to be made with Reaſon, it alſo requires that Princes ſhould not be poſſeſſed by Perſons who deprive them of the Light, they ſtand in need of to ſee the Objects, which are put before their Eyes.

When the Hearts of Princes are ingag'd by ſuch means, it is almoſt Uſeleſs to do well; becauſe the

Craft

Craft of those who are in possession of their Affections, tarnish the lustre of the purest Actions, and make the most signal Services pass for Offences.

Many Princes have undone themselves, by preferring their particular Affection to Public Interest.

Such misfortunes have befallen some, by the unruly Passions they have had for Women.

Some are fallen into the like Inconveniences, by such a simple blind Passion they have had for their Favorites, that in order to raise their Fortune, they have ruin'd their own.

There have been others, who having no natural Inclination for any thing, have nevertheless been sway'd with so much Violence in favour of some particular Persons, that they have occasion'd their Ruin.

Men perhaps will wonder at this Proposition, which is nevertheless as True, as it is easy to be conceiv'd; and if Men consider, that such Motions are distempers to the Minds that are influenc'd by them, and that as the Cause of Feavours is the Corruption of Humors; one may also say, That those sorts of Violent Affections, are rather Grounded on the defect of the Person in which we find them, than on the Merit of those who receive the Effect, and Advantage of them.

Such Evils commonly carry their Remedy along with them, in that being Violent they are not lasting; but when they continue they often occasion Death, as well as the Feavers of that Kind; or a want of health, which is seldom repair'd afterwards.

The wisest Princes have avoided those divers kinds of Evils, in making Reason the guide of all their Affections.

Many have cur'd themſelves of them, after having found to their Coſt, that unleſs they did it, their Ruin was Inevitable.

To return preciſely to the Point of the Queſtion propoſed in this Chapter, the ſcope of which is to ſhow how Important it is to diſcern thoſe who are the fitteſt for Employments; I will conclude it, ſaying, That ſince Intereſt is that which makes Men guilty of Male-adminniſtration in the Places that are committed to them: Eccleſiaſticks are often to be preferr'd to many others, in what relates to Places of great Truſt: Not that they are leſs ſubject to their own Intereſt, but becauſe they have a great deal leſs ſelf Intereſt than other Men, ſince that having neither Wives, nor Children, they are free from the Bonds which ingage Men moſt.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Evil which Flatterers, Detractors, and Intriguers commonly occaſion in States, and how neceſſary it is to remove them from Kings, and to baniſh them from their Courts.

THere is no Plague ſo capable to ruine a State, as Flatterers, Detractors and certain Men, who apply themſelves wholly to form Cabals and Intrigues in their Courts.

They are ſo induſtrious to ſpread their Venom, by divers imperceptible ways, that it is difficult to ſcape it, without abundance of care.

As

As they are neither of a Quality, nor Merit, to have a ſhare in the Management of Affairs, nor good enough to be concern'd for the Publick Good, their only aim is to diſturb both; and expecting great advantages from Confuſion, they omit no means to overthrow, by their Flatteries, by their Crafts, and by their Detractions the Order and Rule which deprives them abſolutely of all hopes of Fortune, ſince it is impoſſible to build any in a well diſciplin'd State, unleſs it be upon Merit, which they are wholly deſtitute of.

Beſides that as it is a common thing for thoſe who have no ſhare in Affairs, to endeavour to ruine them, thoſe ſort of Men are capable of doing all manner of Evils; and therefore it behoves Princes to take all the precautions imaginable againſt the malice, which diſguiſes it ſelf in ſo many different dreſſes, that it is often difficult to ward it.

There are ſome, who notwithſtanding they have neither Courage nor Wit, have nevertheleſs ſo much of both as to feign as much ſteadineſs, as a profound and ſevere Wiſdom, and to ſet off themſelves, in finding fault with every body's Actions, even when they are moſt to be commended, and that it is Impoſſible to do better, in reſpect of the thing in queſtion.

Nothing is ſo eaſy as to find apparent Reaſons, to Condemn what cannot be better done, and what has been undertaken upon ſuch Solid Foundations, that one could not have done otherwiſe without committing a notable fault.

Others having neither Mouths nor Spurs, diſlike by their Geſtures, by ſhaking of their Heads, and by aſerious Grimace, what they dare not Condemn

with Words, and cannot be blam'd with Reaſon.

Not to flatter in what Relates to ſuch Men, It is not enough for the Prince to refuſe them his Ear, he muſt alſo baniſh them from the Cabinet, and Court together; becauſe that as their facility is ſometimes ſo great, that to ſpeak to them and to perſuade them, is the ſame thing; even when they cannot be perſuaded, there ſtill remains ſome Impreſſion, which has its Effect another Time, when the ſame Artifice is renew'd: And indeed the Little Application they have to Affairs, induces them often to Judge the Cauſe, rather by the number of Witneſſes, than by the Weight of the accuſations.

I could hardly relate all the Evils, thoſe Evil Councelors have been the Authors of, during your Majeſtie's Reign. But I have ſo lively a Reſentment of it for the Intereſt of the State, that it forces me to ſay, That there can be no room for mercy for ſuch Men, in order to prevent the miſchiefs that have been done in my Time.

Tho a Prince be never ſo Firm and Conſtant, he cannot without great Imprudence, and without expoſing himſelf to Ruin, keep ill Men about him, who may ſurpriſe him unexpectedly, as during a Contagion a Malignant Vapor ſiezes in an Inſtant the Heart and Brains of the ſtrongeſt Men, when they think themſelves ſoundeſt.

Thoſe Public Plagues muſt be remov'd, never to return, unleſs they have caſt all their Venom, which happens ſo ſeldom, that the care we ought to have of repoſe, obliges more to the Continuation of their Removal, than Charity can Invite to recall them.

I boldly advance this propoſition, becauſe I have never ſeen any of thoſe Lovers of Factions bred in the Intrigues of the Court, loſe their Ill habit, and change their Nature, unleſs for want of Power, which, properly ſpeaking, do's not Change them, ſince the will of doing Ill remains in them, when the Power has left them.

I am ſenſible that ſome of thoſe Men, may be ſincerely converted, but experience teaching me, that for one who perſiſts in his repentance, twenty return to their old Vomit; I decide boldly, That it is better to uſe Rigor againſt one Perſon who deſerves favour, than to expoſe a State to ſome prejudice by being too Indulgent, either towards thoſe who keep their malice in their Heart, only acknowledging their fault in Letters, or towards thoſe whoſe levity may give a reaſon to dread a relapſe, worſe than their former Evil.

'Tis no wonder that Angels ſhould never do any Evil, ſince they are confirm'd in Grace; but that thoſe who are obſtinate in that kind of Malice ſhould do any good, when they may do harm, is a kind of Miracle, which muſt be wrought by the immediate Powerful hand of God, and it is certain that a Man of great Probity, will find much more difficulty to ſubſiſt in an Age corrupted by ſuch Men, than one whoſe Vertue they will not ſtand in dread of, his Reputation not being ſo Intire.

Some are of Opinion, that it ſuits with the goodneſs of Kings to Tolerate things which ſeem to be of ſmall Conſequence in the beginning; but I ſay, That they can never be too careful to diſcover and to extinguiſh the leaſt Intrigues of their Cabinets and of their Courts, in their Birth.

Great

Great Conflagrations being occaſion'd by ſmall ſparks ; who ever puts out one, do's not know what miſchief he has prevented : but to diſcover it, if he leaves any one unextinguiſh'd, tho the ſame Cauſes do not always produce the ſame Effect, he will perhaps find himſelf reduc'd to ſuch an Extremity, that it will no longer be in his Power to remedy the ſame. Whether it be true or no that a little Poyſon ſtops a great Veſſel, the Courſe of which it cannot advance of one Moment, it is eaſy to conceive by what Naturaliſts relate to us of that Poyſon, that it is abſolutely neceſſary to purge a State of that which may put a ſtop to the Courſe of Affairs, tho it can never advance it.

On ſuch occaſions it is not ſufficient to remove great Men upon the account of their Power, the ſame muſt be done to the meaneſt, upon the account of their Malice : All are equally dangerous, and if there is any difference, mean Perſons, as thoſe that are moſt conceal'd, are more to be fear'd than the others.

As the bad Air, I have already mention'd, lock'd up into a Trunk often Infects a Houſe with the Plague, which afterwards ſpreads throughout the Town, ſo the Intrigues of Cabinets often fill the Courts of Princes with partialities, which finally diſturb the body of the State.

As I may affirm with Truth, that I have never ſeen any Troubles in this Kingdom, but what did proceed form thence, I anſwer once more, that it is more Important than it ſeems to be, to extinguiſh not only the firſt ſparks of ſuch Diviſions, when they appear, but alſo to prevent them, by the removal of thoſe who make it their whole buſineſs to kindle them.

The

The Peace of the State is too Conſiderable, to neglect that Remedy, without being anſwerable for it to God.

I have often ſeen the Court in the midſt of Peace, ſo full of Factions, for want of practiſing this good Counſel, that they were very like like to overthrow the State.

That knowledg, and that which Hiſtory has given your Majeſties of the like Perils, to which many, and particularly the laſt of your Predeceſſors, have often been expoſed upon the ſame account, having oblig'd you to ſeek out a Remedy, I have ſeen *France* ſo peaceable at home, while ſhe had Wars abroad, that conſidering the Repoſe it injoy'd, no body could have thought it was oblig'd to oppoſe the greateſt Powers.

Perhaps ſome may urge that the Factions and Troubles I have mention'd, have been occaſion'd more by the invention of Women, than by the Malice of Flatterers.

But that Inſtance is ſo far from being againſt what I have urg'd, that on the contrary it confirms it powerfully, ſeeing that in ſpeaking of Flatterers, and the like, I do not deſign to exclude Women, who are often more dangerous than Men, and to whoſe ſex a World of Charms are annex'd, more powerful to Diſturb and to Imbroyl Affairs, Courts and States, than the moſt ſubtil and induſtrious Malice of any others whatever.

It is true, that while the Queens *Catherine* and *Mary de Medicis*, had a ſhare in the Government and that many Women being Influenc'd by them, meddl'd with the Affairs of the State, many of them very powerful in Sence and Charms, have

have done a world of Miſchief, their Places having acquir'd them the beſt Qualify'd Perſons of the Kingdom, and the moſt Unhappy; they have drawn this advantage by it, that being ſerv'd by them according to their Paſſions, they have often prejudic'd thoſe who were not in their Favour, becauſe they were uſeful to the State.

I might Inlarge upon this Subject, but divers reſpects ſtop my Pen, which not being Capable of Flattery, when it condemns openly, cannot forbear obſerving, That the Favourites I have mention'd in the preceeding Chapter, often ſupply the place of thoſe, whoſe Malice I have examin'd in this.

After thoſe Truths, I have no more to ſay, but that it is Impoſſible to ſecure States againſt the Evils thoſe ſort of Perſons may occaſion, but by removing them from the Court; which is the more neceſſary, in that it is Impoſſible to keep a Snake in ones boſom, without expoſing one's ſelf to be ſtung by it.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Which Treats of the Power of the Prince; and is divided into Eight Sections.

SECTION. I.

The Prince muſt be Powerful, to be Reſpected by his Subjects and by ſtrangers.

POWER being one of the moſt neceſſary Ingredients towards the Grandor of Kings, and the proſperity of their Governments; thoſe who have the chief Management of Affairs, are particularly oblig'd not to omit any thing, which may contribute to Authoriſe their Maſter ſo far as to make all the World Reſpect him.

As goodneſs is the object of Love, Power is the cauſe of Dread: and it is moſt certain, that among all the Princes who are capable to Stir a State, Fear grounded upon Eſteem and Reverence, has ſo much Force, that it ingages every one to perform his Duty.

If this Principle is of great Efficacy in reſpect to the internal Part of States, it is to the full as prevailing abroad: Subjects and Strangers looking with the ſame Eyes upon a formidable Power, both the one and the other abſtain from offending a Prince, whom they are ſenſible is in a condition to hurt them, if he were ſo inclin'd.

I have obſerv'd by the by, that the ground of the Power I am ſpeaking of, muſt be Eſteem and Reſpect; I add, that it is now a thing ſo neceſſary, that when it is grounded upon any other Principle, it is very dangerous; in that caſe inſtead of creating a reaſonable Fear, it inclines Men to hate Princes, who are never in a worſe condition than when it turns to public averſion.

The Power which induces Men to reſpect and fear Princes with Love, is of many different kinds; It is a Tree which has five divers Branches, which all draw their nutriment and ſubſtance from one and the ſame Root.

The Prince muſt be powerful by his Reputation.

By a reaſonable Army always kept on Foot.

And by a notable Sum of Money in his Coffers, to ſupply unexpected exigencies, which often come to paſs when they are leaſt expected.

Finally, by the Poſſeſſion of his Subjects hearts, as we may eaſily ſee.

SECTION II.

The Prince muſt be powerful by his Reputation; and what is neceſſary to that End.

REputation is the more neceſſary in Princes, in that thoſe we have a good opinion of, do more by their bare words than thoſe who are not eſteem'd, with Armies.

They are oblig'd to value it beyond Life; and they ought ſooner to venture their Fortune and Grandeur, than to ſuffer the leaſt Breach to be made

made in the ſame, ſince it is moſt certain that the leaſt diminution a Prince receives, tho never ſo ſlight, is the ſtep which is of moſt dangerous conſequence for his ruin.

In conſideration of which I declare freely, that Princes ought never to eſteem any Profit advantagious, when it reflects in the leaſt upon their honour: and they are either blind, or inſenſible to their true Intereſts, if they receive any of this nature.

And indeed Hiſtory teaches us, that in all Times and in all States, Princes of great reputation are always happier than thoſe, who being inferior to them in that Point, have ſurpaſs'd them in Force and Riches, and in all other Power.

As they cannot be too jealous of it, their Counſellors can never be too careful, to cry up the good Qualities they poſſeſs.

Thoſe who will form their Conduct upon the Rules and Principles contain'd in this preſent Teſtament, will undoubtedly acquire a Name which will be of no ſmall weight in the mind of their Subjects and of their Neighbours, particularly if being Religious towards God, they obſerve the ſame Rule towards themſelves.

That is, in being true to their word, and faithful to their Promiſes; conditions which are ſo abſolutely neceſſary for the reputation of a Prince, that as he who is deſtitute of them can never be eſteem'd by any body, ſo it is impoſſible for him who does poſſeſs them not to be reverenc'd and credited by all the World.

I could inſtance many Examples of this Truth; but as I do not deſign this Work for a Common Place, eaſy to be perform'd by all ſorts of Men,

who

who will extract good Books; I will only inſtance ſuch as are ſo certain and ſo clear, that all ſenſible Perſons will find the Proof of them in their own Reaſon.

SECTION. III.

The Prince muſt be Powerful by the force of his Frontiers.

NONE but ſuch as are depriv'd of common ſence, can be unſenſible how neceſſary it is for great States to have their Frontiers well Fortify'd.

It is a thing the more neceſſary in this Kingdom, in that, that tho the Levity of our Nation ſhould make it incapable of making great Conqueſts; their Valour would render them Invincible, in their defence; having conſiderable Places, ſo well fortify'd, and ſo well provided with all things, that they may be able to ſhow their Courage, without being expoſed to ſuffer great hard-ſhips, which are the only Enemies they have to overcome.

A Frontier well fortify'd is capable either to diſcourage Enemies from the deſigns they might have againſt a State, or at leaſt to ſtop the Courſe of the ſame, and their Impetuoſity, if they dare venture to do it by open force.

The ſubtil motions of our Nation ſtand in need of being ſecured againſt the Terrour they might receive in an unexpected attack, if they did not know that the entrance into the Kingdom has ſuch ſtrong Ramparts, that no foreign Impetuoſity can be capable to take them by Storm, and that it is impoſſible

impoſſible to overcome them, without a conſiderable Time.

The new method of ſome of the Enemies of this State being more to ſtarve the Places they beſiege than to take them by force of Arms, and to ruin the Country they invade by a great number of horſe, than to advance by degrees into it with a conſiderable body of Foot, as was done antiently; it is clear, that Frontier Places are not only uſeful to reſiſt ſuch Efforts, but alſo to ſecure States, in the Bowels of which it is impoſſible for Enemies to make any great Progreſs if they leave Places behind them to cut off the communication of their Countrys and their Convoys together.

Theſe conſiderations oblige me to repreſent, that it is not ſufficient to fortify Places, and to put ſuch Proviſions and Ammunitions into them, as may ſerve to reſiſt briſk attacks, but alſo to furniſh them with all things neceſſary for a year at leaſt, which is a ſufficient time to relieve them conveniently.

I am ſenſible that it is almoſt impoſſible for great Kings, to provide many Citadels thus; but it is not ſo with great Towns in which the Society of Men produces a great ſtore of many things, which a particular Governor cannot make a ſufficient proviſion of, and it is eaſie to oblige the Inhabitants to provide Proviſions for a Year, which will always ſuffice for ſix Months and more, if they turn out uſeleſs Mouths, as reaſon requires.

I am ſo far from pretending that this Order ſhould exempt Princes from having publick Magazins, that on the contrary I am of opinion that they can never have too many, and that after having provided them, they muſt eſtabliſh ſuch good Orders to

preſerve, them that the Governors, to whom the diſpoſition of the ſame belongs, may not have the Liberty to diſſipate them in vain, either out of negligence, or a deſire to convert them to their own Uſes.

I do not particularly ſpecify the Number of Cannons*, of Powder and of Bullets, and of all other Warlike Ammunitions, which are to be put in every place, becauſe it is to be different according to their different Largeneſs. But I will ſay that Proviſions for the Mouth are not more neceſſary than thoſe of War, and that it would be to no purpoſe for a Town to be well ſtor'd with Victuals, if they wanted what is abſolutely neceſſary, both to defend themſelves and to annoy their Enemies, ſeeing particularly that Experience ſhoweth us that thoſe who ſhoot moſt, commonly kill moſt. when a Place is beſieg'd, one might better ſpare Bread than Powder.

To omit nothing, I will obſerve in this Place, that it is better to have Magazins of Salt Petre, of Brimſtone and of Coals than of Powder ready made, by reaſon that it ſpoils in time by keeping, and that an Accident of Fire is the more to be fear'd.

The Antients having obſerv'd very well, that the real Strength of Towns conſiſts in the number of Men, I cannot forbear adding, that all Fortifications are uſeleſs, unleſs the Governor and the Officers, who command in a place, have a Courage equal to the Strength of the Walls and Ramparts, and unleſs the Number of Men is proportion'd to the Largeneſs of the place, and the quantity of the Poſts that are to be defended.

Experience has ſhow'd us in divers occaſions, that the leaſt Holds are impregnable by the ſteadineſs of the courage of thoſe who defend them, and that the

the beſt Citadels make no great reſiſtance, when thoſe that are in them have not a Courage ſuitable to their Force.

Therefore Princes can never be too careful in chooſing thoſe to whom they intruſt Frontiers, ſince the Welfare and repoſe of the State depends chiefly on their Fidelity and Vigilancy, their Courage and Experience, and that often the lack of one of theſe Qualifications coſts millions to States, if it does not prove the abſolute cauſe of their Ruin.

SECTION. IV.

Of the Power a State ought to have by its Land-Forces.

This *Section* has ſeveral Subdiviſions, upon the account of the abundance of matter it contains, which will be ſpecify'd in the Margin.

THE moſt potent State in the World cannot boaſt of injoying a certain Peace, unleſs it be in a condition to ſecure it ſelf at all times, againſt an unexpected Invaſion, or Surpriſe.

In order thereunto it is neceſſary that ſo great a Kingdom as this is, ſhould always keep a ſufficient Army on Foot to prevent the deſigns which hatred and envy might form againſt its Proſperity and Grandeur, when'tis look'd upon to be in a ſecure Repoſe, or at leaſt to ſtifle them in their Birth.

Who has Force, has commonly Reaſon on his ſide; and he that is Weak, is commonly thought in the wrong in the Judgment of moſt Men.

As a Souldier who do's not always wear his Sword is lyable to many inconveniences; that King-

dom which do's not always ſtand on its Guard, and keep it ſelf in a condtion to prevent a ſudden ſurpriſe, is in great danger.

Public Intereſt obliges thoſe who have the management of States to Govern them ſo, as not only to ſecure them againſt all the Evil which may be avoided, but alſo from all apprehenſions of it.

*The Power of Princes is the only means that can produce that Effect and therefore it only remains to know what Forces ought to be kept on Foot in this Kingdom.

* As Reaſon requires a Geometrical Proportion, between that which ſuſtains, and that which is ſuſtained, it is certain that there muſt be conſiderable Forces, to ſuſtain ſo great a Body as this Kingdom.

Thoſe that are neceſſary to ſo great an End, may and ought to be of a different Nature, that is, that among the Men deſign'd for the preſervation of this State, ſome muſt be liſted to be ready on all occaſions, and others actually in Arms, in order always to be in readineſs to make a good defence.

*The Number of Men which ought to be kept on foot in this Kingdom.

*In order to provide for the Frontier Towns, and to keep a Body on foot to oppoſe all unexpected Deſigns, it is neceſſary to keep at leaſt four thouſand Horſe, and forty thouſand Foot actually in Arms at all times, and it is eaſie without burthening the State, to keep ten thouſand Gentlemen, and fifty thouſand Foot liſted, ready to be rais'd on all Emergencies.

It may perhaps be urg'd that the Defence of the State does not require ſuch great Preparations, but whereas the ſaid Eſtabliſhment is ſo far from being

a Burthen to *France*, that on the contrary the Nobility and the People will receive a Benefit by it; I say, that it is neceſſary to make War, when ever the Good of the State will require it.

*In the opinion of the moſt judicious, War is ſometimes an unavoidable Evil; and on other occaſions, it is abſolutely neceſſary and advantagious.

*War is ſometimes neceſſary.

States ſtand in need of it at certain times, to purge their ill humours, to recover what belongs to them, to revenge an Injury, the Impunity of which draws on another, to free Allies from Oppreſſion, to put a ſtop to the Progreſs of a Conqueror's Pride, to prevent the Evil one is threaten'd with, when there is no other way to avoid them, or, in fine, to prevent many other Accidents.

I maintain, and it is an undoubted Truth, that no War can be happy unleſs it be juſt, and that not being ſo, tho the Event ſhould prove favourable according to the World, yet an account muſt be given for it at the Tribunal of God.

Therefore the firſt thing to be done, when a Prince is forc'd to take Arms, is to examin the Equity of the Cauſe for which they are taken, which muſt be done by Doctors of Capacity and Probity.

This Foundation ſuppos'd, the means to carry it on vigorouſly muſt be conſider'd, and to time it well, is not one of the leaſt Material.

There is this difference betwixt him who purſues revenge with Anger, and he who does it with Reaſon, that the firſt does miſchief, at the venture of receiving the ſame, chuſing rather to ſuffer himſelf than to loſe an opportunity to prejudice his Enemy; and the laſt diſſembles his reſentment, until he finds

an occaſion to puniſh him who has wrong'd him, without ſharing his Sufferings.

The firſt acts like a Beaſt, according to the Impulſe of Nature; and the laſt behaves himſelf like a Man, ſuffering himſelf to be guided by reaſon.

In order to ſucceed in War, it is not ſufficient to chuſe a fit opportunity, to have a ſtrong Army, abundance of Money, of Proviſions, and warlike Ammunitions, the main point is to have Men fit for the Service they are deſign'd for, to know how to make them obſerve a good Diſcipline, to make them live regularly, and to manage ones Money, Proviſions and Ammunitions prudently.

It is eaſy to ſet down theſe general Principles, but the practice of them is difficult, and yet in caſe it be neglected, the Succeſs of a War cannot be happy, unleſs by chance or miracle, which wiſe Men muſt never truſt to.

There is no Nation in the World ſo unfit for War as ours; their Levity and Impatience in the leaſt hardſhips, are two Principles which are but too well known.

Tho *Cæſar* ſays, that the *French* underſtand two things, the Military Art, and that of Speaking, I own that hitherto, I have not been able to apprehend upon what ground he attributes the firſt of theſe Qualifications to them, ſince Patience in Labour and Sufferings, a Qualification abſolutely neceſſary in War, is but ſeldom found among them.

Were this Qualification joyn'd to their Valour, the Univerſe would be too little to bound their Conqueſts, but as the great heart God has given them, makes them fit to overcome whatever oppoſes them by force, their Levity and Lazineſs make

them

them incapable of overcoming the leaſt Obſtacles, which the delays of a ſubtle Enemy oppoſes to their Eagerneſs.

This is the reaſon why they are not fit for Conqueſts which require time, nor to preſerve thoſe they might make in an inſtant of Time.

They are not only inconſtant, impatient, and little inur'd to Fatigues, but moreover they are accus'd of never being pleas'd with their preſent condition, and to have no great Affection for their Country: and the ſaid Accuſation is ſo well grounded, that no body can deny, that there are more among them who are wanting in thoſe Duties which their Birth exacts from them, than among all the other Nations of the World.

There are few who wage War againſt *France*, without having *French* Men in their Army, and when they are Arm'd for their Country, they are ſo indifferent in what relates to its Intereſt, that they do not uſe the leaſt Endeavours to overcome their Natural Defects to it's advantage.

They run an hundred Leagues to ſeek a Battle, and yet would not expect the occaſion of one a week, the Enemy tires them out, even before they have begun to work.

They are not afraid of Peril, but they will expoſe themſelves to it without any Pains; the leaſt delays are inſupportable to them, they have no Flegm to tarry one moment for their happineſs, and they are tir'd even with the continuation of their Proſperities.

At the beginning of their Enterpriſe, their eagerneſs is not common, and indeed they are more than Men that moment, but they cool by degrees,

ſo that they become equal to thoſe who have but a common Vertue, and in proceſs of Time, they are diſguſtedand grow effeminate, inſomuch that they are leſs than Men.

They ſtill retainCourage enough to fight, provided they are put to't immediately, but they do not keep ſo much of it as to tarry for an occaſion; tho their Hon the Reputation of their Country and theService of their Maſter requires it.

They can neither improve a Victory, nor reſiſt the Fortune of a Victorious Enemy; Proſperity blinds them beyond other Men, and yet they have neither Courage, nor Judgment in Adverſity, and in Labour.

In fine, They are ſubject to ſo many faults, that it is not without reaſon, ſome judicious Perſons wonder how this Monarchy has been able to ſubſiſt from it's Birth, ſince that as it has always found faithful Children for it's Defence, it has never been attack'd but it's Enemies have found Sectators in it's Boſom, who, like Vipers, have us'd their utmoſt Endeavours to gnaw the Bowels of their Mother.

I am ſenſible at the ſame time that the *French* have good Qualifications to counterpoiſe thoſe Imperfections; They are Valiant, full of Courage and Humanity; their Heart is void of Cruelty, and ſo free from Rankor, that they are eaſily reconcil'd.

But tho theſe Qualifications are the Ornaments of Civil Society, and Eſſential to Chriſtianity; yet it is certain, that being deſtitute of Flegm, of Patience, and of Diſcipline, they are exquiſite Victuals ſerv'd without Sawce to reliſh them.

I am not ignorant that the Providence of God, which is admirable in all things, is particularly ſo, in having

having counterpois'd the ill Qualities of every Nation, by other advantages which make amends for their defects.

If the *French* Nation is inconſtant and impatient, their Valour and Impetuoſity often makes them do that at the firſt Onſet, which others are a long time abour.

If their uneaſineſs hinders them from remaining long in Armies willingly; God's Providence has made it ſo abounding in Men, that there are always abundance of them, who being mov'd by the ſame *Principle* of Levity, are ready to ſupply the room of thoſe who are deſirous to come home again, and theſe are ready to go back, before thoſe who have ſucceeded them, are weary.

If their want of affection for their Country inclines them ſome times to take Arms againſt their King, the Inconſtancy and ſudden Motions, to which they are ſubject, not permitting any body to rely upon them, they do themſelves more harm than they are capable of doing to their Country.

'Tis moſt certain, that the *Spaniards* ſurpaſs us in Conſtancy and Steadineſs, in Zeal, and in Fidelity for their King and Country; but in exchange, that Kingdom is ſo barren and ſo deſart in ſome *Places*, and ſo little abounding in Men, that were it not for their Conſtancy, it would often be abandon'd by it ſelf.

Moreover, if among the *French*, ſome particular Perſons ingage againſt their Maſter, the *Spaniards* ſome times mutiny and revolt in Bodys in their Armys.

If the Emperor has the advantage to govern a Nation, which is the Nurſery of Souldiers, he has the

the diſadvantage, that they eaſily change their Party and Religion together, beſides that they are very much addicted to Drunkenneſs, and far more unruly than ours in the Field.

In a Word all Nations have there defects, and the moſt prudent are thoſe who endeavour to acquire by Art, what Nature has deny'd them.

It is more eaſy to add Flegm, Patience, and Diſcipline, to the Courage, Valour, and Courteſy of the *French*, than to inſpire that Fire in Flegmatic Nations, which they have not naturaly.

The *French* are Capable of every thing, provided their Commanders are Capable to teach them what they are to do.

Their Courage, which inclines them to ſeek out War all the World over, Juſtifys this Propoſition: Since they live like *Spaniards* in their Armys, like *Sweedes* in their Country, like *Crawats* when they are liſted among them, and like *Hollanders* in their States.

They obſerve their ſeveral Diſciplines; which ſhows, that if they keep their Natural Imperfections in their Country, it is becauſe they are tolerated, and that their Officers do not know how to Correct them.

If they live in this Kingdom without Diſcipline, it is not ſo much their fault, as the fault of their Leaders, who commonly content themſelves with making fine Ordinances, and do not take ſo much care as they ſhould do to cauſe them to be obſerv'd.

Nothing can be more eaſy than to preſcribe Rules to live well, and nothing more difficult then to put them in practice; however it is not impoſſible.

Endeavours

Endeavours muſt be us'd to ſhow the Juſtice of them by reaſon, and then no mercy muſt be ſhown to thoſe who Violate them.

If one, two, or three Examples of Puniſhment do not put a ſtop to Diſobedience, the continuance of it will do't; and I dare aſſure your Majeſty, that if you find Chiefs worthy to command, you will never want Subjects fit to obey. It is moſt certain, that the general Opinion of the World, That the *French* are incapable of Rule and Diſcipline, has no other Foundation than the Incapacity of their Commanders, who do not know how to chuſe neceſſary means for the Ends they propoſe.

The Siege of *Rochel*, in which during thirteen Months an Army of 25000 Men receiv'd Orders, and obey'd like Monks bearing Arms, and the Expedition of *Pignerol*, where they did the ſame, plainly demonſtrate what I have ſaid.

But the General muſt be a Man of Reſolution, and no reſpecter of Perſons, and known to be ſo; for it is certain that unleſs he has ſo much ſteadineſs as to remain inflexible in the Rigor of the Rule he has preſcrib'd, no Man will think himſelf oblig'd to obſerve it; or at leaſt many will venture to break it, in hopes of a Pardon.

But when a General perſiſts as much in puniſhing as the Delinquents in their Faults; his ſteadineſs will ſtop the courſe of our exceſſive Levity; and without ſuch a Remedy it is in vain to expect to keep ſo hot and ſo impetuous a Nation as ours is, within the Bounds of Reaſon. The Puniſhments of *Marillac* and of *Montmorency*, have reduc'd all the Grandees of the Kingdom to their Duty in an inſtant of time; and I dare affirm, that the ſame being practis'd

practis'd against Ten Officers, and Fifty Souldiers, will maintain the Armys in Discipline, and in a condition to perform whatever will be desir'd of them.

Punishing those thus, who shall be wanting in the Performance of their Duty, few Men will be punish'd, since few will venture to expose themselves to ruin, finding it inevitable, and by the Death of a small Number, the Lives of many will be preserv'd, and Order observ'd in all things.

The Defects of this Nation never appear'd more than under your Majesty's Reign, which being signaliz'd by great Prosperity and Power by your Conduct, will also be signaliz'd in the opinion of the most judicious, for many Infidelities you have suffer'd, and by a World of Attempts against your Service.

After having made divers Inquiries into the Reasons of both, I am not afraid of saying, That they proceed from the Weakness of your Majesty's Minority, during which Men have so insensibly accustom'd themselves to all sorts of Licentiousness, that they thought they might continue the same under your Reign with the same Impunity as heretofore.

The first is, that as there are more Colleges of Religious Orders, more Officers of Justice, and of the *Finances* than for the time past, there are not near so many Souldiers, for which reason the desertion of those who retire from the Armies is more apparent, because there are not so many found as formerly, to supply the room of those who forsake their Duty.

The second, that Souldiers advanc'd their Fortune more, formerly than in these Times, in which the

the Officers of the *Finances*, and the* *Partiſans* reap all the Fat, to the great diſguſt of thoſe who are conſtrain'd to expoſe their Lives almoſt to no purpoſe.

*Thoſe that farm the Public Revenue.

The third, that Generals are leſs careful in our days of military Diſcipline, and leſs ſevere in chaſtiſing thoſe who ſwerve from it than our Fore-fathers were.

The fourth, that the long diſcontinuation the *French* have had of Foreign Wars, in which they had powerful Enemies to encounter, had almoſt made them forget the Trade, and diſus'd them from the Fatigues they are little capable of, tho they muſt go through many, when they have briſk and potent Enemies to deal with.

I add to theſe conſiderations, that your Majeſty's health has not always permitted you to be in the Army, and that the Injuſtice of the *French* is ſo great, that they are never ſatisfy'd in a Place, where they venture their Life, unleſs they ſee their King, whoſe preſence they fancy does in ſome meaſure ſecure it.

None but the Enemies of this State can make War ſucceſsfully by their Lieutenants; the Flegm of their Nation gives them that advantage; but the *French* are the moſt unfit for it of any other Nation, becauſe the eagerneſs of their Courage and the deſire of fighting gives them an Impatience, which can never be vanquiſh'd, but by the preſence of their King.

If at any time any great Enterpriſe has met with Succeſs under Lieutenants, it will either be found that thoſe who have had that good Fortune, were Men of very great Authority, by the Truſt repos'd

pos'd in them by their Maſter, and by their particular Merit, or that thoſe Wars were not ſo laſting, as to oblige them in overcoming the Enemies alſo to vanquiſh the humour of the *French*.

It is no ſmall Trouble to me to be oblig'd in this Place to diſcover the defects your Majeſty has often obſerv'd in your Nobility; yet they are ſo public, that it is impoſſible to conceal them.

The Affection I have for that Order, obliges me to examin them, to find out Examples and to endeavour to remedy the ſame.

The eſteem they were in heretofore will hardly permit one to believe, that they have committed faults on ſome occaſions in your Reign; but I will diſcover the reaſon of them to thoſe who have beheld their Effects.

All Men eaſily apprehend, that there is a great deal of difference between the Spirits, which naturally aſcend on high, and the groſſer Parts of their Bodies which remain below.

The excellency of the Nobility which love War, are thoſe Spirits which aſcend on high, eſteem'd by all the World; and thoſe who only follow it, becauſe the Laws of this Kingdom conſtrain them ſo to do, are if not the Lees, at leaſt the Wine which drops out of the Cask, which is hardly fit for Servants.

There are no Communities in which there are not more ill Subjects than good ones; and whereas a little Tare is capable to ſpoil ſeveral heaps of Wheat it is no wonder if, when the Nobility is aſſembled, the greater number corrupts the leſs, tho better; and as the beſt Wine mix'd with the Lees is nought, ſo the Service of the beſt Nobility is not only uſeleſs

but

but prejudicial, when joyn'd with the Lees which alters it.

* This Diſcourſe ingaging me to ſpeak of the *Ban*, and *Arriere Ban*, I cannot forbear ſaying that it is an Aſſembly of Gentry, which having no Head with any Authority, governs it ſelf without Rule, and lives without Diſcipline.—

*Arriere Ban.

An Aſſembly the ſubſiſtance of which has ſo little certainty, that the fickleneſs, cowardice, malice or diſguſt of three or four Perſons, is capable to diſſipate it in a moment.

An Aſſembly which ruins the Places through which it paſſes far more than the regular Forces, which ruining your Majeſty's Country pay part of what they ſpend, whereas thoſe pay nothing at all.

They never perform any Guard in an Army, which produces a double Ill, Lazineſs and the Diſguſt it creates in others.

Unleſs they fight at their firſt Arrival; as they are quick in coming, they are ſpeedy in going back, and threaten it every moment; in retiring they do not only debauch many by their ill Example; but the moſt ingenious among them, invent whatever Craft can ſuggeſt to cover their Infamy, and to perſuade that they do not retire without reaſon; ſo that they both weaken and aſtoniſh Armies at one and the ſame time.

Your Majeſty being much better acquainted with theſe Truths, of which you have ſeen the practice, than I am, without inſiſting on the defects of an Order, the Perfections of which I have repreſented, my Conſcience obliges me to declare freely, that Princes muſt never have any recourſe to ſuch a Succour

cour, which is much more prejudicial than uſeful to the State.

But that this Kingdom may not be depriv'd of the Service of the Nobility, which has always been the Principal Sinew of it, and is oblig'd to ſerve it in time of VVar, upon the accounts of the Fiefs which have been granted them on that condition, and of the advantages they injoy over the People in time of Peace: It will be neceſſary to tax all the Fiefs in every Bailywick, according to their Revenue, to form regular Troops with the ſaid Money, into which ſuch as had rather ſerve in Perſon, than to pay the Contribution of the Fiefs ſhall be admitted, provided they ingage to perform the Conditions of their Obligation.

Prudence requires that Men ſhould be imploy'd according to their capacity, and that the defects of Nature ſhould be ſupply'd by Art; and for that reaſon it is neceſſary to make this uſe of the Body of the Nobility, in order to derive ſome advantage by them.

Next to this Obſervation, proceeding on, I am oblig'd to obſerve, that it is almoſt impoſſible to undertake great Wars with Succeſs with the *French* alone.

*Strangers neceſſary.

* Foreigners are abſolutely neceſſary to maintain the Body of Armies, and if the *French* Horſe are good to fight, there is no being without Foreigners to perform the Guards, and to ſupport the Fatigues of an Army.

Our Nation, tho hot and eager in Combats, is neither vigilant to guard it ſelf, nor proper to form Deſigns

Deſigns or Enterprizes, which require toyl and labour.

One half of the *French* Armys were formerly Compos'd of Foreigners, and we have experienc'd how advantageous it is to uſe them, to ſupply the defect of our Nation, beſides that the good qualifications of thoſe by whom we may be aſſiſted may in ſome meaſure correct our Imperfections.

But whereas it we want well diſciplin'd Souldiers, ſteady and conſtant in their Duty, we are yet in greater want of Commanders, qualifi'd as they ought to be; it will be needleſs to remedy one of theſe Evils, unleſs we alſo correct the other.

There are but few of them in the World, and leſs in *France* than in any other part, who do not ſuffer themſelves to be blinded by Proſperity, and do not loſe their Courage and Judgment in Adverſity.

Nevertheleſs it is neceſſary there ſhould be Men imploy'd in the adminiſtration of the State, and in the Command of Armys free from theſe defects, otherwiſe we ſhould be in danger of never improving the favourable occaſions, which God may offer us, and of being conſiderable loſers by the firſt frowns of Fortune.

Tho the Head guides the reſt of the Body, and Judgment is the moſt Eſſential Part of him who Commands, Nevertheleſs I prefer a great deal of Courage and Indifferent Parts in a General, before a great deal of Wit, and an indifferent Heart.

Many perhaps will wonder at this propoſition, becauſe it is contrary to the opinion of many, but the reaſon of it is Evident.

Thoſe who have a great deal of Courage are never aſtoniſh'd in danger, and make uſe of all the Wit and Judgment God has indued them with on ſuch occaſions; whereas thoſe who have but little Courage being eaſily aſtoniſh'd, are ſo much diſmay'd in the leaſt danger, that let them have never ſo much Wit, it is abſolutely uſeleſs to them, fear not allowing them to Uſe it.

I make but little difference between giving the management of the *Finances* to a Thief, and the Command of an Army to a Man of mean Courage.

As Avarice, and the deſire the firſt has of getting an Eſtate, hinders him from improving the occaſions to increaſe his Maſter's Fund, ſo the ſecond, having a deſire to preſerve his Life, and to avoid many Perils, which are only ſuch in his Imagination, commonly loſes and avoids many advantageous occaſions to imploy his Arms; and thus if the firſt is capable of committing faults out of a deſire to fill his Purſe, the laſt is lyable to do the ſame, in order to ſecure his Life.

Among Men of Courage, ſome are naturally Valiant, and others are only ſo by reaſon; The firſt are fitter to be Soulders than Captains, by reaſon that their Valour is commonly accompany'd with Brutality; but the laſt are good to make Commanders: Nevertheleſs it is always to be wiſh'd that their reaſonable Valour may not be void of Natural Courage, becauſe otherwiſe it were to be fear'd, that the conſideration of many incoveniences which may happen, and yet do not happen, might hinder him who proceeds with too much caution from undertaking

dertaking that which might ſucceed in others with leſs Wit and more boldneſs.

Want of Judgment contributes conſiderably towards the Valour of ſome Men, who perform Actions which are the more hazardous, in that they are not ſenſible of the Peril to which they expoſe themſelves.

Judgment is of no ſmall uſe to others to feign a great boldneſs on ſome occaſions, which tho dangerous in appearence, are neither ſo in Effect, nor in the opinions of thoſe, whom God has indued with more knowledge than others.

As a General's Valour muſt not be deſtitute of Judgment: So tho he be Prudent and Judicious to the higheſt degree he muſt have ſincerity to hinder him from making Artifices paſs for Actions of Courage. Men diſguiſe themſelves ſo many different ways, that it is almoſt Impoſſible to diſtinguiſh the Effects which proceed from the head from thoſe which proceed from the Heart.

There are Men ſo naturaly Valiant, that they continue ſo to their dying day.

Others, which not being ſo, make an Effort in their Youth to appear ſuch, to gain ſome Reputation, in favour of which they may paſs their Life without Infamy.

Theſe laſt have no ſooner obtain'd their Ends, but the Effects of their Valour diſappear, becauſe they have what they deſire, and that Artifice is the Sourſe of their Courage, and not their natural Inclination.

Great Care muſt be taken not to chuſe a Chief of that Nature, remembring that Craft is as dan-

gerous in thoſe who Command, as Judgment and Courage is neceſſary.

Thoſe two qualityes ought almoſt to keep an even pace, but they muſt be accompany'd with many others.

Great enterprizes not being Childrens Play, they require a ripe Age in thoſe who perform them; but as the maturity of Judgment which advances with years is uſeful to form a deſign, the Fire of Youth is no leſs neceſſeary to put it in execution, and it is moſt certain that Fortune often Smiles on Youth, and Frowns on Age.

Therefore it is fit to obſerve, that there is a great deal of difference between a Novice, a young Man, and an old one. It is difficult to be good and bad at once.

To be Excellent, it is neceſſary to be young in years, but not in Service and Experience. For tho Old Men are commonly the Wiſeſt, they are not the beſt to undertake, becauſe they are often deſtitute of the fire of youth, which is requiſite in ſuch occaſions.

In concluſion, Courage, Wit, and good Fortune are three qualifications ſo Eſſential in a General, that tho there are but few who poſſeſs them altogether, it is difficult to expect without hazard great events from thoſe who are deſtitute of either of them.

But if a Prince be ſo happy as to find any, in whom theſe qualifications are met, it will be eaſy to remedy the defects of thoſe who ſhall be committed to their Conduct.

One of thoſe which do's moſt harm, as I have obſerved, is the Inconſtancy of our Nation, which rendering it almoſt incapable of remaining long in the

the ſame State, an Army is no ſooner Rais'd, but one half of it dwindles away.

* I have thought ſometimes that the beſt Expedient that could be taken to make Souldiers Subſiſt, and to maintain them in Diſcipline, would be to reſtore the Eſtabliſhment of *Legionarys*, formerly practis'd in this Kingdom, adding ſome particular Orders to it, altogether neceſſary to make it ſafe; but Reaſon and Experience have alter'd my mind.

* A Remedy to make Armys Subſiſt.

Reaſon, in that it ſhows clearly that what is committed to the care of many, is the leſs certain, in that every one lays the blame upon his Companion, and that the Elections which are made by the advice of Communities, are rarely made by the bare motive of Reaſon, becauſe that tho there are many Perſons of Wiſdom, and Probity among them, the number of Fools, and of Knaves is always the greateſt.

Experience, in that it Teaches every body, that no money is laid out worſe than that of Communities.

* Beſides that I may ſay with Truth, that when ever the urgent neceſſitys of the State have conſtrain'd your Majeſty to imploy Forces ſent by Princes, led and paid by their own Officers, which I have ſeen Twice during this laſt War; they have always coſt double, and have committed as much and more diſorder than the others, and have done leſs ſervice than thoſe which were rais'd at the ſame Time, and conducted by particular Perſons at your Charge.

* This Truth is ſo well Juſtify'd by the male adminiſtration of the Summs raiſed for the Reparation of Citys and Churches.

Thoſe conſiderations have convinced me that inſtead of Charging the Provinces with the Raiſing

and maintaining of Souldiers; Soveraigns ought to take the Care of it, and that they may make them ſubſiſt with order if they will uſe proper means to that end, according to the following order.

All Souldiers muſt be Liſted, their Names, place of Birth, and of abode, Enter'd, that in caſe they ſhould run away from their Colours, they may be the ſooner found again.

The Regiſter of every Place muſt be charg'd with the number of thoſe that ſhall be rais'd within his Precinct, and the Judges oblig'd to uſe their endeavours for the apprehending and puniſhing, according to the Ordinances, all thoſe who ſhall come back from the Armys without leave; on pain of the ſaid Judges being turn'd out of their Offices, upon proof of their having receiv'd Information of the return of your Souldiers without having proſecuted them for the ſame.

For the Liſting of Souldiers, every one muſt be oblig'd to ſerve three Years without demanding to be diſmiſs'd, unleſs in the Caſe of an Evident Illneſs, on condition that the ſaid Term being expir'd it ſhall not be lawful to refuſe it them, when demanded.

This condition is very neceſſary, by reaſon that when the *French* think themſelves conſtrain'd, and kept againſt their Will, they commonly think of nothing but running away, tho they were to loſe a thouſand Lives, if they had ſo many, whereas when they are at Liberty to retire, it is likely they will freely remain in the Armies, Nature commonly inclining Men to have a leſs deſire for what they are allow'd to do, than to do that which is forbidden them.

Whatever

Whatever Souldier ſhall obtain his diſmiſſion, ſhall be oblig'd to enter the ſame into the Regiſter of the Jurisdiction in which he was rais'd.

The Chiefs and Officers of a Regiment ſhall not be allow'd on any pretence whatever, to receive Souldiers of another, on pain of being degraded of Arms, nay more, of their Gentility, if they are Gentlemen.

And the Souldiers who ſhall abandon their Captains without leave, ſhall be ſent to the Galleys without Mercy, at whatever time they are taken, neither ſhall any change of Place, or of condition exempt them from the ſame.

No Furlow or Diſmiſſion ſhall be allow'd of, unleſs ſign'd by the Colonel, or Commander in Chief in his Abſence, and ſeal'd with the Seal of the Regiment.

Every Regiment ſhall have a Provoſt, a Commiſſary, a Comptroller, and a Pay-Maſter, who ſhall all be obliged to follow the Regiment; on pain not only of being caſhier'd, but alſo of Exemplary Puniſhment.

In caſe any diſorders happen, and the Provoſt do's not Puniſh the offenders according to the Laws of Arms he ſhall be puniſhed himſelf, as ſoon as the ſaid Complaint is brought to your Majeſty, or to the Generals.

In caſe the Regiment is not Compleat, and the Comptroller or Commiſſary do not give Notice thereof, they ſhall be anſwerable for it themſelves, and be ſeverely puniſhed.

If the Men are unpay'd by the Pay-Maſter's fault, either by his imbezeling the King's Money, by bare put offs or delays, or other failures, he ſhall be liable

to pay the quadruple, and to be exemplarily puniſh'd.

The ſaid Officers ſhall only be imploy'd by way of Commiſſion, Experience having ſhewn that nothing ſpoils the King's Officers more, particularly in Military Affairs, than to give them Places for Life, which properly ſpeaking, is nothing but a Title to ſteal with Impunity.

Thoſe who command the Forces ſhall be oblig'd to put them in Battalia whenever it ſhall be requir'd by the Commiſſaries.

To the end that thoſe who ſhall have ſuch Commiſſions, may perform them faithfully; the Commiſſary ſhall have 200 Livers a month, the Comptroller 150 Livers, the Provoſt 100 Livers, his Clerk 50 Livers, and every one of his Men 30 Livers.

And whereas it would be to no purpoſe to regulate the Souldiers and inferiour Officers, without preſcribing the Order which muſt be obſerv'd by the principal Officers. The Colonels, Captains, Serjeants Major, Lieutenants and Enſigns, ſhall not be allow'd to quit their Poſts, without leave from their Generals, and Commanders of the Forces, or from your Majeſty: and in caſe any ſhall infringe the ſaid Regulation, they ſhall be Caſhier'd, Degraded of their Gentility and Arms, if they are Gentlemen, or barely Caſhier'd if they are not, without any prejudice to greater puniſhments. It will be fit for Your Majeſty to impoſe this Law upon Your Self, never to grant them any ſuch leave in time of War, without a Lawful Cauſe: but when they are in Gariſon, Your Majeſty may be ſo kind as to grant furlows to a third part of the Officers

for

for four months, to the end, that in a years time they may have it all in their turn.

If with this good Rule, which cannot be thought too Auſtere, even by thoſe who may ſuffer by it, particular care be taken of the Souldiers: If Bread be given them all the year round, ſix Muſters and a Suit of Cloathes: If the Military Miſſions be continued which were practis'd in 1639. to prevent their falling ſick: If when they are ill, Hoſpitals be provided to follow the Army in all places, as it was done in the ſaid year, and a livelyhood ſecur'd for thoſe who ſhall be maim'd in the King's Service, in the *Commandery* of St. *Lewis* deſign'd to that end; I dare anſwer, that the Infantry of this Kingdom will be well Diſciplin'd for the future.

* It will be the ſame with the Horſe, if raiſing them with the ſame Order, (which I do not repeat, to avoid a tedious Narration) every Trooper be obliged to keep two Horſes for Service and a Sumpter: If they are made to obſerve the Ordinances rigorouſly, which oblige them never to be without Arms: and if in time of Peace they are put in Gariſon in cloſe places, to prevent the diſorders which it is impoſſible to ſecure the People againſt, when Souldiers are Quarter'd in the open Countrey. * Cavalry.

They have behav'd themſelves ſo ill in theſe laſt Wars; that in caſe they ſhould remain in the ſame condition, they would be no longer fit for any Service.

The true cauſe of their decay is the vaſt number that has been rais'd in theſe latter times, to oppoſe the Cavalry of Foreigners who make all ſorts of Men Troopers indifferently.

For

For which reaſon it has been impoſſible to raiſe them among the Gentrey of Courage and Activity as formerly, and the Officers have been oblig'd to take not only old Souldiers, but alſo raw young Men of all conditions, whoſe Courage or Strength had never been Try'd.

If in imitating Strangers who receive all ſorts of Men in their Cavalry, ours had learnt alſo to ſupport Fatigues as well as theirs, tho' they had loſt part of their ancient Valour, which made them recommendable, we ſhould have ſome reaſon to comfort our ſelves; but the Inconſtancy and love of eaſe which reigns almoſt among all conditions in our Nation, having quite alter'd them; they have loſt the beſt qualification they had without acquiring that which they had not.

Tho' Phyſicians eſteem the cure of a Diſtemper in a very fair way, when the cauſe of it is known; I own that notwithſtanding the ſource and reaſon of the Evil in queſtion be known, the cure is nevertheleſs very difficult.

If none but Gentlemen are admitted into the Cavalry, it will be impoſſible to raiſe a ſufficient number of them, to oppoſe that of the Enemies; and if all ſorts of Men be receiv'd among them, it is impoſſible they ſhould be ſuch as Hiſtory repreſents the *French* Horſe.

The only expedient that can be taken, in my Opinion, in this Extremity, is to exhort the Captains to get as many Gentlemen in their Troops as can be got, to make an Order that none of them ſhall be admitted to Muſter, unleſs one half of them are Gentlemen.

To oblige all thoſe of that Birth being 20 years of Age, to bear Arms, declaring them incapable of any Imployments or Dignities, unleſs they have actually ſerved three years in Your Majeſty's Forces.

To forbid all Officers of Horſe to Liſt any Souldiers in their Troops, not being Gentlemen, unleſs they be above 25 years of Age, and have born Arms in the Foot at leaſt three years.

Finally, to cauſe the ancient Military Orders to be put rigorouſly in execution, which ordains all Troopers who ſhall abandon their Commander in a Combat, to be diſarm'd upon the bare knowledge of the ſaid fault.

If this Regulation is Religiouſly obſerv'd, I do not doubt, but the *French* Horſe will regain its former Reputation, and Your Majeſty's Infantry and Cavalry being well Diſciplin'd, you will be able to boaſt your being ſtrong in Arms, at any time whatever, and in a condition to give your Subjects in time of Peace as much ſafety as terror to your Enemies.

It now remains to know whether this State will be able to bear the expence of ſo great a Body of Men, as that which I have drawn a Project of. Which will be examin'd hereafter.

In the mean time tho' there is reaſon to hope that by means of ſo uſeful a Regulation, and ſo eaſie to be obſerv'd, as that which I propoſe, the Armies will ſubſiſt for the future, according to our wiſhes; or at leaſt that they will behave themſelves a great deal better than heretofore; I will nevertheleſs make ſix Remarks which will be the more neceſſary in a great War, in that Prudence requires many expedients in important Affairs, that Men may never fall ſhort of their Meaſures. The

* Remarks to make Armies ſubſiſt, and to make War advantagiouſly.

* The firſt is, that in order to have 50000 effectual Men, it is neceſſary to raiſe a hundred, reckoning upon a Regiment of 20 Companies which ought to conſiſt of a hundred Men, only as a thouſand.

The ſecond, that it is neceſſary to refreſh Armies often by new Levies, without which though they are ſtrong upon the Rolls, they will be weak in Effect.

The third, that ſuch Refreſhments ought rather to be made by frequent Recruits of old Regiments, which muſt be preſerv'd tho' abſolutely decay'd, than by raiſing of new ones, which nevertheleſs muſt be done on certain preſſing occaſions, becauſe Souldiers love to Liſt themſelves under new Officers.

The fourth, That when Forces are ruin'd, it is better to pay them on the foot on which they are, than to disband them, becauſe it is impoſſible to do it without loſing excellent Officers and good Souldiers.

I am ſenſible, that the remaining Souldiers may be put into other Regiments. But it is not practicable, the kindneſs Souldiers have for their Captains, giving them a pretence to retire, or at leaſt of covering their inconſtancy in ſo doing.

I am alſo ſenſible that in reforming Regiments, one might imitate the *Spaniards* who do not only initiate the Souldiers into old Regiments, but the Officers alſo.

But tho' it be eaſie to reſolve upon ſuch an Order, no ſeverity will be ſufficient to put it in execution; the ambitious, inconſiderate humour of our Nation, not permitting them to ſuffer themſelves to be commanded, after having commanded, whatever advantage

vantage they might receive by ſuch an Obedience.

The Fifth, that it is abſolutely Impoſſible in Wars which require extraordinary Efforts, to pay the muſters of the Forces that are rais'd regularly, as it may be done in an Enterprize which do's not exceed the Power of a State: But in ſuch a caſe theſe two Expedients may ſerve to remedy ſuch a defect.

The firſt conſiſts in making ſo good a Proviſion that the Souldiers may never want Bread.

The Second, to oblige the Commanders, who being ſatisfyed, have too much Intereſt to preſerve the Men under their Command, not to uſe their utmoſt Endeavours in order thereunto; whereas when they are misus'd their Complaints and Negligence give way to the Licentiouſneſs of their Souldiers, and give them a deſire to run away, tho otherwiſe they would not think on't of their own accord.

However I muſt not forget to obſerve, that to do well, it is neceſſary to make three Muſters, during the Campaign, beſides five Months of VVinter Quarters which the Forces muſt have regularly.

And whereas nothing is more material towards the ſubſiſtance of Armys, and the ſucceſs of all the deſigns that can be undertaken, than to take ſuch meaſures that Proviſion may never fail them.

I add for the ſixth remark, that the ſaid care is one of the chief that is to be taken, and that Oeconomy and Policy are the chief qualifications of Generals. Armys hardly fight once in a year: But they muſt live daily, and ſubſiſt with order; which cannot be done without an extraordinary Oeconomy, and Policy.

Hiſtory affords us the Example of more Armys that have periſhed for want of Bread, and Policy, than by the effort of the Enemys Arms: and I am a faithful

Witneſs

Witneſs, that all the Enterprizes which have been made in my dayes, have only miſcarry'd upon that account.

Thoſe who have no Experience, commonly think they have done all when they have rais'd Armys, and provided for their Pay; but let them be paid never ſo well, unleſs they are in a Place where they may live conveniently, their Money is of no uſe to them, and cannot hinder them from periſhing.

Therefore I muſt needs ſay, that it is dangerous to rely upon the Faith of a Purveyor who obliges himſelf to provide all the bread of an Army.

The Life of ſuch Men is too poor a ſecurity for the miſchief their negligence may occaſion, to rely upon their Faith.

The Care of the Proviſions ought to be committed to Perſons of Quality, of known Vigilancy Fidelity and Capacity; ſince the Welfare of Armys and often of States depends upon it.

No men can be too great to be imploy'd in ſuch Places.

* In order not to be miſtaken in our reckoning, in putting an Army on Foot, the Proviſions muſt be ſettled ſo, that every Regiment of a thouſand Men may have 15. Waggons to carry Bread for a Fortnight which is partly as much as is required for a conſiderable Enterprize: Moreover it is neceſſary to have a hundred or two, over and above the common Calculation, otherwiſe one might fall ſhort.

* A Waggon with four Horſes muſt carry Seven or eight *Septiers* of Wheat in all Countrys, amounting to 1500. pound weight. Every *Septier* weighing 240 in Bread it ought to carry 1000 Rations which muſt weigh 1500 pounds, in Bisket it will carry 2000 Rations, thus 15 good Waggons will carry Bread for a fortnight for a thouſand Men, and Bisket for three Weeks, and conſequently 225. Waggons will carry bread for 25. days and Bisket for 30 for an Army of 15000 Men.

Special

Special care muſt alſo be taken to carry Mills and Ovens, for tho Commonly the uſe of them is not good, yet it is neceſſary to have ſome, to make uſe of them in certain Places in which it would otherwiſe be impoſſible to ſubſiſt, and in which it may happen that a ſtay of four days may give the Enemys a great advantage, over an Army which wants Proviſion.

As the leaſt things ought to be conſider'd in great deſigns, the General of an Army muſt take a particular care of every thing belonging to his Train.

He muſt know that a Cart is not ſo cumberſom as a Waggon which turns with more eaſe in narrow Paſſes; but on the other hand that they are ſooner overthrown, and that the overturning of one is capable to ſtop a Train a long while. Therefore it behoves him to conſider the Places he is to march through, to make uſe of the one or of the other, according as he will think it moſt proper.

He muſt alſo know that there are two ways of carrying the Bread, either in Carriages which are very heavy and cumberſom, or in Carts plaited on the ſides and cover'd with cere Cloths which are more Convenient.

After theſe ſix Remarks, I have only two Councels to give to thoſe who Command our Armys.

The firſt is, always to be the firſt in the Field, becauſe it is difficult for an Army, tho never ſo conſiderable to make any progreſs, when they find another ready to oppoſe them, and often very eaſy for thoſe that come firſt into the Field to ſecure a good ſucceſs.

The Second is to attack, when it may be done without raſhneſs, rather than to ſtand upon the defenſive; by reaſon that, beſides that he who has the

boldneſs

boldneſs to attack gives ſome Impreſſion of fear to him he attacks, the Impatient and Inconſtant Temper of the *French*, is as unfit for the defenſive part, as their fire and firſt eagerneſs qualifys them to perform their duty in the firſt.

Experience makes me ſpeak thus, and I am perſuaded that thoſe who are perfect Commanders will ſay the ſame.

SECTION. V.

Of Naval Power.

THE Power of Arms do's not only require that the King ſhould be ſtrong a ſhore, but alſo potent at Sea.

When *Anthony Perez* was receiv'd in *France* by the late King your Father, and that in order to ſoften his miſery he had ſecured him a good Penſion: That ſtranger being deſirous to expreſs his Gratitude to that great King, and to ſhow him that tho he was unfortunate he was not ungrateful, gave him three Councels in three Words which are of no ſmall Conſideration, *Roma, Conſejo, Pielago.*

The advice of this old *Spaniard* conſummated in Affairs, is not ſo much to be looked upon for the Authority of him that gave it, as for its own weight.

We have already mention'd the Care Princes ought to take to have a good Council, and to be authoriſed at *Rome*, it now remains to ſhow how it behoves the King to be Potent at Sea.

The Sea is, of all Heritages that in which Soveraigns pretend to have the greateſt ſhare, and yet it

it is that on which the Rights of every body are leaſt agreed upon.

The Empire of that Element was never well ſecur'd to any. It has been ſubject to divers Revolutions according to the inconſtancy of its nature, ſo ſubject to the Wind that it ſubmits to him who Courts it moſt, and whoſe Power is ſo unbounded that he is in a condition to poſſeſs it with violence againſt all thoſe who might diſpute it with him.

In a word, the old Titles of that Dominion are Force and not Reaſon, a Prince muſt be Powerful to pretend to that Heritage.

To proceed with Order and Method in this point, we muſt conſider the Ocean and the Mediterranian ſeperately, and make a diſtinction between the Ships which are of uſe in both thoſe Seas, and of the Gallies, the uſe of which is only good in that which Nature ſeems to have reſerv'd expreſly betwixt the Lands to expoſe it to leſs Storms, and to give it more ſhelter.

A great State muſt never be in a condition to receive an injury without being able to revenge it.

And therefore *England* being ſituated as it is, unleſs *France* is powerful in Ships, the *Engliſh* may attempt whatever they pleaſe to our prejudice, without the leaſt fear of a return.

They might hinder our Fiſhing, diſturb our Trade, and in blocking up the mouth of our great Rivers, exact what Toll they pleaſe from our Merchants.

They might Land without danger in our Iſlands, and even on our Coaſts.

Finally, The Situation of the Native Countrey of that haughty Nation, not permitting them to fear the greateſt Land-Forces, the ancient Envy they have againſt this Kingdom, would apparently encourage them to dare every thing, ſhould our weakneſs not allow us to attempt ſome thing to their prejudice.

Their Inſolence in the late King your Father's time towards the Duke of *Scily*, obliges us to put our ſelves in a poſture never to ſuffer the like again.

That Duke being choſen by *Henry* the *Great* for an extraordinary Embaſſy into *England*, Embarking at *Callis* in a *French* Ship with the *French* Flag on the Main Top Maſt, was no ſooner in the Channel, but meeting a Yacht which came to receive him, the Commander of it Commanded the *French* Ship to ſtrike.

The Duke thinking his Quality would ſecure him from ſuch an affront, refus'd it boldly; but his refuſal being anſwer'd with three Cannon ſhot with Bullets, which piercing his Ship, pierc'd the Heart of the *French*; Force conſtrain'd him to do, what Reaſon ought to have ſecur'd him from, and whatever Complaints he could make, he could get no other reaſon from the *Engliſh* Captain, than that as his Duty oblig'd him to honour his Quality of Ambaſſador, it oblig'd him alſo to compel others to pay that reſpect to his Maſter's Flag, which was due to the Soveraign of the Sea.

If King *James's* words prov'd more civil, yet they produc'd no other effect than to oblige the Duke to ſeek for ſatisfaction in his own Prudence, feigning himſelf cur'd, when his pain was moſt ſmarting, and his wound incurable.

The

The King your Father was oblig'd to diſſemble on that occaſion; but with this Reſolution another time to maintain the Right of his Crown by the Force, which time would give him means to acquire at Sea.

I repreſent this Great Prince to my mind projecting in that occurence, what your Majeſty muſt now put in Execution.

Reaſon obliges to take an Expedient, which without ingaging any of the Crowns, may contribute towards the preſervation of the good underſtanding which is deſirable among the Princes of Chriſtendom.

Among many that might be propos'd, the following are in my opinion the moſt practicable.

It might be agreed upon, that *French* Ships meeting *Engliſh* Ships upon the Coaſt of *England*, ſhould Salute firſt, and ſtrike the Flag; and that when *Engliſh* Ships ſhould meet *French* Ships upon the *French* Coaſt, they ſhould pay them the ſame Honors, on condition that when the *Engliſh* and *French* Fleets ſhould meet beyond the Coaſts of both Kingdoms, they ſhould both ſteer their Courſe without any Ceremony, only ſending out their reſpective Long-Boats to hail each other, coming no neerer than within Cannon ſhot.

It might alſo be agreed upon, that without having any reſpect to the Coaſts of *France* or *England*, the greater number of Men of War ſhould be Saluted by the ſmaller, either in ſtriking the Flag or otherwiſe.

Whatever Expedient is found out on that ſubject, provided it be equal on all parts, it will be juſt: if your Majeſty is ſtrong at Sea, that which is reaſonable, will be thought ſo by the *Engliſh* who are

ſo much blinded on that ſubject, that they know no Equity but Force.

The advantages the *Spaniards*, who are proud of being our Enemies at preſent, derive from the *Indies*, oblige them to be ſtrong on the Ocean.

The reaſon of a ſound Policy does not allow us to be weak there; but it obliges us to be in a condition to oppoſe the deſigns they might have againſt us, and to croſs their enterprizes.

If your Majeſty be potent at Sea, the juſt apprehenſion *Spain* will lay under of your attacking their Forces, the only Source of their Subſiſtance: of your making a Deſcent on their Coaſts, which have upwards of ſix hundred Leagues Circumference: your ſurpriſing ſome of their places, which are all weak, and in great number: that juſt apprehenſion, I ſay, will oblige them to be ſo powerful at Sea, and to keep ſuch ſtrong Gariſons, that the major part of the Revenue of the *Indies* will be conſumed in Charges, to preſerve the whole, and if the remainder ſuffices to preſerve their States, at laſt it will produce this advantage, that they will no longer be able to trouble their Neighbours, as they have done hitherto.

* Compat of Gattary.

* Had your Majeſty been as weak as your Predeceſſors, you could not have reduc'd to Aſhes, in the midſt of the Waters, all the Forces *Spain* could aſſemble in 1638. on the Ocean.

That proud haughty Nation, could not have been conſtrain'd to ſuffer the checking of their Pride, not only within ſight of *Italy*, but alſo before the Eyes of all Chriſtendom, which ſeeing the Iſles of St. *Marguerits* and of St. *Honorat* ſnatch'd out of their hands

hands by open force, whereas they had only got them by ſurprize, has beheld at once and with the ſame Eye, the ſhame of that inſolent Nation, and the Glory and Reputation of yours.

You could not finaly have fought that famous Combat of the Gallies, on the Seas of *Genoa*, which ſtriking your Enemies with Terror, increas'd the Love and Eſteem of your Allies, and imprinted ſo much Reverence in the indifferent, that the weight of reſpect ingag'd them abſolutely on your ſide.

Your Majeſty having Allies ſo diſtant from this Kingdom, that it is impoſſible to have any Communication with them but by Sea, if they found *France* deſtitute of neceſſary means to ſuccor them on certain occaſions, it would be eaſie for thoſe who are Enemies of the happineſs of both ſides, to ſow the ſame Diviſion in the minds, which is between the States; whereas your Naval Forces being conſiderable, tho' divided as to place, they will remain ſtrictly united in Heart and Affection to this State.

Nature ſeems to have offer'd the Empire of the Sea to *France*, by the advantagious Situation of her two Coaſts, equally provided with excellent Havens, on the Ocean, and on the Mediterranean. *Britanny* alone contains the fineſt in the Ocean; and *Provence*, which has but 160 Miles extent, has many larger and ſafer than *Spain* and *Italy* together.

The ſeparation of the States, which form the Body of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy, renders the preſervation of them ſo difficult, that *Spain* has no other way to keep them in ſome Union, than by keeping a great number of Ships on the Ocean, and of Gallies in the Mediterranean, which by their continual

going backwards and forwards, may in ſome meaſure preſerve the Union between the Members and the Head, tranſporting to and fro whatever is neceſſary for their ſubſiſtance; as Orders for whatever is to be undertaken, Officers to Command, Souldiers to Execute, Money, which is not only the Sinew of War, but alſo the Fat of Peace; from whence it follows, that obſtructing the Liberty of ſuch paſſages, thoſe States which cannot ſubſiſt of themſelves, can never be able to avoid confuſion, weakneſs, and all the deſolations wherewith God threatens a divided Kingdom.

And whereas the Weſtern Coaſt of this Kingdom, ſeparates *Spain* from all the Territories poſſeſs'd by their King in *Italy*, ſo the Providence of God, which will keep an even Balance, ſeems to have been pleas'd to ſeparate the Territories of *Spain*, by the Situation of *France*, to weaken them by their Diviſion.

If your Majeſty conſtantly keeps forty good Men of War well Rigg'd and Equip'd, ready to put out to Sea on all occaſions, that number will be ſufficient to ſecure you againſt all Injuries, and to make you fear'd on all the Seas, by thoſe who have hitherto deſpis'd your Forces there.

As Men of War are neceſſary to that end in the Ocean, Gallies which are light Ships, and can make great Courſes with their Oars in Calms, which are more uſual in the Mediterranian than elſewhere, are as uſeful in the *Levant*.

With thirty Gallies your Majeſty will not only balance the Power of *Spain*, which by the aſſiſtance of their Allies can put fifty in a Body, but you will overcome them by the reaſon of Union, which redoubles the Power of the Forces it unites. As

As your Gallies may remain in a Body, either at *Marſeilles* or *Toulon*, they will always be in a condition to oppoſe the conjunction of thoſe of *Spain*, which are ſo much ſeparated by the Situation of this Kingdom, that they cannot aſſemble without paſſing in ſight of the Ports, and Roads of *Provence*, and even ſometimes without Anchoring there, by reaſon of the Storms which ſurprize them half way the Chanel, which thoſe light Ships are not able to bear without great hazard, in a troubleſome paſſage in which they are very frequent.

The Gulph of *Leon* is the moſt dangerous paſſage in all the Seas of the *Levant*; the inconſtancy and contrariety of the Winds, which commonly reign there, render the paſſage of it very difficult, whatever way it is undertaken.

All ſtormy weather is very dangerous there, and unleſs our Coaſts are favourable to thoſe who paſs by them, they ſeldom have a ſafe paſſage.

The true reaſon of the hazard of this paſſage, proceeds from the contrariety of Winds, occaſion'd by divers Aſpects of the Coaſts.

The more a Coaſt is Mountainous and elevated, the more it raiſes Winds, when the heat of the ground is oppos'd by the coldneſs and moiſture of the water, or of the Snow it is covered with.

This is the reaſon that the Coaſts of *Provence* which are of this nature, being ever moiſten'd during the Winter with Rain or Snow, are never free from Wind, which blowing from the Shore, are always contrary to thoſe who have a mind to land there.

And tho' thoſe Winds are contrary to the approach of Veſſels, yet they are not ſtrong enough to carry them back to the places from whence they

come, becauſe they commonly meet with other ſhore Winds which drive them back again; in ſo much that the contrariety of Winds from our Coaſts, and from thoſe of *Spain*, force the Ships into the Gulph, where generally by Tempeſtuous Weather their ruine proves inevitable.

All Ships and Gallies going from *Spain* into *Italy*, always ſet Sail from the Cape of *Quiers*, and from the Gulph of *Roſes*, and commonly tarry for a Weſtern and North-weſt Wind, ſafely to reach the Coaſt of *Genoa*, or *Morgues* which is their firſt landing place; but tho' they put out with a fair Wind, it changes as ſoon as they come to the Gulph.

If the Wind turns to the S. W. or S. S. W. they muſt of neceſſity make for the Coaſt of *Provence*, and if it turns to the South Eaſt and by Eaſt, it is impoſſible for the Gallies and Ships which are near our Coaſts, either to reach *Italy*, or to turn back to *Spain*, and in hard weather it is a Miracle if they are not loſt on the Banks of our Coaſts.

On the other hand, the Ships which go from *Italy* into *Spain*, ſet ſail commonly from *Morgues*, which is the laſt Port of *Italy*.

In order to have a good Paſſage, they tarry for a North Weſt and Northerly Wind, but they are never half way the Gulph, before the Weather changes, and without their being in Peril; becauſe a South Eaſt or a Southern Storm renders their loſs inevitable, unleſs our Ports are open to receive them.

Therefore *France* being ſtrong in Gallies and in Gallions, they can have no certain Paſſage, ſince they can never undertake to make the middle of the Chanel in the Winter time, without running the hazard

hazard of being loſt, either on our Coaſts, or in *Barbary*, if the Wind turns wholly to the North.

And even when the North Eaſt and by Nore drives them towards *Majorca* and *Minorca*, and the North Weſt and by Nore drives them into *Corſica* and *Sardinia*, the violence of the Storms often breaks and deſtroys them before they can reach the ſhelter of the Iſles that are favourable to them.

And if to avoid that Peril they reſolve to tarry for a fair Wind to ſail along our Shores, it will not happen once in thirty times, that they will paſs ſafely, without ſtriking by ſome ill Weather, within our ſight.

And tho' they ſhould meet with ſuch favourable Winds, as to eſcape all the dangers of the Sea, the leaſt advice we have of their Paſſage, will enable us to croſs it, the more eaſily, in that we may always put out to Sea, and put in again without Peril, whenever the Weather threatens us, by reaſon of the Neighbourhood of our Ports, which they dare not come near.

Thirty Gallies will afford your Majeſty this advantage, and if to ſuch a Body you add 10 Gallions, true Citadels of the Sea, formidable to Gallies, when they have a favourable Wind, becauſe their Body bears no proportion to the weakneſs of thoſe light Ships, and that they are not afraid of them even in the greateſt Calms, by reaſon that being provided with as good Guns as their * *Courſiers*, they are capable to do them a great deal of harm if they come too near them.

* The Guns plac'd in the Gallerys of the Gallies.

Tho the King of *Spain* ſhould increaſe his Forces of one half in that Sea, which he cannot do without

out a great Expence, he would not be in a condition to repair the harm we could do him, by reaſon of the Union of our Forces and the Diviſion of his.

Such a Body may attempt any thing, it may attack the *Spaniſh* Armies in their Ports, when they are aſſembling there, experience having convinc'd us in the retaking the Iſles of St. *Marguerit* and St. *Honorat*, that floating Fortreſſes, prevail over the moſt ſecure of the Sea, when Men know how to uſe them boldly.

By this means your Majeſty will preſerve the Liberty of the Princes of *Italy*, who have been hitherto as it were, Slaves to the King of *Spain*.

You will incourage thoſe who have endeavour'd to caſt off the Yoke of that Tyranny, which they only bear becauſe they cannot free themſelves from it, and foment the Faction of thoſe who are *Frenchmen* in their Hearts.

The late King your Father, having order'd Monſieur *d'Alincourt* to make reproaches to the Great Duke *Ferdinand*, for having made a new engagement with *Spain*, notwithſtanding the Aliance he had contracted with him, by the Marriage of the Queen your Mother: The Great Duke after having given a patient hearing to what he ſaid to him upon that ſubject, made an anſwer which ſignify'd much in few words, and which muſt be conſider'd by your Majeſty and by your Succeſſors; *Had the King had forty Gallies at* Marſelles, *I would not have done what I have done.*

The Paſſage *Pignerol* gives your Majeſty into *Italy*, being well preſerv'd, if you open another by Sea, time and the ſteadineſs which will be obſerv'd in your Councils, the inconſtancy of which is fear'd

upon

upon the account of the Levity of our Nation, will alter the Hearts of many *Italians*, or rather will incourage them to ſhew what they have been all along.

Italy is look'd upon as the Heart of the World, and indeed it is the nobleſt part of the Empire of the *Spaniards*, it is the place where they dread moſt be be attack'd and troubl'd, and that in which it is moſt eaſie to obtain great advantages over them, provided we go about it as we ſhould do.

And conſequently, tho' one had no deſign to do them any harm, nevertheleſs it is neceſſary to be in a condition to give them a Counter-ſtab ſo near the Heart whenever they ſhall attempt any thing againſt *France*, that their Arms may no longer have ſtrength enough to attempt any malicious deſigns againſt us.

That Force will not only keep *Spain* in Awe, but it will oblige the Grand Seignior and his Subjects who only meaſure the Power of diſtant Kings, by that which they have at Sea, to be more careful than they have been hitherto, to keep the Treaties they made with them.

Algier, *Tunis*, and all the Coaſt of *Barbary*, will reſpect and fear your Power, whereas, they have deſpis'd it hitherto with an incredible infidelity.

In that caſe the *Barbarians* will either live willingly in Peace with your Majeſt's Subjects, or if they are not ſo wiſe as to do it, they will be compell'd to do that by Force, which they have refuſed to do by Reaſon.

Whereas at preſent tho' we think we have no War with them, we receive all the Evils of it, and we neither enjoy Peace, nor the advantage we ought to reap by it; We will find Calm and Safety in War,

which

which is very advantageous with Men whose natural Infidility is so great, that there is no way to avoid it but by Force.

It now remains to examine the Expence, which will be necessary for the maintenance of the number of Ships above projected, which tho never so great will be inconsiderable in comparison of the advantages we will receive by it; And yet it may be done with two Millions and five hundered thousand Livers, according as it will appear by the Settlement which will be inserted at the end of this Work.

SECTION. VI.

Which Treats of Trade, as a dependency of the Power of the Sea, and specifies those which are most Conveniens.

IT is a Common but a very true saying, that as States often are Inlarg'd by War, so they are commonly inriched in time of Peace by Trade.

The Wealth of the *Hollanders*, which properly speaking are only a handful of Men reduc'd into a Corner of the Earth, in which there is nothing but Waters and Meadows, is an Example and Proof of the usefulness of Trade, which admits of no contestation.

Tho that Country produces nothing but Butter and Cheese, yet they furnish all the Nations of *Europe* with the greatest part of what is necessary to them.

Navigation has made them so famous, and so powerful throughout the whole World: That after having made themselves Masters of the Trade of the East

East *Indies*, to the prejudice of the *Portugueze* who had been long settled there; they have cut out a great deal of Work for the *Spaniards* in the West *Indies*, where they injoy the Major part of *Brasil*.

As in *England* the greatest part of those whose Circumstances are the least easy maintain themselves by common Fisherys the most Considerable drive a greater Trade in all the Parts of the World, by the Manufactures of their Cloth, and by the Sale of Lead, Tynn, and Sea Cole, which are productions of their Country. The Kingdom of *China*, the Entrance into which is allow'd to no body, is the only Country in which that Nation has no Place settled for their Trade.

The City of *Genoa* which only abounds in Rocks makes so good a Use of its Trade, that I may safely affirm that it is the Richest City in *Italy*, if the succors of *Spain*.*——

* The Manuscript is defective in this place.

France only abounding too much within it self, has hitherto neglected Trade, tho they are as conveniently seated for it as their Neighbours, and might free themselves of the assistance they receive from them on that account at their own Cost.

The Fisheries of the Ocean are the easiest, and most useful Commerce, which can be made in this Kingdom. It is the more necessary, in that there is no State in the World so well Peopled as *France*.

That the Number of those who are out of the Road to Heaven, is very inconsiderable compar'd to the Catholics, who living under the Laws of the *Roman* Church, abstain the third part of the year from the use of Meat.

And

And that none of the diſpenſations practiſed in *Spain* are uſed there, to eat Meat at all times under a ſpecious pretence.

Trade will be the eaſyer for us, in that we have a great number of Sea Men, who heitherto have been oblig'd to ſeek out imployment among our Enemyes, having none at home, and we have made no other uſe of them hitherto but to get ſalt Fiſh and Herrings. But having wherewith to imploy our Mariners, inſtead of being Conſtrained to ſtrengthen our Enemies, by weakning our ſelves, we will be able to carry into *Spain* and other Countrys, that which they have hitherto brought to us, by the aſſiſtance of our Men who ſerve them.

France is ſo fertile in Corn, ſo abounding in Wine, Flax and Hemp to make Cloth and Riggings ſo neceſſary for Navigation, that *Spain*, *England*, and all other Neighbouring States, muſt have recourſe thither.

And provided we know how to improve the advantages which Nature has given us, we will get money of thoſe who have occaſion for our Goods, without troubling our ſelves much with their Commoditys which are of little uſe to us.

Spaniſh, *Engliſh* and *Dutch* Cloths, are only ſuperfluous; we may make them as good as theirs, getting Wool from *Spain* as they doe. Moreover we may have them more conveniently, upon the account of our Corn, and Linen Cloths, if we will exchange them to make a double gain.

* Our Kings having made a ſhift with Draps *de Berry*, we may very well make a ſhift now with Draps *de Sceau*, and *de Meunier* or Millers Cloth, which are

* The Draps *de Sceau*, are made at *Roan*, and the Draps *de Meunier* at *Remorantin*, and *Elbœuf*.

are now made in *France*, without having recourſe to thoſe that are made abroad, the uſe of which will be aboliſh'd by this means, as well as the Serges of *Chalons* and of *Chartres* have aboliſh'd thoſe of *Milan*.

And indeed the Draps *de Sceau* are inſomuch requeſt in the Levant, that next to thoſe of *Venice* made with *Spaniſh* Wool, the *Turks* preferr them to all others; and the Citys of *Marſelles*, and of *Lyons*. have heitherto driven a very great Trade in them

France is Induſtrious enough, Not to ſtand in need of the beſt Manufactures of our Neighbours ſuch fine Pluſhes are made at *Tours*, that they are ſent into *Spain*, *Italy* and other foreign Countrys, the Plain Tafetas which are made there alſo, are ſo much in Vogue throughout *France*, that there is no need to look for any elſewhere. Red, Purple and Spotted Velvets, are made finer there now than at *Genoa*: It is alſo the only place in which Silk Serges are made. Mohair is made as good there as in *England*; the fineſt Cloths of Gold are made finer there, and Cheaper than in *Italy*

So that we may eaſily forbear that Trade, which only ſerves to foment our Lazineſs, and to feed our Pride, to ſtick ſolidly to that which may increaſe our Wealth, and imploy our Mariners, inſomuch that our Neighbours may not improve our labours at their coſt.

Over and above thoſe above ſpecify'd which are the beſt in the Ocean, many others may be made.

The Skinners Trade of *Canada* is the more neceſſary, becauſe there is no need of carrying Money there, and that they take ſuch Commodities in Exchange, as ſcizzer-Caſes, Knives, ſmall Pen-knives, Needles,

Needles, Pins, Bills, Hatchets, Watches, Hat-bands, Points, and other ſorts of Mercery Wares.

That of the Coaſt of *Guiny* in *Africa*, in which the *Portgueze* have long poſſeſs'd a place call'd *Caſtel de Mine*, which the *Hollanders* of the *Weſt-India*-Company have taken from them within theſe 2 or 3 years is of the ſame nature, in that the only Goods exported there, are Pedlars Wares, Canvaſs and courſe Linen Cloths, in exchange of which the *Negroes* give Golden Powder.

The Merchants of *Roans* have formerly driven a Trade of Linen and Woolen Cloths in the Kingdom of *Fez* and of *Morrocco*, by means of which they got a great deal of Gold.

Were the King's Subjects ſtrong in Shipping, they might ingroſs all the Trade of the North, which the *Dutch* have got, by reaſon that the North ſtanding abſolutely in need of Wine, Vinegar, and Brandy-Wine, of Cheſnuts, of Pruens, and of Nuts; all Commodities in which the Kingdom abounds, and which cannot be conſum'd in it, it is eaſie to make a conſiderable Trade of them, and the better in that returns may be made of Wood, of Copper, of Pitch and Tar; things not only uſeful for our ſelves, but neceſſary for our Neighbours, who can not get them from them without our Goods, unleſs they will loſe the fraight of their Ships in going thither.

I do not enter into the particulars of the Trade which may be driven in the *Eaſt-Indies*, and in *Perſia*, by reaſon that the humour of the *French* being ſo haſty, that they will ſee the effects of their deſires as ſoon as they have conceiv'd them: Long Voyages are not ſuitable with their temper.

How-

However as abundance of Silks and Carpets are brought from *Perſia*, many Curioſities from *China*; and all manner of Spices from divers places in thoſe parts of the World, which are of great uſe to us, that Trade is not to be neglected.

To make a good Settlement, it would be neceſſary to ſend two or three Ships into the Eaſt, Commanded by Perſons of Quality, Prudence, and Wiſdom, with Patents and neceſſay Powers, to Treat with thoſe Princes, and to Make Allyances with the People on all ſides as the *Portugueze*, *Engliſh*, and *Dutch* have done.

This deſign would ſucceed the better, by reaſon that thoſe who have taken a footing in thoſe Nations, are very much hated by them at preſent, either becauſe they have deceiv'd them, or becauſe they have ſubdued them by Force.

As to the Weſt, there is no great Trade to be expected there, *Drake*, *Thomas Cavendiſh*, *Sperberg*, *L'Hermite*, *le Maire*, and the late Count *Maurice*, who ſent twelve Ships thither of 500 Tuns, on purpoſe to Trade there, either by way of Friendſhip, or by Force, not having been able to make any ſettlements there; there is but little to be hop'd for on that ſide, unleſs a Military Force be ſent thither to take poſſeſſion of the places *Spain* poſſeſſes there at preſent.

The little Iſles of St. *Chriſtopher*, and others ſeated at the Head of the *Indies* may yield ſome Tobacco, ſome Skins, and other things of ſmall conſequence.

THERE NOW REMAINS TO KNOW WHAT MAY BE DONE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

Trade of the Mediteranean.

Memorial of the different Trades driven in the Levant.

Napoli de Romania.

" The *French* carry ſome Goods there and Mo-
" ney, and bring back Silks, Goats Leather, Wool,
" Wax, and Cheeſe, part of which is deſtributed
" and ſold in *Italy*.

Satalia.

" The *French* only carry Money there, and bring
" back Cotton, Wax, and all manner of Goat
" Skins.

Smyrna.

" The *French* carry more Goods there than
" Money, abundance of Merchandiſe going off
" there, for *Chio*, the *Archipelago* and *Conſtanti-*
" *nople*. The Goods carry'd there, are Pa-
" per, Caps, *Draps de Paris*, and of *Languedoc*,
" *Braſil* Wood, Cutchaneal, Spices, Satins made
" at *Lyons*; and ſometimes they bring back *Perſian*
" Silks, and Rubarbs, which the *Perſians* bring
" thither, Cottons ſpun into Thred, Wax, Ma-
" ſtick, and courſe Carpets.

Scala Nova.

" Sometimes our Ships take in Wheat and Le-
" gumes there.

Con-

Conſtantinople.

" The *French* carry abundance of Goods there, " which are the ſame that are carry'd to *Smyrna*, ex- " cepting Gold, Silver, and Silk Stuffs, and very " ſeldom Money; they bring back Leather and " Wool, there being nothing elſe; and often not " finding Commodities for the Goods that have " been ſold there, they are oblig'd to ſend the ſaid " Money to *Smyrna* to be imploy'd there, or elſe it " is remitted by Bills of Exchange to *Aleppo*, there " are always abundance of Goods to be bought " there to carry into Chriſtendom.

Iſle of *Cyprus.*

" In which there are divers Ports; Money is " carry'd thither, ſome Cloths and Caps; and in " return we take Cotton ſpun into Thred, Silks " made in the ſaid Iſles, and ſome Drugs.

Alexandria and the Port of *Aleppo.*

" Abundance of Merchandice and Money are " carry'd thither from *France*. Thoſe Goods are " the ſame which are carry'd to *Smyrna*. And great " quantities of Silks and Drugs are taken in there; " all ſorts of Cottons, Oak-Apples, Goat Skins, " which they ſtile of the *Levant*, Red, Yellow, " and Blue, Callicos, and ſometimes *Indian* Goods, " which are brought there from *Perſia*. Before the " *Engliſh*, and *Dutch* went into the *Indies*, all *Per-* " *ſian* Silks, Drugs, and other Goods were " brought to *Aleppo*, from whence they were " brought to *Marſeilles*, and from thence they were " afterwards ſold throughout *France*, *England*, *Hol-*

" *land* and *Germany*. And now the ſaid *Engliſh* and " *Hollanders*, have taken away the ſaid Trade from " us, and do not only furniſh all *France* with *Per-* " *ſian* Goods, but alſo with thoſe they buy on " the Grand Seignior's Territories, which they carry " through *Perſia* to *Goa*, where they lade.

" The Goods that are brought from the " *Levant*, are diſpos'd of in *Sicily*, *Naples*, *Genoa*, " *Leghorn*, *Majorca*, and throughout *Spain*, *Flan-* " *ders*, and *Germany*.

Seyda, *the Port of* Tripoly, Barut, *and St.* John d'Acre.

" The *French* carry ſome Commodities thither, and " for the moſt part Money; they bring back from " thence Silks, ſpun Cottons, Aſhes to make Soap, " Drugs which come from *Damaſcus*, ſometimes " they take in Rice, and when they have a good " Crop of Wheat, they ſuffer our Ships to take " lading of it.

Alexandria, *the Port of* Ægypt and *Grand Cairo*.

" The *French* carry ſeveral *French* Commodities " thither, as Cloth, Paper, Braſil, Cochaneal; " but more Money than Goods; they take in their " *Natron*, Drugs of divers ſorts, and moſt of the " Goods which ſell in *Italy* or in *Spain*.

" Formerly all ſorts of Spices were brought to " *Alexandria* through the *Red Sea*, which were car- " ry'd to *Marſeilles*; but now the *Engliſh* and *Hol-* " *landers* go into the *Indies*, we muſt buy them of " them.

Tunis.

Tunis.

" Wine is tranſported thither from *Marſeilles*, " Hony, Tartar, Cloth, Paper, and other Goods, " and ſeldom any Money, and Leather and Wax " is taken in there.

Algiers *and the adjacent Ports.*

" The ſame Commodities are often carry'd thi- " ther from *Marſeiles* which are carry'd to *Tunis*, and " Leather and Wax, are alſo brought from thence.

I own I have been long deceiv'd in the Trade the *Proveneals* drive in the *Levant.*

I was of opinion with many others, that the ſaid Trade was prejudicial to the State, thinking according to the common notion of the World, that it exhauſted the Money of the Kingdom, in exchange of Goods no wiſe uſeful, and only fit to indulge the Luxurioufneſs of our Nation.

But having made an exact enquiry into the Nature of that Trade, condemn'd by the publick voice, I have alter'd my opinion upon ſuch ſolid grounds, that whoever will know them, will certainly think I have done it with Reaſon.

It is certain that we ſtand in abſolute need of moſt of the Commodities of the *Levant*, as Silks, Cottons, Wax, Goat Skins, Rubarb, and ſeveral other Drugs which are neceſſary to us.

It is alſo certain that if we do not fetch them, Strangers will bring them to us, and get the profit, we might get our ſelves.

It is likewiſe certain that we do not carry near ſo much Money into the *Levant*, as *French* Commodities: our Hemp, our Linen Cloath, our Timber

to build Ships are in greater requeſt there than Money.

Thoſe who underſtand the Trade of the *Levant*, know that the Money which is carry'd thither, is not of the growth of *France*, but *Spain*, from whence we draw it by the Traffick of thoſe very Commodities we bring from the *Levant*; which is very obſervable.

They are moreover ſenſible that the more the City of *Marſeilles* Trades into the *Levant*, the richer it is in Money.

That the Silks and ſpun Cotton which are the principal Commodities which come from the *Levant*, are wrought in *France*, and from thence tranſported into Foreign Countries, with a profit of *Cent. per Cent.* upon the buying of the ſaid Manufacture. That the ſaid Trade maintains a vaſt number of Workmen, and that it preſerves us.

That it imploys abundance of Seamen, uſeful in time of Peace, and neceſſary in War.

Finally, That the Cuſtoms of the ſaid Trade amounnt to a great deal of Money.

And therefore it is evident that the ſaid Trade is not only advantageous, but abſolutely neceſſary.

Whatever advantages may accrue by the Trade of the two Seas, the *French* will never apply themſelves to it with delight, unleſs the means appear as eaſie to them, as the end is uſeful.

One of the beſt expedients to incourage them for their own good, is that your Majeſty would be pleas'd yearly to ſell them ſome of your Ships at an eaſie rate, on condition that they ſhall imploy them for Trade, and not ſell them out of the Kingdom.

This Medium applying a Remedy to their impatience, which does not permit them to tarry for the

the building of a Ship, to make uſe of it, will be the more agreeable to them, in that it will enable them to reap almoſt as ſoon as they have ſown.

Beſide the profit that will thereby accrue to private perſons, the State will receive a conſiderable advantage by ſuch an Order; by reaſon that the Merchants will be very conſiderable in ſix years time by the number of their Ships, and in a condition to aſſiſt the Kingdom in caſe of need, as it is practis'd in *England*, where the King makes uſe of his Subjects Ships, in time of War, without which he would not be ſo powerful at Sea, as he is.

Moreover the number of Ships your Majeſty deſigns to keep, will not be leſſen'd by it, ſince the Publick Docks you have been pleas'd to re-eſtabliſh, will furniſh you yearly as many as you pleaſe.

There is no State in *Europe* fitter to build Ships than this Kingdom, abounding in Hemp, Linen Cloth, Iron, Rigging, and in Workmen whom our Neigbours commonly debauch from us, becauſe they are not imploy'd at home.

The Rivers *Loire* and *Garrone* have ſuch convenient places for Docks, that Nature ſeems to have deſign'd them for that uſe.

The cheapneſs of Victuals for the Workmen and the conveniencies of divers Rivers which disburthen themſelves into them, and bring all manner of neceſſaries, juſtifie the ſaid Propoſition.

If next to this Expedient, your Majeſty will think fit to grant Merchandiſing ſome Prerogatives to give a Rank to Merchants, whereas your Subjects are oblig'd to obtain it by divers Offices, which are only good to maintain their idleneſs, and to pleaſe their Wives, you will reſtore Trade to that

degree, that every one, and all in general will be advantag'd by it.

In fine, if beſides thoſe two Favours, you will be pleas'd, to take a particular care to clear theſe two Seas from Pirates, which may eaſily be done; *France* will ſoon add to its Natural Plenty, what Trade affords to the moſt barren Countries.

Six Guard Ships of two hundred Tuns, and ſix Pinnaces well Arm'd, will be ſufficient to ſecure the Ocean, provided the ſaid Ships keep conſtantly at Sea.

And in order to ſecure the Sea of the *Levant*, it will alſo be ſufficient to put out to Sea yearly towards the month of *April*, a Squadron of ten Gallies, ſteering their Courſe towards the Iſles of *Corſica* and *Sardinia*, cruiſing all along the Coaſt of *Barbary*, unto the *Streights*, ſteering the ſame Courſe back again, not to come home again until the Weather compels them to it, at which time ſix Ships well Equip'd ſhall put out to Sea in their room, to perform their Caravan in the Winter time.

SECTION VII.

Which ſhows that Gold and Silver are one of the principal and moſt neceſſary ſupporters of the State; declares the means to make this Kingdom Powerful in that kind: ſhows the revenue of the ſame at preſent, and how it may be improv'd for the Future, in diſcharging the People of three parts in four of the Burthen which overwhelms them at this Time.

IT is an old ſaying, that the *Finances* are the ſinews of a State; and it certainly is the point of *Archimedes* which being firmly ſettled, Inables to move all the World.

A neceſſitous Prince can never undertake a Glorious Action, and neceſſity ingendring Contempt. He can never be reduced to that condition without being expoſed to the Efforts of his Enemys and of thoſe who are Envious of his Grandeur.

Gold and Silver, are the Tyrants of the World, and tho' their Empire is unjuſt in it ſelf, it is ſometimes ſo reaſonable, that we muſt ſuffer the Dominion of it; and ſometimes it is ſo extravagant that it is impoſſible not to deteſt the yoke of it, as altogether Inſupportable.

There muſt be, as I have already obſerv'd it, a proportion between what the Prince draws from his Subjects, and what they can give him, not only without ruining themſelves, but without a notable Inconvenience.

As it is reaſonable not to exceed the Power of thoſe that give, neither can leſs be exacted than what the neceſſity of the State Requires.

None but Pedants, and the real enemys of the State, can ſay, that a Prince ought not to exact any thing from his Subjects, and that his ſole Treaſure ought to lay in the Hearts of thoſe who are ſubmitted under his Dominion.

But at the ſame time, none but Flatterers, and the true Plagues of the State, and of the Court, can Inſinuate to Princes, that they may exact what they pleaſe, and that in that Caſe their Will is the Rule of their Power.

Nothing can be more eaſy than to find plauſible Reaſons, to raiſe Money even when there is no neceſſity for it; neither is any thing leſs difficult than to produce apearent arguments, to Condemn the ſame tho never ſo neceſſary.

Men

Men muſt lay aſide all Paſſions, to be able to Judge, and to decide, what is reaſonable on ſuch occaſions, and there is no ſmall difficulty to find the certain point of a juſt Proportion.

The Expences which are abſolutely neceſſary for the ſubſiſtance of the State, being fix'd, the leſs a Prince can raiſe among the People is the beſt.

In order not to be forc'd to raiſe great ſumms, it is neceſſary to ſpend little, and the beſt way to make moderate expences, is to baniſh all Profuſion, and to Condemn whatever may tend to that end.

France would be too Rich, and the People too abounding, if it did not ſuffer the diſſipation of the public Revenue, which other States ſpend with rule.

They loſe more, in my opinion, than ſome Kingdoms who pretend ſome Equality with us, Commonly ſpend.

A *Venetian* Ambaſſador told me, one day, wittily upon this Subject, ſpeaking of the Wealth of *France*, that in order to make us perfectly happy, he only wiſh'd we knew as well how to ſpend that well, which we diſſipate without reaſon, as the Republic knew how to lay out every *Quatrain*, without waſte, and without overmuch husbandry.

If it were poſſible to regulate the appetite of the *French*, I would think that the beſt way to manage the King's purſe, were to have recourſe to that expedient; but as it is impoſſible to preſcribe bounds to the greedineſs of our Nation, the only way to contain them is to uſe them as Phyſicians do famiſh'd Patients, whom they conſtrain to uſe abſtinence, by keeping all manner of Victuals from them.

To

To that end it is neceſſary to reform the *Finances*, by the ſuppreſſion of the chief means, by which Men get money unlawfully out of the King's Coffers.

Among them all, none are ſo dangerous as that of the * *Comptans*, the abuſe of which is grown to that heigth, that not to remedy it, and to ruin the State is one and the ſame thing.

* Perſons imploy'd to pay private ſervices.

Tho it is uſeful to uſe them on ſome occaſions, and that it ſeems neceſſary in others, nevertheleſs the great inconveniences, and the abuſes which ariſe by it do ſo far ſurpaſs their uſefulneſs, that it is abſolutely neceſſary to aboliſh them.

Whole Millions will be ſav'd by this means, and a thouſand conceal'd profuſions will be redreſs'd, which it is impoſſible to diſcover as long as the ſecret ways of ſpending the public Treaſure will be in uſe.

I am ſenſible that ſome will urge that there are ſome foreign expences, which by their Nature muſt be kept ſecret, and which the State may receive conſiderable advantages by, which it will be depriv'd of whenever thoſe in favour of whom they may be made, will think they can get no more Money out of them.

But ſo many robberys are committed under that Pretence, that I am of opinion upon mature deliberation, that it is better to loſe ſome advantages which may accrue by it, than to be thereby expoſed to all the abuſes which may be daily committed to the ruin of the State.

However not to Obſtruct the means of making ſome ſecret Expences to the advantage of the State, a million of Gold may be allowed for the ſaid private

private expences, on condition that the laying of it out ſhall be ſign'd by the King himſelf, and that thoſe who ſhall have a ſhare in it, ſhall give acquittances for the ſame.

If any one urges that theſe *Comptans* are neceſſary for the remitments which are in uſe, I ſay that it is one of the reaſons, for which it is fit to remove them.

Since Men have liv'd in former ages without the aforeſaid *Comptans*, the ſame may be done again, and if in laying aſide the uſe of them, the uſe of Farming were alſo abrogated, inſtead of doing any harm, it will do a great deal of good.

Some perhaps may wonder, why, ſince I know the uſe of the * *Comptans* to be of ill conſequence, I did not retrench it in my time.

* Perſons imploy'd to pay private ſervices.

The great *Henry* was ſenſible of the evil eſtabliſh'd in his Predeceſſor's time, and could not remove it.

The Troubles, and Inteſtine broils, the foreign Wars, and conſequently the great Expences, and the extraordinary Farms the King has been oblig'd to make and to let out to raiſe Money, have not permitted the thinking on the Execution of ſo good an advice.

The ruining the Huguenot Party, abating the Pride of the Grandees, maintaining a great War againſt Powerful Enemys, in order to ſecure the future Tranquillity of the State by a good Peace, are all means which have been uſed to reach the ends propoſed, ſince that is the way to remove the Cauſes of the Toleration of thoſe abuſes.

The

The Subject of the *Comptains*, having given me an occaſion to ſpeak of the letting out of extraordinary Farms, I cannot forbear ſaying that the great augmentations of the revenue, which may be made that way are ſo far from being advantageous to the State, that on the Contrary they are very prejudicial, and Inpoveriſh it, inſtead of Inriching it.

Perhaps this propoſition may be looked upon at firſt as a Paradox; but it is impoſſible to examin it carefully, without diſcovering the Juſtice and Truth thereof.

The King's Revenue can only be increas'd by the augmentation of the Impoſitions which are laid on all ſorts of Commoditys, and therefore it is evident that increaſing the revenue that way, Expences are increaſed at the ſame time, ſince thoſe things muſt be bought dearer, which were bought cheaper before.

If Meat grows dearer, if the Price of Stufs, and of other things riſes, the Souldiers will not be able to maintain themſelves, and conſequently it will be neceſſary to augment their Pay, and the ſalary of all Workmen will be greater than it was before, which will make the increaſe of the Expence anſwerable to the augmentation of the Revenue and tho it will be a great grievance to the People, the Prince will be but very little the better for it.

Poor Gentlemen whoſe Eſtates conſiſt in Land will not improve their Revenue by ſuch Impoſitions; the Fruits of the Earth, will hardly riſe in Price, at leaſt for their advantage, and if the Times make them dear the leſs of them will be ſold, ſo that at the Year's end, the poor Gentry will find no augmentation in their Revenue, tho a very conſidera-

ble

ble one in their Expences, by reaſon that the new ſubſidys will raiſe the Price of all thoſe things which are neceſſary for the maintenance of their Families, which they will make ſhift to maintain at home, tho' poorly, but they will be no longer able to ſend their Children into the Armies, to ſerve their King and Country, according to the obligation of their Birth.

If it be true, as it is moſt certain, that the ſale of thoſe Commodities which your Subjects deal in, diminiſhes according to the increaſe of Impoſitions, it may happen that ſuch augmentations will leſſen your Majeſties Duties inſtead of increaſing them.

If we conſider ſuch as are imploy'd in the Kingdom, it is certain that when Goods are at a reaſonable price, People buy, and really ſpend more, than when the price of them is exceſſive, for then they retrench even thoſe which are moſt neceſſary.

If on the other hand we conſider thoſe Commodities which are carry'd out of the Kingdom, it is plain that Foreigners who have hitherto been incourag'd to buy them becauſe they were cheap, will provide their ſtores elſewhere, if they can better themſelves, which will leave *France* abounding in the Fruits of the Earth, but unprovided of Money: whereas the Impoſitions being moderate, the great quantity of Fruits which will be Exported by Foreigners, will recompenſe the loſs ſome may fancy by the moderation of Subſidies.

Moreover the increaſe of Impoſitions is capable to reduce a conſiderable number of the King's Subjects to idleneſs, ſince it is certain that the major part of the poor People and Workmen imploy'd in Ma-

Manufactures, will rather be idle and do nothing, than consume their whole life in an ungrateful useless labour, if the unreasonableness of the Subsidies hindering the sale of the Fruits of the Earth, and of their Labour, hinders them at the same time from receiving what they have earn'd by the sweat of their Body.

To resume the thred of my Discourse, after having condemn'd the abuse of the * *Comtans*, and demonstrated that the augmentation of Subsidies, is sometimes not only useless, but often prejudicial;

* Persons imPloy'd to pay Private Services.

I say that there ought to be a Geometrical proportion between the Subsidies and the necessities of the State, that is, that no Impositions ought to be made but such as are absolutely necessary for the subsistance of the Kingdom, in its Grandeur and Glory.

Those last words signifie much, since they show not only that it is lawful to raise that upon the People which is requisite to preserve the Kingdom whatever condition it may be in, but also to raise that which may be necessary to maintain it with Lustre and Reputation.

Nevertheless care must be taken not to extend those last conditions so far, as to think that the Prince's bare Will should be, under that pretence, the Rule of those Impositions, Reason must be the only Rule in those cases; and if the Prince exceeds those bounds, exacting more from his Subjects than he ought to do, tho' even in that case they owe him Obedience, he will be answerable for it before God, who will call him to a strict account for the same.

More-

Moreover Reaſon and Policy, can never allow the increaſing of the Peoples burthen, to receive no benefit by it: thoſe that do it, draw publick Maledictions upon their Heads; which are attended with very ill conſequences, ſince it is certain that the Prince who exacts more than he ſhould do from his Subjects, only exhauſts their Love and Fidelity, which are far more neceſſary towards the Subſiſtance of the State, and the Perſervation of his Perſon, than the Gold and Silver he may hoard in his Coffers.

I am very ſenſible that in a great State it is always neceſſary to have a Fund to ſupply unexpected occaſions; but that Fund muſt be proportion'd to the Riches of the State, and to the quantity of the Coyn'd Gold and Silver which is in the Kingdom; and unleſs it be regulated by that, the Riches of the Prince, would prove his Poverty, ſince his Subjects would no longer have any Fund themſelves, either to keep up Trading, or to pay the lawful Duties they owe their Sovereign.

As a Prince ought to be careful to lay up Money to ſupply the neceſſities of the State, and Religious in preſerving it, when there is no neceſſity to lay it out, he muſt be liberal in imploying it when Publick good requires it, and in doing it in due time; for delays in ſuch caſes are often dangerous to the State, and time thus loſt, is never to be retriev'd.

We have examples of Princes who to preſerve their Money, have loſt both it and their States together, and it is moſt certain that thoſe who lay out their Money with regret, commonly ſpend more than others, becauſe they do it too late: It requires a great deal of Judgment to know the moſt important hours and moments, and ſome may be capa-

ble

ble to lay up, who not knowing how to lay out, may occasion unutterable misfortunes.

But whereas general Maxims are always useless, unless a proper application be made of them; there now remains to see,

What the revenue of this Kingdom may amount to.

What the Expence of it may be.

What Fund is necessary to be kept in the Coffers; and to what degree the People may be eas'd.

The Revenue of this Kingdom may be consider'd in two respects.

Either as it may be in time of Peace, without altering the advance of Money which is drawn at present out of the general Receipts and Farms, making no other augmentation save that which may be made in reducing the old Rents which will be preserv'd, to six *per Cent*, as well as the Salary of certain Officers, who will rather suffer the Diminution of the same, than the Suppression of their Places with reimbursements.

Or, as it may be, in making certain alterations, thought so reasonable, and so useful, by those in whose Hands I have seen the Management of the *Finances*, that in their opinion no other opposition is to be fear'd but that of Novelty.

* By the first Seulement, the Exchequer may expect to receive 35 Millions of Livers yearly, according to the following acount.

* Rents created upon the City, at 8 *per Cent.* Salt, one Million 23 1411 Livers. Aids 85 1000 Livers.

General Receipts 4741 84 Livers.

All these Rents have been constituted from the year 1551. until 1558.

No Rents have been created in the Reign of *Henry* the 4th nor even in that of *Henry* the 5th. There are 22 Generalities, in every Office 24 Officers, which are in all 552. every one of which having 1000 Crowns Salary, the third part thereof amounts to 55200 Livers.

By the *Taille*, 17 Millions 350000 Livers.

By all the *Gabelles*, 5 Millions 250000 Livers.

By the Aids, one Million 400000 Livers.

By the Reduction of Rents to 6 *per Cent*, one Million.

By the Reduction of the Treasurers of *France* to two thirds of their Salary, which they will willingly consent to, provided they are freed from the new Taxes they are daily plagu'd with, 552000 Livers.

Des Parties Casuelles, which is the Income the King receives by the Sale of Offices, and the Annual Duty paid him out of the same, two Millions.

By the Farm of *Bourdeaux*, 800000 Livers.

By 3 Livers *per Muid* of Wine for the entrance into *Paris*, 700000 Livers.

By the ancient 30 Pence and the new addition of ten more for entrance upon every *Muid* of Wine brought into *Paris*, 503000 Livers.

By the Farm of 45 Pence instead of the Tolls, 503000 Livers.

By the 9 Livers 18 Pence *per* Tun of *Picrady*, 154000 Livers.

By the Farm of *Brouage*, 250000 Livers.

By the Exportation of Goods from *Languedoc*, Spices and Drugs from *Marseilles*, and two *per Cent* from *Arles*, 380000 Livers.

By the third additional Tax of *Lyons*, 60000 Livers.

By the five great Farms, two Millions 400000 Livers.

By the new Impositions of *Normandy*, 240000 Livers.

By those of the River *Loire* 225000 Livers.

By the Farm of *Iron*, 80000 Livers.

By

By the Sales of common Woods, 550000 Livers.

By the Demeans, 550000 Livers.

By the ſecond Settlement, diſcharging the Peo-ple abſolutely of the 17 Millions of Livers, which the King receives at preſent by the *Tailes*, the Receipt may amount to 50 Millions, as the following account will clearly juſtifie.

By an Impoſition to be put upon Salt, or upon the Fens, in all the Provinces of the Kingdom, the King may receive all Charges being paid 20 Millions.

By a Penny *per* Liver upon all the Merchandiſe and Commodities of the Kingdom, 12 Millions.

By the Aids, one Million 400000 Livers.

By the Reduction of the price of the Rents conſtituted on the * *Hoſtel de Ville*, ſix Millions.

* Like *Guild-Hall.*

By the Reduction of the Treaſurers of *France* 550 thouſand Livers.

By the Income the King receives by the Sale of Offices and the Annual Duty paid him for the ſame, two Millions.

By the Farm of *Bourdeaux*, 1800000 Livers.

By the three Livers *per Muid* of Wine entrance into *Paris*, by a new Impoſition, 700000 Livers.

By the ancient 30 Pence, and the new addition of ten more for the entrance of every *Muid* of Wine into *Paris*, 580000 Livers.

By the Farm of 45 Pence inſtead of the Tolls and Grants, 530000 Livers.

By the 9 Livers 18 Pence *per* Tun of *Piccardy*, 174000 Livers.

By the Farm of *Brouage*, 254000 Livers.

By the Exportation of Goods from *Languedoc*, Spices and Drugs from *Marſeilles*, two *per Cent* from *Paris*, 380000 Livers.

By the additional Tax of *Lyons*, 60000 Livers.

By the five great Farms, two Millions 400000 Livers.

By the new Impoſitions of *Normandy*, 250000 Livers.

By thoſe of the River *Loire*, 225000 Livers.

By the Farm of Iron, 80000 Livers.

By the Sale of common Woods, 550000 Livers.

By the Demeans, 550000 Livers.

Summ Total, 50 Millions 483000 Livers.

I am very certain that this Settlement being well underſtood, will be found juſt and reaſonable by all thoſe who have any Experience and Capacity in the direction of States.

Among the ſeveral ſuper-intendants of the *Finances* in my time, I have known ſome of the moſt learn'd in what relates to the Treaſury, who equal'd the bare Impoſition upon Salt, or upon the Fens, to the King of *Spain*'s *Indies*, and who preſerv'd that ſecret as the true foundation of the eaſe of the People, of the Reformation, and of the Wealth of the State.

And indeed let Men be never ſo dull, they muſt needs be ſenſible that it is impoſſible to expreſs the diſcharge, and ſatisfaction the People would receive, if they were allow'd to uſe Salt as they do Wheat, every one buying no more than he thought fit, and could imploy.

It is certain that the ſuppreſſion which would be made of the great number of Officers, which are eſtabliſhed for the Impoſition of the Salt, and the deliverance of the Diſputes and Law-Suits they often commence to diſcharge their Truſt; and ſometimes

out

out of Malice, to conſtrain the People to take the Salt that is impos'd upon them, would be a wonderful eaſe to them.

It is moreover certain, that one might eaſily recompence the Provinces, which hitherto have injoy'd the Exemption of Salt, by ſuch a diſcharge of *Tailles*, that if for the future they were oblig'd to buy it dearer than they have done heretofore, the Diminution of the *Taille* would be equivalent to the augmentation of the price of the Salt, to which they would be liable, tho' they ſhould buy it freely.

It is alſo certain, that tho' it may be ſaid, that the Diminutions of the *Tailles* only relate to the People, and that the augmentation of the price of Salt, which has hitherto been ſold in the Provinces without any Impoſition, would concern the Clergy, the Nobility, and thoſe who are free. All of them would receive the benefit of the Diminution of the *Tailles*, by reaſon that the Revenue of the *Tailles* being taken off, the Revenue of Eſtates would increaſe according as the Farmers who rent them were diſcharg'd of the Impoſitions which are laid on the Eſtates, they Farm.

Finally, It is certain, that notwithſtanding the difficulties of ſuch an Eſtabliſhment, might prove great, yet they might be overcome.

If after having conſider'd this Eſtabliſhment of the Salt, we examine that of the Penny *per* Liver, it will be found the more juſt, in that it is eſtabliſhed in many Countries, and that it has already been reſolv'd upon twice, by the Body of the State, under the Great King *Francis*, and in the Aſſembly of the Notables at *Roan*, under the Great *Henry* of Eternal Memory.

Nevertheleſs whereas Suſpicions are ſo natural in the People, and in communities, that they commonly place their principal ſafety in their diffidence, which ever induces them to fear that what is moſt uſeful for them, will prove diſadvantagious, and that great alterations are for the moſt part liable to dangerous Revolutions. Inſtead of adviſing ſuch an eſtabliſhment, I preſume to adviſe the contrary, and the more boldly, becauſe ſuch Novelties muſt never be attempted, unleſs they are abſolutely neceſſary.

Now *France* is ſo far from being under ſuch circumſtances, that on the contrary I am of opinion that it will be much eaſier to eaſe the People, and to inrich the State, without having recourſe to ſuch expedients, than in putting them in practice; ſeeing that tho' there is no difficulty in it but what may be overcome; yet undoubtedly much greater would be met with, in having recourſe to ſuch alterations.

In order to verifie this propoſition, it will be ſufficient to examine the Expences one may make a ſhift with in time of Peace, and to ſee what improvement may be made with the Money the times will allow to lay up.

The Safety and Grandeur of the Kingdom will allow no diminution of the expences of War, above mentioned, which will amount near unto twelve Millions.

The Charge of the uſual Gariſons, which amounts yearly to three Millions, might be ſuppreſs'd, both becauſe the major part of the Forces which will then be maintain'd by the State will be quarter'd in the ſaid Gariſons, and by reaſon that the beſt part of the ſaid three Millions are only

taken

taken out of the King's Purſe, to inrich the Governour's, who commonly keep but ten Men, when they ſhould have a hundred.

But whereas it is difficult, not to have ſome Privileg'd places of ſuch conſequence, that it would be impoſſible to refuſe the Governors of the ſame, ſome particular Gariſons, to enable them the better to anſwer for them, as being of their own choice; In my opinion it will be proper to retrench two thirds of the ſaid Expence, to reduce it to one Million.

The Expence of the Weſtern and Eaſtern Sea, cannot be leſs than of two Millions 500000 Livers, as it appears by the particular Settlements of the ſame.

That of the Artillery will amount to 600000 Livers.

That of the King's, the Queen's, and *Monſieur*'s Houſholds, to three Millions 500000 Livers.

The Penſions paid to the *Switzers*, which cannot be retrench'd in honour, amounts to 400000 Livers.

The Buildings will coſt 300000 Livers.

Ambaſſadors 250000 Livers.

The Fortifications 600000 Livers.

All the Penſions might abſolutely be retrench'd, which coſt the King four Millions; but as it is impoſſible to paſs from one extream to another without a medium, and that the Court of *France* is not us'd to reſiſt importunities, tho' never ſo unjuſt; I am of opinion that it will be ſufficient to retrench one half of them. Which is the more neceſſary, in that it is advantagious for the Publick, that the Idleneſs of Courtiers may meet with no reward, and

that they may be all annexed to the Perils of the War, and thus Pensions and Salaries will only amount to two Millions for the future.

The King's Gentlemen in Ordinary, 50000 Livers.

Warrants for the payment of certain summs 400000 Livers.

Casual Accounts, and the King's Progresses, two Millions.

Arrears of Duties, 150000 Livers.

The King's Privy Purse, 300000 Livers.

All these Expences amount only to 25 Millions, which being deducted out of 35 to which the Receipt amounts; there will remain ten, which for the first year shall be imploy'd towards the diminution of the *Tailles*.

The true way to inrich the State, is to ease the People, and to discharge both of their Burthens: In lessening the Charges of the State, the *Tailles* may be diminish'd, and no otherwise; and therefore it is the chief end which ought to be propos'd in the Regulation of this Kingdom.

* In order to take true measures in an Affair of that consequence, it is necessary to know that tho' all the Levies which are made in this Kingdom amount to near 80 Millions, upwards of 45 of the same are imploy'd in Charges, which may be so well husbanded, that whereas we may say at present, that the said Charges prove the King's

* Of 44 Millions to which all the different sorts of Levys, which are rais'd upon the People by virtue of the Brief of the *Tailles* amount, there are 26 Millions imployed towards the payment of the Charges settled upon the *Taille*, which consist in Rents, or in Salaries and Taxation of Offices, or in Rights which have been engag'd to them.

* Tho' the Farm of the *Aides* produces yearly 4 Millions, there is but 400000 Livers return'd out of it into

King's Ruine: I dare affirm that the King will be eas'd and inrich'd by the means thereof.

the Exchequet. The Rents, Salaries, Taxations, and Rights ingag'd upon the ſaid *Aids*, conſume all the reſt, which is upwards of three Millions and a half.

Notwithſtanding all the *Gabelles* produce near 19 Millions, there is only five Millions 500000 and odd Livers of the ſame return'd into the Exchequer, becauſe the remaindor which amounts to near 13 Millions is imploy'd towards the payment of the Rents created upon the ſaid *Gabelles*, or towards the Salaries, Taxations and Duties of the Officers of the Magazins of Salt, or towards the Salaries of the Parliament of *Paris*, Chamber of Accounts, Court of *Aids*, Grand Council or the King's Secretaries.

Although all the other Farms of the State produce twelve Millions, the King receives but ten of them, becauſe upwards of two Millions muſt be deducted out of the ſame which are ſettled for the payment of ſome Rents, Salary of Officers, Taxations and alienated Duties.

Many without doubt will be of opinion, that it would be fit to eaſe the State of all that burthen, but as it is impoſſible to make a great Body ſubſiſt without divers Expences abſolutely neceſſary for its maintenance. As the weight of all theſe Charges together cannot be born by the State, ſo the intire ſuppreſſion of the ſame cannot be deſir'd with reaſon.

Three means may be propos'd for the diminution of the ſaid Charges.

The firſt is grounded on the over long injoyment which private perſons have had of the King's Money, upon the Fund they have diſburs'd to acquire the Rents, Offices, and Rights they enjoy.

I am ſenſible that it would be eaſie to diſpoſſeſs ſome of the ſaid perſons of the Rents and Duties they receive, by making a true ſupputation of the Summs they have receiv'd, in which beſides the Intereſt allow'd by the Laws, it would be eaſie to find the reimburſement of the price at firſt laid down by them for the ſame.

But

But tho' the Juſtice of the ſaid expedient were allow'd of, Reaſon wouldnot permit the making uſe of it, ſince that in ſo doing, it would be impoſſible for the future to find out Money to ſupply the neceſſities of the State, whatever ſecurities were offer'd.

Therefore it is neceſſary to obſerve that a thing may not be unjuſt, and yet contrary to Reaſon, and ſound Policy, and to take care never to have recourſe to any expedient, which without violating Reaſon, would nevertheleſs violate publick Faith.

If any urges that the publick muſt be prefer'd to private Intereſt, allowing his propoſition, I deſire him to conſider that in the diſcuſſion of this point, thoſe different kinds of Intereſts are not in the leaſt concern'd, but that thoſe of the publick, are counter-pois'd by others of the ſame nature, and that as the future has a far greater Latitude than the preſent, which paſſes in an inſtant, thoſe Intereſts which relate to the time to come, muſt be reſpected before thoſe of the preſent, contrary to the cuſtom of ſenſual Men, who prefer what is at the leaſt diſtance from them, becauſe the ſight of their Reaſon has no greater extent than that of their Senſes.

If we conſider publick Faith in this point, as I think it abſolutely neceſſary, the State will be far more eas'd by it than it would be, tho' part of its Charges ſhould be ſuppreſs'd without making any new Lives, in that it will remain Maſter of the Purſes of its Members on all occaſions, and yet will conſiderably increaſe its revenue.

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The ſecond means to diminiſh the Charges of the Kingdom conſiſts in the reimburſement of the Money which was actually paid by private perſons; but the verification of it would prove difficult, ſince that in order to facilitate the Sale of what the neceſſity of the State has oblig'd to alienate that has often been given at four years purchaſe which appears to be ingag'd at ſix.

This medium tho juſt in it ſelf, is not practicable without giving a pretence to many complaints, tho' ill grounded.

The third means for the Diminution of the Charges of the State, conſiſts in reimburſing thoſe that are not neceſſary, at the ſame price at which they are ſold among private perſons: Reimburſing the Owners of the Offices of the Rents and of the Duties which will be thought neceſſary to be ſuppreſs'd in this manner, they will receive no prejudice, and the King will not make uſe of the common advantage he has with private perſons, who have the liberty to free themſelves of the ſaid Debts, when they are able to pay them at the rate they are commonly ſold at.

This medium which is the only one that can be us'd, may produce its effect divers ways, either in many years time, by the bare management of the injoyment of the ſaid Charges, or in one only, by an immenſe ſum of Money which muſt be had ready by the ſupply of an extraordinary Fund.

The natural Impatience of our Nation, not allowing us to hope, that we will be able to perſevere 15 or 20 years in the ſame reſolution: The firſt way which requires ſo much time, is nowiſe receivable.

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The great Fund which is neceſſary to reimburſe all at once ſuch immenſe Charges as thoſe of the State, would make this ſecond propoſition as ridiculous as impoſſible, and ſo the third only remains practicable.

In order to make uſe of it, with ſo much Juſtice, that no body may have cauſe to complain, it is neceſſary to conſider the charges which it will be neceſſary to ſuppreſs in three different manners, according to the divers rates at which they are ſold.

* The firſt Rents conſtituted upon the *Taille* which are commonly ſold at five years purchace, ought only to be conſider'd and reimburs'd at that rate, according to which their Injoyment of the ſame makes the Reimburſement of them in ſeven years and a half.

* The Major part of the Rents conſtituted upon the *Taille* ſince 1612 are ſtill in the hands of the Grand-Farmers, of their Heirs, or of thoſe to whom they have made them over, and they have purchas'd them at ſo low a Rate, that they dayly expect the retrenchment of them, which would be a far greater greivance to them than the Reimburſement of the ſame, at the common Price.

The new Rents eſtabliſhed upon the *Aids*, are only ſold at ſeven years Purchaſe, and they amount to two Millions.

The new Rents upon the *Gabelles* are ſold at ſeven years and a half Purchaſe, and they amount to five millions 260 thouſand Livers.

The other Rents conſtituted upon the *Taille* ſince the late King's Death, which are paid either in the Elections, or in the General Receipts, muſt be reimburſed at the rate of ſix years purchace, which they are ſold at, the Injoyment of which will only reimburſe them in eight years and a half.

The

The Offices of Elections with ſalaries, Taxations of Offices and other Rights which they injoy muſt be reimburſed at the rate of eight years Purchace, which is the common Price of ſuch Places.

Reaſon requires the taking of the ſame method for the Reimburſement of the charges conſtituted upon the *Aids*, upon all the *Gabelles*, upon the five great Farms, upon the Foreign Farm of *Languedoc* and of *Provence*, upon the Cuſtoms of *Lyons*, upon the Convoy of *Bourdeaux*, the Cuſtom of *Bayone*, the Farm of *Bronage*, and ſuch Reimburſements can only be made by the bare Injoyment in eleven years time.

I am ſenſible that Rents of that kind are daily ſold for leſs than eight years Purchace; but I propoſe the Reimburſement of them at this Rate, for the ſatisfaction of the partys concern'd, being ſenſible that if in an affair of that importance, there muſt be a loſs, it is better it ſhould fall upon the King than upon them.

The Rate of all the Reimburſements which can be made, being juſtly eſtabliſh'd; it is neceſſary to conſider that there are ſome Charges ſo neceſſary in this Kingdom, or ingaged at ſo high a Rate, that I do not place them among thoſe of which the Reimburſement is to be thought on, by the way I am propoſing.

Theſe are the ſalarys of the Parliaments and other ſovereign Courts, of the Preſidials and royal Courts, of the King's Secretarys, of the Treaſurers of *France* and receivers General

Not

Not that I think that no ſuppreſſion ought to be made in thoſe kind of Offices; that's far from my thoughts: But to proceed with order towards the diminution of the Charges of the Kingdom, Reaſon requires that one ſhould begin by the Reimburſement of thoſe which are ſold at lower rates, and which are inconvenient to the Public.

For that reaſon, I prefer the ſuppreſſion of the Rents eſtabliſh'd upon the *Tailles*, and that of many Places of aſſeſſors, to all others.

That of thoſe ſorts of Rents, by reaſon of the lowneſs of their Price, and that of the aſſeſſors, becauſe thoſe offices are the true ſource of the People's Miſery, both upon the account of their Number which is ſo Exceſſive, that it amounts to upwards of four Millions in Exemptions, as alſo of their Maleadminiſtrations which are ſo Common, that there is hardly any one Aſſeſſor who do's not diſcharge his own Pariſh; that many draw conſiderably out of thoſe they have nothing to do with, and that ſome of them are ſuch abandon'd wretches, that they are not affraid of loading themſelves with crimes, by adding Impoſſitions on the People, which they convert to their own uſe.

That very conſideration is the only one which hinders me at preſent from ſpeaking of the ſuppreſſions of many Offices of judicature, the Multitude of which is uſeleſs their Price being as extraordinary as their ſalarys are Inconſiderable, it would be an ill piece of husbandry to meddle with them, upon the account of the preſent neceſſity. When it will be thought fit to leſſen the Number of them, the beſt way in order thereunto will be to make ſo good

a Regulation of the * *Paullette*, that the ſaid Offices being reduc'd to a moderate Price, the King may be able when they become vacant, to Reimburſe them to the owners, and ſuppreſs them at once,

* The Annual Duty the ſaid Officers pay to the King.

Neither do I as yet include in the number of the ſuppreſſions, the Colleges of the King's Secretarys, the Offices of the Treaſurers of *France*, and the Receivers General, not upon the account of the ſmalneſs of their Profit, which is pretty conſiderable, but upon the account of the ſumms they have paid for the ſame which are not ſmall.

Neither do I put in the old Rents which have been created in the time of your Majeſty's Predeceſſors which are paid in the Office of the City of *Paris*, both by reaſon that the actual ſumms diſburs'd by the Purchacers, are greater than that of all the reſt, and becauſe it is fit that the intereſt of Subjects ſhould in ſome manner be mix'd with thoſe of their Soveraigns, as alſo becauſe they are devolv'd to ſeveral Religious Houſes, Hoſpitals, and Communitys, towards the maintenance of which they are neceſſary; and that having been often divided in Familys, they ſeem to be ſettled there in ſuch a manner that it would be difficult to remove them without diſturbing their ſettlements.

Nevertheleſs in order not to omitt any husbandry that may be made with reaſon, to the advantage of the State, I muſt obſerve two things in this place.

The firſt is that the Office of the Treaſurers of *France* remaining, a third part of their Salarys may be retrench'd, ſince they will think themſelves very

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favourably uſed in the general Reformation of the Kingdom, if in ſecuring them againſt all new Taxes their Salary is redu'd to two thirds of what they have enjoy'd hitherto, and had by their firſt Creation.

The ſecond is that in not ſuppreſſing the Rents eſtabliſh'd upon the Town Houſe, in the late King's time, which are all Created at the rate of eight per Cent, which will be the more reaſonable in that as no private Perſons do allow above ſix, the owners of the ſaid Rents ſettled upon the Town-Houſe, will by your Majeſty's favour get two per Cent more, in the injoyment of thoſe of this Nature.

And as they will find an advantage by this, the King will do the ſame by reaſon that the Rents charg'd upon the State, will be more coveted than thoſe of private Perſons, ſuppoſing they be paid exactly without any deduction, as in reaſon they ought to be.

In order to pay the ſaid Rents as well as the Salary of divers Officers either abſolutely neceſſary or at leaſt which cannot be ſuppreſſed in theſe Times, I am of opinion that it will be fit to ſuppreſs thirty Millions out of the fourty five this Kingdom is at preſent charged with, leaving the reſt to acquit the remaining charges.

* Out of the thirty Millions which are to be ſuppreſs'd, there are near ſeven, the Reimburſtment of which being only to be made at the rate of five years Purchace, the ſuppreſſion of the ſame will be perform'd in ſeven years and a half's time, by the bare Injoyment of the ſame.

* The Rents of which the Courant price is ſeven years purchace, will amount juſtly to ſix Millions 812 thouſand Livers, *Viz.* ſix Millions which have been ſettled out of the

As

eight allienated Millions upon the *Tailles* in the month of *February* 1634. 415 thouſand Livers ſettled by *Le Sr. Gaillard* and his Partners in the month of *January* 1634. And 112 thouſand Livers ſettled by an Edict of the month of *March* of the ſaid year, by the Creditors of *Moyſſel* and *Payen*.

As many will be found, out of the remaining twenty four, which being to be reimburs'd at the rate of ſix years Purchace, which is the Currant price of them, will be ſuppreſs'd in eight years and a half's time, by the bare injoyment.

But whereas, as aboveſaid, long Winded deſigns are not the ſafeſt in this Kingdom, and that upon that account it is neceſſary to reduce all the ſuppreſſions which are fit to be made to a number of years not exceeding the compaſs of our Patience; in order to accompliſh the Reimburſments which will be undertaken at the ſame time in which the Rents which are ſold at five years purchace will be ſuppreſs'd by the very income of the ſame, an extraordinary Fund muſt be rais'd to the Value of a ſixth part of the currant price of the Rents, which amounts exactly to ſeven Millions once paid, for the ſuppreſſion of as much revenue.

To accompliſh the ſuppreſſion of the thirty Millions propos'd, there ſtill remains 16 to be reimburs'd, which muſt be done at the rate of eight years purchace, becauſe it is the common price of them.

And whereas the reimburſement of thoſe ſixteen Millions, cannot be perform'd under twelve years time by the bare enjoyment of the ſame, and that it is neceſſary to ſhorten that time, to reduce the ſaid ſuppreſſion to the term of ſeven years, as well as that of the fourteen preceeding Millions, out of

eight parts three muſt be ſupply'd by extraordinary Funds, amounting to 43 Millions.

Tho' the greatneſs of the ſaid ſumm may ſurprize at firſt; thoſe who are acquainted with the facility of Affairs of that nature in this Kingdom, will not queſtion the feaſibleneſs of the ſame, conſidering that it is only to be paid in ſeven years time.

* Farming part of the Revenue.

And Peace will be no ſooner ſettled, but the practice of * *Parties*, which is uſual at this time to find out Money, being aboliſh'd, thoſe who are bred in thoſe ſort of Affairs, not being able to alter their former way of living all of a ſudden, will willingly convert all their Induſtry, to deſtroy what they have rais'd, by the ſame means they did uſe to eſtabliſh it at firſt; That is, to extinguiſh and ſuppreſs by virtue of the Bargains they will make to that effect, the Rents, Rights and Offices, the creation of which they have promoted by virtue of other Bargains.

Thus the Kingdom may be eas'd in ſeven years time, of thirty Millions of common Charges which it bears at preſent.

The People being actually diſcharg'd of the 22 Millions of *Taille*, which is one half of what they bear at preſent; The Revenue of the Kingdom will be found to amount to 57 Millions, as the following Settlement will juſtifie.

RECEIPT

Of the *Tailles*, 22 Millions.
Of the Aids, 4 Millions.
Of all the *Gabelles*, 19 Millions.

Of

Of all the other Farms 12 Millions.

Total, 57 Millions.

Out of which deducting 17 Millions, which will be yearly put into the Exchequer, the ſaid ſumm muſt be look'd upon to be ſo conſiderable, that there is no State in Chriſtendom which lays up half ſo much, all the Charges of it being deducted before.

If next to theſe ſuppreſſions, which will make many perſons liable to the *Tailles*, without their having any reaſon to complain of it, all Offices are ſuppreſſed which are officiated by Inrollment or by bare Commiſſions; if the number of Notaries be regulated, not only ſuch as are Royal, but thoſe of common Juriſdictions, it will eaſe the People conſiderably, both in that they will thereby be deliver'd of ſo many leeches, and that as there are upwards of 100000 Officers of this kind to be turn'd out, thoſe who will find themſelves deprived of their uſual imployments, will be conſtrain'd to follow the Wars, to ingage into Trade, or to turn Labourers.

If in the next place all Exemptions are reduc'd to the Nobility, and to the Officers in ordinary of the King's Houſhold, it is moſt certain that the Cities, and Communities which are exempted, the Soveraign Courts, the Offices of the Treaſurers of *France*, the Elections, the Salt Magazines, the Offices of Waters and of Foreſts, of the Demain, and of the Tithes, the Intendants and Receivers of Pariſhes, which compoſe a Body of upwards of 100000 exempted perſons, will diſcharge the People of more than one half of their *Tailles*; it being alſo certain, that the Richeſt, which are liable to the greateſt Taxes, are thoſe who gee exemptions by dint of Money.

I am ſenſible that it will be urg'd, that it is eaſie to make ſuch Projects, like unto thoſe of *Plato's* Commonwealth, which tho' fine in his *Ideas*, is a real Chimera.

But I dare affirm, that this deſign is not only ſo reaſonable, but ſo eaſie to execute, that if God pleaſes to grant your Majeſty a ſpeedy Peace, and to preſerve you for this Kingdom with your Servants, of which I eſteem my ſelf one of the meaneſt, inſtead of leaving this Advice by Teſtament, I hope to accompliſh it my ſelf.

SECTION. VIII.

Which ſhews in few words, that the utmoſt point of the Power of Princes muſt conſiſt in the Poſſeſſion of their Subjects Hearts.

THe *Finances* being manag'd as above written, the People will be abſolutely eas'd, and the King will be Powerful by the Poſſeſſion of his Subjects Hearts, who conſidering his care of their Eſtates, will be inclin'd to love him out of Intereſt.

* *Philip de Valois.*

* Formerly the Kings thought themſelves ſo happy in the Poſſeſſion of their Subjects Hearts, that ſome were of opinion that it was better by this means to be King of the *French* than of *France*.

And indeed this Nation had formerly ſuch a Paſſion for their Princes, that ſome Authors praiſe them,

* them, for being always ready to ſpill their Blood, and to ſpend their Eſtates for the Service and Glory of the State.

* *Ammian Marcellin Lib.* 16 and 17.

* Under the Kings of the firſt, ſecond, and third Race, until *Philip le Bell*, the Treaſure of Hearts was the only publick Wealth that was preſerv'd in this Kingdom.

* That Policy was grounded upon the ſaying of a great Prince, who tho' depriv'd of the Light which conſiſts in Faith, nevertheleſs was ſo clear ſighted by Reaſon, that he thought he could never want Money in his neceſſities, ſince he was belov'd by his People, who had enough for him.
Cyrus and *Xenophon*, Book the 5th of his Inſtitution.

I am ſenſible that former times have no relation nor proportion to the preſent; that what was good in one Age, is often not permitted in another. But tho' it is certain that the Treaſure of Hearts cannot ſuffice at preſent, it is alſo very certain that the Treaſure of Gold and Silver is almoſt uſeleſs without the firſt: both are neceſſary, and whoever ſhall want either of them, will be neceſſitous in Wealth.

CHAP. X.

Which concludes this Work, in ſhowing that whatever is contain'd in it will prove ineffectual, unleſs the Princes and their Miniſters are ſo mindful of the Government of the State, as to omitt nothing which their Truſt obliges them to, and not to abuſe their Power.

IN order to conclude this Work happily, I am now to repreſent to your Majeſty that

Kings being oblig'd to do many things more as Soveraigns, than as private Men, they can never ſwerve ſo little from their Duty, without committing more faults of omiſſion, than a private perſon can do of commiſſion.

It is the ſame with thoſe upon whom Soveraigns diſcharge themſelves of part of the burthen of their Empire, ſince that Honour makes them liable to the ſame obligations which lie on Soveraigns.

Both of them being conſider'd as private perſons, are liable to the ſame faults as other Men; but if we regard the Conduct of the publick which they are intruſted with, they will be found liable to many more, ſince in that ſence they cannot omit without ſin, any thing they are oblig'd to by their Miniſtry.

In that conſideration, a Man may be good and virtuous, as a private perſon, and yet an ill Magiſtrate, and an ill Soveraign, by his want of care to diſcharge the obligation of his Truſt.

In a word, unleſs Princes uſe their utmoſt endeavours to regulate the divers orders of their State.

If they are negligent in their choice of a good Council; if they deſpiſe their wholſom Advice.

Unleſs they take a particular care to become ſuch, that their Example may prove a ſpeaking voice.

If they are negligent in eſtabliſhing the reign of God, that of Reaſon, and that of Juſtice together.

If they fail to protect Innocence, to recompence ſignal Services to the Publick, and to puniſh diſobedience and the Crimes which trouble the order of the Diſcipline and Safety of States.

Unleſs they apply themſelves to foreſee and to prevent the evils that may happen, and to divert

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by careful Negotiations, the Storms, which Clouds easily drive before them, from a greater distance than is thought.

If Favour hinders them from making a good choice of those they honour with great Imployments, and with the principal Offices of the Kingdom.

Unless they are very careful to settle the State in the Power it ought to have.

If on all occasions they do not preferr Publick Interest to Private Advantages, tho' otherwise never so good livers, they will be found more guilty than those who actually transgress the Commands and Laws of God; it being certain, that to omit what we are oblig'd to do, and to commit what we ought not to do, is the same thing.

I must moreover represent to your Majesty, that if Princes, and those who are imploy'd under them in the first Dignities of the Kingdom, have great advantages over private Men, they injoy that benefit upon hard conditions, since they are not only liable by omission to the faults I have already observ'd, but also that there are many others of commission, which are peculiar to them.

If they make use of their Power to commit any injustice or violence, which they cannot do as private persons, they are guilty of a sin of Prince or Magistrate by commission, which their sole Authority is the source of, and for which the King of Kings will call them to a very strict account on the day of Judgment.

Those two different kind of faults peculiar to Princes and to Magistrates, must needs make them sensible that they are of a far greater weight than those of private persons, by reason that as universal

Cauſes, they influence their diſorders to all thoſe who being ſubmitted to them, receive the impreſſion of their movements.

Many would be ſav'd as private perſons, who damn themſelves as publick perſons.

One of the greateſt of our Neigbouring Kings, being ſenſible of this Truth at his Death, cry'd out that he did not ſtand in ſo much dread of the ſins of *Philip*, as he was apprehenſive of the King's.

His thought was truly Pious, but it would have been much better for himſelf and for his Subjects to have had it before his Eyes in the heighth of his Grandeur, and of his Adminiſtration, than when in diſcovering the importance of it, he could no longer make that uſe of it which was neceſſary for his Conduct, tho' he might for his Salvation.

I humbly crave your Majeſty would be pleas'd to reflect this very moment on that which that great Prince perhaps only thought on a few hours before his death; and to invite you to it by Example, as much as by Reaſon, I promiſe you that I will ſpend no day of my life without endeavouring to introduce that into my Mind, which ought to be there at the hour of my Death, in what relates to thoſe Publick Affairs which you are pleas'd to intruſt me with.

THE END.

Hiſtorical Obſervations.

ON THE

Political Teſtament,

OF

Cardinal de Richelieu.

Book 1. Chap 1. Page. 42. *of the Firſt, and* Page. 50 *of the Second and Third Editions, publiſh'd at* Amſterdam *by* Henry Desbordes *in the Year* 1688.

Upon Theſe Words:

THE *Removal of the Duke* de la Valette *tho' Voluntary and not forc'd, giving me an occaſion to put him in this Claſſis; I cannot omit ſaying, That not long before he did ſolicit* Monſieur *your Brother and the Count de* Soiſſons *to turn your Forces, of which they had the Command at that time, againſt your Perſon: Your Majeſty had honour'd him with the Title of Duke and Peer; to which I muſt alſo add that in order to Ingage him the more in your ſervice, you had thought fit to Unite him to thoſe who were altogether inſeparable from it; and that in Conſideration of my Allyance, you had granted him the Surviviorſhip of the Government of* Guyenne, *and were pleaſed to add* 30000 *Livers Income to his place of Colonel of the Infantry. I may ſay moreover,*

over, that the Pardon your Majeſty did grant him for a Crime ſo baſe, and ſo ſhameful, averr'd by the mouth of two Princes whoſe Teſtimony was undeniable on that occaſion, did not hinder his Weakneſs and jealouſy againſt the Prince of Conde *and the Arch Biſhop of* Bourdeaux, *or his deſign to croſs the proſperity of your Affairs, from making him loſe a great deal of honour, in loſing the occaſion of taking* Fontarabie, *when the Enemys could no longer defend it.*

Obſervation.

THE Wiſeſt Miniſters have much ado to defend themſelves againſt Pride. In this place the Cardinal ſpeaks to the King his Benefactor and Maſter. The Duke *de la Valette* he ſpeaks of, had the honor in his firſt Marriage to Wedd *Gabrielle de Bourbon*, the King's Siſter, who upon that account always call'd him Brother, either in ſpeaking or writing to him. The Cardinal nevertheleſs thinks he do's much for him, and that he will ingage him to be eternaly Faithful, tho he had never been ſo before, by giving him Madamoiſelle *de Pont Chateau* his Couſin.

* Daughter to *Henry* the 4 by the Dutches *de Verneuil.*

But the Actions of great Men muſt not be examin'd with Rigor. Neither would we reflect upon this thing, were it not to redreſs ſome eſſential Circumſtances of the Hiſtory which we know *ab Origine.*

In order thereunto we muſt go back a Little, ſince it is Impoſſible to give a true account of the Duke *de la Valette*'s Voluntary Removal, of his Innocence

cence, or of his Guilt, without explaining the then ſtate of his Family, either in relation to the King, or to the Miniſter. This relation which perhaps will prove ſome what long, and will ſeem ſometimes to deviate from the ſubject, will nevertheleſs always return to it, and if I am not miſtaken will have ſome curious and remarkable paſſages.

John Lewis de la Valette, whom we commonly call the old Duke *d' Espernon*, who was the firſt of that Name, Father to the Duke *de la Valette*, I am to ſpeak of, was naturaly very haughty and Imperious: a great and dazling Fortune made in a ſhort ſpace of time, had not leſen'd his Courage. The unbounded favour of *Henry* the 3. had heap'd Honors, Dignitys, Governments, and great places upon him. The ſaid Prince ſometimes boaſted that he would make him ſo great that it would not be in his Power to deſtroy him.

It is very well known that in giving him the Government of the three Biſhopricks, *Metz*, *Toul*, and *Verdun*, he offered him the abſolute Soveraignty of the ſame, which he had the Wiſdom or Cunning to refuſe.

His Marriage with the Heireſs of *Foix*, and of *Candale* had acquir'd him all the Lands of that ancient Family, and the moſt illuſtrious Alliances. Under the two following Reigns, among many contradictions, he had ſtill kept his Rank, and defended his Fortune, being conſidered and fear'd rather than lov'd by all thoſe who did govern, by the power he had to plague them within the Kingdom. It was perhaps for that Reaſon *Henry* the *4th.* ſeemed diſſatisfied with his behaviour at firſt, but being reconcil'd to him afterwards, in the year 1610.

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in the great War he was meditating, when Death prevented him, he deſign'd him the honor of the Command of his Vanguard, until he had joyn'd the Prince of *Orange*, and then ſent him back to *Mary de Medicis*, to be her Miniſter. However reflecting on his former Favour and Elevation, he could neither forget what he was, nor what he had been, nor agree with any Favourite, or Miniſter; leſs with *Richelieu* than with another, becauſe he had a greater eſteem for him than for any other, and did look upon him as the fitteſt Man to humble all thoſe who had rais'd themſelves.

The Cardinal on his ſide tho a far better Politician, finding himſelf at the helm of Affairs, could brook no reſiſtance, tho' never ſo Inconſiderable, without being wounded to the very heart by it; nor ſuffer any grandeur unleſs ſubſervient to his own. And indeed tho we ſhould allow him to be above all Weakneſs, or private Intereſt, which Humanity is never free from, his general Plan, and the honor of his Miniſtry, could hardly ſuit with the Power and Authority of a Man, who under *Henry* the *4th.* had ſuſtain'd an open War to maintain himſelf in the Government of *Provence*; who lately, in the Duke *de Luines* time, ſetting out of his Fortreſs of *Mets* in cold blood, with his uſual Equipage of 20 Mules, and near two hundred Horſe for his Guard, Gentlemen and other Perſons of his Retinue, croſs'd the whole Kingdom quietly, to reſcue the Queen Mother who was confined at *Blois*, to give her a refuge in his Governments, and to make himſelf Mediator between that Princeſs and the King her Son.

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The old Duke had three Children, *Henry* Duke of *Candale*, *Bernard* Duke *de la Valette*, the Perſon in queſtion here, and *Lewis* Arch-biſhop of *Toulouſe*, as Men often were in thoſe Times, in *Commendam*, without being ingag'd in ſacred Orders, and ſince Cardinal *de la Valette*. *Henry* bore the names of *Foix* and of *Candale*, according to the Fathers obligation, who had promis'd in Marrying the Heireſs of that Family, to leave all her Eſtate, Name and Arms to the Eldeſt Son of that Marriage: This Gentleman having a lively Wit, a free and agreeable Humour, was likewiſe out of favour with the Miniſter, by reaſon that not being uſed better than another, he ſometimes let fall ſome free Ingenious and ſharp Expreſſions which ſome retain'd with pleaſure, and never fail'd of being reveal'd; but in that he did not ſooth the Inclination of his Father, with whom he was no better pleas'd than with the Miniſter himſelf: he could not forgive him, notwithſtanding his having added to his ſhare abundance of Lands over and above thoſe of *Candale* to the Value of 50000 Crowns a year, beſides the place of Firſt Gentleman of the Chamber, the Governments of *Saintonge*, *Aunis*, *Angoumois* and *Limoſin*, for having given his younger Brother the Goverment of *Metz*, and of the three Biſhopricks, in great Eſteem at that time; but above all, the place of Colonel General of the *French* Infantry, which was look'd upon as a Military Royalty, becauſe it gave the Poſſeſſor of it a right to nominate to all inferior Places, without ſo much as excepting that of Colonel of the Guards; and that Vexation particularly with ſome other domeſtic troubles, made him acquire abundance of Glory, in ſeeking War, and the Com-

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mand of Armys in foreign Countrys. *Bernard* Duke *de la Valette* the ſecond Son, deſign'd all along to bear the Father's Name, was indeed the firſt object of his Affection, and of his Tenderneſs, which he anſwered with a great deal of Gratitude & Duty, keeping meaſures with the Miniſter, but without lowneſs, and in ſuch a manner that the Duke his Father could receive no prejudice by it. *Lewis* the laſt of the Brothers, either as being a better Courtier, or as a Cardinal, or out of Inclination or Eſteem, had contracted a Friendſhip with Cardinal *de Richelieu*. But the Father not approving his behaviour, often ſaid; It is no longer the Cardinal *de la Valette*, it is the Cardinal *Valet*. The only reward he had for his Aſſiduity and for his Cares, was ſometimes to command Armys, which he had earneſtly deſir'd contrary to the ſentiments of the old Duke his Father, who had all along Endeavour'd in vain to diſſuade him from it. Perhaps it is a thing ſufficiently remarkable (to obſerve it by the by) that Cardinal *de Richelieu* has not mention'd him once in all this Book, notwithſtanding he did him the greateſt and moſt ſignal Service that ever he received from any other. For it is very well known, that in the Famous day of the * *Duppes*, when the Queen Mother having prevail'd with the King to diſmiſs him, thought on nothing in her Palace of *Luxemburg* but how to diſpoſe of the greateſt Places of the State; the Cardinal being ready to be gone, ſeeing nothing but ſolitude and diſgrace about him, the only Cardinal *de la Valette* ſtood up to Incourage him, and offering to accompany him to *Verſailles*, made him reſolve once more to ſee the King and to ſpeak to him, as he did, which on a

* Cullys.

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ſudden produc'd that great alteration of Affairs; the Cardinal being allow'd to continue the Functions of his Miniſtry, The Lord keeper *Marillac*, who was come to ſucceed him, Impriſon'd, and all the reſt which is known without my repeating it. Which ſhows how neceſſary the advice of a firm and faithful Friend is ſometimes even to the greateſt Souls, in that uncertain and floating Condition, to which great Paſſions reduce us. But let us return to our principal and real Subject.

Thoſe general diſpoſitions did not promiſe a great union between the old Duke, and the Cardinal Miniſter. Add now to this a vaſt number of things which did divide them abſolutely, ſome of great Conſequence, others which would ſeem to be Inconſiderable, if we did not know what effect they generally produce in Mens minds. In 1624. *Richelieu* already made Cardinal, was made firſt Miniſter againſt the King's Inclination, by the earneſt deſires and importunitys of the Queen Mother. The Duke who was abſent from the Court at that Time, and who thought himſelf very much in favour with that Princeſs, as he had deſerv'd it by his ſervices, was both ſurpris'd and vex'd thereat, becauſe ſhe had not given him the leaſt hint of it. However he comply'd ſo far with decency and cuſtom, as to make Complements by a Letter to the new Miniſter, but leſs capable to oblige than to diſpleaſe him. For he kept with him, as with all other Cardinals, to the end of his Life, the ſingular method he had taken, to write to them without leaving the whole Line, and to conclude by, *Votre bien humble Serviteur*. The Cardinal being nettled, made no anſwer at all; but on

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the first occasion, which offer'd it self soon after, to send the King's orders to him, he writ to him without hardly leaving any blank space in the Line, and by *your most Affectionate Servant*, which the Duke was very much offended at. Those who knew how things pass'd in those Days, look'd upon that beginning either as the Source, or Omen of all that happened since. Soon after this, the Duke, then Governor of *Guienne*, by his haughtiness, imbroil'd himself with the Parliament of *Bourdeaux*, under the first president *de Gourgues*, a Man of great sence and Vigor, who easily perswaded the angry Cardinal, to take their part. The same Affairs return'd often, and others of worse consequence with *Henry de Sourdis* Arch-Bishop of *Bourdeaux*, one of the Cardinal's Creatures, whose part he ever took as he was oblig'd to do.

In 1627. Fortune presented them with a fine Phantasm and great hopes, as a notable Subject of discord. It was the wreck of two Large *Portugueze* Carricks returning from *Goa*: Their lading of Gold, Silver, Diamonds Ambergres, and other precious Commoditys, being valu'd at 15 Millions of Livers; the one was lost on the Coast of *Medoc*. The Right of the Wreck did belong to the Duke, as it was adjudg'd since, by Authentic Titles of the ancient Lords of *Candale*, who had maintain'd that Right in Law even against their Kings. The Cardinal did pretend to the same Right; as well as *Chofet* superintendant general of the Navy, and Commerce of *France*, which in effect was the Office of Admiral disguis'd for him under that new Title. The old Duke formerly Admiral himself, remembred then with great regret, that he had given that great

great and fine Place, with the Government of *Provence* to *John de la Valette* his elder Brother, to make him ſhare his Fortune, who dyed ſoon after it.

The Sea almoſt alone profited of thoſe immenſe Riches, of which the Duke after often having prov'd his Right did not get above ten or twelve thouſand Crowns. But the Proceſs which he had maintain'd with Vigor befor the King's Commiſſioners, choſen by the Cardinal himſelf, left new Impreſſions of Spite, and Animoſity in the mind of that Miniſter. In 1629 the time of the Cardinal's Triumph, as I may ſay, when after the taking of *Rochel*, the expedition of *Italy* the *Pas of Suſa's* being forc'd, the ſuccors of *Cazal*, the Conqueſt of the *Huguenot* Citys of *Languedoc*, he thought he had wholly ſuppreſs'd that Party by the reduction of *Montauban*; there was need of a new Negotiation, and of the Councel of the moſt faithful of the old Duke's Servants, to oblige him to come to *Bourdeaux* to pay a viſit to the Miniſter. But they all repented the giving of that advice. The ſaid interview ſpoil'd all, inſtead of contributing towards an accommodation: Not but the Cardinal, without deſcending from his Rank, which he was incapable of doing, paid the Duke a great deal of Reſpect, and careſſes, even ſo far as to proteſt to him that he would ſtand him inſtead of a fourth Son; but the Duke ſtill preſerved that Air of Grandeur with him which he could not lay aſide; and only receiv'd the Arch-biſhop of *Bourdeaux*, whom the Miniſter preſented to him after an apparent reconciliation, with a haughty Air, and not without ſome Coldneſs. In 1630 notwithſtanding the Cardinal

de la Valette his Son, had had ſo great a ſhare, as I have ſaid, in the day of the * *Duppes*, and that in his particular he had received ſome conſiderable diſguſt the preceeding day from the Queen Mother, he went to *Verſailles* to ſee the King upon this great alteration, and could never be perſuaded by his Friends to ſtep into the next Room, where all the Court repair'd in a throng to pay new homages to the reſtor'd Miniſter; he contented himſelf with ſeeing him two or three days after it, as if nothing extraordinary had happen'd to him. In 1631 the Cardinal ſeem'd to have a mind to reconcile himſelf to that Family; for he prevailed for the Duke *de la Valette*, who was only a Duke by Breef, to be receiv'd into the Parliament in that Quality the ſame day with him, which the Court looked upon as a great Careſs. But the following year 1632 gave him a new and very conſiderable cauſe of diſpleaſure from the old Duke. He caus'd him to be ſounded by the ſuperintendant *de Bullion*, to try whether he would yield his Government of *Mets* and of the three Biſhopricks to him in exchange, upon very advantageous Conditions; to which the Duke expreſs'd a great repugnancy. Thoſe whoſe Conjectures always go too far, or who reckon upon the eaſineſs of Human minds to paſs from deſire to deſire, and from one ambition to another, fancy'd that the Cardinal had a mind to make a great and laſting Settlement in that Country, to ſecure himſelf againſt all Revolutions for the future; to obtain next to that Government, the Biſhoprick of *Mets* and the great Abbys of the ſaid City, or adjacent Parts: In the next place, to get that from the

* Cullys.

King's

King's favour, which the Duke had refuſed from *Henry* the 3*d's*. To add to the three Biſhopricks, firſt in the King's Name, and next in his own, *Dun*, *Stenai*, *Jamets*, and ſome other Places of *Lorrain*, *Sedan* which might be got out of the Houſe of *Bouillon*, *Chateaurenaud*, *Charleville*, and mount *Olimpus*; and finally to compoſe a little Kingdom of *Auſtraſia* capable to maintain it ſelf againſt all the Neighbouring Powers, under a Soveraign of his capacity. If this was his deſign, which I would neither affirm nor reject, that Inſtance would diſcover as much as any thing the Character of his mind more us'd to give than to receive a Law. For it is certain that tho he paſſionately deſired the ſucceſs of *Buillon's* negotiation, he broke it firſt, becauſe the Duke, without explaining himſelf clearly, and without accepting, or refuſing, talk'd of adding to the propoſed exchange a Marſhal's Staf for the Duke of *Candale* his Son, a Man who indeed deſerved that honour, being famous throughout *Europe*, for his foreign expeditions, but to whom the Cardinal was unwilling to give ſuch a reward for the jeſts he had made on him.

Shall I ſay moreover, what others have written and publiſhed before me, which perhaps will ſeem frivolous. The ſaid Negotiation was ſet on foot in 1632 in the journey of *Toulouſe*, which ended by the Execution of the Duke *de Montmorency*. They pretend that on their return two things which in appearence ſeem'd to be inconſiderable, nevertheleſs ſenſibly mov'd the mind of that Miniſter. The firſt, as it is reported, is that he thought himſelf neglected by the old Duke who was too buſy in receiving the Queen *Ann* of *Auſtria* in his

Houſe of *Cadillac* upon the road to *Bourdeaux*. The Queen was coming back that way to ſee *Rochel*, and the Cardinal to ſee *Brouage*, where he had never been ſince he had made great expences there: The Coaches which the Duke had order'd to receive him at his coming out of the Boat, were taken up by the numerous Train of the Queen, and could not come back ſoon enough to prevent the Cardinal's arrival, who was not expected ſo ſoon. The Duke after having conducted the Queen to her appartment, brought them back to him himſelf, with a thouſand excuſes that his orders had not been well executed; but he could never perſuade him to uſe them, and the Cardinal choſe rather to walk the remainder of the way a foot, notwithſtanding he was fatigu'd, and incommoded with a diſtemper, which had like to have kill'd him ſome days after. They add in the ſecond place, that it prov'd a great deal worſe, yet at *Bourdeaux*, where his diſtemper which was nothing but a ſuppreſſion of Urine, oblig'd him to tarry after the Queen. The Duke, out of reſpect to that Princeſs, and to keep no mark of Command in her preſence had order'd his Guards to put of their Coats and Muskets: he ordered them to take them again, as ſoon as ever ſhe was gone, and went to viſit the Cardinal with his uſual pomp of Governor, and a large attendence of Gentlemen belonging to him, or of the *Province*, who did always accompany him. It is thought that the Arch-biſhop of *Bourdeaux*, and ſome others, who were the Duke's Enemys, and were with the Cardinal at that time, perſuaded him that it was not only done to brave him, but perhaps to quarrel him, in caſe of need,

and

and to attempt upon his Perſon, ſo that he excus'd himſelf from ſeeing him, as being too Ill; and almoſt thought he had ſcaped a Peril, when he found himſelf in a Condition to leave *Bourdeaux*; The Duke having accompanyed him at his departure with the ſame train, as it were to honour him. That which is certain, is, that the Duke was inform'd ſome time after it by the Cardinal *de la Valette* his Son, that ſome had endeavour'd at leaſt to give the Miniſter thoſe impreſſions. That he took it very Ill from the Arch-biſhop of *Bourdeaux*, and made War againſt him more than ever. Their quarels proceeded ſo far, that the Duke having employ'd ways of fact, as it were to maintain his Authority of Governor in the Metropolitan City, induc'd the Archbiſhop to excommunicate him. The Clergy of *France* being inſpir'd by the Cardinal, who put himſelf at their head, declar'd for the abus'd Prelate, and demanded reparation for the Injury. It was in that great Storm the Cardinal *de la Valette* his Son, and ſome of his Friends propos'd, as a laſt remedy of reunion, the Marriage of Mademoiſelle de *Pontchateau* with the Duke *de la Valette*: for *Gabrielle de Bourbon*, one of the moſt lovely Princeſſes of her time, beautiful and wiſe, very witty, and ſo mild, that ſhe was never known to be angry, dy'd ſix or ſeven years before, a forthnight after her being deliver'd of a Son, who dyed Duke of *Candale* in the year 1658. As ſoon as the Conditions of this new Marriage were reſolv'd upon and accepted, all the Affairs with the Archbiſhop of *Bourdeaux* and the Clergy of *France* ended much ſooner than they would have done. But if ever the old Duke ſhow'd his haughtineſs it was on this occaſion,

caſion; he gave his Son his conſent by word of mouth, but he refus'd to give it in writing, and to ſign the Contract, ſaying ſometimes that it was ſufficient, that he had ſign'd one; and ſometimes with more frankneſs, that it would not be handſom for him to ſign it without giving ſome thing, nor to give any thing to redeem himſelf, and to get out of a troubleſom Affair. Neither muſt we forget among the Subjects of alienation and averſion we are ſpeaking of, that the old Duke, who thought he had formerly oblig'd the Biſhop of *Lucon*, complain'd that he had found no manner of Acknowledgment in Cardinal *de Richelieu*; and that in the latter times, he could not digeſt his Proceedings againſt the Queen Mother; a Princeſs for whom the Duke had ever had a veneration full of Tenderneſs, and for whom he thought himſelf oblig'd to expoſe all. The Reader will perhaps conclude, that this relation was abſolutely neceſſary to make Poſterity believe the Secret I am going to reveal, not upon vain Conjectures, but upon certain Knowledg.

What is it a great Genius does not think poſſible? or himſelf capable of? The Cardinal being ſenſible by Experience, that the old Duke would never be perfectly reconcil'd to him, form'd a very extraordinary deſign to ruin him, in ingaging nevertheleſs the Duke *de la Valette* his Son in his Intereſts, in whom he had never found any Sentiments, but ſuch as were reaſonable. After that Marriage he ſhow'd a great deal of Affection for a time to that young Lord, who was look'd upon as his Son-in-Law, gave him a proſpect of the greateſt elevation and grandeur for the future, until judging the Fire ſufficiently kindl'd, after having exhorted him to confide in his

promiſe,

promiſes, which had never deceiv'd any Body, and to look upon him as a true Father, he proceeded to declare to him that in order thereunto, it was neceſſary, he ſhould have no other Father but him: In a word, that he ſhould not be aſtoniſh'd, at his being reſolv'd no longer to ſpare the Duke *d'Eſpernon*, and *to deſtroy*, thoſe were his very Words, *a Man whom he had never been able to tame.* The Duke *de la Valette*, being as much ſurpris'd, as can be imagin'd, endeavour'd in vain to diſſemble his thoughts; part of them appear'd in his Eyes, and upon his Face. The Obligations of Blood, Thoſe he had to the beſt Father in the World towards him, who had pref'er'd him in ſo many reſpects before his Elder Brother, a Man of great Merit, crowded all in a moment in his mind. He fancy'd he already ſaw that old Man, who was then fourſcore years of Age or more, whoſe Fortune had been reſpected till then by his greateſt Enemies, leading the remainder of his Life in obſcurity and ſolitude, languiſhing in ſome place of Exile; To ſee himſelf, as a worthy recompence of his baſe complyance, ſhamefully inveſted with thoſe Honours, which he was only to tarry for a few years, to poſſeſs them without reproach. Who knows, whether he did not add, that the moſt honeſt Ingagements are commonly the ſafeſt; and that all Duty laid aſide, no true Prudence could ever adviſe him to abandon the Fortune of his own Family, which was ſo well ſettl'd, to run after vain hopes, and to abandon himſelf to the new, and perhaps falſe Tenderneſs of that adoptive Father? Nevertheleſs doing himſelf a great Violence, he thank'd the Cardinal for his kindneſs, as Men always behave themſelves towards thoſe who govern: He expres'd

his being oblig'd to him for the confidence he repos'd in him: He assur'd him of a perfect gratitude on his side. As to his Father, without accusing or defending him, he added, that it was impossible to alter his mind for the little time he had to live: That his Behaviour was rough and daring, but that he had a great deal of Honour, that his Heart was upright and sincere, incapable of deceit and treachery: That taking his word once, one might rely upon it for ever; in a word that if the Cardinal would do him the honour to rely upon him, he would answer for the old Duke's fidelity as for his own. The Minister did very well apprehend what was not said to him, and was secretly concern'd to have said too much himself. The Conversation ended in general Complements on both sides, in which neither of them were deceiv'd. From that time forward a serious behaviour and cold Civility succeeded the Carresses and advances of the Cardinal towards the Duke *de la Valette*. And in relation to the old Duke, all the disgusts and mortifications that can be given to a proud Heart, who will not oblige his Enemy so far as to complain. He met perpetual Contradictions in his Province of *Guienne*, in which it was known that he was very Jealous of his Authority. Those who were known to be his Enemies, or suspected by him, were applauded and favour'd in all things; Fables were heard against him. The Exchequer was wholy shut up for several years together for his Salarys and Pensions, under pretence of public necessity, and of the *Finances* being exhausted: Excuses that are ever ready for those that are not belov'd. And when ever foreign War threatned or attack'd his Government

ment, no ſuccors beſides Words was ſent to him, as if they had been glad to expoſe him, to the prejudice of the State. In fine, neither he, nor his Son, could doubt but the firſt opportunity to ruine them, would earneſtly be imbraced: But the times were not proper for it. (1635.) *France* had declar'd War againſt *Spain*. (1636.) The Enemys were entring into *Guienne*, *Burgundy*, and *Picardy*. (1637.) The People being oppreſſed by new Edicts to make the Armys ſubſiſt, and being as yet but little us'd to Obedience after the Civil Wars, did riſe in divers Places, particularly in the old Duke's Government, ſometimes by ſeditions at *Bourdeaux*, ſometimes by whole Armys which kept the Field by the name of *Crocans*. He commonly ſtifled thoſe Commotions with his own Forces, and by his ſole Authority, being accuſed nevertheleſs to the Miniſter, but without any ground, of exciting them ſecretly himſelf, to make himſelf neceſſary. The Cardinal had not the injuſtice to believe it, but he reckon'd among the Croſſes of his Life, and of his Grandeur, to be oblig'd for a time, not only to keep meaſures with, but alſo to praiſe and to thank thoſe, to whom he neither did, nor deſign'd any good, but on the contrary, their Ruin. His Fortune was look-ed upon to be very much ſhook, when the Enemy ſeem'd to ſettle in the Kingdom, within ſight of the Capital City, and of the Throne it ſelf, by the taking of *Catelet*, of *La Capelle* and of *Corbie*. The ſucceſs of that War which he alone had counceled, and which he was proud of being the Author of, was either his ſafety or his Ruin: having moreover ſo many Envious Perſons, Enemys, and ſecret Intrigues to oppoſe, he left no means unattempted to

retake,

retake the Places of *Picardy*, with powerful Armys Commanded by the Duke of *Orleans* the King's brother, and by the Count *de Soiſſons*, a Prince of the Blood. The Duke *de la Valette* in an occaſion which was look'd upon, as a great Peril of the State, deſir'd leave to ſerve as a Volunteer in the Army of *Picardy*, which could not be deny'd him. But before his departure from *Paris*, he made, rather by his Misfortune than fault, being as it were, forc'd to it, a new, and very deep wound in the Miniſter's mind. The Baron *du Bec*, Governer of *La Capelle* was the Duke's Friend: whether he had ſurrender'd it too ſoon out of Weakneſs, or for want of all manner of Ammunitions as he pretended, which I have not dicover'd, the Cardinal thought it neceſſary to make an Example of him, either to keep the Governors of the Frontier Towns in Awe by that ſeverity, or to clear himſelf before the King and the Public, for the loſs of that Place, which through *Picardy* had given the Enemy an entrance into the Kingdom: For thoſe who are at the helm of Affairs, are never in the wrong, and the weakeſt is Commonly the moſt guilty. He would have that affair examin'd in a Solemn Coucil, the King being preſent, in which all the Officers of the Crown were to aſſiſt. The Duke excuſed himſelf three times from coming to it, to avoid the danger he foreſaw. But *Chavigny* was ſent to him the fourth, to acquaint him that he muſt either break of with the Cardinal, or not preſiſt in his refuſal. Therefore he went to the Council, but more faithful to Friendſhip, or to Reaſon, than to his own Intereſt, he ſpoke for the Accus'd contrary to the intention of the Miniſter, who not being commonly Maſter of himſelf

himſelf in the firſt heat of his Anger, as ſoon as the Council broke up, calling him a ſide, uſed hard and reflecting Language towards him, which a good heart can never bear, nor forget. His anſwer was not only firm and bold, but full of a heat, which made the Cardinal ſencible of his own, which he endeavour'd to aleviate, concluding with obliging words. In this condition the Duke *de la Valette* went for the Army, where it is true, that the Count *de Soiſſons*, and the Duke of *Orleans* cauſed him to be ſounded in ſecret, to ingage him to a revolt, and to afford them a retreat in *Guienne*: But it is equaly true, that he refuſed both, barely aſſuring the Princes on one hand of his Reſpect, and moreover of ſecrecy; and on the other, that the old Duke, without whom he could do nothing, would never hearken to any ſuch thing, what ever Cauſe he had to complain of the Cardinal, as well as himſelf. It has never been known from the Dukes own Mouth who made him that propoſition, he kept his word but too ſcrupulouſly, and never ſpake of it, even when he might have done it without danger. What the Cardinal ſayes here, *that this crime is averr'd by the Mouth of two Princes whoſe Teſtimony is undeniable on that occaſion*, is eaſily clear'd. One of them who out liv'd that Miniſter, has often own'd, that he had been ſurpriſed, and perſuaded that the Duke *de la Valette* had accuſed him, ſo that being irritated by his pretended Infidelity as well as by his Refuſal, he was glad to excuſe himſelf by laying the whole fault at his door. The ſequel of things naturally repreſented, in my opinion do's not allow the queſtioning of this Truth. The ſaid Negotiation,

whether rejected, or receiv'd, certainly was not profecuted, and was not known in a certain time after it. But when *Corbie* was retaken and *Picardy* peaceable, and the Cardinal's authority better ſettled than ever, even thoſe who thought him undone before, were earneſt to ſerve him, and to imbrace his Intereſt. At that time one of the Duke of *Orleans* falſe Servants, to whom that ſecret was confided, made haſte to reveal it to him. The two Princes who had notice given them thereof, remov'd forthwith from the Court, for fear of being ſecur'd. The Duke *de la Valette* who was gone for *Guienne* ſome days before, quietly proſecuted his journey. They ſent *Bourdeilles* and *Montreſor*, after him, to excite him, and the old Duke his Father, upon the account of their common danger, which both, they ſaid, would endeavour in vain to defend themſelves of, conſidering the opinion the Cardinal had of that buſineſs, and his deſire to ruin them. They both ſhut their Ears, and the old Duke after Complements full of reſpect for the Princes, gave them wiſe Councels to regain the King's favour: The Duke of *Orleans* hearken'd to them, and made his Peace. The Count *de Soiſſons* neglected them to his Misfortune, for he never returned to Court, and dyed afterwards, as it is known in Arms againſt his Prince and Country. The Cardinal having as good intelligence, as ever any Miniſter had, was not ignorant of the old Duke's wiſe behaviour on that Subject, which he never boaſted of himſelf: There ſtill is a Letter extant which that Miniſter order'd the *Chevalier Seguier*, his conſtant friend, to write to him, in which praiſing his prudence, which he aſſures him

the

the King is very well pleaſed with, he Endeavours to make him diſcover more of the matter, which the old Duke had the addreſs to excuſe himſelf from. And ſo far from accuſing him of any thing at that time, nor *La Valette* his Son, new orders were ſent to both to drive the *Spaniards* out of *Guienne*: For they had ſettled themſelves in the Port of *Secoa*, where they had two Forts, and five or ſix thouſand Men well Retrench'd. Thoſe orders to expreſs the more Confidence, gave the old Duke a power to raiſe ſuch Forces as he ſhould think fit, and to make what ever Impoſitions he thought neceſſary on the Province, to deliver it from the Enemy; which he looked upon as a ſnare that was laid for him, being warn'd by Ancient and new Examples, and even by that of Marſhal *de Marillac*. Moreover he was perſuaded that without Oppreſſing the People, whom he lov'd naturally, and whom it was his Intereſt to keep Meaſures with, he would be able to perform what he was ordered. And indeed the Duke *de la Vallette* having put himſelf at the Head of a ſmall number of Men he raiſed in haſte, beſieg'd, or block'd up, as it were, thoſe *Spaniards* retrenched, and much ſtronger than himſelf, but in want of all things, Notwithſtanding the Sea was open to them: He took advantageous Poſts; he made continual Courſes on all ſides, to hinder them from receiving any Subſiſtance out of the Country, and reduced them without fighting, to ſuch extremitys, that they abandoned both Retrenchments and Forts, and made no uſe of the Sea, but for their retreat. The Court which ſeldom applauds thoſe who are not in favour, was very glad of it, however without ſeeming over much

much ſatisfied; they could have wiſh'd the *Spaniards* had been cut to pieces, their Camp forc'd and pillag'd, their Forts taken by aſſault; and in a word that no Bridge of Gold had been made to the Enemy. It was on that occaſion the Cardinal bethought himſelf to attack *Spain* by *Fontarabie*. The Arch Biſhop of *Bourdeaux*, or ſome other had inſpired him with that thought, ſeveral years before: But the Duke *D' Eſpernon* and *La Valette* his Son, who were ſent to View the Place at that time, always found very great difficultys in it. The Son was ſent for, and repaired to Court, without knowing it was upon that Subject: After a much better reception, than he expected from the Miniſter he deſired him to give him an account of what had paſt at *Corbie* about the propoſition of the two Princes; but he had either ſo much Credit, or ſo much Addreſs as to prevent his being preſſed to the utmoſt, and they were or ſeem'd to be ſatisfied with him, without his ever ſaying any thing farther to the King, or Cardinal, but that a Man ſpoke to him near a Mile; that he had broken all his Meaſures by a ſpeedy refuſal: That he had not thought it neceſſary, in an Affair in which he ſaw no appearence of any ſucceſs, to turn Informer without proofs againſt two Princes of the Blood, whom he thought he had ſufficiently perſuaded to remain faithful by his Reaſons, and by his Example. After this Eclaireiſſement, the Siege of *Frontarabie* was propoſed to him. Nevertheleſs I will never believe what others have written *Bona fide*, that it was with a real deſign to engage him, and the old Duke his Father, in an Enterpriſe in which they muſt needs periſh. That is driving ſuſpition too

far;

far; and the Cardinal was not capable of ſuch a falſe Policy againſt the Intereſt of *France*, and his own; but it is very probable that the ſaid Miniſter who ever ſince the Siege of *Rochel*, and the expedition of *Italy*, thought every thing eaſy for him, made uſe of that occaſion to ſend a Prince of the Blood in *Guienne*, with conſiderable Forces both by Sea and Land, which he might Imploy, after that Victory, as he thought fit againſt the Duke *D' Eſpernon* himſelf, and againſt all his Family: it is moſt certain that the Command of the Army was only offer'd to the Duke *de la Valette* upon two Conditions; the one that the Prince of *Conde* ſhould be Generaliſſimo over him; the other that the Naval Army ſhould be Commanded by the Archbiſhop of *Bourdeaux*, who was, or ſeem'd to be reconcil'd to the old Duke, for ſome years paſs'd. The old Duke had refuſed more than once to Command Royal Armys under a Prince of the Blood; not ſaid he, but he had a very great and moſt profound reſpect for that Rank, but he was too old, added he, to learn towards the end of his Days, to receive orders from any but the King his Maſter. It was eaſy for the Duke *de la Valette* to foreſee the ill conſequences of a ſubaltern and divided Command; but the Cardinal his Brother, and another Perſon leſs Faithful, who ow'd his Elevation to their Familly, but yet was ſecretly a Creature of the Miniſter, perſuaded him, with great difficulty, that it was not fit always to oppoſe the Inclinations of a Man who had an abſolute power, as if they had deſign'd to break with him at a time when he ſeem'd to have a mind to be reconcil'd to all the Family; That what the Court had much ado to bear from the old

Duke,

Duke, would neither be excuſed, nor pardoned in his Son, in the ſame manner; Moreover that whereas he would Act more in the Army than any other, the Preſence of a Prince would nowiſe leſſen his Glory, if the Siege had a good ſucceſs; but would totally diſcharge him, if the event ſhould not prove favourable. Theſe reaſons induced him to ingage himſelf to the Miniſter, before he had time to conſult the old Duke his Father, who nowiſe approv'd them, but thought he ought not to find fault with what he had agreed to. If any body has written the Contrary, either they were not acquainted with the whole ſecret, or thought they might diſſemble part of it. The reſolution the Duke took himſelf, ſhow'd ſufficiently that he was not pleaſed. It was to ask leave to go to his houſe of *Pleſſac* in *Xaintonge* to take Milk, as he ſometimes uſed to do; but at that time, it was with a reſolution never to return to his Government, untill the Siege of *Fontarabie* were ended. However he tarryed till the Prince was come to *Bourdeaux*, to pay his Reſpects to him; and taking his leave of him, after having repreſented the difficultys of the Enterpriſe to him, which ought only to have excited him the more, by the glory of overcoming the ſame, he offered if it were neceſſary, to come back, upon his firſt Orders, at the head of a thouſand Gentlemen, to ſerve as a Volunteer under him. The ſequel has ſufficiently teſtifyed the prudence of that Reſolution; for that has been known ſince, which he was ignorant of at that time: Which is, that the Prince had brought ſecret Orders from the King, to Command him to do that which he did of his own accord. The Siege was begun with

great

great hopes. The Duke *de la Vallette* was praiſed for that he was the firſt who with Sword in hand at the head of his Forces, croſs'd the River of *Bidaſſoa*, which divides the two Kingdoms, through the Water up to the Waſte; he forced the Retrenchments the Enemy had made there to defend the Entrance into the Country. It is alſo known that his attack was very much advanc'd, and in a fair way to take the Place, when an Order in writing from the Prince of *Conde* oblig'd him to yield that Poſt to the Arch-biſhop of *Bourdeaux*; which indeed he had much ado to digeſt: and from that time forward, finding an open, and always ready, contradiction to what ever was propos'd by him: and being weary with giving good advices which were not follow'd, he reduc'd himſelf only to command in his new Quarter which he thought himſelf oblig'd to anſwer for; it is alſo moſt certainly true, that even before that Incident, there was no perfect intelligence between our Generals; and that the ſtrongeſt Armys commonly prove Ineffectual, when diſcord reigns among them. The Archbiſhop of *Bourdeaux* was far more mindful of the old differences he had had with the Duke and all his Family, than of a forc'd reconciliation. The Prince of *Conde* dreaded nothing more, than that all the honour of the ſucceſs ſhould be imputed to *La Vallette*. From the very beginning, he had not anſwer'd, either in relation to the Father, or to the Son, the Affection they both expected to find in him, and which they had had proofs of on other occaſions, he perhaps being inſtructed in this by the Court, and being deſirous to oblige the Miniſter. But after all, as far as ever I could

hear, the true, or principal Reaſon of the raiſing of that Siege with ſo little honour, reflected upon the Cardinal himſelf more than upon any other in his Quality of Admiral, without laying any ſtreſs upon his having joyn'd Commanders, whom he knew could never agree. The Naval Army which ſhould have appeared at the ſame time with the Land Forces, was not ready; and whether the Prince had orders to begin the Siege before hand, or that the ſaid precipitation proceeded from his own impatience, and the fear of loſing the fair ſeaſon; for it was in the Month of *July*, the *Spaniards* who were Maſters of the Sea took their time to ſuccour the Town twice, within ſight of him, and to put a Governor into it, who contributed conſiderably towards its Vigorous defence. The *Spaniſh* Army appear'd to relieve it by Land. The Duke *de la Vallette*'s advice, tho' often reiterated, to march againſt, and to Fight them, was not hearken'd unto; and the event juſtify'd on that occaſion, as in ſo many others, that commonly to be attack'd, is to be half Vanquiſht. All things paſs'd among ours with great ſurpriſe, Tumult and Diſorder, without any of the Quarters being inform'd what paſs'd in the other. The Prince of *Conde*'s was forc'd and taken. The *French* never made ſo little reſiſtance; which gave way to the Vain reports of the People, which they are ſtill poſſeſſed with in thoſe parts to this very day, as if the Prince had conſented to it himſelf, being bribed with *Spaniſh* Doubloons, which were ſent to him they ſay, in great quantity, in large Bottles, in the guiſe of Wine, for the Proviſion of his Table. The Duke *de la Vallette* had only notice

of

of the Rout, and Combat, by run-aways, and ſoon after it by the Prince himſelf, who retiring to *Bayonne*, left him to perform what could be done in that misfortune. The Duke approv'd what it would have been uſeleſs to Condemn, and moreover he exhorted the Prince to ſecure his Perſon. But as ſoon as his back was turn'd he could not forbear ſmiling; and that prov'd ſince, the main head of the accuſation againſt him. After which giving his Orders with great Tranquility and unconcernedneſs, he not only put all his Men in Battalia, but rallying the remainder of the others, and oppoſing the purſuit of the Enemys, he ſav'd the Major part of the *French* Army, and ſuch Guns and Equipages, as were not taken yet. The Victorious Souldiers in *Fontarabie* boaſted that they had plundered the Prince's Camp and that they had ſpar'd *La Vallette* who was their Friend: Another great Crime which was to be plac'd with the Bottles of Doubloons, and which nevertheleſs was afterwards laid to his Charge. It is impoſſible to expreſs the Miniſter's anger againſt the Duke *de la Vallette*, whether it were that he only hearken'd to the interreſted relations of the Prince of *Conde* and the Arch-biſhop, or that ſuch an occaſion kindled anew, all his Reſentment againſt the Duke *d' Eſpernon's* Family, or that he dreaded leſt the King and the Public, ſhould impute that misfortune to his Conduct, in caſe the Prince or the Arch-biſhop, or the delay of our Naval Army ſhould ſeem to be the chief cauſe of it. He declar'd [illegible] Attorney General againſt his Kinſman, than to leave his fault unpuniſh'd. The Dutcheſs *de la Vallette* had

the Generosity on ths occasion, as in many others, not to waver one moment between her Uncle Regnant, and her Husband out of favour, but the Cardinal, when she spoke to him upon that account, fell into such a passion, that those who were not to be acquainted with the secret, and who were order'd to withdraw on purpose, overheard it. The Dutchess *d' Eguillon*, who was the Duke's faithful Friend, after having used all her Credit, Art and Addresse with her Uncle, could obtain nothing but bitter Complaints, and open menaces, after which she xpress'd sufficiently that it would not be safe for the Duke to come, tho' on the one side he was passionately desirous to justify himself in Person; and on the other, he had been sent for, to give an account of his Conduct. It is very probable that the Minister designed not to spare him: At least what he said, and declar'd publicly, was not a great inducement to Invite him to Court. A Little Council was held, hereupon at *Paris* by the Duke's Order, of Persons he thought wholly devoted to his Interest, in which was called, among a few others, one of the most Zealous and most grateful Creatures of his Family. It was *Philip de Cospean*, then Bishop of *Nantes*, formerly Bishop of *Aire*, and since Bishop of *Lisieux*; for whom the old Duke during his favour, out of respect to his Merit, being delighted with his Sermons, had not only obtain'd the Bishoprick of *Aire*, without his knowledge, but caused the Bulls of the same to be expedited at his own Charge, and so sent them to him. This Gentleman who was a Man of Sence, and Wit, after having heard many arguments upon the circumstances of the Affair of

Fontarabie

Fontarabie ; upon the facility the Duke would have to deſtroy ſuch frivolous accuſations, and not only to juſtify his Innocence, but alſo his Services: All this, ſaid he is good, and I believe it; but who has told us, *that they will not ſpeak of the Man and the Mill.* This prov'd ſufficient to perſuade the little Aſſembly ; and that indeed was a thing to be dreaded in the hands of an incens'd Miniſter. For tho the Duke had clear'd himſelf before him and before the King about it ; and that inſtead of being puniſh'd, he was ſoon after honor'd, with a conſiderable Command, it was no abolition in forms; and the Laws of the State oblige all Subjects, and particularly all the Officers of the Crown, to reveal what ever they know againſt the King's Service, without examining whether they have oppoſed it in ſecret, whether they could not prevent it, whether they thought the advice would be uſeleſs, finaly without diſtinguiſhing Prince, Friend, Maſter or Benefactor. Wo to thoſe whoſe Fate, and that diverſity of Dutys put to ſuch a terrible Tryal. However the Duke, contrary to his own inclination follow'd the advice of his Friends, and retir'd into *England.* His proceſs was made. The Cardinal would needs have the information againſt him brought in before the King. The Preſident *de Bellievre*, ſince firſt Preſident, and ſome others had the Courage to ſay they ſaw no proofs. The greater Number follow'd the falſe and pernicious Maxim that one may always Condemn an abſent Perſon, becauſe his Life is in no danger, and that it is the bare reward of his Contumacy. As if it were ever allowable to betray Truth and juſtice becauſe they make no defence. The old Duke,

d' Eſpernon who till then had been an object of envy, began to become an object of Pity. (1639.) In ſix months time of the year 1639 he loſt the Duke *de Candale* his eldeſt Son, he ſaw the ſecond Condemn'd to Death, on whom he had fix'd his heart and all his hopes, beſides the Death of the Cardinal *de la Valette* his third Son, to whom it was thought Cardinal *de Richelieu*, as a recompence for his Services had promis'd not to diſturb the repoſe of his Father's old age. Orders follow'd immediately to Confine him firſt to his Houſe of *Plaſſac*, next to *Loches* where he ended his days ſome years after. His conſtancy was ſuch in that great Age, that after having perform'd in his laſt ſickneſs what ever could be deſir'd of him for his Conſcience, without Pride, or Weakneſs, for he ever had Religion and Faith, he let fall never a Word in relation to the Cardinal, but what was at once Chriſtian like and Noble. He ordered the Duke *de la Vallette*'s two Children to be recommended to the King, they having the honor to be related to him; they were the Children of his firſt Marriage, for he had none by the ſecond: And ſome ſuggeſting to him that he would do well to do them the ſame office with the Miniſter, whoſe power was ſo well known, he only anſwer'd mildly, I am his Servant, without being able to reſolve to requeſt any thing of him. He dyed on the 13. of *January* 1642, being 88 years of Age, repeating often, even in the middle of his Prayers, and in the very Arms of Death, the Name of his Son *de la Valette*, whom he look'd upon as his Martyr. The Cardinal *de Richelieu* did not out-live him long: He dyed on the 4th. of *December* of the ſame Year, being only

ly 58 years of Age, leaving to Courtiers one of those fine, but too subtile, Examples of what Fortune, Grandeur and Favour is, never certain, never contented, and which is worse, little present, and long past'd. The King who griev'd, in secret for having allow'd him so much Power, and who had reason to dread all things from him, if he had liv'd much longer, did not think himself so much depriv'd of a faithful Minister, as deliver'd of a proud, insupportable, Master. It then prov'd a kind of Merit at Court not to have been too much his Friend. But all things were soon alter'd there a second time by the King's own Death, on the 14th. of *May* 1643. The Duke *de la Valette* call'd Duke *d'Espernon* since his Father's Death, came back from *England*, and surrender'd himself in the Prison of the Palace of *Paris*, and was absolv'd by the unanimous Voice of the Parliament, with a general Applause of the Grandees, and of the People. No Man of any Note, that I know of, ever laid the ill Success at *Fontarabie* to his charge but the Cardinal; and as to the pretended Intelligence or Conspiracy with the two Princes, far from upbraiding himself with it, he plac'd it among his best Actions, since that tho ill us'd and oppress'd by the Cardinal, to the highest degree he had been able to resist the Temptation to right himself, and the Duke his Father, by a Civil War, the greatest and most dangerous of all those of that time, if both had hearkn'd to it.

As the Cardinal *de Berulle* dyed with the repute of sanctity, and that all those who have known him have testify'd the same, except Cardinal *Richelieu*; it is a very material point to inform the Public with the Motives that could induce the said

Cardinal *de Richelieu* to inſert theſe Words in the Tenth Page of his *Political Teſtament*. *Your Majeſty would thereby have freed the Nation of the* Griſons *for ever from the Tyranny of the Houſe of* Auſtria, *had not* Fargis *your Ambaſſador in* Spain *at the Sollicitation of Cardinal* de Berulle, *made (as he has confeſs'd it ſince) without the knowledge and contrary to your Majeſty's expreſs Orders, a very diſadvantageous Treaty, to which you adher'd at laſt to pleaſe the Pope, who pretended to be ſomewhat concern'd in that Affair*; and in the 14 Page, *the Cardinal* de Berulle, *and the Lord Keeper* Marrillac *adviſed your Majeſty to abandon that poor Prince*, (he ſpeaks of the Duke of *Mantua*) *to the injuſtice and Inſatiable avidity of that Nation, which is an Enemy to the Repoſe of* Chriſtendom (he means the *Spaniards*) *to hinder them from diſturbing it*; *the reſt of your Council proved of a different opinion, both becauſe* Spain *durſt not have formed ſuch a Reſolution, immediately after the making of a Treaty of Union among the* Engliſh; *and becauſe if they ſhould have followed ſo ill an advcie, they could not have been able to ſtop the progreſs of your Arms.*

A Little inſight into the principal Affairs tranſacted in the reign of *Lewis* the XIII. is ſufficient to know that the Cardinals *de Berulle* and *de Richelieu*, were both ingag'd in the Intereſt of the Queen Mother *Mary de Medicis*; and that they liv'd in perfect Intelligence until the year 1622, when the War of the *Pon de Cee* broke out. All the Queen Mother's Creatures did expect that Cardinal *de Richelieu* to whom that Princeſs had given Order & Power to conclude an accommodation with the King her Son's Miniſters, would mind their advantages as much as his own, and would not expoſe them to the Vengance of their

their Enemys, whom they had only irritated to remain Faithful to the Queen Mother: Nevertheleſs Cardinal *de Richelieu* only thought of obtaining a Place for himſelf in the Sacred College, and neglected all the reſt. For which reaſon Cardinal *de Berulle*, the Marſhal and Lord Keeper *Marillac*, Monſieur and Madam *du Fargis* and ſeveral others fell out with him. In the Second Place, the firſt conſiderable affair which occur'd in the Council of *France* in 1624 immediately after the Cardinal's being introduc'd there, upon the Marriage of Madam *Henrietta* of *France* youngeſt Siſter to the King with the Prince of *Wales*. The Cardinal *de Richelieu* pretended to attribute all the honor of it to himſelf, and negotiated with ſo much addreſs that he obtained from the Earls of *Holland* and *Carliſle*, Ambaſſadors from *England* more advantageous Conditions for the Catholic Religion, than thoſe which the King of *Great Britain* had granted to the *Spaniards* when he deſir'd their Infanta for the ſaid Prince of *Wales*. But the main difficulty was to prevail with the Court of *Rome* to approve the Conditions Cardinal *de Richelieu* had made with the *Engliſh* Ambaſſadors. The Court pitched upon Cardinal *de Berulle* in order thereunto. He went to *Rome*, and there began, continued, and concluded the famous Negotiation, which is found among the Manuſcripts of *Lomenie* in the King's Library. He obtain'd what ever he deſir'd of the Pope, and that was ſufficient to excite Cardinal *de Richelieu*'s jealouſy.

As to the Treaty which *du Fargis* made at *Moncon* in 1626 with the *Spaniard's* in relation to *Valtelina*, we muſt conſider that the ſaid *du Fargis* had been ſix years before Ambaſſador in *Spain*, and

that

that he was ſent thither by the Court of *France* before Cardinal *de Richelieu* entred into the Miniſtry, which was in 1624. The inſtructions which *du Fargis* had receiv'd in taking leave of the Court, from M. *de Puiſieux* Secretary of State, Son to the Chancellor *de Silliery*, oblig'd him to treat with the *Spaniards* on the ſame Conditions as he did ſince at *Moncon*, becauſe the Council of State was reſolved at that time not to break with *Spain*. But Cardinal *de Richelieu* cauſed that reſolution to be alter'd, and the collection of the Pieces for the Juſtification of that Cardinal which were given to the Public by M. *du Chatelet* maintains in ſeveral Places that the ſaid Cardinal ſent M. *du Fargis* orders directly contrary to thoſe he had receiv'd in *France*. But M. *du Fargis* perſiſted conſtantly in denying that ever he received them, and the thing remains undecided to this day. Therefore it is not true that he himſelf confeſſed that he had concluded the Treaty of *Moncon* at the ſollicitation of Cardinal *de Berulle*, without the King's knowledge, and contrary to his Majeſty's Expreſs Orders. For among ſo many Authors, who have attack'd and defended the Reputation of Cardinal *de Richelieu*, none ever bethought himſelf hitherto to write this point of Hiſtory; and there is no reaſon to believe the ſaid Cardinal upon his bare Word, ſince he was ſo public an Enemy to the Cardinal *de Berulle* that his Panegyriſts loſe no occaſion to blame him, and to puſh it as far as ever it can go.

Finally it is yet leſs true that the Cardinal *de Berulle* and the Lord Keeper *Marillac* adviſ'd the King to abandon the Duke of *Mantua* to the injuſtice and inſatiable Avidity of the *Spaniards*; but that which is cerain in relation thereunto, as the

the two Authors who are moſt devoted to Cardinal *de Richelieu*, who are thoſe that have written his Life, and the Hiſtory of his Miniſtry, do acknowledge, is ; that at the Death of *Vincent* Duke of *Mantua*, and when the Duke *de Nevers* ſucceeded him, it was put in agitation in the Council of *France*, not whether the Duke of *Nevers* ſhould be abſolutely ſeconded ; but whether they ſhould ſecond him ſo far as to run the hazard on his account to break the Peace of *Verwins* which King *Henry* the Great had concluded with *Spain*, and it was carry'd by the plurality of Voices, that the King ſhould not run the hazard of that riſque : Cardinal *de Berulle* who was then one of the Principal Councellors of State, was of that opinion, he perſiſted in it until Cardinal *de Richelieu*, cauſed the ſaid Affair to be examin'd anew in the Council, and made them reſolve to maintain the Duke *de Nevers* againſt the Emperor and againſt the King of *Spain*. There was but ſix Months ſpace between thoſe two deliberations, and they were both taken in the year 1627. If the Cardinal *de Berulle* during the Interval of the ſaid ſix Months pretended that it was not fit to exaſperate the *Spaniards*, In that he only conform'd to the determination of the Council of State of *France*. But I maintain that after the ſecond deliberation which was to protect the Duke of *Mantua* towards and againſt all, the Cardinal *de Berulle* never let fall any word to blame the War which *France* engaged into upon the account of the Duke *de Nevers* with the Emperor, and the King of *Spain*, and no Man can produce any Printed paper, or Manuſcript which ſays any ſuch thing.

THE END.

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